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Abstract 
The development of new major league sports facilities in the United States is increasingly 
tied to strategies for urban development within their host cities. Generally, these strategies seek 
to leverage the large audiences generated by sporting events to support new private investment in 
the immediate area, typically envisioned as a cluster of new housing, office, retail and 
“entertainment” land uses. Since many host cities participate financially in the provision of new 
facilities, these urban development benefits are an important part of the promise made to 
taxpayers as a return on their investment.  
This study examines the case of major league arenas, and asks whether they are successful 
in generating new development in their immediate vicinity. My methodology is empirical, 
comparing the magnitude and nature of development before and after the arenas were opened. I 
examine development patterns around 15 major league arenas opened between 1990 and 2004, 
tracking development patterns in a quarter-mile radius around each venue over a 25-year period 
from 1990 to 2015. I follow three measures of change: 1) changes in the volume of built area 
(square feet), where a successful urban development outcome would indicate an increase in new 
construction and renovation activity, 2) changes in the land use composition of the area (land-use 
mix), where a successful urban development outcome would indicate a shift toward residential, 
commercial and retail uses, and away from industrial uses and vacant parcels, 3) changes in 
assessed value, where a successful urban development outcome would indicate increases in 
xxvi 
market value (where assessments are based on market valuations) and increased property tax 
revenues. 
The significance of this empirical approach is twofold. First, there are few studies that 
provide a quantitative analysis of these built environment changes for any type of development 
anchor, sport or otherwise, because it is only recently that GIS and other land data technologies 
are making the kind of inquiry presented here possible. Second, the comprehensive and 
systematic record of development presented here across 15 cases is itself a significant 
contribution. While it may be argued that these metrics cannot fully explain success in a complex 
urban system, they do explicitly address three of the most commonly stated goals accompanying 
urban development strategies. 
My findings point to a mixed record of urban development changes around major league 
arenas. Eight of the 15 arena districts had successful urban development outcomes measured 
across all three metrics of success, whereas in the seven remaining cases there was a significant 
shortcoming on one or more metric, most typically on the land use metric where no significant 
shift in land use composition was evident. Importantly, the data show in almost all of the cases, 
there was a ten-year lag before any significant development arrived in the area, regardless of the 
distinct economic and political context. Thus host cities should be cautious in their estimation of 
the impact of arenas on development patterns in the immediate vicinity.   
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 CITIES, ARENAS, AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
Arenas used by major league teams in the United States and Canada are increasingly tied 
to specific strategies for urban development in their host cities; this is a phenomenon that 
different from what took place in the early 1990s and earlier. Generally, as undertaken by local 
governments, these strategies seek to leverage the large audiences generated by events to attract 
private investment in new residential and entertainment-oriented commercial land uses in the 
immediate area—forming what are now commonly referred to as sports districts. Since sport and 
entertainment activities are particularly appealing to young, affluent, and well-educated persons, 
proponents of these developments have found willing allies among urban development advocates 
hoping to woo these coveted demographics to live, work, and play in their cities.  
Working together, these allies—teams, leagues, and host city officials—are finding 
common ground in a phenomenon labelled herein as “arena-led” development. I define this term 
to mean a strategy that targets the introduction of major league arena as a central ingredient of a 
strategy to create a new sport and entertainment district within the host city. Generally, but not 
always, the defining feature of these arena-led urban development strategies is a pledge of public 
subsidies for the development of the arena (including land acquisition and infrastructure 
2 
provision, as well as construction costs) in the hope of attracting new private investment in the 
immediate area. The new private investment is expected to foster redevelopment in the area, 
which can be measured in three primary ways:   
 
1) increased private investment in the form of new construction and/or renovations,  
2) changes in the land use mix that favor transition to higher property tax generation, 
typically a mix of residential and entertainment-oriented commercial uses, and 
3)  increased property assessments and other geographically-targeted tax revenues 
dependent on tax revenue streams.  
 
While these physical benefits sit within a much broader set of benefits from 
redevelopment activities, my focus is on the physical aspects of redevelopment. The definition of 
“arena-led” development is specifically tied to a set of physical urban development outcomes: an 
increase in the volume of built area, desired changes in the land-use mix, and an increase in 
property values. 
 
1.1.1 THE COST OF ARENA-LED STRATEGIES: PUBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR MAJOR LEAGUE ARENAS 
 Urban development strategies anchored by major league arenas are an increasingly 
important and controversial issue because of the magnitude of public investments involved. As 
of 2016, there were 60 major league teams playing in 50 arenas, located in 49 host cities across 
the US and Canada (Table 1).1 In 2010, the average cost of a major league arena was 
                                                 
1 There are two arenas in New York City: Madison Square Garden and Barclays Center.  
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approximately $260 million, with an average public investment of 70% or $182 million. Based 
on this figure, a quick estimate of the total cost of all arenas in-use in 2010 was approximately 
$16 billion dollars, with just under $11 billion supported by the public sector (Long, 2012). In 
2018, the average cost of a major league arena in US was $430 million, with an average public 
investment of 56%, or $207 million. Given that facility costs have increased over the past 
decade, it is reasonable to anticipate that the amount of public funding in the current set of 50 
arenas would be greater than $11 billion. This is a significant public outlay, especially 
considering the fact that these major league arenas are largely operated to benefit private 
corporations that are extensions of the constituent teams. 
 Despite the high cost, almost every NBA and NHL host city has built a new arena since 
1990, and in several cities, the venues were privately financed. Of the 50 currently in-use for 
major league play, 46 were built after 1990, representing a replacement rate of 92%—a much 
higher replacement rate than football stadiums and ballparks over the same period (Long, 
forthcoming).2  Most of these host cities are large cities: 46 are among the 50 largest metro areas 
in the United States and Canada. Many are part of a formalized district planning initiative (such 
as the Edmonton Ice District and just recently Detroit’s Little Caesars Arena), or are part of a 
planning initiative that is underway, but not yet approved (e.g. the New York Islanders’ return to 
Nassau County, Long Island and the Belmont Park “arena village”). Taken together, these data 
make clear that the development and subsidy of arenas is an important and expensive issue 
facing cities that host major league teams. 
                                                 
2 The exceptions are Madison Square Garden, built in 1968 and subsequently renovated; the Palace at Auburn Hills 
built in 1988 and the subject of frequent rumors that the Pistons will move to the new arena in downtown Detroit; 
the Bradley Center in Milwaukee built in 1988 and also the subject of imminent replacement rumors; and Oracle 
Arena in Oakland built in 1966 and soon to be replaced in 2019 by a new arena in San Francisco. 
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Table 1. Major league sports facilities currently in-use in US and Canada. 
* The “total” column is adjusted for the double-counting of joint-use facilities as appropriate. 
Sources: Long (2012) and author’s database 
 
1.1.2 THE BENEFITS OF ARENA-LED DEVELOPMENT: FOCUS ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
Much of the controversy surrounding arena-led development strategies is focused on the 
benefits received by the public sector relative to its investment. The members of what has been 
described as growth coalition regimes advocate for public investment. There are other groups, 
however, who argue the cost to the public sector exceeds the tangible benefits.  
While a simplification, those advocating for an investment by the public sector argue that 
venues are unique and are able to generate a critical mass of economic activity in a specific 
location.  Attracting large groups of people in one location for a sporting event can be utilized, or 
“leveraged” to serve as a market for other ancillary land uses, typically restaurants, nightclubs, 
retail, and hotels and large residential developments. As these ancillary uses converge to take 
advantage of this market, a cluster is created that can, in turn, provide entertainment and lifestyle 
amenities even when the sports facility is closed and revenue streams for the local government. 
The cycle continues as affluent, well-educated young people and empty nesters may find living 
 
MLB NFL NBA NHL Total* 
Teams in league 30 32 30 30 122 
Facilities used  30 31 29 30 90* 
Joint-use 2 4 10 10 16 
Privately-owned 4 6 13 12 16 
Publicly-Owned 27 25 17 19 74 
Part of a Plan 10 5 10 9 34 
Plan-in-Process 3 3 1 4 11 
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in the local area appealing, and businesses looking to attract workers who fit the same profile 
may also choose to locate in that location. 
Theoretically, this new economic activity, through both the construction and operating 
phases, should create new jobs, and spur multiple rounds of spending and capture of new tax 
revenues across the full spectrum of property, sales, excise, and income sources in a 
phenomenon known as the multiplier effect. Measurements of the extent of these new public 
revenues vary widely, since even the smallest changes in the multiplier itself can result in 
significant changes in the estimate of overall revenues. Moreover, there is a significant incentive 
for subsidy advocates to overestimate the amount of benefits as part of a public relations 
campaign to smooth passage of the public subsidy, particularly if a voter referendum is required 
as part of the approval process. Any witness to a major league subsidy debate can testify to the 
small industry of consultants willing to produce and endorse wildly spurious estimates of 
economic impacts—a phenomenon that extends beyond the case of major league sports to 
include many other large-scale public assembly activities from Coachella to the Hajj. The 
essential point to be made in any of these subsidy advocate studies is that the cost of the public 
subsidy will be paid back, often many times over, by the public benefits to be received over the 
life of the facility. 
For their part, opponents of public investments in major league sports facilities have 
taken great measures to dismantle the promises made by advocates, dismissing the 
methodologies and arguing that the estimates produced by consultants are grossly overstated 
(Baade & Dye, 1996; Baade, 1996; Rosentraub & Swindell, 1991; Rosentraub, Swindell, et. al, 
1994; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, 1997; Coates & Humphreys, 1999, Noll & Quirk, 
1974). Among the errors noted in the consultant reports, these studies point to methodological 
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errors such as the substitution effect—where spending at the sport facility is treated as new to the 
economy, rather than simply existing disposable income that is allocated away from another 
consumption activity in the same location, such as a restaurant or theatre. Since most advocate 
studies ignore the substitution effect, they overstate the resulting impacts. Opponents also take 
issue with the multipliers chosen to estimate indirect spending effects, as well as the opportunity 
costs associated with reduced public capability for investment in traditional areas such as 
hospitals, schools, and infrastructure.   
Despite the plethora of academic studies taking aim at subsidies for major league sport 
facilities, it appears that subsidy advocates are winning the debate. Despite years of research 
from high profile sports economists, public funding for major leagues has continued, and new 
facilities continue to be built, and subsidy levels are increasing (Zimbalist and Long, 2006).  
In response, other disciplines have sought to ask how their theories can contribute to our 
understanding of why cities continue to subsidize sport facilities despite overwhelming economic 
evidence that the costs vastly outweigh the benefits. Academics working in public policy and 
political science have taken aim at this gap between academic economists and the reality of 
continued investment from host cities, pointing to growth machine politics and special interest to 
explain outcomes (Rosentraub, 2007; Chapin, 2000; Rich, 2000; Euchner, 1993; Klobuchar, 
1983). Others point to intangible factors to explain this gap, including benefits from being 
perceived as a “major league” city, the “civic pride” associated with winning teams and new 
facilities, and even the benefits of increased social cohesion among sports fans (Kanter, 1995; 
Noll and Zimbalist, 2007; Long 2012). These studies tend to be few in number, and tend to focus 
on single case studies, leaving many questions about broader trends unaddressed.   
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1.1.3 OTHER BENEFITS FROM ARENA-LED DEVELOPMENT: IMPACTS ON THE LOCAL AREA  
Of particular importance to my research are the efforts of urban planning and urban 
policy scholars to unpack the specific set of urban development outcomes that play an increasing 
role in the promise and packaging of sport facility developments. While these studies are 
generally few in number, and are case studies in the methodological approach, there are many 
elements that when taken together, provide insights into my approach to this study. Rosentraub 
(2014, 2007) and Chapin (2005, 2000) offer case studies of several high profile single facilities 
and districts including: Arlington, Baltimore, Cleveland, Denver, Glendale, Indianapolis, 
Reading, San Diego and St. Louis. Euchner (1993) offers case studies of Baltimore Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and Klobuchar  (1983) (now Senator Klobuchar, MN(D)) offers an in-depth study of 
the HH Humphrey Metrodome.  
While these studies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), it bears 
to mention here that these studies combine traditional economic benefits (e.g. tax revenues, 
employment gains, income gains, etc.) in a more specific and small-scale geography, as well as 
physical urban development benefits (e.g. number of new or renovated buildings, reduction in 
the vacancy rate, creation of new businesses, number of new housing units, etc.), and public 
policy nuances (e.g. level of government, role of quasi-public agencies, and voter referendum 
requirements, etc.).  The methodological approach and factors consider tend to vary by author, 
and their disciplinary backgrounds.  
 
1.1.4 A GAP IN THE LITERATURE: THE PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS OF ARENA-LED DEVELOPMENTS 
Among these threads in the urban planning and policy discourses, my specific interest 
lies in the physical dimensions of redevelopment that occur in the wake of a new arena. In this 
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sense, the work of Rosentraub and Chapin, and their measures of what constitutes success, are 
most closely aligned to what is presented in this work. Building on their work, I argue that urban 
development outcomes play an important role in host city decisions to subsidize sport facilities. 
In particular, as stadiums, ballparks, and arenas are rolled into plans to create larger districts that 
draw from their activity, it is a strong signal that host cities are keen to leverage these facilities to 
activate or “lead” other aspects of the plan.  
Certainly the early phasing of a facility project relative to the remaining (later) 
components of the plan is a key indication of the direction or sequence expected relationship, 
that x precedes y, thus the plan is “sports-led”.  Of course, this relationship is theoretical, as 
others will point to this timing as evidence of a different phenomenon, where the plan serves as a 
Trojan horse for the construction of the facility, and once built there is little political 
accountability around the implementation of the remainder of the plan. 
The gap in the literature that I have identified, and that guides the research in this 
dissertation, is the physical changes that occur around a new facility as a specific set of 
indicators of success, and thus to consider whether or not the presence of the sport facility leads 
to the desired changes in the area immediately around it. These changes are often operationalized 
by physical metrics such as x units of new housing, y new residents, z new businesses, a square 
feet of new construction, and b dollars of new investment.  
My research proposition is physical changes near the facility are an important factor in 
determining the success of the public sector’s investment and that it is possible to measure the 
physical changes that occur in the vicinity of a new arena. It is possible to measure the number of 
new buildings, the changes in the land-use patterns, and the change in assessed value of 
property—as these are commonly expressed as goals of subsidizing either the facility alone, or 
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an entire sport district. It is also possible to use these measures to gauge success in meeting the 
objectives of a facility development (particularly if established a priori) over a given time 
horizon such as 20 to 30 years. Additionally, it is possible to use these physical metrics to 
compare outcomes across multiple host cities, to learn more about how and when these physical 
changes arrive. Given that arena-led development is a significant issue in major league host 
cities, and that there is very little research that guides the actions and expectations of host cities 
in this regard, my research on physical outcomes aims to be an important contribution to our 
understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the success of arena-led developments, where 
success is specifically measured by the extent of physical changes in the adjacent area. Many 
arena developments, whether stand-alone projects or part of a formal district plan, promise new 
private investment on adjacent properties through the payback or return on investment of upfront 
public subsidies in the arena, and/or in the land and infrastructure that support it. Moreover, 
arena projects often promise a particular kind of physical “success”, with new buildings and 
renovations, new uses—particularly those that appeal to the coveted young professional 
demographic, and new tax revenues that flow from the increased value of these properties once 
redeveloped.  
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1.2.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To fulfill this research purpose, I have developed two sets of research questions. The first 
set addresses how success may be investigated through an empirical assessment of physical 
changes, and the second set seeks to explain why some host cities experience more “success” in 
fostering physical changes than others. 
1.2.1.1 Set One: Empirical 
1) Are arena-led urban development strategies successful in fostering physical changes 
in the immediate area? 
2) What specific factors define “success” in fostering physical changes around an arena-
led development?  
3) What measures should be used to operationalize these physical success factors? What 
are the sources of data for these measures? 
1.2.1.2 Set Two: Explanatory 
4) What factors explain why some arena-led districts are more successful than others in 
fostering physical changes in the immediate area?  
5) Specifically, how do planning and policy factors affect physical outcomes?  
6) How do GIS-based data and analytic techniques advance our understanding of these 
factors, and their assessment? 
 
1.2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 (Literature Review) and Chapter 3 
(Research Design), I have chosen three metrics to measure these promised changes: 1) changes 
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in the volume of built area, 2) changes in the land use mix, and 3) changes in assessed value. 
These changes will be measured across a “zone of influence” measuring a quarter-mile radius 
around the new arena, a measure borrowed from transportation planning, specifically the zone of 
influence used to evaluate public investments in transit-oriented development. Using GIS and 
other digital spatial data sources, I plan to measure these physical impacts across 15 arenas built 
in US cities between 1992 and 2005. This research will be the first of its kind, as a systematic 
examination of physical changes around arenas across a large number of host cities. 
 
1.2.3 INTER-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
As noted, my research was guided by work from the perspective of sport management (or 
sports business) and urban planning. These two disciplines are highly germane to the question of 
private and public aspects of large sports facility developments, as a result, reflects the 
interdisciplinary path I have followed in my graduate studies.  
My use of these two disciplines to explain urban development outcomes in sports-led 
development (with insights into why some districts are more successful than others), is based in 
the understanding that the success of these developments varies. There are both synergies and 
tensions related to the two perspectives. For example, the goal of cities is to deflect a level of 
regional economic activity to its taxing boundaries. A team seeks to maximize profits. The 
misalignment of these goals may compromise the success of arena-led plans.  
Successful arena-led strategies blend the interests of both team and a city in the context 
of their given market. This is not to suggest that all benefits and costs are spread equally across 
the two sets of interests. Rather it is intended to suggest that the most successful districts present 
benefits to both team and host cities. By understanding the profit maximizing behavior of teams, 
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in tandem with the urban development goals of cities, it is possible to increase the success of 
arena-led plans, and by extension, all classes of sports-led plans. 
 
1.2.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. This introductory chapter serves to 
provide an overview of the study, including the significance of the issue and its context in 
contemporary sport management and urban planning debates.  
Chapter 2, “Literature Review” looks in detail at the existing scholarship that is relevant 
to this study, starting with guiding theory and ending with specific studies on sport-led 
development. In particular, I focus on the gap in the literature that exists in our understanding of 
the spatial effects of venues. I conclude with a discussion of how insights from this literature 
bear on the design and execution of this study.  
Chapter 3, “Research Design” introduces and describes the approach to this study. I begin 
by describing my empirical approach and the rationale for this research design. I continue by 
describing the population of major league arenas, and how the sample of 15 facilities built 
between 1994 and 2004 was drawn from this grouping. I describe in detail the three metrics that I 
use to measure physical change before the facility was built, and for at least 10 years after it 
opened: 1) new construction and renovations, 2) changes in land use mix, and 3) changes in 
assessed value. I explain the data sources for these metrics, and the method of data collection for 
the period from 1990 to 2015. I describe how these metrics will be summarized and evaluated 
when comparing outcomes across host cities. I conclude with a discussion of the limitations of 
this approach. 
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Chapter Four, “Case Summaries: Snapshots of Physical Changes by Host City” frames a 
city’s early development trajectory and urban planning agenda and offers both a current and 
comprehensive overview of the urban composition in a quarter-mile of these professional sports 
facilities. The urban development trajectory of each city’s arena-district micro-area and the 
different plans that encompassed that particular geographic area are discussed at length. In this 
chapter, it is concluded that each city’s development trajectory is different, and dependent on 
political, economic and social forces influenced by the city’s history. Each summary briefly 
outlines the nuances of arena construction negotiations, the city’s comprehensive plans; the 
integration of professional sport venues in a city’s planning agenda, other notable major 
development projects built after the opening of the sport venues, and overall development 
findings that impact the arena-development success measures. Case summaries include 
descriptive statistics (total assessed value, land value, building value, improved value, tax rate, 
land composition, and acreage) for professional sports facilities, built between 1990 and 2015.  
 Chapter Five: “Concluding Remarks” provides a recap of the data collection process, the 
findings from the case summaries, and lessons learned from the overall analysis of the three 
interrelated metrics and their relation to arena-led development strategies and the urban 
development outcomes in arena-district micro-areas. 
 Appendix A provides tables and figures for the land-use composition, built volume, 
assessed value, and property taxes for the remaining seven of the fifteen cities. 
 Appendix B presents a sampling of land-use maps in 1990 and 2015 to demonstrate 
visually the changes in property-use before and after a facility opened within the arena-district 
micro-areas. Sample maps are included for Nashville, Cleveland, Dallas, Memphis, Miami, 
Oklahoma City, Denver, and Glendale (AZ). 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter situates sport-led development within the urban and economic development 
literature, and summarizes the existing literature on urban development outcomes around sport 
facilities, highlighting theoretical, empirical, and methodological insights from these studies. I 
also identify the gap in the literature as pertains to the spatial effects of arena-led urban 
development strategies; I position my study as a response to this gap.  
As introduced in the preceding chapter, my research aims to investigate the success of 
arena-led developments, where success is specifically measured by the extent of physical 
changes in the adjacent area. The benefit to an investor city lies in the extent to which regional 
economic activity is deflected to the area over which it collects taxes. As a result, to fulfill this 
research purpose, my overarching research questions asks: Are arena-led urban development 
strategies successful in fostering physical changes in the immediate area? 
My secondary research questions ask: What specific factors define “success” in fostering 
physical changes around an arena-led development? What measures should be used to 
operationalize these physical success factors? Moving to explaining variations in success across 
15 
host cities, I also ask: What factors explain why some arena-led districts are more successful than 
others in fostering physical changes in the immediate area?  
In preparing to respond to these questions, this literature review is organized into three 
parts. First, I situate my research in the broader context of public investments in sport facilities, 
explaining how urban development outcomes are but one of a set of rationales that explain these 
choices made by government entities. Second, I highlight the role of urban development in these 
sport-led developments, specifically the desire to use sport facilities to attract new private 
investment in the form of new development, renovations, and attracting a land-use mix that 
includes residential alongside entertainment-oriented commercial and retail uses. Third, I 
introduce the theoretical frameworks that guide my inquiry, divided into theories used in sport 
management (traditionally drawn from economics including profit maximization and rent-
seeking) and urban planning theories that explain the actions of local governments (public choice 
theory and regime theory).  
 
2.2 PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN SPORT FACILITIES3 
As noted,—as well as counties and states—that host major league sports teams, the 
rationale for a public investment in a venue is to attract or retail a level of regional economic 
activity. The measurement of economic benefits traditionally focuses on the creation of new jobs 
and tax revenues, and is the subject of the majority of existing research investigating public 
subsidies for major league sports facilities.  Urban development projects target benefits in the 
form of increased private investment in targeted geographic areas, increased private investment 
                                                 
3 The discussion in this section 2.2 is abridged from Long 2002; 2006; 2012, with permission 
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as measured by new construction and renovation, as well as desired changes in land use patterns 
and composition.  Compared to the number of economic cost/benefit studies, there is 
comparatively little measurement of these impacts, since too many scholars have focused on 
regional effects without a focus on spatial impacts.  
 
2.2.1 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
    Starting with economic benefits, there was an initial focus on regional impacts.  Those 
were typically measured by looking at the number of jobs created, changes in a region’s GDP, or 
the total revenues collected by the governments in the region. Many of first wave of studies  
focused on these changes relative to the scale of the public sector’s investment.  In summary, 
given the size of a team or the level of consumption of entertainment events it was unlikely that 
there would be any noticeable regional changes.  
Job creation is measured in terms of temporary and permanent jobs, the number of 
temporary jobs created—by the construction of the facility, including the feasibility, design, and 
finance and approval processes—outnumber permanent jobs.  Permanent jobs are those created 
by the ongoing operation of the facility, including high profile groups such as the athletes and 
front-office staff, as well as those working behind the scenes within the venue. Job creation is 
usually measured at the regional level as workers can easily commute to employment centers.  
The important issue is whether or not the jobs are new to the regional economy. If the city in 
which the venue is located collected an earnings tax then whether or not these are new or quality 
jobs, new revenues could be secured by the host city.  
 Tax revenues created by major league sports facilities produce direct and indirect taxes. 
Wages from jobs created by the construction and operation of the sports facility induce further 
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streams of tax revenues, primarily in the form of sales taxes paid by workers, the income earned 
by created jobs from additional spending in subsequent rounds on goods and services. Property 
taxes, for their part, are an important target of tax creation, but are rarely collected directly from 
the facilities themselves; the vast majority of facilities are exempted from paying property taxes.    
Evaluating tax revenues also requires careful thinking about measures and interpretation.  
Similar to the issues associated with job creation, there are first nuances associated with the 
boundaries of tax origination and collection among the host municipality, the metropolitan 
region, the county, or the state.  In the case of income taxes, for example, the taxes paid by 
athletes on their income is often paid in the their official state of residence, which is often 
different from the state in which their home sports facility is located. However, many cities have 
earnings taxes or special taxes on athletes and entertainers. Second is accounting for the 
“substitution” effect, whereby taxes are substituting for tax revenues that otherwise would have 
been collected from alternative entertainment activities, including restaurants, movie theatres, 
etc.; thus the amount of new tax revenues should be “net” of the substitution effect. This of 
course does not address the value of having the economic activity take place in one city relative 
to another. For example, the move of the Detroit Pistons from Auburn Hill to downtown Detroit 
generates no new tax revenues for the metropolitan statistical area (MSA). However, Detroit 
does gain and that might have value relative to political or equity concerns. Third is to consider 
the incidence of these taxes: income taxes are progressive, property taxes are mostly 
proportional, but sales and other consumption taxes tend to be regressive. That regressivity can 
be modulated if wealthier individual pay the tax, in that people with lower incomes pay a higher 
proportion of these costs. Incidence issues could also have a negative geographic implications if 
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residents in central cities pay a higher proportion of an investment while having proportionally 
lower incomes, thus bearing a geometrically disproportionate financial burden.  
Finally, the evaluation of jobs and taxes created by major league venues should be 
considered through the lens of opportunity cost:  Could the same amount of public investment 
have yielded more jobs and better jobs, or more tax revenues that are more evenly distributed, if 
spent on another type of program?  For example, many economic studies compare economic 
benefits from venues to that of building affordable housing.  Both construction and permanent 
jobs are created, albeit far fewer in the operating phase; and there is a multiplier effect, albeit at a 
lower rate.  However, the broader benefits from affordable housing, including economic effects 
such as bolstering the supply of labor, and social effect of improving quality of life of residents, 
are in question.  Ultimately, all public investments hinge on the question of opportunity cost, and 
this example--comparing sports facilities to affordable housing--demonstrates how traditional 
economic cost benefit analysis falls short as an evaluation tool or decision-making aid. 
 
2.2.2 URBAN DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
 Urban development benefits are an important, and yet poorly understood, element of the 
venue investment debate.  In many of the cases where cities enter into partnerships to build new 
major league venues, they do so with an express intent to revitalize targeted geographic areas, 
typically in central city locations where there are large swaths of vacant, underutilized, and often 
environmentally contaminated land located near major transportation infrastructure.  These urban 
redevelopment objectives are more spatial/physical than the traditional economic “jobs and 
taxes” rhetoric, seeking physical changes such as new construction or renovation activity,  
changes in land use composition (e.g. from heavy industrial to mixed commercial/housing), 
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increased density and decreased vacancy rates. Ideally, these changes arrive through new private 
investment in the form of real estate development projects that attract and house new businesses 
and new residents, creating new sources of property tax revenue, while also bringing additional 
vitality to formerly underutilized areas of the city.  In the master plans that typically accompany 
sports facility developments, the facilities themselves are often seen as anchors to large 
development initiatives, delivering a critical mass of consumers that will support the 
development of restaurants and nightclubs, and whose presence, in turn, makes the area more 
attractive for new residents and businesses, fostering more new construction, and hopefully, the 
cycle of redevelopment continues, in a physical “trickle down” effect or built environment 
multiplier effect.   
 These kinds of urban development benefits—changes in land use pattern, the amount of 
new private investment, changes in vacancy rates—while relatively easy to measure, can be very 
difficult to interpret. First, evaluating urban development impacts is often made a bit more 
difficult due to the fact that urban development impacts are in districts or sub-districts, whereas 
economic benefits can more easily be measured along the political and legal bounds of legal 
jurisdictions. Second is the issue of attribution, or cause and effect: in a case where an additional 
2,000 housing units are built in the vicinity of a new facility over a 10-year period, it will never 
be clear that the rationale for building those units is tied to the construction of the facility alone. 
Third is the substitution effect, which in urban development diction is summarized as 
“development here, not there.”  If market demand for new housing over a ten-year period is 
fixed, then new residential development near the sport facility effectively siphons demand from 
other locations in the region and perhaps in the city itself.  Fourth, the evaluation of effects is 
skewed by the quirks of real estate development and property ownership. Increasingly, team 
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owners are directly involved in real estate deals adjacent to the facility, and in so doing, can 
control urban development impacts to favor their core businesses, which may or may not be a 
team. 
 
2.2.3 PSYCHO-SOCIAL/INTANGIBLE DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
 The psycho-social benefits associated with major sports facilities that accrue to the 
general public are broadly categorized as city image, civic pride, and quality of life.  Civic image 
translates to attracting new residents and business from other cities, and can be analyzed, as an 
example, by using business location preference surveys and determining the dollar value of 
“media mentions”.  Civic pride is characterized by social cohesion, where the presence of a team 
provides an instrument for the formation of social capital and the expansion of social networks 
via the activity of following the team and league through in-stadium experiences, television 
broadcasts, and the sports pages of local newspapers.  Social cohesion fomented by sports is very 
difficult to measure, but clearly exists, and is reported to be of particular importance to patterns 
of socialization among males.  Finally, quality of life benefits imply that the presence of a major 
league sport team—and by extension a major league sports facility—improves the quality of life 
for residents and businesses, whether or not they consume its benefits directly.   
 
2.3 THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT RATIONALE IN SPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT 
Since the 1980s, central cities of large metropolitan areas have used large capital projects 
such as major league sport venues, museums, and convention centers to reignite interest in living 
and working “downtown.” In large part, this was a response to declining federal aid to cities, 
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declining population and a concomitant decline in tax revenues, as well as increasing demands 
for social services. While boutique retail and shopping malls were less successful in attracting 
residents and businesses back downtown, largely because these amenities were replicable in the 
suburbs, large capital projects such as convention centers, museums, and major league sports 
facilities were unique and thus forged a greater demand of their presence (Rosentraub, 2014).  
In particular, due to the cartel-like structure of the four major sports leagues and the 
limited supply of franchises, facilities for these teams were cast as unicorns - a rare and highly 
desirable amenity. Cohesive redevelopment strategies used these large capital projects as anchors 
for further ancillary development such as new mixed-use residential and commercial 
development as well as encouraged larger corporations, business start-ups, and business 
incubators to relocate downtown. Simply put, capital projects such as sport venues were not only 
catalysts for the redevelopment of failing inner-cities, but also a mechanism to recentralize 
economic activity in and around the urban core.  
Downtown city centers have had a turbulent history; formerly economic powerhouses 
and industrial centers of commerce, cities transitioned into blighted and crime-ridden areas 
attributable to the process suburbanization and economic and racial segregation. With the 
resurgence of new infrastructure and capital improvement projects as well as the rehabilitation 
and historical preservation of historical buildings illustrative of stories of the past, downtowns 
are entering into a new age of purpose and definition. Since the 1990s, professional sports 
facilities have been used by cities as a strategy to support downtown economic development 
agendas by creating more entertainment options, residential (single-family and mixed-housing) 
and commercial units, employment opportunities, and other land use development.  
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While sports facilities are perceived to promise great benefits to cities, studies have 
shown that these facilities produce very little to no economic impact and return on investment at 
the regional level (Baade & Dye, 1996; Baade, 1996; Rosentraub & Swindell, 1991; Rosentraub, 
Swindell, et. al, 1994; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, 1997; Coates & Humphreys, 1999; 
Noll, 1974). That past research, however, did not address the spatial effect of venues.  Could a 
level of regional economic development be deflected back into central cities by hosting a venue 
(Rosentraub, 2014)? 
The tangible and intangible benefits generated by professional sports facilities have often 
been evaluated on their individual impacts among host cities (Johnson, Whitehead, Mason, et. al, 
2012). Stand-alone facilities surrounded by a sea of parking lots provides no impact or benefit to 
the city itself. Large capital projects such as professional sports facilities are both large 
investments for the team’s owners as well as for the public sector. The benefits of the facility 
need to exceed the costs of the initial construction, maintenance, and operations of the facility in 
order for such a project to be considered a valuable investment worth considering (Fort, 2006).  
It is important to view facility development in a broader context rather than as a single 
entity development project (Johnson, Whitehead, Mason, et. al, 2012). Rather, stadia and arena 
developments should be analyzed based on their contributions to overall urban development 
agendas and how these infrastructure projects facilitate and anchor ancillary development that 
would not have otherwise occurred.   
Furthermore, this becomes a pertinent issue as to whether public money should be 
invested on such a project. Is it justified to invest public dollars in a facility to redevelop the 
central city? If venues are capable of anchoring further ancillary development thus creating a 
healthier and more prosperous downtown that no other large capital project can achieve, then 
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using public dollars to assist subsidizing such a construction can be both an economically 
efficient and a good investment (Rosentraub, 2014; Johnson, Whitehead, Mason, et. al, 2012).  
In the last twenty years, cities have been economically and socially impacted by tourism. 
Tourism has become a key component in the economic restructuring of cities, transitioning from 
manufacturing centers to centers for service and entertainment (Fainsten & Judd, 1999; Judd, 
Winter, Barnes, et. al, 2003). With both the rise in wealth and leisure time, tourism has added a 
profound economic presence in the ways cities have transformed. Cities as retail centers supply 
the expected luxury high-end retailers as well as boutique outlets and pop-up shops for emerging 
designers, these emerging designers add a sense of vibrancy and unpredictability. These trends 
and amenities are often concentrated around a larger capital project such as a convention center, 
stadium or arena, casino, or new hotels.  
While in some cities these amenities have been organically created and formed an 
entertainment district, many other cities have purposefully integrated these entertainment options 
in their master planned developments as part of the city’s overall redevelopment agenda. Planned 
developments are thus also used to establish tax increment financing (TIF) districts insulating the 
capture of the entertainment revenues produced. These entertainment districts serve failing city 
centers not only with a new tax base for young professionals who choose to move downtown due 
to the newly provided entertainment options, but also captures the spending occurring within the 
districts geographic boundaries. Dependent on how the TIF district is created, these revenues 
will only be used to improve infrastructure and services within the TIF boundaries. With the 
preconceived notion that inner-cities are laden with crime and considered as unsafe, 
entertainment districts can assist in re-establishing an area’s reputation, attract new investments, 
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and facilitate the creation of an “urban culture that it in itself is a commodity” (Fainstein & Judd, 
1999 p. 261) 
There are three types of tourist cities: resort cities, tourist-historic cities, and converted 
cities (Fainstein&Judd, 1999). Cities utilizing teams as part of their redevelopment agendas can 
be considered as converted cities. It is arguable that while such large capital projects are 
designed to revitalize blighted downtown centers, much of the redevelopment that transpires, 
occurs within an insulated area often designated by a TIF or Enterprise/Empowerment zones. 
Simply put, sport facilities can be successful anchors for ancillary development such as 
residential or commercial real estate, retail, other entertainment options, etc. An immediate 
economic effect, however, may not occur right away and it is difficult to determine whether 
spillover effects will follow into the peripheral neighborhoods a few miles away from the sports 
stadium or arena development or the entertainment district at large.  
Projects such as Coors Field (Denver), and the Gateway District (Cleveland) activated 
development projects in the vicinities of each of these facility projects, yet research is needed 
that looks at effects near the venue and throughout the targeted downtown area (Eisinger, 2000).  
Venues are development to establish a quasi-entertainment district, are built and designed for 
high-income earning young professionals and tourists and, in many instances, new renters and 
homeowners who resided in the area prior to the envelopment of new real estate ventures.  
Pursuing this idea further, the development of these entertainment districts can alter the 
civic agenda and intentions concerning the revitalization process of the central city (Eisinger, 
2000). Cities pursuing stadia and arena development as anchors to stimulate development 
throughout the rest of the city may face the creation of a divided city. A divided city is a 
consequence of fulfilling development plans that indulge the tastes of the high-earning young 
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professionals seeking an “elite urban playground” where they can live, work, and play while 
continuing to neglect those long-standing residents who are economically segregated lacking 
both economic opportunities and the availability of public services (Levine, 1987). However, in 
order to reverse the urban decline these long-standing residents are familiarized with, high-
income households and residents need to be both attracted to live and work in the central city. 
Responding to this criticism it is useful to note that most cities require sport venues and districts 
to the building of new below market rate housing if new residential properties are also built.  It is 
not unusual to find a requirement that 30 or 35 percent of all new residential development 
include below market rate units. 
Stadia and arena development and subsequently entertainment districts are not just 
simply meant to redirect economic activity to the urban core. City property tax must also be 
generated (Rosentraub, 2014). Without a diverse population that includes a large proportion of 
wealthy individuals and households, cities cannot generate the appropriate tax revenues needed 
to revitalize downtown neighborhoods and continue to provide public services that are largely 
consumed by low-income residents. Yet, while waterfronts are beautified into walking 
promenades and old warehouses located in designated historic preservations zones are gutted and 
rehabilitated into luxury industrial lofts that are highly valuable and profitable real estate 
investments transforming neighborhoods, these are transitions that are advantageous for the 
middle and upper-class residents relocating to areas that now offer ample entertainment and 
nightlife options. Although public services can once again be supplemented for low-income 
residents by attracting an appropriate tax base, these residents will eventually be displaced as 
they begin to be priced-out of their neighborhood that has since become the new playground for 
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the young and wealthy professionals. That possibility is why below market rate commitments are 
part of most districts. 
To revive central cities and their urban core, the entertainment districts must be linked to 
residences creating a sense of community and neighborhood atmosphere (Rosentraub, 2014). 
This is an alternative to Fainstein’s premonition that converted cities would become tourist 
spaces “isolated from the ordinary fabric of daily life” (Fainstein & Judd, 1999 p. 266).  
 
2.3.1 SPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES DEPENDENCY ON LOCAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
Sport-led development has played a pivotal role in turning singular facility investments 
into substantial real estate interests. Quite a few professional sports facilities (Cleveland, Denver, 
Indianapolis, etc.) have generated both organic and planned ancillary real estate development. 
Sports anchored development has burgeoned as a strategy that many public elected officials have 
adopted in order to revitalize or develop their cities. Some examples include:  
 
1) Illitch Holdings plans to privately invest at least $200 million for new mixed-use 
developments around the Little Caesar’s Arena (estimated at a total of $650 million) in 
addition to investing millions of dollars in public infrastructure improvements such as 
lighting, sidewalks, greenspaces, etc. around the arena (District Detroit, 7/20/2014).  
2) The Green Bay Packers announced in the summer of 2015 the master plan for the 
Titletown District, which will include a 10-acre public plaza, diverse programming, 
public art, a winter ice-rink, a ski hill, and regulation-sized football field and an 
additional 16-acres to be developed for commercial and retail as well as a substantial 
number of new residential units. The three tenants of the district will include Lodge 
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Kohler, Bellin Health Sports Medicine Clinic, and Hinterland Restaurant and Brewery 
(Packers.com, 8/20/2015). In 2018 it was announced that Microsoft would be the lead 
partner in Titletown Tech, a business incubator.  
3) A new arena for the Edmonton Oilers opened in 2016, and by 2018 included millions 
of dollars of new downtown real estate development, a casino, and other entertainment 
options within the Ice District.  
4) Surrounding the proposed site SunTrust Park in Cobb County, Atlanta, the Atlanta 
Braves new ballpark will be surrounded by ancillary development including the new 
headquarters for Cox Media Group Television (Tucker, 07/25/2015).  
 
Every city has a unique development trajectory that is co-dependent on its particular political, 
economic, and social history. During the Reagan administration in the 1980s, both 
intergovernmental revenue and federal aid were cut, requiring local governments to conform to 
“fend for yourself” federalism agendas by creating and relying on their own economic bases and 
competing against other regional governments. These changes prompted cities to adopt more 
economic-development policies in order to maintain their communities’ fiscal health and to 
promote future city growth (Rubin & Rubin, 1987; Sharp, 1990).  
Cities will adopt a variety of economic-development policies dependent on the conditions 
for which those communities are willing to embrace different policies. This variation is a result 
of the structure-versus-agency debate (Swanstrom, 1985; Wong, 1988; Kantor, 1988; 
Fleischmann, Green, & Kwong, 1992). The structure-versus-agency premise claims that a city’s 
adoption of certain economic-development policies is based on the local government’s political 
and economic structure (e.g., urban development shaped by economic and social conditions of 
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the region)4 and the involvement of political actors (e.g., pressuring for certain incentives and 
having political influence on local policy decisions). Extensive literature exists from Logan and 
Molotch (1987), aligning economic development with the growth machine theory; from Stone 
(1987), with urban regime theory; and from Mollenkopf (1983), with political entrepreneurs that 
promote economic growth through forming coalitions and expanding political influence to 
further the local policy agendas along with individual interests. 
Cities are likely to adopt more economic-development policies if they are negatively 
impacted by demographic factors (population decline, rising unemployment levels, business 
relocation, and so on) and economic factors (effects of deindustrialization, underutilized land 
parcels, etc.) (Fleischmann, Green, & Kwong, 1992). Cities may also adopt more economic-
development policies if they are in decline and pressured to spur new growth, have a high 
percentage of poverty and avoid redistributive programming, hold a mayor-council government 
in which private-sector authority is limited, or possess a specialized department (e.g., a 
downtown redevelopment authority) to oversee the distribution of these policies (Fleischmann, 
Green, & Kwong, 1992). Fleischmann, Green, and Kwong (1992) found that there was 
substantial variability in the number and type of economic-development strategies that cities 
supported.  
Overall, cities that are more aggressive in adopting a number of economic-development 
policies are those that are in the process of slow growth, those that have formed development 
authorities to oversee the economic-development programs, and those that are wary of increases 
in property taxes. Furthermore, it was established that cities are impartial to the nine economic-
                                                 
4 Cities are pressured to adopt certain economic-development policies as a result of local politicians seeking support 
for their own interests in serving additional terms in office or scenarios in which businesses and residents threaten to 
move because of the lack of adequate services provided by the city or increases in taxes.  
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development strategies5 identified in Fleischmann, Green, and Kwong’s (1992) study and 
therefore use a variation of those strategies to stimulate the local economy.  
Turning more specifically to sport-led development, there is only a small existing body of 
research. A number of cases have focused on professional sport facilities and their impact on 
adjacent real estate development activities, but very few have analyzed the trajectory of urban 
development changes at the parcel-data level since the construction of these venues. Among 
these studies, the most relevant to my research are studies by Chapin, Rosentraub, and 
Humphries. 
Rosentraub (2007, 2012, 2014) has extensively examined professional sport facilities and 
their centrality to many downtown redevelopment efforts. Rosentraub (2014) advances the 
research on sport-led development research by assessing the financial and administrative 
implications professional sports facilities and how they contribute to surrounding neighborhoods 
and new and existing development projects. The cities found in Rosentraub’s case studies all 
decided that investments in sports, entertainment, and cultural amenities should anchor 
revitalization efforts in their downtown core areas. In summarizing lessons that emerged from 
those cases, Rosentraub provides nine recommendations for other cities that are considering 
sports-led urban development strategies as part of their city redevelopment initiatives. Some of 
the more notable recommendations include: 
1) Provide advertising: Adjacent properties to sports facilities should be properly 
marketed and leased to businesses as a potential opportunity for advertising and 
the generation of revenues – and lower tax dollars spent on the facilities – for the 
                                                 
5 Fleischmann, Green, and Kwong (1992) identified nine groups of economic development strategies. These include 
loans, financial incentives, activities to attract or retain business, revitalization projects, regulatory reform, 
developmental land management, historic preservation, aesthetic improvements, and improvements to facilities.  
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public sector. The value of public space should be leveraged and controlled in 
order to secure alternative revenues streams. 
2) Concentrate amenities and make detailed plans: Concentrating a detailed 
revitalization plan is more feasible when it is in a tightly designed area, ensuring 
that all vacant land and buildings are in fact redeveloped within the district. 
3) Build neighborhoods not iconic architecture: The scale of the facilities should be 
designed in such a way that it seamlessly fits into the surrounding neighborhood 
and does not become the tallest structure. 
4) Secure organizations needed to succeed as a broker city: It may not be feasible to 
secure guaranteed investments, therefore many cities will have to use their own 
tax revenues to ensure that any other subsidies are strategic investments.  
 
Chapin (1999) addressed the impact that professional sport facilities have on a local 
district’s micro-area. Through his case-study research on Baltimore’s Camden Yards, 
Cleveland’s Gateway District, and Arlington’s Ballpark District, Chapin expanded sport-facility 
research by providing one of the first urban-planning-oriented perspectives on micro-level 
development impacts. Chapin’s work took a different path from that of other scholars who 
focused on regional impacts (Baade, 1996; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, 1997, 2000; 
Baade & Dye 1990; Coates & Humphreys, 2003; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2006).  
Chapin’s study of Baltimore (1999) concluded that district redevelopment is not 
guaranteed through the massive investments in sport projects. While Camden Yards was a 
success on its own, it did not turn out to be the urban development catalyst. On the other hand, in 
his study on Cleveland – along with other examples such as San Diego and Columbus –sports 
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facilities played a role in catalyzing district redevelopment and resulted in the building of new 
hotels, retail businesses, and residences. The mixed success rate of the venues as catalysts for 
urban redevelopment, he notes, suggested the need for further research to identify particular 
project characteristics and planning processes and programs that may have been simultaneously 
enacted with the sport facilities that yielded such development benefits. 
Humphreys (2016) focuses on the economic impact of facilities on nearby property 
values by examining the relationship between the opening of a venue and residential mortgages. 
Humphreys found that the opening of a professional facility was associated with a 20% increase 
in residential mortgage applications and that both property values and rents increase with closer 
proximity to the major league venues. Humphreys and Feng (2012) predicted that the opening of 
a new facility would both increase the demand for residential housing and residential property 
values. Using a hedonic housing price model and capturing property values within census block 
groups five miles of every major league sports facility, Humphreys and Zhou found that median 
house value is higher closer to these facilities and therefore such projects can be used to 
capitalize on residential real estate prices.  
Aligned with Chapin’s urban-planning outlook, Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2008) explore 
changes in land values and patterns of impact for two arenas situated in Berlin-Prenzalauer Berg, 
and Ahlfeldt and Kavestos (2012) found that in the case of London, property prices increased 
following the announcement of new stadium construction plans. Also, they found that changes in 
land value is consistent with changes in land-use composition, one factor in measuring urban 
development outcomes and measures of success in arena-led urban development strategies. 
A gap in this former research is that success measures were not quantified, and variables 
used to define success were not comparatively measured in a comprehensive and systematic 
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manner. Furthermore, the success rates of these urban development initiatives were not 
differentiated among the facility typologies (arena, ballpark, and football stadium).  
 
2.3.2 EXAMPLES OF “SUCCESS” AND “FAILURE” IN ARENA-LED DEVELOPMENT: CLEVELAND AND 
GLENDALE 
Among the many cases of sport-led urban development, two arena-district cases 
effectively set up the contrast between “success” and “failure.” This includes the Historic 
Gateway District in Cleveland and the Westgate District in Glendale, Arizona. While the 
differences between the two outcomes are stark, these cases highlight the complexity of 
assessing urban development outcomes, particularly when making comparisons across cities, and 
across time. 
The Cleveland Gateway District is widely considered to be an example of a “success” in 
sports-led urban development. The Gateway District was originally conceived of as part of 
Cleveland’s “Civic Vision 2000 Plan” which focused on improvements for both the downtown 
and surrounding neighborhoods by developing strategies to housing and office uses downtown, 
and to provide more entertainment opportunities (Keating & Krumholz, 1991). In that spirit, the 
plan targeted the 28-acre Central Market neighborhood as the site of two new venues, with the 
hope that new private development would follow and mark a new “gateway” to downtown 
Cleveland.   
By 1990, the Central Market’s glory days were long past, and the area offered no 
housing, no hotel rooms, and only six restaurants. City leaders joined forces with the owners of 
the Cleveland Cavaliers (the Gund family) and the Cleveland Indians (then the Jacobs family, 
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followed by the Dolan family in 2000), with the result that the Gund Arena and Jacobs Field 
(now Progressive Field) opened in 1994.  
Nearly three decades later in 2016, the Gateway Historic Redevelopment District 
(adjacent to the Gateway Economic Development Corporation’s venues and a separate public 
corporation) was home to over 1,500 residents, six hotels, and over 60 restaurants, and is 
considered a prime example a successful sport-led urban development. When Jacobs/Progressive 
Field was constructed, the project cost $276 million in 2016 dollars with the public paying 
approximately 48% public share of costs. The proposed hotel and mixed-use projects that have 
just been recently completed or currently in the construction pipeline for downtown Cleveland 
includes a 150-room Starwood Property located on the east bank of the Flats which is part of a 
greater $500 million mixed-use residential complex. Furthermore, a 600-room Hilton Cleveland 
Downtown Hotel and convention center was completed in June 2016 and another $272 million is 
spent on a 28-story tower project that is situated right next to the current Mall.  
The Westgate Entertainment District in Glendale, Arizona is perhaps the most commonly 
used example of failed ambitions in sports-led urban development. In 2001, real estate developer 
Steve Ellman joined forces with the suburban city of Glendale to bring to fruition a vision for a 
233-acre entertainment district anchored by a new arena for the NHL Coyotes.  
Glendale, anxious to capitalize on the sports-led development trend, created the Glendale 
Sports and Entertainment District, and through it, offered substantial public funding for the new 
arena, and a football stadium, as well as for land acquisition and other infrastructure costs for the 
promised mall. In return, Ellman promised the usual windfall of jobs and taxes. Early warning 
signs appeared when Ellman was twice fined for not meeting performance obligations with 
regard to building the retail mall. As the US housing market began to show signs of collapse, it 
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became clear that little of the promised new development would materialize. Bankruptcies, 
finger-pointing, and rebranding as the Westgate Entertainment Zone followed, however Glendale 
has yet to fully recover from the financial burden of this plan. The NHL Coyotes, for their part, 
also suffered greatly as this development plan unraveled, being forced into bankruptcy in 2009, 
taken over by the NHL, and finally sold to the Renaissance Group in 2013.  The Glendale district 
is a cautionary tale for team owners, developers, and city officials alike. 
Comparing these two examples, the good news is that there are far fewer arena-led 
developments that would fall into the rather extraordinary circumstances faced by Glendale over 
the past decade.  Those who follow sports facility development would likely suggest that there 
are many more arena development outcomes that fall somewhere in the spectrum between 
Cleveland and Glendale. Other “success” candidates might include Denver’s LoDo District and 
the area around the Boston Garden, as examples, with some representing formal district plans 
(Denver), while others are more stand-alone development projects created without a district in 
mind (Boston). However, much of these impressions—even amongst those who follow these 
issues—are based on informally gathered observations based on visits to the sites, following new 
feeds, and discussions among colleagues. What is missing from our understanding of these issues 
is a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the outcomes from these arena-led projects. 
 
2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
The theories underlying my research can be divided into two main disciplinary 
orientations: sport management (or sports business) and urban planning, reflecting the 
interdisciplinary nature of my graduate studies. In simple terms, I use the perspective of 
professional teams as a proxy for sport management theories in this work, although by use of the 
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shorthand term “teams” I also infer that the perspective of leagues and other aspects of sports 
business are also included.  In turn, I use the term “cities” as a proxy for the urban planning 
perspective, though again this is a form of shorthand, because there are often other levels of 
government, and other public interests that are implied as bundled within that term. 
Generally, my use of these two disciplines to explain urban development outcomes in 
sport-led development, and why some districts are more successful than others, is based in the 
understanding that the success of these developments is not limited solely to one of these groups.  
Instead, there are both synergies and tensions between the two perspectives. For example, if the 
goal of cities is to create a cluster of restaurants around the arena, while the goal of teams is to 
maximize profits within the arena, the misalignment of these goals may compromise the success 
of arena-led plans. There is some anecdotal evidence that successful arena districts involve some 
degree of financial interest by teams in the ancillary development around the arena, thus 
allowing for both goals to be achieved. By better understanding both these tensions and 
synergies, it may be possible to improve the outcomes.  
Yet successful arena-led plans blend the interests of both team and cities, in the context 
of a specific market. This is not to suggest that all benefits and costs are spread equally across 
the two sets of interests. Rather it is intended to suggest that the most successful arena-led 
districts present benefits to both team and host cities. By understanding the profit maximizing 
behavior of teams, in tandem with the urban development goals of cities, it is possible to increase 
the success of arena-led plans, and by extension, all classes of sports-led plans. 
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2.4.1 SPORT MANAGEMENT THEORIES 
Sport management is an umbrella discipline, encompassing economics, finance, 
organizational behavior, leadership, and others to guide the research. My primary theoretical 
frame is profit-maximization as the primary goal of firms—by extension in this dissertation to 
the interests of teams, leagues, and the associated businesses involved in major league sports 
(Marshall 1897, 1890, and others). Viewed in this manner, the actions of teams are largely 
governed by the desire to earn profit, and their participation in arena-led development would also 
be guided by this principle. My secondary theoretical frame is the rent-seeking behavior of teams 
as they seek to influence the political process to gain increased revenues via public subsidies and 
preferential treatment (Tullock 1967; Krueger, 1974; and others). In this framework, the success 
of arena-led developments would be in part contingent on the ability of teams to extract rents by 
participating in the development plan.  
Teams and their leagues have a particular set of interests in the context of arena-led 
developments. First, teams are motivated by the promise of a new facility and the latest 
innovations in revenue generation. The demand for luxury suites remains the best example of a 
design innovation that became a significant revenue generator, and was an important factor in the 
most recent replacement cycle for major league facilities. Second, teams are motivated by the 
possibility of public investments to build a new facility; since every public dollar means less 
expense for the team. Third, teams are motivated by involvement in plans for an entire arena-led 
district since these lead other lucrative investment opportunities that could exist with the team’s 
owner. Fourth, teams are motivated by arena-led plans to play a high profile role in a project, and 
can leverage that involvement to gain influence and with the local business community, unions, 
and the media. 
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Despite these considerable advantages, the profit-maximizing behavior of teams may not 
always lend itself to the success of an arena-led development from the city’s perspective. There 
may be a misalignment of goals if teams act in a manner that stifles the development potential of 
other properties in the district. Likewise, if cities enact policies that affect the revenues generated 
by teams (e.g. ticket surcharges, payments in lieu of property taxes, etc.) then tension ensues. A 
recent example of the latter is the regulation of hot dog carts in the vicinity of ballparks, pitting 
the interests of ballpark operators and teams against those of local street vendors. In fact, there is 
speculation among facility opponents that teams go to considerable lengths to influence arena-led 
developments such that the plan works in their favor. While this is a subject for future research, 
there is some evidence that teams are investing in real estate opportunities in the district beyond 
the traditional bounds of the facility itself.  In one sense, this can be interpreted as an effort to 
protect their investment and position within the district, but it also speaks to the expanding 
influence of these districts in the business model of teams. 
 
2.4.2 URBAN PLANNING THEORIES 
Urban planning is also an umbrella discipline, bringing together economists, political 
scientists and historians to sit alongside urbanists and architects guiding research and practice 
pertaining to the growth and management of cities. My primary theoretical frame for explaining 
arena-led development is public choice theory, as applied to urban development in the 1980s by 
Peterson (1981).  In the context of urban development, Peterson argued that governing regimes 
are subordinate to the overall economic principles that incentivize cities to compete with other 
cities to capture new private investment. This competition encourages politicians and business 
interests to favor new development projects, and tasking the planning process with ensuring the 
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provision of local infrastructures that support the needs of private actors in the name of economic 
development. My secondary theoretical frame is Logan and Molotch’s growth machine theory 
(1987) as counter-argument to Peterson’s public choice treatise. Growth machine theory is 
positioned to highlight the ascendance of public choice-led urban development theory, arguing 
that the development projects favored by politicians and business interests come at the expense 
of the general population, and vulnerable residents in particular. In this sense, the allied 
relationship between politicians and business interests fuels the growth machine, thus allowing it 
to overpower the weaker interests in the development process. 
These theories are instructive in my effort to understand the success of arena-led urban 
development strategies. Public choice theory explains the allied interests of teams and host cities, 
while growth machine theory reminds us to think carefully about the incidence of costs and 
benefits. These theories are particularly important in the second stage of the research, where I 
examine factors that explain why some districts are more successful than others, because taken 
together, these theories help us to understand differing notions of “success”. For team owners, 
“success” is measured in profitability and influence. For host cities, “success” is measured in the 
balance between accommodating the profitability of teams, with the needs of city residents, 
particularly those who bear a disproportionate share of the costs. 
Given this theoretical backdrop, what does urban planning theory tell us about measuring 
“success”?  Plans are the guiding forces for future urban development (Talen, 1996), yet there is 
wide variability in determining whether the implementation of a plan achieves prescribed 
“successful” outcomes or not.  
Plans are conventionally described as a “set of instructions that detail both goals and the 
means for achieving those goals” (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980: 31). Plans are differentiated 
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from one another based on scope, range, and specificity and vary by city and project.  Plans both 
broadly describe visions and policy changes for entire cities and regions while also detailing 
action plans for specified central business districts or neighborhoods. However, in the case of 
major league sports facilities, there are very few comprehensive plans in the 1980s in which 
these facilities were even mentioned. As the popularity of public-private partnerships increased 
in the 1990s, cities assumed greater responsibility in financially supporting the attraction and 
retention of professional sports teams; this was achieved either through the construction or 
renovation of new and existing sports facilities. 
Yet, based on preliminary research searching through several host city comprehensive 
plans, there is little mention of integrating professional sports facilities into the broader 
redevelopment strategy. While general plans often address land use, physical development, and 
infrastructure, it is surprising that sports facilities built in the 1990s are not distinctly mentioned; 
if not for the size and square footage of the facility and possibility of needing to acquire land. It 
is only recently that professional sports facilities are being included into city comprehensive 
plans and redevelopment strategies. As the partnership between the public sector and private 
developers and team owners are strengthened, RFPs are including not just development and 
financing strategies for the facility itself but development strategies to help the surrounding 
neighborhood. 
Absent these traditional plans, I evaluate master developer agreements, reviewing 
whether terms for additional development sponsored by both private entities and the city were 
outlined in the documents. Furthermore, master developer agreements often discuss the different 
stakeholders involved in the facility development process. This can provide additional insight 
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into the negotiation process for such development, what kind of terms were made with the city 
and grassroots organizations, and financing mechanisms used to subsidize the facility.  
As an example, the Barclays Center master developer agreement outlines terms 
negotiated between the Prospects Heights Neighborhood Development Council, the Empire State 
Development Corporation, and Forest City Ratner Corporation. The goal was to create a 
significant number of affordable housing units in the Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area as a 
function of the Barclays Center: Pacific Park, which would consist of 17 new mixed-use and 
residential units. In addition to the proposed residential development, a community benefits 
agreement was also outlined for several community groups in the area proposing that 50% of all 
rental units would be set aside as affordable housing, that 10% of all rental units be set aside for 
senior housing, that 35% minority construction workers hired for the construction project, and 
also promised a health care center and some open space. Although what is proposed in master 
developer agreements may be very different from what is actually realized, these documents still 
provide a plan or roadmap for future development in an arena district.  
Finally, tax increment financing (TIF) strategies are public financing mechanisms that 
subsidize redevelopment and community improvement projects by redirecting property tax 
revenues into a defined area that provides more assistance and funding to specific economic 
development or public improvement projects and initiatives. TIFs involve issuing bonds to 
finance public infrastructure, land acquisition, utility costs, and other public service 
improvements. TIFs are typically enacted for 20-25 years, which is aimed at matching the build 
out of the district site. Over the 25-year period, the increase in property values within the district 
will theoretically yield higher property tax revenues, and the increment in those taxes above the 
initial level would be used to pay off the bonds. TIFs are controversial, in part because they 
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present some financial risk if the planned development does not materialize, and also because the 
increasing property values is often associated with gentrification. 
 
2.5 LESSONS FOR RESEARCH DESIGN 
This literature review has identified a gap in the literature as pertains to the evaluation 
and assessment of arena-led, and sport-led, urban development strategies. First, I have made 
clear that there is a general lack of research on the topic of urban development impacts from 
sport-led strategies, as most of the research focuses on economic outcomes and political 
influence. Second, I have traced the small number of studies that make up the extant literature 
specific to sport-led development to highlight the methodologies that have been used to measure 
success. Third, I have described the theoretical frameworks that I will use to explain successes 
and failures, borrowing from both the sport management and urban planning disciplines. The 
results of these inquiries are integrated into the research methodology presented in the next 
chapter. As cities turn to sports and entertainment districts as key element of their urban strategy, 
this research will provide a better understanding of this trend and its impacts using a systematic 
and comprehensive approach to measuring and interpreting these outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methodological approach undertaken to measure the physical 
changes around major league arenas in a set of selected host cities. This is an empirical or 
observation-based analysis across several host cities, or “cases”. I have chosen three metrics to 
measure these changes: 1) changes in the volume of built area, 2) changes in the land use mix, 
and 3) changes in assessed value. These changes will be measured across a “zone of influence” 
measuring a quarter-mile radius around the new arena, a measure borrowed from transportation 
planning, specifically the zone of influence used to evaluate public investments in transit-
oriented development. Using GIS and other digital spatial data sources, I plan to measure these 
physical impacts across 15 arenas built in US cities between 1994 and 2005, with the 
development impacts measured prior the facility opening in 1990, and then again 25 years later 
in 2015. This research will be the first of its kind, as a systematic examination of physical 
changes around arenas across a large number of host cities. 
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3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
3.2.1 HYBRID COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
My approach is a hybrid comparative case study, using empirical quantitative data. The 
case study research approach is a detailed empirical examination of a phenomenon, through 
either single or multiple examples, to create new theoretical constructs. The purpose of case 
studies is not only to provide a purely descriptive narration of an example, but also to attempt to 
generalize the narrative toward a theoretical development; as Eckstein (1975) notes, “Case 
studies are an alternative means to the end of testing theories.” Furthermore, single case studies 
are just as valuable as multiple case study research. The data or evidence collected and insights 
formed are linked and transferrable to other cases that help further support theory development 
(Ragin, 1992). 
There are many misconceptions about case studies as a research strategy. Flyvbjerg 
(2006) outlines five misunderstandings concerning the nature of case study research. Two are 
especially resonant with the research approach taken for this particular study. The first 
misconception is that “one cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case and therefore 
cannot contribute to scientific development” (Flvbjerg, 2006, p. 221). Yet Eckstein (1975) argues 
that case studies are capable of predicting theories, and he offers broader generalizations in 
support of theory-based research; case studies are therefore just as useful in testing theory as 
other methods and thus should not be underestimated. Furthermore, case studies are valuable in 
all aspects of the theory-building process (Eckstein, 1976). Understanding the underlying issues 
of a given problem or situation can be facilitated by a strategic selection of cases (Ragin, 1992; 
Rosch, 1978); such cases can be extreme cases, critical cases, maximum variation cases, or 
paradigmatic cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006; see p. 230 for his summary of these case descriptions). 
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Relevant to the present research study, the sample was systematically selected based on 
two conditions: that chosen cities had venues deriving from the arena typology, host to NBA and 
NHL teams; and that cities had professional sports venues opened between 1990 and 2004. 
These cities were confirmed under specific conditions in order to observe a 20-year development 
cycle or period, but they also represent what Flyvbjerg defines as critical cases. Critical cases are 
cases that are able to provide a detailed narrative that provides a full contextual scope of an issue 
and relates it back to the broader theoretical issue at hand while simultaneously moving the 
scientific research forward. In other words, to find common trends among cases to further 
support a theory, it follows that “if it is valid for this case, it is valid for all (or many) cases” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230). If a number of urban development outcomes are similar across a few 
cases in relation to the arena-led development strategy, then the similarities must be true both for 
these 15 cases and for other cities with professional sports venues. 
The second misunderstanding in terms of case study research that Flyvbjerg addresses is 
that “it is often difficult to summarize and develop general propositions and theories on the basis 
of specific case studies” (2006, p. 221). In this study’s sample, the details and context of each 
case are unique. Indeed, the political, economic, social, and historical context particular to each 
metropolitan area influences the city’s urban fabric and subsequently its development trajectory. 
To reiterate, a city may use a variety of economic-development strategies to strengthen and grow 
its local economy; the type, number, or even combination of strategies used is dependent on the 
conditions of the community.  
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The unifying condition in studying these cities is that they all have a local government 
that has contributed public funds toward arena construction.6 Arena construction has then led to a 
number of substantial changes—both economic and physical—to the urban fabric. Thus, the 
systematic selection of sample cities, the common thread of the arena-district micro-area, and the 
summarization of each case analysis together contribute to the “cumulative knowledge” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 241) of the theory surrounding sports-led urban development initiatives; as 
the sample size increases, broad theoretical development compares favorably with large sample 
size research. This research study combines the use of case studies with a comprehensive parcel-
level dataset to provide further knowledge regarding the success of arena-led development 
strategies. 
Building theory behind the use of arena-led development strategies for downtown 
revitalization involves applying multiple cases to create a new theoretical construct through 
empirical evidence and a variety of data sources (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). Specific to this 
study, the data sources include assessment records, property characteristic cards, comprehensive 
annual financial reports (CAFRs) of all cities in the sample between 1990 and 2015, in addition 
to city urban planning documents and comprehensive planning reports. 
This leads to the use of case studies as a means to identify patterns of relationships within 
and across cases and to bridge qualitative evidence (along with quantitative data) and deductive 
research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), thereby developing a strong theoretical foundation.  
The overall strategy of this research study is designed around a mixed-method approach. Since 
there is limited research about sports-led urban development strategies, this study combines 
                                                 
6 In some cases, public funding had been provided as the professional sports venue had been perceived as an anchor 
for downtown redevelopment. In other scenarios, funding may have been tethered to fulfilling political agendas 
(e.g., paying for new arena construction in fear of team relocation or even fearing reelection losses). 
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theory building with a quantitative data analysis that uses data sources, such as parcel-level 
assessment records, to evaluate the success of arena-led development strategies. The challenge 
with adopting the theory-building-from-cases approach is case selection. Multiple cases were 
selected according to their robustness, generalizability, and testability, based on conditions that 
will be expanded on later.  
In general, the findings from these multiple cases must display a robust replication logic 
(Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007); that is, they must be replicable among other cases. 
The replicability of the case-study findings for the 15 cities in the sample is used to build the 
theory, while the richness of the data collection process, the data collected, and the presentation 
of evidence in tables, graphs, and appendixes (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) supports the theory 
and the theoretical arguments. 
3.2.1.1 Measuring success  
The success of arena-led development strategies is measured by analyzing trends in the 
percentage change of land-use composition, built area, total assessed and market values,7 and 
property taxes. Table 2 summarizes the steps used to measure urban development outcomes in 
arena districts across 15 cities. Although success measures of arena-led development strategies 
are more clearly discussed in the research design section, these measures may in fact be different 
from a city’s definition of success for the arena district.  
The measures used to define success in this research design are standardized across all 
cities. However, it should be noted that in some cases, a city may have wished to focus on a 
                                                 
7  The issues and policies regarding tax abated and exempt properties are considered in the calculations of 
assessment and market values and property tax revenues. In some cases, tax abatement policies substantially 
impacted downtown development. For example, dependent on city policies, these vary on a case-by-case basis, only 
a portion of a tax abated property’s assessment value and market value is recorded for property tax values.  
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particular policy agenda related to the professional sports venue. In such a scenario, the city 
could consider some urban development outcomes post arena construction a success if those 
outcomes fulfilled the city’s original plan, which may deviate from the success measures 
outlined in this research. A summary of the steps taken in the research design and data collection 
process are outlined in Table 2, with a summary of this series of steps reflected in the subsequent 
discussion. 
 
Table 2. Stage One of the data collection process in mapping the urban development 
outcomes 
  
3.2.1.2 The study population 
The population for the arena-led urban development outcome analysis includes all US-
based NBA and NHL arenas that have opened between 1994 and 2004 and that are currently in 
Stage One: Mapping Urban Development Outcomes 
Step 1: 
Identify “success” criteria 
Absolute 
• Build-out, land-use mix, assessed value per formal plan 
• Build-out, land-use mix, assessed value per arena district micro-area 
Comparative 
• Same four measures across all 15 sites; analyze compounding rates of 
change of these four measures over a 25-year period and at five-year 
intervals between 1990 and 2015. 
Step 2: 
Sample selection 
• Population: All major-league arenas currently in use (N = 50) 
• Sample: Venues built between 1990 and 2004 (n = 15) 
Step 3: 
District boundary “rules” 
• Use a standard extent of influence measure for all arena districts 
(quarter-mile radius) 
• Note (1): Only a few cities in which arenas opened between 1990 and 
1999 were part of a formal plan 
• Note (2): Cities with more than one professional sports venue located 
in the downtown area will have additional boundaries measured. This 
means that in some cases, the quarter-mile radius for one venue may 
overlap with the second venue, or the district boundaries are 
completely separate. 
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use. Arenas—a subset of all professional sport facilities—were chosen as the unit of analysis 
because at present, they are the most likely facility type for inclusion in a sports-led planning 
effort. This is because of their higher degree of compatibility with other land uses—a function of 
their high number of event days, small footprint, and higher likelihood of being in an urban 
location (and thus access to transit), among other factors. In addition, assessing urban 
development outcomes across different typologies (e.g., football stadiums, ballparks, and arenas) 
would create issues in case comparisons, since each facility type would need to be accounted for 
differently in terms of overall footprint, visitation, and overall urban development impacts. 
The rationale for examining arenas built between 1990 and 2004 is threefold. First, urban 
development outcomes take time to materialize. It would be premature to evaluate the success of 
sports-led urban development initiatives for venues built after 2005 as this does not provide a 
sufficient lag to determine the impact of the new-construction build-out when the venue has been 
open for only a few years. In urban planning practice, it is more typical to evaluate the success of 
plans at 10-year and 20-year marks. Second, the data from the decennial census is available for 
1990, 2000, and 2010. By choosing those facilities opened between 1990 and 2004, it is possible 
to bookend the evaluation with the 1990 and 2010 census data. Third, there are some shifts in 
planning for arenas that occur around 1990. Arenas built during the 1980s still followed the more 
suburban development model of being co-located with stadiums with large parking lots, whereas 
arenas built after 1990 were harbingers of the trend toward sports-led development as a strategy 
for underutilized sites in downtown locations. Thus, the restriction of the sample to 26 facilities 
opened between 1990 and 2004 serves my research questions well. 
During the data collection process, assessment information for two of the four arenas 
built between 1990 and 1994—San Jose and Anaheim—was inaccessible because of the 
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prohibitive cost of accessing earlier files from archives and assessors’ offices. Los Angeles was 
similarly eliminated from the study population because assessment records were limited to the 
period from 2006 to the present. The assessment and mapping division of Los Angeles County 
did not release earlier information, despite filing a Freedom of Information Act request. Parcel 
splits and consolidations occurred frequently in Los Angeles County as the downtown area has 
transformed dramatically over the last 25 years. Tracking former parcel identification numbers 
from what is available in 2006 without available parcel deeds would be impractical. 
Furthermore, although data was collected for the remaining ten cities in the study population (St. 
Louis, Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington DC, Sunrise (FL), Indiana,8 Raleigh, Atlanta, 
Columbus, and San Antonio), given the scope of the dissertation, I decided to set these cities 
aside to keep the dissertation to a reasonable size. The remaining ten cases will be added in the 
future to complete the full list of arenas built between 1990 and 2004. 
There are currently 50 major-league sport arenas currently in use, spread across 49 host 
cities (Table 3). The sample population for this dissertation study is limited to 15 arenas opened 
between 1992 and 2004 (Table 4). Three of the cities (Cleveland, Denver, and Phoenix) include 
arena-district boundary extensions past the quarter-mile radius to account for baseball facilities 
located within the extent of influence. 
 
  
                                                 
8 Assessment records for the city of Indianapolis are only accessible from 2002 to present (email correspondence, 
Indiana Department of Local Government Finance, 2017). A data analyst from the Indiana DLGF explained after 
contacting the Indianapolis Historical Society and the Indianapolis Historical Preservation Association that 
assessment records prior to 2002 had been destroyed. With the consolidation of the nine townships into one county, 
the county decided that it was not necessary to retain the old township records.  
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Table 3. Study sample’s original list of arenas built between 1990 and 2004. 
 
 
  
Obs. Franchise City County Facility 
Open
ed 
11 Minnesota Timberwolves Minneapolis Hennepin County NBA 1990 
22 Utah Jazz Salt Lake City Salt Lake City NBA 1991 
43 Phoenix Suns Phoenix Maricopa County NBA 1992 
44 Mighty Ducks of Anaheim Anaheim Los Angeles County NHL 1993 
55 San Jose Sharks San Jose Santa Clara County NHL 1993 
66 Cleveland Cavaliers Cleveland Cuyahoga County NBA 1994 
77 St. Louis Blues St. Louis St. Louis County NHL 1994 
88 Chicago Bulls/Blackhawks Chicago Cook County NBA/NHL 1994 
99 Portland Trail Blazers Portland Multnomah County NBA 1995 
110 Boston Celtics/Bruins Boston Suffolk County NBA/NHL 1995 
111 Buffalo Sabres Buffalo Erie County NHL 1996 
112 Nashville Predators Nashville Davidson County NHL 1996 
113 Tampa Bay Lightning Tampa Bay Hillsborough County NHL 1996 
114 Philadelphia 76ers/Flyers Philadelphia Philadelphia County NBA/NHL 1996 
115 Washington 
Wizards/Capitols 
Washington D.C. District of Columbia NBA/NHL 1997 
116 Florida Panthers Sunrise, FL Broward County NHL 1998 
117 Indiana Pacers Indianapolis Marion County NBA 1999 
118 Carolina Hurricanes Raleigh Wake County NHL 1999 
119 Atlanta Hawks/Thrashers Atlanta Fulton County NBA/NHL 1999 
220 Denver Nuggets/Col. 
Avalanche 
Denver Denver County NBA/NHL 1999 
221 L.A. 
Lakers/Clippers/Kings 
Los Angeles Los Angeles County NBA/NHL 1999 
222 Miami Heat Miami Miami-Dade County NBA 2000 
223 Columbus Blue Jackets Columbus Franklin County NHL 2000 
224 Minnesota Wild St. Paul Ramsey County NHL 2000 
225 Dallas Mavericks/Stars Dallas Dallas County NBA/NHL 2001 
226 Oklahoma City Thunder Oklahoma City Oklahoma County NBA 2002 
227 San Antonio Spurs San Antonio Bexar County NBA 2002 
228 Houston Rockets Houston Harris County NBA 2003 
229 Phoenix Coyotes Phoenix Maricopa County NHL 2003 
330 Memphis Grizzlies Memphis Shelby County NBA 2004 
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Table 4. List of observed arenas (n = 15) built between 1992 and 2004. 
 
3.2.1.3 Arena-district micro-area “zone of influence”  
One of the methodological challenges of evaluating the extent of influence that 
professional sport facilities have on urban development outcomes is determining what level of 
analysis should be used in analyzing the changes in land-use composition, total built volume, and 
property values (assessment values, market values, and property taxes). Chapin (1999) reveals in 
his three-case-study analysis of Cleveland’s Gateway District, Baltimore’s Camden Yards, and 
Arlington’s Ballpark District that it is a challenge to delineate areas in which impacts of a new 
professional sports facility are felt. Few public declarations of a city’s governmental bodies or 
official district boundaries (e.g., arts district, warehouse district, and so on, which may even have 
their own economic-development and planning board) are conducive to a sports venue’s “zone of 
Obs. Franchise County Facility Opened 
11 Phoenix Suns Maricopa County NBA 1992 
22 Cleveland Cavaliers Cuyahoga County NBA 1994 
33 Portland Trail Blazers Multnomah County NBA 1995 
44 Boston Celtics/Bruins Suffolk County NBA/NHL 1995 
55 Buffalo Sabres Erie County NHL 1996 
66 Nashville Predators Davidson County NHL 1996 
77 Tampa Bay Lightning Hillsborough County NHL 1996 
88 
Denver Nuggets/Col. 
Avalanche 
Denver County NBA/NHL 1999 
99 Miami Heat Miami-Dade County NBA 2000 
110 Minnesota Wild Ramsey County NHL 2000 
111 Dallas Mavericks/Stars Dallas County NBA/NHL 2001 
112 Oklahoma City Thunder Oklahoma County NBA 2002 
113 Houston Rockets Harris County NBA 2003 
114 Phoenix Coyotes Maricopa County NHL 2003 
115 Memphis Grizzlies Shelby County NBA 2004 
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influence.” Cleveland’s Gateway District9 and Dallas’ Victory Park are cases in which official 
governmental district boundaries were established for a sports and entertainment district. Victory 
Park, for instance, was one of the first master-planned developments intentionally built around 
the American Airlines Center to create a mixed-use luxury and entertainment district.  
Aside from the use of TIFs or CRAs, which have defined boundaries to capture a percentage of 
property tax revenues, official public declarations of district boundaries were ambiguous in the 
early 1990s. Chapin (1999) further notes that examining urban development outcomes at the 
neighborhood level can cause inconsistent results, since neighborhood boundaries are delineated 
along social and economic lines and are often not legally or administratively determined. There 
could also be development beyond that small area. 
Due to the ambiguity of geographic boundaries for small areas such as neighborhoods or 
districts, few academic studies have examined the impact of professional sports facilities at a 
micro-level geographic area. Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) investigate employment changes in 
relation to Cleveland’s Gateway District at a geographic level that they characterized as a 
“micro-area.” The micro-area’s exact size and boundaries are not geographically defined, but 
rather refer to areas that are most impacted by activity generated by the professional sports 
facility. Furthermore, Chapin extends the definition of “micro-area” in his own study to be “the 
area surrounding the new project that is most impacted by crowds attending events at the facility 
and most impacted by the activity, both economic and social, generated by the [sports venue]” 
(Chapin, 1999, p. 126). 
                                                 
9 Cleveland’s Historic Gateway Corporation determined the boundaries of the Gateway District. The Gateway 
District was more of a venue operation authority while the Historic Gateway Corporation was more involved in the 
economic development of the particular area identified in downtown Cleveland. 
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The logic is that downtowns can be revitalized by combining sports venues with mixed-
use developments in the form of hotels, residences, and retail businesses. As part of the arena-led 
development strategy, the presence of the arena stimulates the development of adjacent parcels. 
Furthermore, the way in which cities are financing venue construction is changing. Both cities 
and developers are capitalizing on transforming idle parking lots into revenue-producing 
properties (e.g., retail, residential, and office space) that are then capable of covering the costs of 
the new venue through a percentage of the parcel’s property taxes. “It is the one-square mile 
effect, [in which] downtowns and midtowns possess an enormous amount of value in a relatively 
small geography” (Katz quoted by Schneider, 01/19/2018). Land values are capitalized by 
professional sports venues, suggesting that people are willing to pay more to be closer to the 
venue. 
There is a growing body of research that examines the relationship between the presence 
of professional sports teams and facilities and nearby property values. Humphreys (2015) 
provides a valuable summary of the current literature (Tu, 2005; Dehring et al., 2007; Ahlfeldt & 
Maennig, 2009, 2010; Kavestos, 2012; Ahlfeldt & Kavestos, 2014) regarding the effects of a 
new sports facility on housing prices using data from before and after the opening of a facility. 
For example, Tu (2005) found a 13% increase in single-family housing values following the 
opening of FedEx Field (Washington DC). Additional factors, such as improved public 
infrastructure, may contribute to the price increases for residents living near the sports facility. 
FedEx Field is located in a low-income community in which there are limited financial 
resources. The state’s financial support for stadium construction and public infrastructure 
improvements included $70 million worth of physical upgrades, such as road improvements, that 
were needed by the community (Tu, 2005). Despite the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) concerns 
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related to the venue’s presence, including traffic congestion, air and noise pollution, and 
loitering, overall results show that the closer housing properties are to a major league sports 
venue and its attractive amenity package, the more the property values increase. The impact of 
property values for parcels located more than two miles away is minimal (Tu, 2005). 
Since the above studies focus exclusively on residential property values, the existing 
literature is still incomplete. The purpose of my research is to measure not simply housing 
property values but overall urban development outcomes, which will include commercial and 
exempt properties. The assessment of urban development outcomes must incorporate 
commercial properties (e.g., retail businesses, restaurants, hotels, and office space) in addition to 
accounting for the nuances of tax-abated and exempted properties. Propheter (2017) expands on 
the literature and estimates the impact of Brooklyn’s Barclays Center10 on commercial rents. 
Using the net operating income (NOI) from assessment records from 2006 through 2015, he 
found that commercial rents are negatively related to the distance from the arena;11 this suggests 
that businesses are willing to pay more in rent in order to be closer to the major league sports 
venue. 
These studies measured the changes in residential property values and commercial rental 
values relative to the spatial distance from a major league sports venue. A standardized “zone of 
influence” or micro-area is needed to systematically assess overall urban development outcomes 
at the parcel level surrounding the major league sports venues across the 15 cities. One might 
                                                 
10 Barclays Center, developed by Forest City Ratner Companies, is part of a $4.9 billion 22-acre urban complex 
called Atlantic Yards, now known as Pacific Park, which is touted to bring new residential units (30 % of which will 
be affordable housing units), commercial and retail space, and six acres of public space. The arena sits on top of one 
of the largest transit hubs in New York City (Plitt, 2016). Barclays Center was promoted by state and local policy 
makers as a project that would help revitalize the Atlantic Avenue-Flatbush Corridor into a business center.  
11 Propheter (2017) found that with every 1,000 feet of distance put between the commercial property and that of the 
Barclays Center, the NOI per square foot decreased by 3.7% (p. 2).  
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consider that an arena’s “zone of influence” is consistent across all city cases given the capacity 
of the arena (normally 18,000 to 22,000 seats) and the arena’s building footprint. Each arena 
district has a unique set of boundary conditions that are either determined by the natural 
environment (e.g., transportation corridors and open bodies water) or official local governmental 
boundaries (e.g., TIF districts and CRA zones). Issues in comparing arena districts that are 
different in size must be addressed. For example, the Historic Gateway District in Cleveland is 
approximately 28 acres in land area, whereas the Westgate Entertainment District in Glendale is 
approximately 233 acres. Indeed, it would be inaccurate to compare the total amount of new 
construction and other success measures without noting this important underlying characteristic. 
The impact area used to measure urban development outcomes is characterized as the 
“zone of influence” or the “arena-district micro-area.” For consistency, throughout the rest of 
this study, I will define the zone of influence as the arena district’s micro-area. Based upon 
Chapin’s case study analysis of Cleveland, Baltimore, and Arlington, I have resolved the 
boundary consistency issue by using a standardized definition of arena-district micro-area when 
comparing development changes across the 15 cities. 
I considered several approaches when determining the optimal size of the arena-district 
micro-area. First, Baade and Dye (1988) determined that the important factors to be considered 
for the local-area development and that should be a part of arena-district micro-areas include 
transportation corridors, spread of parking, and the potential for increased development. Austrian 
and Rosentraub (1997) were the first to observe downtown sports development at the micro-level 
compared to the metropolitan area. They defined micro-areas as “the location as to where 
development occurs is as important to center cities as is the issue of whether or not development 
takes place” (1997, p. 553). Chapin (1999) expanded the idea of sports-led urban development at 
56 
the micro-area level by defining micro-areas as “arenas surrounding the new project that is most 
impacted by crowds attending event at the facility and most impacted by the activity, both 
economic and social, generated by the project” (1999, p. 126). 
The variety of studies investigating the impact of major-league sport facilities on both 
residential and commercial property and rental values also defined distances in order to estimate 
the intensity of the spatial effect. For example, Tu (2005) used a 3-mile impact area around 
FedEx Field, Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2010) used a 1.5-mile radius to measure the impact of two 
sports complexes in downtown Berlin to improve neighborhood quality, Feng and Humphreys 
(2016) used an impact within a 1-mile radius in Columbus to measure willingness to pay and 
housing value changes, and Propheter (2017) used a 1-mile radius in Brooklyn to measure 
commercial properties and how rents are influenced by the distance from the Barclays Center. 
On average, these studies used a 1-mile radius to observe changes in property values. 
To resolve the boundary consistency issue is to use a standard “zone of influence” for all 
cases. This study extends the concept of an arena-district micro-area by defining a specific radius 
for the micro-area to create a standard level of analysis for cross-city comparisons. Indeed, cities’ 
arena-district micro-areas will vary from the standard size allocated per this study based on local 
government boundaries or TIF districts. But for the purpose of this study, an arena-district micro-
area is defined as a quarter-mile radius in which parcels were impacted by sports-anchored 
development. There are too few arenas in the mix that use an established boundary as part of a 
plan, declared government boundary, or listed in the local government’s policy objectives– thus 
not really worthwhile and will skew results. The key factor used to establish the quarter-mile 
radius was walkability—that is, how far one would be willing to walk to a luxury amenity, in this 
case a sport arena—as supported by research regarding pedestrians and park planning, retail 
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gravity models, and walking distance to public transit, among other factors. Per the field of 
transportation and public health, Yang and Diez-Roux (2012) found that the quarter-mile radius 
was often used as an acceptable walking distance across research studies12. Although an 
individual’s willingness to walk varies based on age, health, time availability, and the built 
environment (City Parks Blog, 2018), as part of public transport accessibility goals, the 
assumption is that walking distance to access public transport uses a quarter-mile or half-mile as 
distances in service planning (Daniels & Mulley, 2011). Furthermore, as local governmental 
units seek to produce typical guidelines for transit-oriented development, catchment areas for 
retail and service establishments were prescribed with walking distances of a quarter- to a half-
mile, or a five- to eight-minute walk (Iacono, Krizek, El-Geneidy, 2008). New York Regional 
Plan Association study found that residents within a quarter-mile of a transit facility were five to 
seven times more likely to walk to a transit station than other passengers (Regional Plan 
Association, 1997). Willingness to walk further than this threshold, which would create a larger 
catchment area, has not yet been studied. There are certainly the same sets of issues in gravity 
models that part of a catchment area is not included in the model, yet it is used all the time (e.g., 
drive time of 30 minutes from a mall to determine the market, and so on). 
In related work, a radius of a half-mile around each arena was tested but was found to be 
too large, largely because of the impact of city density on what is considered a reasonable 
distance to travel between two points, for example between one’s residence and a transit hub or 
retail center. Aerial images of high-density cities, such as Brooklyn, determined that the 
substitutional effects of the urban development outcomes from a major sports venue would likely 
                                                 
12 In determining the quarter-mile distance as an appropriate walking distance measure, it is important to note that it 
was not determined whether walking distances were altered based on the purpose of the trip and across different 
population groups (Yang & Diez-Roux, 2012).  
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not extend that far (although the quarter-mile radius also had challenges, such as the circular 
shape of the district not reflecting underlying conditions like barriers—natural or manmade—
that impede development in given direction). Moreover, there are issues associated with the 
geography of census units and the fact that the radius approach often bisected census tracts, 
making data gathering more challenging (though there are some GIS-based (geographic 
information system) innovations available through MABLE/Geocorr2k from the Missouri 
Census Data Center that offers a solution to these kinds of problems) (Missouri Census Data 
Center, 2015). 
With all factors considered, a quarter mile seemed the most appropriate radial dimension 
to define the arena-district micro-area. Such an area would comprise approximately 125 acres 
and would allow a suitable five-minute walking distance from the periphery to the center, a 
distance that could be used to remain consistent across all the cities. In some cases, another 
important boundary issue concerned the composition of the district. In three cases out of the 15 
cities, an arena district also contains another large-scale public assembly facility, such as another 
sports venue (major league, college, minor league), a convention or congress center, or other 
retail or commercial centers. To capture the impacts of the two venues in the same vicinity, an 
additional quarter-mile radius was drawn around the second venue. In Cleveland’s Gateway 
District, for instance, Progressive Field and Quicken Loans Arena are parcels that sit right next 
to each other, separated by a parking garage. Two quarter-mile radii were drawn around the two-
centroid points of the venues, and the quarter-mile radii overlapped. The expansion of the arena-
district micro-areas were used to measure whether an additional sports venue altered urban 
development outcomes. Utilizing GIS and conducting primary research at assessment offices, it 
was also a pragmatic choice to use the quarter-mile radius. 
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3.2.2 THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME MODEL13 
Three measures are used to determine the success of arena-led urban development 
outcomes and whether arena-district micro-areas grow and develop at a faster rate than the city 
itself. The three main measures that are incorporated into this urban development outcome model 
include the compounding rate of change in (1) property values, (2) total built volume (new 
construction and renovation), and (3) diversity in land-use composition over a 25-year period. 
Subsequently, the sum of these three measures—adjusting property values (assessment and 
market values and property tax revenues) to 2015 dollars—is used to determine the 
compounding rate of change in development of outcomes between 1990 and 2015 relative to 
each city overall. This comprehensively captures a set of physical changes in sports districts and 
the overall success of arena-led urban development strategies. 
Financial and land-use composition measures are discussed in detail, including their 
definitions, assumptions for predicting the overall urban development model, examples, and a 
list of data sources. 
3.2.2.1 Success measure 1: Increased property values  
An arena-led development is successful if it leads to increased arena-district micro-area 
property values. For cities, the promise of increased property values is a key objective of fiscally 
                                                 
13 There are several different ways to measure the success of urban development outcomes, and I specifically chose 
the three measures of success in the changes in property values, built volume, and land-use composition. These three 
variables are not by any means a comprehensive way to measure success in urban development outcomes, 
particularly in the urban planning discipline. Other factors that should be considered include the percentage of 
affordable housing units or below-market rate housing developments offered, racial diversity, fulfillment of terms 
agreed upon in community benefit agreements, to name a few. For this dissertation I focused on the three metrics 
above, however, in future urban planning research, other variables should be considered to provide a more 
comprehensive perspective on the relative success of arena-led development strategies. 
60 
oriented urban-planning strategies since these values are the basis for property tax assessments. 
Compounding rates of change in property values are assembled through the assessment data 
records for each district before and after the arena was built. Adjustments may need to be made 
for differences in assessment and valuation techniques across cities. For the purposes of 
comparison across the cities, a district with an increase in total valuation of $200 million is more 
successful than a district with a $50 million change in total valuation over the same time period. 
Of course, exceptions are considered for cities that have specific tax abatement and exemption 
policies. 
Cleveland, for instance, assesses all properties, regardless of whether or not they are 
exempt. The inclusion of exempt properties’ assessment values inflates the total assessment 
values generated in the city while keeping the property tax revenues low and realistic (again here 
you have to deal with the earnings tax issue and tie it to what is discussed in the case study) 
Additionally, the city of Cleveland also possesses tax abatement policies in which there is a 
temporary elimination of 100% of the increase in real estate property tax that results from 
improvements on eligible residential and commercial projects. During the length of the 
abatement, typically 15 years at 100% of the dollar amount, the property’s assessment value is 
recorded as the property value prior to any improvements completed before the 15-year period 
lapses. Although the Cuyahoga County Appraiser’s Office lists the full market and assessment 
value of the property, only the assessed value before improvements is used to determine the 
parcels’ property tax payments. Assessment values for exempt properties in Houston and Dallas, 
on the other hand, are not provided at all. This subsequently demonstrates a lower total 
assessment value for the cities and may not be entirely accurate per the building inventory in the 
city. 
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3.2.2.1.1 Property values: Assessment information 
Real property assessment is the process of establishing a dollar value for a particular 
property for property tax purposes. Property taxes help pay for local public services such as fire 
and police protection, parks and recreation facilities, water sewage and sanitation, and public 
schools and community colleges. To ensure that the tax burden placed on local residents is both 
accurate and distributed fairly across the jurisdiction, local governments assess city and county 
property values every one to three years, a process known as a mass appraisal. 
Assessed value is evaluated by overall quality of the property. This includes comparable 
property values, square footage, home features (construction type, age, etc.), and market 
conditions. Additionally, assessed value is calculated differently depending on property usage—
residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural, vacant land, and so on. While there are similar 
basic procedures for calculating assessed value, each tax district may conduct their calculations 
differently. For example, in some jurisdictions, assessed value is determined by the market value, 
and in other jurisdictions, the assessed value is calculated by multiplying the market value by a 
pre-determined assessment rate. Assessment rates between 1990 and 2015 are provided in Table 
5. Moreover, these assessed values, typically lower than the appraisal’s market value, can range 
from 10% to 100% of a property’s fair-market value. 
Assessment rates differ widely across states and from city to city, therefore creating 
challenges when comparing these values. Property assessment data is used to record the changes 
in land use and profitability of development, thereby observing how property taxes and 
development costs affect urban development. Fiscal instruments, such as assessment values and 
development costs, both change and impact the way in which land is developed (e.g., density) 
and the mix of land use. While the method for which assessment data is both collected and 
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calculated is variable by jurisdiction, it is important to note that within a jurisdiction, properties 
are assessed uniformly and consistently; the same application of policies and standards are used 
to determine real estate quality and desirability. Each parcel located in the defined study area of a 
particular city is assessed both uniformly and consistently. It is, however, much more difficult to 
compare the rate of change of assessment values across the 25 US cities in the study population. 
Since assessment data differs substantially by jurisdiction in how the data was collected and 
analyzed, finding any sort of useful or intelligible results summarizing and comparing percent 
change in assessment values across the different cities is a challenge. While a compounding rate 
of change for each of the three measures is feasible within a city, conducting such an analysis 
across jurisdictions can produce muddled results. 
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Table 5. City assessment ratios by land-use category, 1990–2015, (t = 15) 
CITY YEAR LAND TYPE ASSESSMENT RATIOS 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
PHOENIX 1992 
COMMERCIAL    0.25 0.18 0.18 
RESIDENTIAL    0.10 0.10 0.10 
INDUSTRIAL    0.25 0.18 0.18 
AGRICULTURAL    0.16 0.15 0.15 
VACANT    0.16 0.15 0.15 
PARKING    0.25 0.18 0.18 
CLEVELAND 1994 ALL PROPERTIES 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
PORTLAND 1995 ALL PROPERTIES 0.1 0.1 
(+) 3% OF 
PRIOR YEAR 
(+) 3% OF 
PRIOR YEAR 
(+) 3% OF 
PRIOR YEAR 
(+) 3% OF 
PRIOR YEAR 
BOSTON 1995  - - - - - - 
BUFFALO 1996 ALL PROPERTIES 1 1 1 1 0.88 0.72 
NASHVILLE 1996 
COMMERCIAL 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
RESIDENTIAL 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
INDUSTRIAL 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
UTILITY 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
EXEMPT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TAMPA BAY 1996 ALL PROPERTIES 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DENVER 1999 
NON-RESIDENTIAL 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
RESIDENTIAL 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 
MIAMI 2000 ALL PROPERTIES 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ST. PAUL 2000  - - - - - - 
DALLAS 2001 ALL PROPERTIES 1 1 1 1 1 1 
OKLAHOMA 
CITY 
2002 ALL PROPERTIES 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
HOUSTON 2003 ALL PROPERTIES 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GLENDALE 2003 
COMMERCIAL    0.25 0.18 0.18 
RESIDENTIAL    0.10 0.10 0.10 
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INDUSTRIAL    0.25 0.18 0.18 
AGRICULTURAL    0.16 0.15 0.15 
VACANT    0.16 0.15 0.15 
PARKING    0.25 0.18 0.18 
MEMPHIS 2004 
COMMERCIAL 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
RESIDENTIAL 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
INDUSTRIAL 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
UTILITY 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
EXEMPT       
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3.2.2.1.2 Property values: Appraisal methods 
A property’s assessed value largely depends on the city (or county, since in many places 
the assessments are done at the county level) assessment office’s data-collection methods. There 
are three methods that assessment offices use to determine a property’s value: the sales 
comparison approach, the cost approach, and the income capitalization approach. These three 
appraisal methods are used to estimate the value of a particular property at a specific point in 
time. Appraisal reports and property record cards are valuable to government agencies, investors, 
mortgage lenders, and businesses, not only by helping assess important real estate transaction 
decisions, but also by assisting in determining the growth management and urban development 
of a particular area. 
 
The Sales Comparison Approach: The sales comparison approach, sometimes referred to as the 
market approach, estimates a property’s value by comparing properties that have recently sold. 
These properties must be as similar to the subject property as possible in terms of property 
characteristics and available amenities, must have been sold in the last year, and must have been 
sold under comparable market conditions. However, since no two properties are exactly alike, 
adjustments are often made. Such adjustments may include the age and condition of the building, 
the date of the sale (e.g., the length of time between when the property was last appraised and the 
date of sale of comparable properties), location, physical features (lot size, construction, square 
footage, etc.), and terms and conditions of the sale (foreclosure, duress, etc.). The market value 
of a property will fall close in range based on the adjusted sales prices of the comparable 
properties. 
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The Cost Approach: The cost approach valuation method is typically used for properties that are 
either not sold often or are not income-producing properties. Such properties may include 
government buildings, hospitals, schools, and churches. The cost approach appraisal method 
estimates the value of properties that have been improved with the addition of one or more 
buildings. This method requires a separate estimated value for each of the buildings and that of 
the land, as well as depreciation. The cost approach valuation method is often used to estimate 
the value of land as if it were vacant and available for best and highest use; the cost of 
constructing new buildings or performing any site improvements; and the depreciation of the 
property due to deterioration or that of market conditions. 
Based on the estimated construction costs and site improvements and accounting for 
depreciation, these estimated values are then summed to calculate the value of the entire 
improved property. 
 
The Income Capitalization Approach: The income capitalization valuation method is used to 
estimate the value of income-producing properties that include apartment and condominium 
complexes, office buildings, shopping malls, etc. The valuation is based on the investors’ 
required rate of return, or capitalization rate, and the property’s net income. This valuation 
approach estimates the property’s value in four ways: by estimating the property’s gross income; 
by determining the losses in vacancy and rent to calculate the property’s effective gross income; 
by calculating the annual net operating income; and by estimating the capitalization rate and 
applying the rate to the net operating income 
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3.2.2.1.3 Market value 
Market value is defined as the price for which a property will bring in a competitive and 
open market transaction under all the conditions in which there is a fair sale and the buyer and 
owners are acting in each other’s best interests. Simply put, it is the price that the buyer is willing 
to pay and the seller is willing to accept for a particular property.  
3.2.2.1.4 Property taxes 
Property taxes are an effective method for financing local public services and is the 
primary local tax that supplies the majority of local government revenue in 48 of the 50 states. 
The calculation of property tax revenue for a city and the property tax paid on a particular parcel 
begins with the city assessor’s office, which calculates the total value of taxable property. In 
most cases, the taxable value of a property is the same as the property’s assessed value. Some 
exception exist, such as in the city of Tampa, in which taxable property values are 15% of the 
parcel’s assessment value. The tax rate for the year is then set at a level determined by the 
jurisdiction and multiplied by the taxable value, divided either by 100 or 1,000, depending on 
how the tax rate, or mill rate, is displayed. The calculation presented is the property tax owed on 
the property. 
Table 6 provides the tax rates by land use for each city between 1990 and 2015. Tax rates 
vary based on land-use category. Commercial and industrial parcels typically have higher tax 
rates and therefore owe more taxes. Since local governments rely heavily on property tax 
revenues for the funding of public infrastructure improvements, schools, recreational services, 
and public services, land use plays a substantial role in the amount of property tax revenues 
generated and the overall urban development outcomes of a city. Parcels that are at their highest 
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and best use generate the highest levels of property taxes; therefore, it is an incentive of the city 
to ensure that all parcels are income-producing parcels rather than laying vacant.
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Table 6. City Assessment Ratios by Land Use Category, 1990-2015 (t = 15) 
CITY 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
PHOENIX 
LPV: 9.4785 
FCV: 4.0106 
LPV: 13.1873 
FCV: 5.3132 
LPV: 11.4140 
FCV: 5.7759 
LPV: 9.6911 
FCV: 4.5344 
LPV: 7.9071 
FCV: 4.1731 
LPV: 12.3331 
FCV: 5.9999 
CLEVELAND 
80.2 
 
RESIDENTIAL CREDIT: 
0.267388 
 
COMMERCIAL CREDIT: 
0.154158 
80.40 
 
RESIDENTIAL 
CREDIT: 0.361214 
 
COMMERCIAL 
CREDIT: 0.208040 
93.50 
 
RESIDENTIAL 
CREDIT: 0.373593 
 
COMMERCIAL 
CREDIT: 0.226175 
102.60 
 
920 REDUCTION 
RATE: 0.169755 
102.7 
 
920 REDUCTION 
RATE: 0.209934 
119.73 
 
920 REDUCTION 
RATE: 0.149309 
PORTLAND 33.5048 31 20.95 19.89415 21.7815 23.6472 
BOSTON 
COMMERCIAL: 23.9 
  
RESIDENTIAL: 8.45 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 23.9 
 
 
MIXED-USE: 
 
VALUE UNDER 2 
MILLION:  
80% COMMERCIAL  
& 20% RESIDENTIAL 
 
 
VALUE OVER 2 
MILLION:  
60% COMMERCIAL & 
40% RESIDENTIAL 
COMMERCIAL: 42.66 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 13.86 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 42.66 
 
MIXED-USE:  
 
VALUE UNDER 2 
MILLION: 80% 
COMMERCIAL & 20% 
RESIDENTIAL 
 
VALUE OVER 2 
MILLION: 60% 
COMMERCIAL & 40% 
RESIDENTIAL  
COMMERCIAL: 34.21 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 13.15 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 34.21 
 
MIXED-USE:  
 
VALUE UNDER 2 
MILLION: 80% 
COMMERCIAL & 20% 
RESIDENTIAL 
 
VALUE OVER 2 
MILLION: 60% 
COMMERCIAL & 40% 
RESIDENTIAL  
COMMERCIAL: 32.68 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 10.73 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 32.68 
COMMERCIAL: 29.38 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 11.88 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 29.38 
COMMERCIAL: 29.52 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 12.11 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 29.52 
BUFFALO 
TOTAL: 42.23 
 
CITY TAX: 26.26 
 
SCHOOL TAX: 15.97 
TOTAL: 36.12 
 
CITY TAX: 21.77 
 
SCHOOL TAX: 14.35 
TOTAL: 37.67089 
 
CITY TAX: 19.869348 
 
SCHOOL TAX: 
17.801542 
TOTAL: 37.40728 
 
CITY TAX: 19.838094 
 
SCHOOL TAX: 
17.569182 
TOTAL: 32.06205 
 
CITY TAX: 16.442665 
 
SCHOOL TAX: 
15.619385 
TOTAL: 26.99025 
 
CITY TAX: 13.848783 
 
SCHOOL TAX: 
26.99025 
NASHVILLE 
TOTAL: 4.8 
 
GSD: 3.48 
 
USD: 1.12  
TOTAL: 4.5 
 
GSD: 3.38 
 
USD: 1.12 
TOTAL: 4.24 
 
GSD: 3.29 
 
USD: 0.95 
TOTAL: 4.58 
 
GSD: 3.84 
 
USD: 0.74 
TOTAL: 4.13 
 
GSD: 3.56 
 
USD: 0.57 
TOTAL: 4.516 
 
GSD: 3.924 
 
USD: 0.592 
TAMPA BAY TOTAL: 26.5 
TOTAL: 25.042 
 
CITY: 6.54 
 
COUNTY: 8.931 
TOTAL: 23.855 
 
CITY: 6.54 
 
COUNTY: 8.454 
TOTAL: 20.777 
 
CITY: 5.733 
 
COUNTY: 6.882 
TOTAL: 20.37 
 
CITY: 5.733 
 
COUNTY: 6.784 
TOTAL: 20.37 
 
CITY: 5.733 
 
COUNTY: 6.784 
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SCHOOL: 9.071 
 
SCHOOL: 8.361 
 
SCHOOL: 7.692 
 
SCHOOL: 7.353 
 
SCHOOL: 7.353 
DENVER 67.576 81.161 67.321 66.897 (2007) 66.591 78.127 
MIAMI 31.7196 31.2275 27.884 25.9728 24.7081 22.7032 
ST. PAUL - -  -  - -  -  
DALLAS 
TOTAL: 2.11989 
 
CITY: 0.6297 
 
COUNTY: 0.39019 
 
SCHOOL: 1.1 
TOTAL: 2.628163 
 
CITY: 0.6722 
 
COUNTY: 0.47415 
 
SCHOOL: 1.481813 
TOTAL: 2.720697 
 
CITY: 0.6675 
 
COUNTY: 0.505667 
 
SCHOOL: 1.54753 
TOTAL: 2.98486 
 
CITY: 0.7417 
 
COUNTY: 0.5548 
 
SCHOOL: 1.68836 
TOTAL: 2.658141 
 
CITY: 0.797 
 
COUNTY: 0.62333 
 
SCHOOL: 1.237811 
TOTAL: 2.7406 
 
CITY: 0.797 
 
COUNTY: 0.66275 
 
SCHOOL: 1.282085 
OKLAHOMA 
CITY 
94.5 99.01 101.66 108.9 114.33 114.5 
HOUSTON 2.215 2.733 2.904 2.988 2.65923 2.655164 
GLENDALE 
LPV: 8.6412 
 
FCV: 7.1579 
LPV: 9.4221 
 
FCV: 8.9663 
LPV: 8.3424 
 
FCV: 8.8652 
LPV: 7.7814 
 
FCV: 7.0801 
LPV: 5.6255 
 
FCV: 7.4576 
LPV: 8.5491 
 
FCV: 8.9011 
MEMPHIS 2.88 3.16 3.54 4.04 4.02 4.37 
       
 
 
 
71 
3.2.2.1.5 Land value and building value 
For appraisal purposes, land is defined as real property exclusive of improvements. Land 
surveys are used to determine land value. These surveys will determine the exact parameters and 
borders of the land plot and use items such as street frontage, topography, and the buildable land 
to determine the total land value. Furthermore, surveyors determine what the base cost is to 
improve a plot of land to a condition that can be built upon. Developable land parcels are 
typically assessed in two components. The first component is dependent on how the site 
conforms to a particular jurisdictions’ zoning laws. The second is determining the amount of 
land that is in excess of the building site. Building value is based on the rentable square footage 
of a building. Building additions or attachments, such as garages or greenhouses, are not 
included in the assessed value of the building. 
3.2.2.1.6 Improvement value  
Improved value is defined as anything that is done to the land or building with the 
intention of improving its value. Such improvements can include, for example, additional 
buildings, fences, retaining walls, driveways, or pavements. 
 
3.2.2.2 Success measure 2: Increase in total built area (square footage)  
An arena-led district is successful if there is evidence of new construction (including 
renovations) over the study period. To test this criterion, I ask, What is the amount of new 
construction and renovation in the district? (this measure is net of the arena itself); and, How has 
the total volume of building changed between 1990 and 2010? This criterion is measured using 
the volume of new construction in square feet. The precise determination of “success” will be 
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assessed both in absolute terms and comparison terms. In absolute terms, the amount of new 
construction is measured relative to the full-build-out scenario for each district. For example, a 
district that is 50% fully built by 2010 is more successful than a district that is 25% built out. The 
percentage terms are used to normalize and control for differences in the size of districts, as 
appropriate. For other comparisons, there are measures of new construction in volume by square 
footage. For example, a district that has generated two million square feet of new construction is 
more successful than a district that has generated one million square feet. 
3.2.2.2.1 Total built area 
Total built area is a measurement of the rate of change in construction and renovation. 
While not all assessment cards, property characteristic records, and tax rolls differentiate 
between lot size (acreage) and the building size (square footage), there are instances in which 
this information is entirely eliminated. To calculate the compounding rate of change in total built 
volume, the ratio of new construction and renovation (e.g., the construction of a complete new 
structure or the addition to a pre-existing structure) for parcels located in the arena-district micro-
area are calculated and compared to the construction and renovation ratio of the entire city. The 
purpose of this is to determine whether the entire city grew in total built volume or whether the 
construction and renovation trend is concentrated in the arena-district micro-area surrounding the 
professional sports facility. 
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3.2.2.3 Success measure 3: Achieving desires changes in land-use mix 
An arena-led development is successful if it generates desired shifts in the land-use mix. 
Since many district sites are underutilized areas of cities, the baseline land-use mix in 1990 was 
typically characterized by having few buildings, few residents, high vacancy rates, and in some 
cases environmental contamination. As a result, we can expect that many districts will reveal a 
substantial change in the land-use mix. In absolute terms, “desired changes” can be measured 
only if there is a specific plan in place to serve as a reference. Absent such a plan, the 
comparison of land-use mix outcomes will be assessed relative to the full sample. For example, 
based on this analysis, it will be possible to discuss the snapshot of land-use mix in planned 
arena districts and the snapshot of the current land-use mix in the “average” district and thereby 
to chart which districts have more housing, which have more retail, and so forth. 
 
3.2.2.3.1 Land-use composition 
Land-use composition is reported in the city or county’s property characteristic records or 
annual tax rolls. Land-use mix is measured by the shift in property land use. My interest is in 
finding trends in the change in property land use concurrent with the rate of change in property 
assessment values. As cities and neighborhoods are pressured to grow and to spur more 
development, land-use composition tends to shift toward what is deemed as its highest (e.g., 
highest revenue-generating) and best use. For instance, as heavy industry and manufacturing 
factories became obsolete in downtown areas, zoning ordinances were changed to allow for 
different land uses, thereby providing more opportunities for the renovation of old warehouses 
into office buildings, residential condominiums, or even mixed-use properties. 
74 
The land-use composition counts, as displayed in the tables for each case study, are 
dependent on the number of parcels available for each land-use category. In determining land use 
by a parcel unit of analysis, one must be aware that a large infrastructure project may contain 
hundreds of individual parcels for one single building. For instance, the newer residential owner-
occupied condominium buildings may have 300 parcels with the same property address. In such 
cases, each condominium is assessed individually. The reason for this is that condominiums are 
owner-occupied, which allows owners, with some restrictions, to make improvements to their 
living units. Based on the various improvements and additions made—square footage, number of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, location in the building, etc.—each condominium’s assessment value 
will vary. Moreover, there is the possibility of including commercial office space, ground floor 
retail and restaurant space, and even an underground parking garage in a building that might be 
primarily for residential use. Such a building is defined as mixed-use, but each retail space, 
office, etc., is given a separate parcel identification number. In such cases, if all the parcels have 
the same address, the multiple office parcels are counted as one unit of commercial land use. 
However, the final count of office parcels—a subcategory of commercial land use—is listed as 
the count of how many office parcels existed in the same building and had its own parcel 
identification number. existed in the building. The same is true for the multiple counts of retail 
and restaurant space allocated for one address. 
Coupled with resolving the appropriate count for land-use categories by parcel-level data, 
mixed-use properties can be a bit of an anomaly. The city of Boston’s Assessing Office, for 
example, provides a designation “residential/commercial” or “commercial/residential” for 
mixed-use properties. These labels are dependent on which land use is the primary use of the 
property. For example, for the label “residential/commercial,” the first listed land use, 
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residential, is the primary use of the parcel. To be clear, mixed-use land use is the designation for 
each individual parcel. This should not be confused with the larger infrastructure developments 
that are mixed-use in nature but contain multiple parcels of different land uses. The mixed-use 
parcels therefore have a smaller overall land-use count compared to residential and commercial 
parcel counts. 
 
3.3 ARENA-LED URBAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES DATA SOURCES 
3.3.1 PARCEL-LEVEL DATA 
Parcel-level information was the first data element needed. I began the process of 
collecting cadastral (parcel) GIS files from individual city GIS, planning, or assessment 
websites. For cities that did not have these GIS shapefiles14 publicly available, I had two options. 
The first was to utilize the city assessor’s online GIS tools that were often unable to capture the 
parcels located in a quarter-mile radius of the arena. In such instances, I had to manually select 
and individually identify each parcel. The second option was to take a screen capture of the 
parcel boundaries on the assessor’s website, impose the screen capture into ArcMap, and again 
cross-reference with the assessor’s website. Furthermore, parcel-level information embedded 
within the GIS shapefiles varied greatly city by city.  
 
                                                 
14 A shapefile is a format that can store geometric location and attribute information of geographic features (ESRI, 
2018). 
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3.3.2 HISTORICAL PARCEL MAPS 
Historical parcel maps were extremely valuable to have in order to track parcel 
subdivisions and consolidations across a 25-year period. Again, the accessibility to parcel maps 
from the 1990s was varied. Some cities contracted through REI (Real Estate Inventory) to create 
parcel map books and incorporate all assessment data onto microfilm, while other cities only 
maintained survey maps from the 1800s. 
3.3.3 ASSESSMENT DATA 
A measure of success is the summation of a city’s property value, total built area, and 
land-use mix. Arena-led development outcome data is culled from a number of different city 
departments, including tax assessment and property appraisers, engineering, planning and 
economic development, land surveyors, city clerks and recorders, and city archives. Data used to 
compile the three measurements could largely be found listed on property assessment cards, 
annual tax rolls, or property deeds. All of the data collected for this research utilized primary 
records and resources and for the most part required visits to city offices to record data from the 
1990s.  
 
3.4 CALCULATING VARIATIONS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
The key measure of the success in urban development for this study is the compounding 
rate of change in land-use composition, its linkage to the property assessment values between 
1990 and 2015, and the ratio of the property assessment changes in the arena-district micro-area 
to that of the entire city. Each city case summary provides a line graph of the relative change in 
land-use composition for the arena-district micro-area. Additionally, graphs are presented for 
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compounding rates of change in property assessment values and property taxes between the 
arena-district micro-area and the city. Relative percentage differences between the arena district 
and city growth are also displayed. The aim of the study is to determine whether the arena-
district micro-area had a compounding rate of change over the 25 years and in five-year 
increments between 1990 and 2015 that is higher than that of the city. If the compounding rate of 
change in the arena district is consistently higher than the city, then we know that the arena 
district, along with local governmental support, was successful in generating more arena-led 
urban development outcomes. 
 
3.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE ARENA-LED URBAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME MODEL 
While much of my data derive from primary sources accessed from city and county 
assessment, clerk and recording, and archives offices, there still remain limitations and flaws in 
what data are accessible and how the research is designed. 
The standards for maintaining historical assessment data varies from state to state. Most 
cities are legally required to maintain the past seven years’ assessment data on file, thus any 
information that is requested earlier than 2010 may not be directly accessible from the assessor’s 
offices and must be located at the city and country recorders’ or archives offices. Furthermore, 
city and county offices only began to digitize their information in 2005 or later. This means that 
there might be substantial variability in which assessment information prior to 2005 is organized 
and maintained. Some assessment and archives offices (e.g., Buffalo) house all historical 
assessment records in both paper format and microfiche in a distant warehouse. Other cities, such 
as Indianapolis, destroyed their assessment records prior to 2002 when the city consolidated from 
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nine townships to one county, believing that with the shift to a county level, the older records 
would be obsolete. 
A second limitation has to do with the assessment data that I used to analyze the total 
value of development between 1990 and 2015. Assessing property is not an exact science, and 
valuation methods vary from city to city. Thus, using assessment data to analyze total change in 
development is inherently flawed. While transactional data may prove to be a better 
measurement of changes in property values, there is insufficient transactional data to capture 
when utilizing a small catchment area within a quarter mile radius. 
Finally, to measure the change in total value of development between 1990 and 2015 
within a particular jurisdiction, I plan to measure the order of magnitude of change in nominal 
numbers. However, to compare the change in development values across cities, these nominal 
numbers by city-to-city case must be transformed to constant data, or ratio of change, to compare 
“apples to apples.” 
 
3.6 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
The data collection process for this research study was organized in five phases. A 
summary of the steps in each phase is provided below in Table 7; this series of steps is reflected 
in the subsequent discussion. The data collection process marks Stage Two of this study’s 
research methodology. 
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Table 7. Stage Two: data collection process in mapping the urban development outcomes: 
Summary of data collection process, 2017. 
Data Collection Phases 
Phase 1: 
Identify assessment 
sources and gather parcel 
identifiers using GIS. 
Access GIS land use and parcel-level boundary shapefiles, also 
known as cadastral shapefiles. 
Research online data portals of local assessment, taxation, planning, 
and GIS-specific offices for required data. 
Identify availability (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015) and 
accessibility of assessment and taxation data sources for each 
municipality. 
Phase 2: 
Draw district boundary 
buffers using GIS. 
Use a standard extent-of-influence measure for all districts (quarter-
mile radius). 
Use the intersect and buffer tools in ArcGIS to select and extract all 
currently active parcels from most recent GIS files available 
(2015/2016). 
Compose data request letter requesting 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2010, and 2015 parcel-level assessment and property characteristic 
information and send to 25 assessment offices via priority mail. 
Phase 3: 
Conduct arena site visits 
and inventory microfilm 
assessment and taxation 
data. 
Visit those cities for which the planning, assessment, and taxation 
offices were either unable to provide property assessment values and 
property cards for the five years requested or were unresponsive. 
The length of my stay in each city was determined by the number of 
parcels and years for which I needed to collect information from 
microfilm (e.g., 1990, 1995, 2000). 
Site visits to the arena and walking around the quarter-mile zone of 
influence provided another layer of validity-checking regarding 
correct land-use characterization and building composition. 
Phase 4: 
Impute microfilm 
assessment data and index 
inactive parcels. 
Impute assessment data from microfiche into excel spreadsheets. 
Index current active parcels to determine which parcels were 
consolidated/split/deactivated over the 20-year period. 
Trace “parent” parcels that were not present in each of the five-year 
intervals through legal descriptions, surveyor maps, deeds, clerical 
records, property sales information, verifying when particular parcels 
were split and/or consolidated. 
Phase 5: 
Sum split and 
consolidated parcels; 
identify parcel repetitions 
to eliminate double 
counting. 
Trace parent parcels from current active parcel list (2015) through 
the combination of legal description, surveyor maps, deeds, and sales 
information. 
For cases in which multiple inactive parent parcels made up the land 
area of a current active parcel, inactive parcels were summed. 
Cases in which current active parcels were split from larger land 
parcels suggest that more than one active parcel could have derived 
from the same parent parcel. In such cases, the current active parcels 
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are repetitions. Repeated parcels are eliminated from the dataset to 
avoid the double counting of land acreage and assessment values. 
Land acreage, building square footage, assessment values, market 
values, and property taxes are summed for each five-year interval to 
determine total amount of change in assessment value, built volume, 
and land acreage. 
Percentage total of land-use categories are tabulated for each five-
year period, demonstrating change in built area and land use 
composition. 
 
In the first three phases of this research, my goal was to create a record of urban development 
outcomes that was systematically and consistently measured across each of the 15 arena districts 
in the sample population. 
 
3.6.1 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
3.6.1.1 Phase 1: Gathering parcel identification numbers in zone of influence 
In this first step of this research project, I surveyed city, county, and state websites for 
GIS open data portals and the earliest year for which assessment and property tax data were 
publicly made available online. Surveying assessor and planning department websites for open 
GIS data portals was imperative in accessing property parcel geographic boundaries and the 
linked property identifier.  
3.6.1.2 Phase 2: Drawing GIS buffers to collate parcel identification numbers 
In Phase 2, I used the GIS shapefiles acquired during Phase I to identify all parcels 
located in the arena-district micro-area (i.e., the quarter-mile radius). The shapefiles used are 
cadastral shapefiles that hold all 2015 parcel boundaries and parcel identification numbers by 
county. I then geocoded the addresses of the 25 arena facilities and then placed a point on the 
centroid of each arena facility. Next, I used the buffer tool in GIS to create a designated area 
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measured in units of distance around the centroid point or map feature. As explained earlier, this 
measured distance is a quarter-mile around the centroid. The quarter-mile buffer is simply a 
drawn boundary around the centroid of the arena. To extract and isolate the parcels desired from 
the overall parcel layer, I used the intersect tool to select the parcels featured within the quarter-
mile buffer. The intersect output then became the new unit of observation for each city case 
study as it is its own layer of extracted information. These selected parcels each possess a parcel 
identification number. A parcel’s identification number remains linked to the property, given that 
the property’s geographic size or configuration is not altered. If a parcel is modified as a result of 
a split (a property parcel is split into two or more properties) or a consolidation (a multitude of 
properties are reconfigured into one large parcel), the original identification number becomes 
inactive, and new parcel identification numbers are distributed. 
In cases where these shapefiles were not publicly available, I contacted individual GIS 
offices for access to these particular files. If there was an associated cost to the GIS files, I 
utilized the city- or county-maintained online interactive mapping platform15 to select the parcels 
that were located in the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area. Depending on the availability of 
advanced features on the interactive mapping platform—for example, the ability to select 
multiple parcels through a radius selection tool versus manually creating a boundary box and 
then selecting individual parcels one at a time—I compiled a complete list of parcels in a quarter-
mile arena-district micro-area. The total number of parcels currently active in the zone of 
influence for each city varied substantially (see individual case summaries tables in Chapter 4 
and Appendix A). Reasons for the variability in total number of parcels is attributed to parcel 
                                                 
15 Interactive mapping platforms vary from city to city. Some interactive mapping platforms are more user-friendly 
than others depending on the types of tools made available to the user. A tool as simple as the radius measurement 
tool to select a radius, highlight parcels in the radius, and extract to a csv file is not always available. 
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configuration or parcel size, density of the urban environment, and the number of splits or 
consolidations16 that may have occurred on several different occasions over the study period. 
Once I identified the total number of currently active parcels in each zone of influence, I mailed 
out data request letters to each of the 25 property assessment offices. The data request letters (see 
Appendix) included (1) a succinct summary of the purpose and goals of the research project; (2) 
a list of variables for six different time points (e.g., 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015), 
including but not limited to property assessment information (e.g., land value, building value, 
market value, and total assessed value) and property characteristic information (e.g., parcel 
number, property address, land-use code, year built, parcel acreage, building square footage, and 
legal description); and (3) a list of parcel identification numbers and addresses. I provided a 
curated list of parcel identification numbers rather than a general geographic area bounded by 
street blocks to ensure that the city and/or county assessment offices would be more willing to 
conduct search queries for historic parcel assessment values. 
Of the 25-property assessment offices contacted, I obtained 2005, 2010, and 2015 
assessment values from 19 cities without being charged a fee. That data, however, only included 
information for parcels specifically listed in the data request letters. The initial search queries 
and datasets provided by the assessing office did not consider splits and consolidations, therefore 
lot parcels that were listed in the 2015 worksheets were eliminated in 2005 and 2010. The reason 
for this is that at some point between 2005 and 2015, the property could have been listed as 
inactive due to a recent sale, parcel split, or parcel consolidation, and therefore the parcel 
identification number is inactive and will not show up on the assessor’s internal database unless 
logs of splits and consolidations are carefully detailed. 
                                                 
16 Splits and consolidations can result from multiple changes in property sales and changes in ownership. 
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Three of the 25 cities—Anaheim, Los Angeles, and San Jose—were eliminated because 
of the high cost of obtaining the dated parcel information. Furthermore, it was not possible to 
travel to these city offices to track down inactive parcels on microfilm. Moreover, assessment 
data prior to 2005 in Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Raleigh, and Indianapolis were unobtainable 
from the property assessor, clerk (recorder), and archive offices, or on microfilm. Cities and 
counties have different data-retention standards and regulations. This means that data availability 
across cities and counties varies. For example, it is typical for most cities and counties to follow 
a five- to seven-year retention schedule. After seven years, the city is no longer legally required 
to retain these records. Some city and county offices will retain the outdated documents at an off-
site storage location or turn them over to the county or state archives or local research libraries. 
In other cases, the documents are destroyed as the minimum retention time is complete. City and 
county offices only began digitizing their property records after 2005; therefore, documents 
earlier than 2005 are still in print format or microfilm. If the records were not already retained as 
microfilm, it is very likely that the records were destroyed because of limitations in local and 
state funding, available labor, or department priorities for eventual digitization of the records. 
Eleven of the cities I visited maintained 1990, 1995, and 2000 records on microfilm either in the 
assessor’s office or at an off-site archives department. Retention schedules for the cities in the 
sample population are available online, providing title and description for each government 
document, number of years required for retention, and the statute of retention.  
3.6.1.3 Phase 3: Site visits 
I traveled to 16 of the 25 cities in the study sample to collect the 1990, 1995, and 2000 
assessment and property characteristic information from tax roll microfilm. I spent an average of 
four days in each city working in the assessment offices, scanning copies of the microfilm while 
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identifying which current 2015 parcels were missing from the microfilm files for 1990, 1995, 
and 2000. After each trip, I searched for the missing parcels’ parent parcels in the city and 
county deeds and records. 
Within those four days, I also conducted arena site visits. Site visits were intended to 
gather additional information that could be corroborated with findings from the other quantitative 
data collected. With respect to this study, the site visits were designed to strengthen the overall 
evaluation and quantitative components of the study, such as the changes in built area, land 
composition, and property values and their impact on urban development outcomes in arena 
districts. My intention for the site visits was to provide a development snapshot of the arena’s 
presence within the arena district and community as a whole. During the site visits, I walked the 
city block grid within the quarter-mile radius and sometimes even an extension of the zone of 
influence, plotting on blank parcel maps whether the construction type per parcel coincided with 
the property and land use listed on the tax rolls. I also took notice of pedestrian and vehicle 
traffic, walkability, access to light rail or public transportation, density of restaurants, bars, and 
general retail. While certainly not a large component of the research study, I interviewed a few 
local government officials, property assessors, and economic development and planning officers 
about the impact the arenas had on their particular city’s urban development initiatives. The 
discussions with local government employees17 provided context to the city’s urban development 
motives,18 future land use planning, and the modifications to city tax policies. The triangulation 
                                                 
17 A large portion of the local government employees have lived and worked in their respective cities for more than 
a decade on average. Informal discussions provided an insider’s perspective on the urban development changes in 
the area.   
18 I had the opportunity to meet with the Tampa Bay City urban development manager, who manages four 
community redevelopment areas, including downtown and the Channelside District, where the Amalie Arena is 
located. I was given a walking tour of the downtown development areas and background on the city’s engagement 
with public-private partnerships to further redevelop downtown Tampa Bay. 
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of the quantitative data, the site visits, and informal discussions with property assessors and 
planning department personnel assisted in presenting a more complete perspective of the urban 
development outcomes in each city’s arena district 
3.6.1.4 Phase 4: Indexing inactive parcels 
Following each site visit, parcel assessment and market values and property characteristic 
information (situs address, ownership information, legal description, land acreage, building 
square footage, year built, property use, etc.) that derived from microfilm were manually 
inputted into Excel.19 I then assigned index numbers to the 2015 parcel dataset to determine 
which parcels were missing from the rest of the record. To reiterate, a missing parcel means that 
the parcel did not exist in the recorded year; this could mean that the 2015 parcel was part of a 
larger “parent” or original parcel. 
Parent parcels were identified through the research of city and county archival records. 
City and county clerk’s offices maintain a digital repository that retains documents such as deeds 
(warranty, grant, and quitclaim deeds), mortgages, municipal lien certificates, affidavits, and 
easements, in addition to plat and surveyor maps. I used property deeds and plat maps to trace 
the transfer of parent parcels. Deeds are legal documents in which the asset owner (the grantor) 
transfers ownership or title to another (the grantee). Within the contents of the deed, the legal 
description describes the property and parcel boundaries and is used for tax purposes to follow 
the transfer of land tracts. The assigned tax identification numbers are not appropriate points of 
                                                 
19 Due to the time intensity of manually inputting rows of property record and assessment value information in 
Excel, I explored the option of OCR (optical character recognition) software. Omnipage Pro PC is designed to 
repurpose information from PDF files or historical documents by converting text, graphics, and tables into editable 
word-processing and spreadsheet documents. However, due to the layout of the tax rolls and faded transparency of 
the documents, Omnipage Pro PC was unsuccessful in increasing efficiency in data imputation. Hence, I continued 
to manually input tax roll data into Excel. 
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reference to trace parent parcels since the identifier is not necessarily based on the legal 
definition of the plat. The legal description can appear as descriptions of lots and blocks, metes 
and bounds, or both. The meters and bounds descriptions are used to initially describe the 
boundaries of the property in a format that is most compatible with the work of public surveyors 
and engineers. The lot and block survey system identifies properties that are part of subdivisions 
and located in densely populated metropolitan and suburban areas. Subdivisions found on plat 
maps illustrate the blocks and lots that are assigned with numerical and alphabetical identifiers. It 
was not until cities began expanding that large tracts of farmland were sold off into smaller lots 
and a survey system was used to document the transfer of land using the lot and block system. In 
the creation of a subdivision map, blocks are rarely altered; however, lots can be consolidated or 
split based on the transfer of ownership or the selling off of lots. In order to trace the parent 
parcels, I consulted the lots and blocks listed in the deed’s legal description with lots illustrated 
on the surveyor maps to identify whether they had been reconfigured by a split or consolidation. 
Changes in tax lot configuration are illustrated in Figure 1, in which the current active parcels 
(parcels outlined in blue) are overlaid on the Denver 2000 assessor map. Alterations to tax lots 
also subsequently means that their tax identification numbers20 are altered as well. Figure 1 is 
simply one example of the maps that were consulted in the effort to detail parcel splits and 
consolidations and validate the changes in parcel legal description for each of the five years 
studied.  
                                                 
20 As is customary for the other cities in the study population, parcel identification numbers include three important 
elements: the assessor's map number, the block number, and the parcel number. In the case of the city of Denver, the 
first five digits refer to the map number, the next two to three digits are assigned to the block number, and the 
remaining digits indicate the parcel number, which is composed of all the smaller lot numbers. In Figure 1, the 
numbers listed in the double circles designate block numbers, while the numbers in the single circles are parcel 
numbers. Numbers listed on the right side of each bounding box is the lot number. The line segments with the 
double arrows traversing across the multiple lots designate which lots comprise the active parcel. 
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Figure 1. An example of parcel splits and consolidation for the city of Denver, 2000-2010. 
Source: City and County of Denver Assessment Office 
3.6.1.5 Phase 5: Estimating land composition, assessed value, and property tax in arena districts  
In each city’s dataset, parent parcels were identified for the inactive parcels indexed from 
the 2015 parcel population. Some inactive parcels have more than one parent parcel due to 
multiple splits and consolidations. The land square footage, building square footage, assessment 
values, and market values were summed to determine what would have constituted the 2015 tax 
parcel. The reason for the summation of the parent parcels and association under the 2015 tax 
identification number was to retain linkages with the current GIS parcel files for future mapping 
purposes. 
Land mixture within the arena district was also determined by tracking changes in 
property use assigned by the city’s planning department. Statutory legal classifications are 
established for tax assessment purposes. Statutes include assessment ratios applicable to the legal 
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property use, which are used to determine the assessed value of the property that would then be 
subjected for ad valorem taxes. 
Proponents for the use of professional sport facilities to spur downtown urban 
redevelopment claim that the mix of property use transitions from industrial and heavy 
manufacturing use to high density residential and commercial properties. As such, I created a 
record of property use between 1990 and 2015 to determine the percentage change in land-use 
mix. Percentage change in land-use mix is not only a visual measure of cities utilizing land for its 
highest and best use but also a measure that reveals trends in total assessment value for the arena 
district. 
In creating the record of land-use mix in the arena district, I consolidated each city’s 
specific land use codes21 into the major property categories: vacant land, residential, commercial, 
industrial, agricultural, mixed-use, parking, and exempt. Subcategories were prepared to 
determine the percentage of residential properties that were owner occupied (e.g., 
condominiums, single-family homes, and duplexes) and renter occupied (e.g., apartments) and 
the percentage of commercial properties that were office, hotel, retail (department store, grocery 
store, mini-mart, etc.), and restaurant. Commercial properties such as gas stations and auto repair 
shops that did not appropriately fit into commercial subcategories were instead included in the 
general commercial property count. Mixed-use properties are properties that have a combined 
land use of commercial and residential uses. This is often the case in which industrial 
warehouses are converted into mixed-use properties; bottom floors are typically reserved for 
retail or office space, while top floors are reserved for residential units. With respect to allocating 
                                                 
21 The property classification numeric code will vary city by city in terms of the code length. However, the first two 
digits will usually refer to the property’s predominant use (e.g., commercial) while the last two digits more 
completely determine the specificity of the property’s use (e.g., regional shopping center-enclosed mall).  
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assessment ratios for mixed-use properties, the cities in the sample population lack a pre-
assigned assessment ratio. Instead, mixed-use property assessment values are determined by the 
ratio (in percentage) of a property’s commercial and residential use. Percent allocation of the 
property use can be found in the property’s deed. For instance, a property could be designated as 
40% commercial and 60% residential. This means that 40% of the property’s total market value 
is multiplied by the assessment ratio held by commercial properties while 60% of the total 
market value is multiplied by the residential assessment ratio. Exempt properties22 are properties 
that are exempt from paying ad valorem taxes. Parcels can qualify as exempt properties, yet their 
use corroborated with residential, commercial, mixed-use, parking, and vacant services. In these 
instances, the properties were counted as exempt properties in determining the percentage of 
land-use mix within the arena district area. 
After redefining each parcel’s property-use code to conform with the major categories 
defined for the research study, land-use composition from 1990 to 2015 was determined by 
calculating the total percentage of each property’s uses by major category found within the arena 
district. The percentage of the land-use subcategories, specifically for commercial, residential, 
and exempt properties, was calculated by dividing the subcategory land use by the major land-
use category rather than the total land-use composition within the arena district. Compounding 
rate of change for each land-use category was analyzed for each of the five time periods. 
 
                                                 
22 Some examples of exempt properties include government-owned properties, hospitals, charitable and religious 
institutions, and cemeteries. 
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3.7. SUMMARY  
With the total percentage of land-use composition, the total values of assessment and 
market values, and the total values of property tax revenues for each five-year period for each 
city, the compounding rate of change can be calculated in five-year intervals and across the 25-
year period to assess the total development trajectory of the arena district micro-area. Total city 
assessment values and property tax revenues were collected from the single-year Comprehensive 
Financial Annual Reports for each city. Compounding rates of changes between the arena-
district micro-area and the city itself were graphed in order to determine whether the arena-
district micro-area grew faster relative to the city. If the compounding rate changes are higher in 
the arena district, this suggests that new construction or renovations of property parcels 
transitioned from low-income-producing uses to high income-producing uses at a faster rate than 
that of the city. In that case, the arena-led development strategies, contingent on whether there 
were other policies in place, such as TIF financing, were successful in spurring new 
development. Parcel-level data analysis, simple descriptive statistics per city, and the urban-
planning-focused case studies offer a balanced perspective of the success of arena-led urban 
development strategies for downtown revitalization. 
 
  
91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. CASE SUMMARIES: SNAPSHOTS OF PHYSICAL CHANGES ACROSS 
EIGHT CITIES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to frame a city’s early development trajectory and urban 
planning agenda and offers both a current and comprehensive overview of the urban composition 
in a quarter-mile of these professional sports facilities. The eight case summaries provided 
briefly outline the nuances of arena construction negotiations, the city’s comprehensive plans; 
the integration of professional sport venues in a city’s planning agenda, other notable major 
development projects built after the opening of the sport venues, and overall development 
findings that impact the arena-development success measures. Case summaries include 
descriptive statistics (total assessed value, land value, building value, improved value, tax rate, 
land composition, and acreage) for professional sports facilities, built between 1990 and 2015.  
Within the data collection process across the three metrics for each of 15 districts, an effort 
was made to collect plans and construct detailed development histories.  Each of those histories 
would constitute a paper itself.  Rather than including all of those histories, eight are included in 
Chapter 4 to illustrate the rich depth compiled for each district that inform the conclusions.  
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However, the data tables for all of the cases not summarized are included in Appendix A.  All of 
the data from the tables was used in answering the research questions that guided this study. 
 
4.2. NASHVILLE: BRIDGESTONE ARENA  
Table 8. Bridgestone Arena Rapid Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005 
 
4.2.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
Bridgestone Arena, (formerly known as the Nashville Arena, the Gaylord Entertainment 
Center, and Sommet Center), was built as a catalyst for the redevelopment of Nashville’s 
downtown after the city’s loss of its core music business to nearby suburban Murfreesboro in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The city’s mayor, Phil Bredesen, who believed drastic measures 
were needed to ensure the success of the revitalization effort, envisioned an entertainment district 
that would include an arena, a stadium (Nissan Stadium), a symphony hall (Schermerhorn 
Symphony Center), and a country music hall of fame museum (Ammenheuser, 01/24/2016). 
These facilities, along with other collateral investments, were seen as essential for continued 
public support. Financed entirely through general obligation bonds, Bridgestone Arena, which 
opened in 1996, was the spark that ignited the downtown revitalization effort. It was constructed 
without having secured an anchor tenant; only in 1998 was Nashville granted an NHL expansion 
team. 
Arena Name Bridgestone Arena 
Owner Sports Authority of Nashville and Davidson County 
Year Opened 1996 
Key Players/Organization City of Nashville 
TIF District Capital Mall Redevelopment District 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $237,120,000  
Public Investment in Venue $237,120,000  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 100% 
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4.2.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
Downtown Nashville experienced a rise in public-private partnerships that played a 
fundamental role in Lower Broadway’s revitalization. Since 2000, more than $500 million has 
been invested in residential construction and an additional $540 million for other developments 
(Nashville Downtown Code, 2010). Nashville’s downtown development is concentrated in four 
neighborhoods: the Downtown Core, the Gulch, SoBro (South of Broadway), and Rolling Mill 
Hill. Even though the Gulch lies just beyond the boundaries identified for the purpose of this 
study, it is important to note that the Gulch neighborhood has experienced the most significant 
degree of change since 2005.23 Much of SoBro had been occupied by warehouses, light-
manufacturing industries, and surface parking lots that supported businesses north of Broadway. 
This research study’s target area is the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area that has been 
established for the other case studies. The quarter-mile arena-district micro-area surrounding the 
Bridgestone Arena encompasses a large portion of Lower Broadway and SoBro. Lower 
Broadway is divided into multiple subdistricts. The subdistricts encompassed within the arena-
district micro-area include the Downtown Core, James Robertson, Upper Broadway, Second 
Avenue and Broadway, and SoBro. Figure 2 illustrates the boundaries of the five subdistricts that 
are encompassed within the arena-district micro-area.  
  
                                                 
23 The Gulch was composed of inactive rail lines that created underutilized properties and eventually separated the 
Gulch from the Downtown Core and the residential area located to the west. 
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Figure 2. NashvilleNext’s downtown community plan of Lower Broadway’s subdistricts 
 
 
Source: Urban Design Associates, 2013. 
 
The Downtown Core district is the epicenter of the central business district (CBD). A 
mixture of mid-rise and high-rise office buildings, parking structures, and surface parking lots 
consumes the area. With the increase in residential development came several new restaurants, 
art galleries, and two small grocery stores. Upper Broadway also encompasses the historic 
95 
district of downtown, which includes the Ryman Auditorium, Riverfront Park, and the new 
Cumberland River Greenway, a multi-use greenway that connects the surrounding 
neighborhoods and recreational areas. 
The SoBro subdistrict, which has seen more overall development over the past 25 years 
than any other portion of the city, includes the Country Music Hall of Fame Park, the 
Bridgestone Arena, the Schermerhorn Symphony Center, and the new Music City Center 
Convention Center, the most notable building in the CBD, around which is a concentration of 
hotels. Although the Music City Center spurred the development of new restaurants, hotels, and 
residential structures, because of rising land costs, the area offers limited neighborhood retail 
options like local grocery stores, coffee shops, and affordable restaurants (Urban Design 
Associates, 2013). SoBro’s strategic plan seeks to encourage mixed-use infill and the adaptive 
reuse of historic buildings (Urban Design Associates, 2013). The priority to connect SoBro to the 
Gulch neighborhood has spurred rapid development into the neighborhood that until recently had 
been dominated by railroad tracks and underutilized land parcels.  
Second Avenue and Broadway forms the epicenter of what is now Nashville’s 
entertainment district. Lower Broadway is bounded by Commerce Street it the north, 
Demonbreun Street to the south, Eighth Avenue to the west, and First Avenue and the 
Cumberland River to the east. In the 1980s and 1990s, Lower Broadway had completely 
deteriorated. Second Avenue, which stretches across three blocks, was populated with restored 
mixed-use Victorian warehouses used for storage and retail. Broadway connects four blocks and 
is the major artery through the center of downtown. Although Broadway is well-known for its 
small bars and country music venues, it was once referred to as Furniture Row and was 
characterized by such commercial stores as feed and grain shops and hardware stores. When the 
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Grand Ole Opry made the decision to relocate from the Ryman Auditorium to Opryland,24 a 
newly built music theme park located outside of Nashville, Broadway devolved to an area ridden 
with crime and prostitution amid a collection of old country music record stores.  
Nashville had long neglected Lower Broadway, and new legislation, amendments, and 
incentives were needed to encourage its revitalization. Only when historic preservationists 
initiated the first redevelopment efforts did the city become more involved in the redevelopment 
process (Sertell, 2005). Through the Market and Design Study for the Lower Broadway National 
Register District, the city recognized the area of Lower Broadway as an officially certified 
redevelopment district. With its National Register listing, the area’s buildings became eligible for 
federal and historic tax credits (Metropolitan HP Zoning Overlay, 2007),25 an incentive designed 
to help owners improve their properties. The Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency 
(MDHA) expanded and upgraded commercial and residential development and ensured that the 
needed infrastructure support was built. The MDHA also provided community development 
grants (CDGs) that provided loans to property owners for enhancing aging facades (Metropolitan 
HP Zoning Overlay, 2007). The Lower Broadway Design Plan provides specific architectural 
and urban-design guidelines for buildings to ensure that the storefronts are restored in such a way 
as to help revitalize the area, increase property values, and create a greater sense of community 
(Metropolitan HP Zoning Overlay, 2007).  
                                                 
24 When downtown became notorious for crime and prostitutes, Nashville’s Chamber of Commerce encouraged 
development in the city’s suburbs. The combination of fans’ reluctance to attend performances at the Ryman 
Auditorium, which was located in a dangerous neighborhood, and the costly renovations that the auditorium would 
require, ultimately forced the Gaylord Entertainment Corporation to relocate to Opryland.  
25 Through the Historic Tax Credit Program, the federal government offers 20% tax credit incentives to owners who 
rehabilitate their homes for income-producing purposes. The tax credit is applied to buildings certified by the 
National Register of Historic Places. For every dollar of tax credit received, income tax owed on the property is 
reduced by one dollar (Downtown Living Initiative, 2003, p. 16).  
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Although a portion of Second Avenue was listed in the National Register of Historic 
Places in the 1970s, no historical zoning existed in the Second Avenue area. Broadway, too, had 
limited zoning regulations (Johansson, 2010). However, during the redevelopment boom, Second 
Avenue lost much of its character when a number of buildings were demolished because of their 
status as “non-contributing” to the historic character of the area and to maximize return on rising 
property values. In an attempt to stabilize the area, preserve the area’s architecture, and retain the 
area’s original character, the mayor proposed a historic-zoning overlay to enforce demolition, 
rehabilitation, and redevelopment guidelines, despite the potential decline in property values that 
such regulations might imply.  
In 1987, the Lower Broadway area was included in the Capital Mall Redevelopment 
District. Lower Broadway’s redevelopment projects benefitted from the inclusion in the Capital 
Mall Redevelopment District by leveraging the district’s tax increment financing, land assembly, 
and land control (Sertell, 2005). Redevelopment projects that received incentives from the 
district overlay included the convention center, an adjacent hotel, the $320 million restoration of 
Ryman Auditorium, and the Music City Walk of Fame downtown park. The Rutledge Hill 
District covered the lower end of Broadway along the Cumberland River; in 1997, both sides of 
Broadway were included under the Capital Hill Redevelopment District. 
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4.2.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Table 9. Notable completed and proposed development projects in arena-district micro-area, 1990 to present 
Development Name Project Cost Description 
List of Lower Broadway Development Projects Completed in early 2000s 
Bridgestone Arena $237,120,000 
• An all-purpose arena that was built prior to an NHL expansion team as a catalyst for 
Nashville’s downtown redevelopment and reinventing Nashville’s image as Music City 
USA. 
Schermerhorn Symphony Center $123,500,000 
• Construction on symphony hall began in 2003, and the hall opened in 2006. Symphony 
hall was built similarly to the arena to be an anchored development to encourage future 
retail and residential development throughout Lower Broadway. 
List of Lower Broadway Development Projects Completed in mid 2000s 
Encore Condominiums N/A 
• Encore Condominiums, located across the street from the Schermerhorn Symphony Center 
at the corner of Third Avenue and Demonbreun, broke ground in 2006.  
• The building is a 20-story residential building with 333 condominium units and 18,000 
square feet of retail and restaurant space on the ground level. 
• Encore is one of three collaborations with Giarratana Development and Novare Group 
Holdings. Viridian Condominiums and the historic Bennie Dillion Building, which was 
converted into loft condominiums, were the other two residential projects. 
Viridian Condominiums N/A 
• Built in 2006, it is one of the first residential buildings in the area, with 305 condominium 
units. 
• At the time the Viridian was completed, 85% of the building was sold. 
• The developer, Giarratana, created the residential housing market in Nashville’s CBD 
when in the early 2000s, there were only 10 residential units for sale (Chamberlain, 
06/21/2006). 
The Pinnacle at Symphony Place $170,000,000 
• The Pinnacle is a 29-story office (520,000 square feet) and retail (23,000 square feet) 
building located adjacent to the Schermerhorn Symphony Center. 
• Constructed began in 2007, and the project opened in 2010. 
• The Pinnacle was one of the first office buildings constructed in Nashville in at least 15 
years (Nashville Business Journal, 02/11/2010). 
Music City Center $623,000,000 
• Developed by the Nashville’s Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority 
(MDHA), Music City Center is a convention complex that opened in 2013 and occupies 
over 2 million square feet. 
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Omni Hotel Nashville $270,000,000 
• The Omni Hotel opened in 2010. 
• The Nashville Metropolitan Government provided $103 million in tourist taxes to cover 
the hotel’s construction costs over a 20-year period. 
• Additionally, $25 million would come from TIFs and a partial abatement of 62% on the 
hotel’s property taxes (Snyder, 12/14/2010). 
List of Lower Broadway Development Projects Planned, 2015–18 
Ryman Auditorium Expansion $14,000,000 
• The original Ryman Auditorium was first established as the Union Gospel Tabernacle in 
1890. 
• The Grand Ole Opry was performed in the Ryman Auditorium until 1974, when the show 
moved to Opryland. Though the Ryman thwarted demolition, it did not host a performance 
for over 20 years. 
• The Ryman was revived in 1994, and in 2015, the theater was renovated and expanded to 
include retail space, a restaurant, and an area for a virtual tour. 
Cambria Suites $50,000,000 
• Opened in January of 2018, the Cambria Suites is a 190-story, 255-room hotel. 
• Located in the heart of SoBro, the hotel has a 2,800-square-foot music venue (True Music 
Room and Bar) that is located adjacent to the hotel lobby (Nashville Business Journal, 
05/30/2018). 
505 Church Street (the 
Cumberland Penthouse) 
$169,000,000 
• Completed at the end of 2017, 505 Church Street is a 45-story, 543 mixed residential 
(condominium/apartment) development. The lower two-thirds of the building are 
apartments and short-term rental units (Sichko, 12/13/2017). 
Bridgestone Americas HQ $200,000,000 
• 30-story, 514,000-square-foot office tower that includes ground-level retail and more than 
1,000 parking spaces. 
• Bridgestone Headquarters will be the fifth largest office tower in downtown and is the 
second-largest private employer in downtown Nashville (Sichko, 12/13/2017). 
• The building was completed in 2017. 
The SoBro $90,000,000 • The building opened in late 2016 as a 32-story tower with 313 apartments. 
The Diner Nashville $4,000,000 • Opened in 2017, Avenue Diner is a six-story 24-hour restaurant and bar 
Embassy Suites/Hilton Curio 
Collection 
$160,000,000 
• A proposed project for the Embassy Suites, a 506-room hotel and a 215-room Curio Hotel 
located across the street from Music City Center. 
• The development cost for the two-hotel project is more than $160 million; land acquisition 
costs were $20 million. The lot was formerly a 1.3-acre parking lot owned by First Baptist 
Church, which sold for $353 per square foot, a record in SoBro (Sichko, 11/21/2016). 
Tri-banded Marriott (SpringHill 
Suites, Residence Inn, AC 
Hotel) 
$137,000,000 
• This hotel combines three hotel brand names within the building. 
• The hotel is 21-stories and has 470 rooms. 
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The Joseph Nashville $166,000,000 
• Proposed 297-room, 21-story hotel that is currently under construction and due to be 
completed by 2020. 
• The developer, Pizzuti Co., bought the lot, located at the corner of Korean Veterans 
Boulevard and Fourth Avenue South, for $7.25 million with the intent to build a hotel. 
Holiday Inn & Suites 65,000,000 
• 15-story, 230-room hotel that is currently under construction (Sichko, 06/15/2015). 
• Completion date for the hotel project is 2019. 
One KVB $200,000,000 
• Proposed 30-story, 475,000-square-foot office building with 20,000 square feet of retail 
and a 1,200-space parking garage on Korean Veterans Boulevard adjacent to Music City 
Center. 
• Close to $10 million dollars were spent on land acquisition (Sichko, 01/24/2017). 
• The project is projected to be completed in 2019. 
Nashville Yards (+) $1 billion 
• Newly proposed mixed-use development replacing the Lifeway Christian Resources 
campus. The complex will cover more than 15 acres from Broadway to the west side of 
Church Street. 
• Within the Nashville Yards complex, AEG is planning to construct an entertainment 
district within itself, including a movie theater, bowling alley, concert venue, nightclub, 
and a boutique hotel.  
• Additionally, there will be an 18-story apartment building with 360 units; a 15-story, 
470,000- square-foot office building; a 10-story, 225,000-square-foot office building; and 
potential residential towers (Snyder, 07/23/2018). 
• The 25-story Hyatt Regency will be the first building to be constructed as part of 
Nashville Yards and the third largest hotel in downtown Nashville, behind the Omni and 
the Renaissance Hotels. 
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4.2.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
The Ryman Auditorium and the Grand Ole Opry played influential roles not only in the 
transformation of country music but in Nashville’s physical, economic, and cultural 
infrastructure. When the Grand Ole Opry departed for Opryland, Lower Broadway lost a key 
economic and social anchor. The loss of this iconic landmark and the activities associated with it 
promulgated blight and crime throughout Lower Broadway as businesses left.  
Second Avenue was largely protected from urban renewal initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Many of the historic Victorian homes were restored, and warehouses were left untouched. 
Although most of Second Avenue remained intact, as development initiatives grew, a number of 
buildings were demolished to facilitate new construction. By impeding future demolitions, the 
historical overlay retarded reinvestments. The few investments that were made involved modest 
projects.  
Development along Broadway had a different trajectory. While publicly financed 
redevelopment began in 1988 with the Nashville Convention Center, private-sector investment in 
Broadway and Second Avenue did not begin until the 1990s. The formation of the entertainment 
district began in 1993, when Gaylord Entertainment announced that the Ryman Auditorium 
would be renovated and reused (McCampbell, 1993). The Nashville Redevelopment Authority 
acquired land along Broadway across from the convention center, and the city partnered with the 
private sector to bring an expansion NHL team to Nashville. Both the arena and the convention 
center are located on Broadway, at the edge of the entertainment district, and are anchor 
developments that support the retail and restaurant activities along the entertainment corridor. 
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The transformation of the Broadway corridor from a blighted area to an entertainment 
center occurred in a relatively short time. Following the announcements of the arena and the 
convention center, the dilapidated structures along Broadway were renovated, and smaller retail 
and entertainment establishments were established. In addition to its local bars, music halls, and 
smaller retail shops, Lower Broadway commercialized its streetscape with venues such as Hard 
Rock Café and Planet Hollywood. With additional development, Demonbreun Street became 
“Music Mile,” and in 2013, the extension of the Korean Veterans Boulevard improved 
accessibility, connecting Lower Broadway to the Gulch (NashvilleNext, 2015). The renewal of 
Broadway as an entertainment district increased the economic activity along the street, creating a 
rent gap for properties located on Broadway and Second Avenue (Johansson, 2010).  
Lower Broadway was redefined in the 1990s, when tourism and historic preservation 
initiatives established their presence in the area. In response to the infrastructure façade and 
public infrastructure improvements, downtown residential development increased. In 2003, a 
task force composed of the MDHA, the planning department, the Nashville Civic Design Center, 
and the Nashville Downtown Partnership published the Nashville Downtown Living Initiative, 
which evaluated the existing downtown housing market, assessed the demand for new residential 
housing, and reviewed local government incentives to encourage downtown residential 
development and attract more residents to the urban core (Nashville Downtown Living Initiative, 
2003), which was burdened by limited housing stock. The Downtown Living Initiative was also 
designed to amplify the opportunities for new infill construction and the adaptive reuse of some 
of the older historic buildings within regulation of the historic-zoning overlay. The plan 
identified that within the 80-block area the early 2000s, 134 parcels were being used for surface 
parking lots in (Nashville Downtown Living Initiative, 2003, p. 8). This meant that 
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approximately 38 acres of land were underutilized within the urban core, demonstrating both the 
need and the opportunity to increase residential housing downtown. The target area identified by 
the Downtown Living Initiative extends beyond the Capital Mall Redevelopment District and the 
quarter-mile arena-district micro-area with which this study is concerned.  
 
4.2.4.1 Land Use Composition  
In the early 1990s, Lower Broadway, specifically the quarter-mile radius around the 
future Bridgestone Arena, was defined by commercial establishments, surface parking lots, and 
exempt properties. Exempt properties in Nashville expanded beyond institutional infrastructure, 
such as religious institutions and government buildings, to include exempt parking garages, 
office buildings, and vacant parcels. Table 11 provides a more specific breakdown of exempt-
property uses by subcategory, as these reflect differences in the commercial subcategory count. 
Since some office buildings and parking garages have been designated as exempt properties, the 
percentage of parking in the arena-district micro-area may have a slight margin of error of 
between 1 and 2%. Table 10 provides a summary of the land-use composition in the arena-
district micro-area between 1993 and 2013. Figure 2 also illustrates how property uses have 
changed over the last 25 years in response to the local government’s redevelopment initiatives.  
As expected from Nashville’s development history, residential properties were limited until 
2005, when both the renter- and owner-occupied markets began to rise. From 1990 to 2005, only 
two small residential apartment properties were listed on the assessment records. In 2006, two 
large residential properties—Encore and the Veridian—were built in the arena-district micro-
area. Residential properties had the largest compounding rate of change of 11.5% over the 25 
years. Downtown has some of the highest occupancy rental rates in the Nashville region, with 
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occupancy in the SoBro neighborhood being 100% (Nashville Downtown Partnership, 2012). It 
is anticipated that additional renter-occupied buildings will be added by 2018. 
On average, commercial properties account for approximately 36% of the arena-district 
micro-area’s land-use composition. The commercial subcategories for office, retail, and 
restaurants have remained consistent over the last 25 years (refer to Table 10). Parking comprises 
25% on average of the micro-area’s land-use composition, making it the second largest land-use 
category. Exempt properties comprise 20% on average of the land-use composition in the arena-
district micro-area.26 The establishment of the Capital Mall Redevelopment District incentivized 
developers to invest in more projects downtown, which explains the increase in exempt parking 
garages and office buildings. Besides the decline in 2005, exempt properties remained fairly 
consistent across the remaining years. Industrial properties decreased from 2005 to 2013 as the 
warehouses were either renovated or demolished to vacate the land for new projects. Overall, the 
most significant changes in land-use composition occurred between 2005 and 2009, with a 500% 
increase in residential buildings and a 150% increase in hotel presence in Lower Broadway.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
26 In Nahville’s case, exempt properties are composed parking structures, office buildings, and vacant properties that 
are simply non-revenue-generating property-tax parcels rather than government buildings, as illustrated in Table 3. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of land-use composition in the Nashville arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
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Table 10. City of Nashville arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1993-2013. 
 
 
  
 
1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 1993-2013 
 
LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
 
COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 1 0.44 1 0.45 2 0.89 2 0.91 12 5.24 15 7.28 11.44 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
1 100.00 1 100.00 2 100.00 2 100.00 2 0.50 4 1.00 5.70 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 395 99.25 402 100.00 - 
TOTAL 
CONDOS 
- - - - - - - - 390 - 390 - - 
COMMERCIAL 83 36.24 86 38.57 89 39.73 92 41.82 89 38.86 76 36.89 (0.35) 
OFFICE 15 18.07 14 16.28 14 15.73 14 15.22 15 17.58 16 20.51 0.26 
RETAIL 25 30.12 26 30.23 25 28.09 27 29.35 22 24.18 22 28.21 (0.51) 
RESTAURANT 33 39.76 33 38.37 33 37.08 33 35.87 33 36.26 33 41.03 - 
HOTEL - - - - 1 1.12 2 2.17 3 3.30 5 6.41 - 
INDUSTRIAL 15 6.55 14 6.28 16 7.14 11 5.00 9 3.93 5 2.43 (4.30) 
EXEMPT 48 20.96 44 19.73 42 18.75 37 16.82 42 18.34 47 22.82 (0.08) 
PARKING 61 26.64 59 26.46 57 25.45 58 26.36 54 23.58 44 21.36 (1.30) 
VACANT 21 9.17 19 8.52 18 8.04 20 9.09 25 10.92 19 9.22 (0.40) 
MIXED-USE - - 
          
- 
TOTAL 229 100.00 223 0.16 224 100.00 218 100.00 229 100.00 206 100.00 (0.42) 
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Table 11. Exempt sub-category property parcel land-use composition and built volume, 1993-2013. 
 
 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 1993-2013 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
EXEMPT PARCEL LAND USE COMPOSITION 
EXEMPT 48 20.96 44 19.73 42 18.75 37 16.97 42 18.34 47 22.82 (0.08) 
OFFICE 4 8.33 4 9.09 4 9.52 4 10.81 4 9.52 4 8.51 - 
RETAIL - - - - 1 2.38 - - - - - - - 
HOTEL - - - - - - - - - - 1 2.13 - 
VACANT 10 20.83 9 20.45 8 19.05 6 16.22 5 11.90 8 17.02 (0.89) 
PARKING 8 16.67 8 18.18 8 19.05 7 18.92 9 21.43 8 17.02 - 
EXEMPT PARCEL BUILT VOLUME 
EXEMPT 531,849 9.22 471,570 8.88 508,554 9.69 613,031 8.52 703,705 9.26 1,901,221 19.30 5.23 
OFFICE 69,111 12.99 69,111 14.66 69,111 13.59 69,111 11.27 69,111 9.82 69,111 3.64 - 
RETAIL - - - - - - - - 4,918 0.01 - - - 
HOTEL - - - - - - - - - - 1,037,552 54.57 - 
VACANT - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
PARKING - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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4.2.4.2 Built Volume  
Since 1993, the arena-district micro-area had a compounding rate of change in built 
volume of 2%, with the total built volume increasing by 3.7 million square feet. Although 
residential and hotel land uses made up a minor portion of the total percentage in the micro-
area’s land-use composition, both categories had the greatest compounding rates of change in 
built volume. Table 12 provides a summary of changes in built volume by land-use composition. 
Since 2000, downtown had over $500 million in capital investments dedicated to residential 
construction. Between 2005 and 2013, there was a 4% increase in building square footage in 
residential development, beginning with the opening of the Encore and Viridian complexes. 
Hotel development increased in built volume by 30%, including the single hotel property, the 
Omni Nashville Hotel, which was listed as an exempt property in 2013 (prior to 2001, the arena 
district did not have a single hotel property). Between 1993 and 2015, the built volume in exempt 
properties had a compounding rate of change of 5%, largely a result of the inclusion of four 
office buildings and the Omni Nashville Hotel. Eight parking structures were also exempt, 
although built-volume information for these structures was not available. The increase in 
residential and hotel development in the mid-2000s marked the arena-district micro-area and 
Lower Broadway’s transition to a viable entertainment district. 
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Table 12. City of Nashville arena-district micro-area built volume count, 1993-2013. 
 
 1993 1997 2001 2005 2010 2013 
1993-
2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 128,471 2.23 128,471 2.42 128,471 2.45 533,822 7.42 697,146 8.37 1,376,455 13.97 9.95 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
128,471 100 128,471 100.00 128,471 100.00 128,471 24.07 335,039 48.06 838,298 60.90 7.79 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - 405,351 75.93 362,107 51.94 538,157 39.10 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 3,721,323 64.55 3,335,286 62.80 3,646,964 69.50 4,646,982 64.66 5,648,845 67.78 5,256,143 53.35 1.39 
OFFICE 1,393,285 37.44 1,390,697 41.70 1,378,079 37.79 1,378,079 29.59 1,327,257 26.99 1,963,535 37.36 1.38 
RETAIL 252,930 6.80 257,930 7.73 234,493 6.43 222,870 4.78 259,078 5.27 214,131 4.07 (0.66) 
RESTAURANT 370,522 9.96 366,652 10.99 338,443 9.28 342,313 7.35 347,359 7.06 364,622 6.94 (0.06) 
HOTEL - - - - 304,105 8.34 799,822 17.17 1,202,949 21.30 1,426,807 27.15 - 
INDUSTRIAL 514,612 8.93 505,777 9.52 94,125 1.79 529,770 7.37 480,895 5.77 449,048 4.56 (0.54) 
EXEMPT 531,849 9.22 471,570 8.88 508,554 9.69 613,031 8.52 703,705 7.65 1,901,221 19.30 5.23 
PARKING 869,172 15.08 869,172 16.37 869,172 16.56 869,172 12.08 869,172 10.43 869,172 8.82 - 
VACANT - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MIXED-USE - -           - 
TOTAL 5,765,427 100.00 5,311,036 100.00 5,247,286 100.00 7,192,777 100.00 7,603,433 100.00 9,852,039 100.00 2.17 
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4.2.4.3 Assessment Values  
Nashville assesses city and county properties every four years; as a result, the assessment 
years had to be slightly adjusted (1993–2013). To measure the impact of the presence of a major 
league sports facility on downtown redevelopment, this case summary focuses on urban 
development outcomes in years prior to the opening of a professional sports venue and then 10 to 
15 years after the arena’s opening. In an in-depth analysis of changes in property values and 
property use in Lower Broadway between 1975 and 1995, Sertell (2005) found that while the 
average property values were not drastically different between Lower Broadway and the rest of 
Nashville, the rate at which the property values shifted in Lower Broadway relative to the city 
indicates positive changes.27  
The assessed values are determined by multiplying the property’s market value by the 
assessment ratio. Property class determines the assessment ratio. The assessed value for 
residential properties is 25% of the market value, while the assessed value for commercial and 
industrial properties is 40% of the market value. The total assessed value for the arena-district 
micro-area has a compounding rate of change of 9%, compared to Nashville’s 2%. Figure 4 
illustrates the compounding rate of change in assessment values within the arena-district’s micro-
area compared to the city of Nashville as a whole.  
The greatest compounding rate of change for the arena-district micro-area occurred 
between 1993 and 1997 (28%), during which the market value of approximately $965,000 
                                                 
27 Sertell (2005) used Nashville city directories to document the shift in property values in Lower Broadway 
between 1975 and 1997. In the 1970s and 1980s, Lower Broadway was ridden with blight. Pawnshops, adult venues, 
and prostitution were prevalent throughout this area of downtown. In light of this, Sertell’s conclusion that between 
1975 and 1984, the rest of Nashville’s property values increased almost 150 times that of the Lower Broadway 
makes sense. Between 1993 and 1997, Lower Broadways properties increased by 195% compared to Nashville’s 36 
percent (Sertell, 2005).  
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increased to $16.3 million. In the years following, land value increased to $19.7 million in 2001, 
$9.7 million in 2005, and $22 million in 2013. Other notable properties that contributed to the 
28% compounding rate of change in assessment values between 1993 and 1997 include the 
Capital Mall Redevelopment commercial parcel, which increased from $11.5 million in 1993 to 
$105 million in 1997; Lot One at Nashville Place, the site of the Nashville Visitor’s Center, 
which increased from a market value of $28.4 million in 1993 to $36.3 million in 2013; the 
AT&T office building, which increased from a market value of $2.7 million in 1993 to $5 
million in 1997; and the former lot of the Music City Center Convention Center, which increased 
from a market value of $2.2 million in 1993 to $8.7 million in 1997. The assessed values of the 
micro-area had a compounding rate of change of 6.8%, which was similar to Nashville’s 
compounding growth rate of change of 6.9%. In 2009, the Encore condominium complex 
opened, with a total market value of $30.6 million; the Virdian Condominiums had a market 
value of approximately $14 million. The Hilton Nashville Downtown had a market value of $50 
million in 2001 and increased to $60.5 million by 2013. These new residential and hotel 
developments created a compounding growth rate of 5% for the micro area and a slow recovery 
process from the decrease in assessed values between 2001 and 2005.28  
Overall, the assessment compounding growth rates between the arena-district micro-area 
and that of Nashville do not vary considerably. It is clear that assessment values increased 
substantially between 1993 and 1997, when the city initiated a plan to redevelop Lower 
Broadway through larger public infrastructure projects. As land property values increased 
dramatically, land was speculated, and in anticipation of the implementation of the historic-
                                                 
28 One reason for the decrease during the 2001-2005 period is explained by the $10 million loss in Bridgestone 
Arena’s assessed value.  
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zoning overlays, historic buildings were demolished in order to capture the highest and best use 
of the land parcels. Between 2001 and 2009, assessment values of Lower Broadway grew at 
more or less the same rate as the rest of the city. Between 2009 and 2013, assessment values 
grew faster again with the construction of new residential and hotel developments. Lower 
Broadway, SoBro, and the Gulch were the fastest growing areas of downtown compared to the 
rest of the city. The growth in residential properties provided more opportunities to attract a 
localized resident population, which could then support the commercial businesses. 
 
Figure 4. Compounding rate of change in assessed value in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Nashville, 1993-2013. 
 
4.2.4.4 Property Taxes  
In 1962, Nashville residents voted to create the first fully unified local government by 
consolidating the city and county government. The total city assessment, market, and property 
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tax values, listed in Table 15, are for the consolidated city and county government. By 
consolidating city and county government, no county tax rate was added to the city tax rate. 
Instead, the metropolitan government instituted a two-tiered system that distributes the tax 
burden and applies government services equally to both urban and rural parts of the county, 
including the Urban Services District (USD) and the General Services District (GSD), listed in 
Table 13. Properties in the USD pay a slightly higher tax than those in the GSD in order to pay 
for city services not undertaken in rural areas (Nashville.gov, 2018). Adopted in the 1960s, this 
tax system has not been able to match the city’s and the county’s rapid growth and urbanization.  
 
Table 13. USD and GSD tax rates for Nashville and Davidson County, 1992-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County Property Assessor 
 
Property tax revenues are a reflection of the arena district’s assessment value. Property 
values increased in response to the announcements of the city’s redevelopment initiatives and the 
proposed construction of additional amenities. Since 2000, the population of downtown 
Nashville has grown over 209%, compared to population growth of 12 % for greater Nashville 
and 13% for the Nashville metropolitan statistical area (MSA; Nashville Downtown Partnership, 
2012). Land speculation may have contributed to increases in property values between 1993 and 
1997 (Figure 5). Following the early redevelopment initiatives and announcements and the first 
TAX RATES TOTAL GSD RATE TOTAL USD RATE TOTAL 
1992-1993 3.48 1.33 4.81 
1996-1997 3.38 1.12 4.50 
1999-2000 3.29 0.95 4.24 
2004-2005 3.84 0.74 4.58 
2008-2009 4.04 0.65 4.69 
2009-2010 3.56 0.57 4.13 
2012-2013 4.04 0.62 4.66 
2014-2015 3.92 0.59 4.52 
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rollout of public infrastructure projects, the arena-district micro-area’s property tax values have 
compounding growth rates that are consistent with that of the metropolitan government of 
Nashville and Davidson County.  
Throughout Lower Broadway, residential development has been in high demand. The 27 
rental properties and 40-condominium properties make up 40% and 49% of the downtown 
housing mix, respectively (Nashville Downtown Partnership, 2012). Table 14 provides a 
snapshot of the price per square foot for condominiums within Lower Broadway. The prices per 
square foot of the Viridian and the Encore, the first residential complexes to be constructed in the 
micro-area (2006), are consistent with the ICON and Terrazzo condominium projects, located in 
the Gulch. The similar price-per-square-foot yields for these residential complexes reveals that 
the demand for residential development, both rental and owner-occupied units, was high in the 
central business district and in the neighboring districts in Nashville. Overall, while the 
assessment and property tax values spiked between 1993 and 1997, the compounding rate of 
change in assessment and property tax values evened out when residential, hotel, and office 
development began occurring in 2006. 
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Table 14. High-rise condominium price per square foot in downtown Nashville, 2008-2015. 
Source: Nashville Downtown Partnership, Residential Report, July 2016 
 
Figure 5. Compounding rate of change in property tax values in arena-district micro-area 
vs. city of Nashville, 1993-2013. 
 
 
Condominium 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PPSF By Building 
Viridian (*) $317 $275 $258 $262 $287 $306 360/$398* $379 
Encore (*) $319 $243 $256 $242 $294 $361 $381 $396 
ICON 
 
$303 $305 $280 $358 $383 $409 $452 
Terrazzo 
 
$341 $259 $272 $294 $329 $375 $485 
Average $319 $295 $294 $274 $325 $361 $395 $420 
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Table 15. Assessment, market, and property values in arena-district micro-area vs. city of Nashville, 1990-2015.
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
BRIDGESTONE ARENA DISTRICT MICRO AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 3,774,474 3,891,650 4,231,854 4,440,071 4,673,117 4,760,237 0.93 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) 6,266,463 5,867,723 5,762,849 7,258,903 7,108,920 9,678,577 1.75 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 32,222,400 118,806,205 185,747,691 168,248,791 199,180,692 261,286,699 8.73 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
53,033,232 180,811,062 251,261,053 205,573,131 220,396,803 266,606,344 6.67 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 
       
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
        
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 122,896,900 313,377,300 513,834,850 510,231,120 695,395,050 928,146,140 8.42 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
202,269,845 476,928,646 695,064,820 623,420,878 769,466,379 947,042,655 6.37 
TOTAL MARKET LAND 
VALUE 
66,354,310 140,427,700 187,412,950 200,730,920 297,186,600 380,481,940 7.24 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING 
VALUE + IMPROVEMENTS 
56,559,600 172,890,100 326,421,700 309,538,000 398,756,550 547,664,200 9.51 
TOTAL TAX 1,549,897 5,346,279 7,875,702 7,705,795 9,341,574 11,178,518 8.22 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 2,550,898 8,136,498 10,653,469 9,415,249 10,336,610 11,406,106 6.17 
CITY OF NASHVILLE 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 23,350,052,307 24,554,554,540 38,576,009,345 45,746,447,359 63,157,226,914 66,270,673,259 4.26 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
38,430,680,282 37,369,555,650 52,181,799,277 55,894,846,938 69,884,539,272 67,619,905,607 2.29 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 23,350,052,307 24,554,554,540 38,576,009,345 45,746,447,359 63,157,226,914 66,270,673,259 4.26 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
38,430,680,282 37,369,555,650 52,181,799,277 55,894,846,938 69,884,539,272 67,619,905,607 2.29 
TOTAL TAX 267,695,725 328,753,949 440,283,351 582,992,853 746,887,650 877,718,182 4.86 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 440,586,971 500,330,355 595,571,648 712,324,086 826,443,811 895,588,013 2.88 
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4.2.5 KEY FINDINGS 
The analysis of the land-use composition, assessment values, and property tax values for 
the arena-district micro-area compared to Nashville’s consolidated city and county government 
reveals that the arena was the catalyst for the redevelopment of Lower Broadway. Lower 
Broadway was intended to be an entertainment district, using the arena to leverage the success 
and activity downtown with new retail, restaurants, and night clubs, among other venues. Office 
buildings had already existed downtown, but residential and hotel establishments were absent 
from the urban fabric. Residential development began in the arena-district micro-area only in 
2006. Since 2000, the downtown population has increased by over 200%, and only recently have 
developers have been unable to keep up with residential demand. 
The arena-district micro-area is a success in demonstrating arena-led urban development 
strategies for urban downtown revitalization. Although the land-use composition was not altered 
tremendously—the area had already been dominated by commercial properties such as retail and 
restaurants—beginning in 2005, more residential and hotel infrastructure were added to the 
assessment rolls. The level of new construction, land speculation, and increases in property 
values with the announcement of the arena reflect the value of the venue to the rehabilitation of 
the image of Lower Broadway. Furthermore, from 2005–13, the arena district has had a 
compounding growth rate change in assessment values and property taxes with that was 
consistent with the consolidation of the government, which was growing tremendously as well.   
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4.3.1 BOSTON: TD GARDEN 
Table 16. TD Garden Rapid Notes 
 
The development of TD Garden, formerly known as the Fleet Center, was the centerpiece 
of the New Boston Garden Development Project. In conjunction with the decision to finance a 
replacement for the Old Boston Garden in 1980,29 home to the Boston Celtics (NBA) and the 
Boston Bruins (NHL), the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) supported the creation of the 
North Station Economic Development Area.30  This area was invigorated with substantial private 
and public investments in the planned North Station area and the surrounding neighborhoods. 
Unlike Boston’s West End neighborhood, which underwent urban renewal efforts commissioned 
by the BRA,31 the North Station Development Area had been overlooked, despite its having 
                                                 
29 The numerous proposals considered whether the 60-year-old arena built in 1928 should be renovated or 
demolished in order to build a new arena. 
30 The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) petitioned to amend the Boston Zoning Code to include Article 39, 
which establishes zoning regulations for the North Station Economic Development Area. Article 39, Section 10, 
explains that no development plans can be approved unless they meet the following three conditions: (1) the plan 
conforms to the general plan for the city of Boston as a whole; (2) each proposed project is in accordance with the 
building and FAR regulations of the surrounding area; and (3) the development plan does not prove detrimental to 
the neighborhood, creating burdens on the public and to the public’s welfare.  
31 The Massachusetts legislature created the BRA in 1957 to promote new investment and future development in 
downtown Boston. BRA oversaw the Boston Housing Authority’s development projects and eventually extended its 
supervision beyond public housing. The BRA’s first commissioned urban renewal project was in Boston’s West 
Arena Name TD Garden (formerly Fleet Center) 
Owner Boston Garden Development Corporation 
(BCDG) 
Year Opened 1995 
Key Players/Organization Boston Redevelopment Authority; Downtown 
North Association; Boston Garden 
Development Corporation 
TIF District NULL 
Total Cost of Venue $274,740,000 
Public Investment in Venue $189,570,600 
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 69% 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005 
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several assets that made it a desirable location for an entertainment district, including the 
intersection of transportation assets and its location within walking distance of the Central 
Business District. 
 
4.3.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
The original Boston Garden was developed as part of an expansion enterprise of New 
York’s Madison Square Garden. The Massachusetts General Court passed legislation that 
expanded the legal powers of the Boston & Maine Railroad Company, allowing them to open the 
Boston Garden in 1928 above their North Station railroad holdings. By the 1970s, the arena had 
deteriorated, and its facilities had become inadequate for large-profile events. The frequent 
power outages and lack of air conditioning discomforted spectators and stifled player 
performance.  
In 1972, a new arena was proposed for construction near South Station, but after years of 
inaction, the owner of the Celtics threatened in 1979 to build a new arena next to the Suffolk 
Downs Racetrack in East Boston. In 1981, the Bruins proposed a move to New Hampshire, a 
proposal that was rejected by the New Hampshire Legislature. In that same year, the BRA 
proposed that a new $114 million (2018 dollars) arena be built behind the existing Boston 
Garden, with or without the Bruins collaboration. In response, Boston-based developer Rosalind 
Gorin submitted plans for a new arena as part of a proposed $585 million complex in Boston’s 
North End. The plan would include new retail, renter-occupied apartment blocks, and parking 
                                                 
End. The vision was to redevelop the area for commercial and retail space and add 2,200 units of new housing. 
However, the West End’s urban renewal history was an example of acres of demolition and the displacement of 
thousands of residents, which splintered established neighborhoods. 
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spaces. Moreover, the proposal would require the city to seize the facility by eminent domain. 
The project would be financed through tax-exempt bonds secured through the establishment of 
the Massachusetts Convention Center Authority and by revenue generated by an increase in 
Boston’s hotel tax from 5.7% to 8%. Gorin’s proposal did not pass the state legislature.  
In 1985, the Dallas-based firm Lincoln Property Co. and the Boston Garden owner and Buffalo-
based firm Delaware North Corporation proposed a $360 million joint venture to renovate the 
Garden (at a cost of approximately $17 million) and to build a twin tower hotel-office complex, 
which would include a 300-room hotel, a high-rise office building, and a 1,500-car parking 
garage, on the adjacent 3.5-acre lot owned by the BRA. This proposal was estimated to generate 
$8 million annually in property taxes and $8 million in linkage payments to the city.32 The BRA 
eventually rejected the proposal and requested a resubmission.  
In 1989, Delaware North Corporation agreed to pay Boston $20 million for the property 
rights in the North Station Area and to build a new arena behind the old Boston Garden. The new 
Boston Garden would be located above five levels of underground parking and rail lines. While 
the arena was estimated to cost $280 million (2018 dollars), the entire cost of the project 
development was $700 million dollars, which included the relocation of commuter and rapid 
transit lines; the construction of 2.3 million square feet of office, hotel, and retail space; 2,450 
new underground parking spots; and the demolition of the existing Boston Garden. Arena 
construction was contingent upon the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
relocating the commuter and mass transit lines underground. Delayed by a poor economic 
climate, it was only in 1992 that the Delaware North Corporation publicly announced that three 
                                                 
32 Created in 1983, the Linkage Program charges a fee for all commercial and institutional development projects 
larger than 100,000 square feet, which are then used to fund and preserve housing units.  
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of the biggest banks in New England—Bank of Boston, Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, and 
Shawmut National Corporation—had jointly agreed to a loan of $120 million to build the new 
arena. In 1993, the Massachusetts Legislature passed a bill, along with a few stipulations, to 
construct the new arena above the North Station rail line. While the new legislation did not 
include the previously negotiated $3.5 million linkage payment, the Delaware North Corporation 
would be required to “administer, produce, promote, and sponsor no less than three charitable 
events per year at the New Boston Garden,” according to Chapter 15 in the 1993 Act of the 
Massachusetts Legislature.  
 
4.3.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
The North Station Urban Renewal Plan was dedicated to redeveloping one of the last 
major underutilized areas in downtown Boston, which also encompasses the quarter-mile arena-
district micro-area. The BRA recognized that the redevelopment of the blighted North Station 
Area and the substantial cost premiums associated with building the arena on air-rights parcels as 
opposed to at grade could not be accomplished simply with private investments. According to 
MGL’s Chapter 121A, local governments are allowed to suspend the normal rate of property tax 
collection for a particular property in order to encourage redevelopment. In 1992, the BRA’s 
vote for Chapter 121A approval was authorized to provide support for the North Station Urban 
Renewal Area Project, the first phase of the New Boston Garden Development, following with 
the second phase for the Nashua Street Residences project. 
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4.3.2.1 North Station Area  
The North Station Area Plan is divided into two distinct areas: Sub-Area I and Sub-Area 
II, as illustrated in Figure 6. These two areas are bounded and separated by major arterial streets 
from the elevated ramp of the Southeast Expressway, which was eventually deconstructed and 
built underground; Causeway Street to the south, which is the boundary of the North Station 
Area and the Bulfinch Triangle; and Lomasney Way to the west, a boundary between North 
Station and the West End.  
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Figure 6. The North Station Redevelopment Project, project boundary, 1980. 
Source: Boston North Station Area Plan, 1980 
 
The Urban Renewal Plan objectives for Sub-Area I and Sub-Area II included the following:  
(1) Stimulate the development of commercial and office space, hotel, residential, and 
mixed-use use for a variety of income levels 
a. Specifically in Sub-Area I, the preliminary plan was to include approximately 
1,000,000 sf of office space, 200,000 sf of retail commercial space, and 1,500 
parking spaces. 
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b. In Sub-Area II, the objectives of the North Station Urban Renewal Plan were 
to incorporate a 350-room convention hotel, 1,100 units of mixed-income 
housing, and 2,200 parking spaces. 
(2) Eliminate blighted infrastructure and transportation facilities 
Plans included the demolition of the elevated MBTA Green Line in order to eliminate the blight 
it sparked in the North Station and West End neighborhoods. 
(3) Encourage construction that is of the highest and best use for both private and public 
development, thus increasing property tax revenue. 
This meant providing a mixture of active uses, which was important to stimulate day and 
nighttime activities. Moreover, there was a lack of public open space in Sub-Area II. The 
majority of the parcels were taken over by large infrastructure such as the Motor Vehicle 
Registry Building or by parking spaces for the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Center and the 
Massachusetts General Hospital. 
(4) Prevent development that could be detrimental to the long-term development of the 
overall area and openly demonstrate the BRA’s intention in revitalizing the North 
Station Area.  
 
Sub-Area I and II qualified as urban project renewal areas. Sub-Area I was classified as 
both a substandard and a decaying area, which meant that at least 20% of the buildings in the 
area qualified for clearance and removal. Sub-Area II was categorized as both a substandard and 
a decadent area and a blighted open area. A blighted open area is an area in which no more than 
30% of the area can be built upon and that therefore has stagnated. Based on the BRA’s survey 
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of the project area, only 10% of Sub-Area II was built up and was largely dominated by tax-
exempt or industrial-use properties. 
The North Station Plan Urban Renewal Plan proposed the demolition of all existing 
residential, commercial, institutional, and industrial structures or buildings. Based on the 
exterior/building and environmental survey conducted in 1980, it was determined that 65% of 
structures in the North Station Area were substandard or decaying and were therefore detrimental 
to the health, welfare, and growth of the neighborhood. Table 17 provides a summary of parcels, 
number of buildings, and their blighted condition in Sub-Area I and Sub-Area II prior to 
structural demolition. 
 
Table 17. List of parcels in Sub-Area I and II determined for demolition in Urban Renewal 
Plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Boston North Station Area Plan, 1980 
 
The 1980 North Station Redevelopment Plan called for the acquisition and consequent 
clearance of 43 structures across 50 acres. Residential properties account for less than 1% of the 
total project area; those residential properties that do exist are located near commercial and 
industrial properties and are thus deemed as low investment properties. Table 18 provides an 
itemization of land usage by percentage of acreage in the North Station Area. 
Parcel No. 
Total No. 
of 
Buildings 
Intermediate 
Defects 
Major 
Defects 
Blighted 
Conditions 
Sub-Area I 36 10 8 9 
Parcel 187 2 xxx xxx 1 
Parcel 167 1 xxx xxx 1 
Parcel 167A 19 6 4 2 
Parcel 168 4 2 2 xxx 
Parcel 168A 10 2 2 5 
Sub-Area II 7 xxx xxx 7 
Parcel 187 4 xxx xxx 4 
Parcel 187A 3 xxx xxx 3 
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Table 18. Percentage of land-usage by acreage in Sub-Area I and II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Boston North Station Area Plan, 1980 
 
The main objective of the North Station proposal was to improve the North Station Area 
and stimulate new major investments through improved rapid-transit facilities and the 
construction of a major federal building and residential units. The North Station Area is an 
eligible development project under Chapter 121B of the Massachusetts General Laws, under 
which the BRA is given the authority to administer urban renewal plans throughout the city and 
to use tax abatements, eminent domain, and land disposition to foster future development. 
Furthermore, the BRA has the authority to extend the jurisdiction of Chapter 121B beyond the 
planned urban renewal projects and to pursue smaller-sized projects. In the case of the different 
arena proposals, the BRA’s ownership of a few of the land parcels and influence in the overall 
North Station Urban Renewal Plan qualifies the area under Chapter 121B. 
 
4.3.2.2 Bulfinch Triangle 
With the future development of the North Station Area underway in the mid-1980s, the 
BRA also designed a redevelopment plan for Bulfinch Triangle, a neighborhood just south of 
Total Project Use Acreage Percentage 
Vehicle Related 33.0 67.0 
Arterial Streets 18.0 36.0 
Parking Garages/Lots 15.0 30.0 
Open Space 8.00 16.0 
Occupied 8.59 17.0 
Institutional/Exempt 6.65 14.0 
Residential 0.40 0.5 
Commercial 0.72 2.0 
Mixed-Use 0.31 0.5 
Industrial 0.50 1.0 
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North Station bounded by Causeway, Merrimac, and North Washington Street, part of the 
Downtown North and West End community. The area is well-known for its architectural design, 
with irregularly shaped parcels, small-scale residences five to six stories in height, and specific 
street patterns. Although the area prospered in the early 20th century with light manufacturing 
and storage above office, retail, and showroom space, the area declined in the mid-1950s (as did 
much of the city). The area further transformed in response to the demolition and urban renewal 
of the West End, a development process that encroached upon the project area’s peripheries, and 
the elevated Fitzgerald Expressway, which severed the integrity of the Bulfinch Triangle 
neighborhood. Three blocks of established streets—approximately 630,000 square feet of built 
volume—were demolished between Canal, Haverhill, and Beverly Street for the Central Artery 
(illustrated in Figure 7). The North Station Area Plan addressed the importance of depressing the 
elevated MBTA Green and Orange Line, widening Lomasney Way, and eliminating other 
elevated arterial lines in order to improve the inadequate transportation facilities. The MBTA 
Green Line also ran directly through the Bulfinch Triangle until the highway was eventually 
depressed and moved underground. The construction of the tunnel was finished in 1995; the 
construction on the Central Artery began in 1991 and was eventually completed in 2004. The 
relocation of the MBTA lines created more availability for open space parcels, utilizing the 
Central Artery’s air rights and the number of new parcels allocated for mixed-use development at 
a scale appropriate to the rest of the neighborhood.33  
                                                 
33 The Big Dig project, which eventually buried the highway running through Boston’s downtown beginning at 
South Station and ending at the North Station terminal, created 22 new parcels as open land parcels on the 
highway’s air rights. Two of these parcels, Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 (a cumulative area of 3 acres) are found in the 
Bulfinch Triangle. These parcels are zoned for commercial and residential use and are meant to knit together the 
historic neighborhood that had been severed by the Central Artery.   
 128 
The purpose of the Bulfinch Triangle Plan is to restore the neighborhood’s historic roots 
and tavern-like buildings by renovating the severed halves of the neighborhood and improving 
the pedestrian links between the North End, the West End, and the Government Center. Since 
most of the existing buildings in the Bulfinch Triangle were intact, the BRA’s plan sought new 
development opportunities through the infill of small vacant parcels and renovation projects. 
This process had already begun in 1986, when 59 properties within the Bulfinch Triangle west of 
Canal Street (shown in Figure 8) were listed within the National Register District by virtue of 
their unique architecture and construction (the simple act of listing properties in the National 
Registry encourages rehabilitation or adaptive reuse of old properties). With more than $100 
million of private investment between 1983 and 1990, approximately 960,000 square feet of 
space was either renovated or reused. 
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Figure 7. Central Artery demolition for the Boston Redevelopment Authority’s Bulfinch 
Triangle Plan, 1990. 
 
Source: Boston North Station Area Plan, 1980 
 
  
 130 
Figure 8. Parcels located within the National Register District, adopted from the BRA’s 
Bulfinch Triangle Plan, 1990 
 
Source: Boston North Station Area Plan, 1980 
 
The conversion of these old warehouse buildings into mixed-use residential properties 
helped address the need for housing downtown. In 1987, the Boston Zoning Commission 
approved Article 27D, the Downtown Interim Planning Overlay District (IPOD), which permits 
downtown temporary zoning changes to ensure that each parcel’s property remains economically 
competitive with the rest of the city, as was often not the case with the existing zoning 
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regulations. To encourage increased density of residential units in the area by utilizing the new 
air-rights parcels, Article 27D designated Bulfinch Triangle as a Restricted Growth Subdistrict 
and a Housing Priority Area. Since there is little demand for more construction in the area, the 
designation suggests that the area’s historic identity and architectural character is established and 
must be well preserved in the future.  
 
To accomplish these primary development goals, the Bulfinch Triangle Plan’s objectives are to: 
(1) Create a lively neighborhood that can sustain activity levels for day and evening patrons 
and provides a balance of mixed-use development that includes housing, commercial, and 
ground- floor retail. 
(2) Increase the housing and commercial development on the newly created arterial air-rights 
parcels by 800,000 square feet. 
(3) Emulate the North Station Area Plan regarding the replacement of surface parking lots 
with mixed-use development and facilitate new construction of parking facilities.  
 
The Boston 2000 Plan envisioned the restoration of the Bulfinch Triangle neighborhood, 
which would include a vibrant mix of residential, commercial, and hospitality uses. It was 
particularly important to the Bulfinch Triangle neighborhood that the future development plans 
attempt to restore the properties that had been lost in the wake of the aboveground transportation 
infrastructure.  
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4.3.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Following the BRA’s support for the construction of a new professional sports arena, the 
creation of the North Station Economic Development Area, and the Bulfinch Triangle Plan for 
Growth in the early 1990s, a number of notable commercial and residential development projects 
opened in the 2000s. Projects that were forced into hiatus during the economic recession are now 
scheduled for completion between 2016 and 2020. Table 19 provides a summary of development 
projects that opened in the early and late 2000s and that have been approved by the BRA in just 
the last few years and are currently moving into the construction phase. The development 
projects in Table 19 coincide with the BRA’s revitalization plans of the North Station and 
Bulfinch Triangle Area and the transformation into Boston’s premier entertainment hub. 
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Table 19. Notable completed and proposed development projects in Boston’s arena-district micro-area, 1990 to present. 
Development Name Project Cost Description 
List of Downtown North/West End Development Projects Completed in early 2000s 
West End Residences $160,000,000 • Replaced surface parking lots. 
126 Washington Street $8,000,000 • Residential renovation to a long-standing vacant building. 
Massachusetts General Hospital $400,000,000 
• Renovation to the Massachusetts General Hospital that includes new ambulatory care and 
in-patient facilities. 
Avenir Project, Canal Street $130,000,000 
• Residential development managed by Archstone Apartments providing 250 units of rental 
housing and ground floor retail and restaurant space. 
Victor Project, Beverly Street $100,000,000 
• Residential development managed by Simpson Housing providing 286 units of rental 
housing and ground floor retail and restaurant space. 
List of Downtown North/West End Development Projects Completed in late 2000s 
Forecaster Building 
121-127 Portland Street 
$45,000,000 
• Modified from its original proposal in 2005, the renovation for the development includes 
81 mixed-income for-sale condominium units, 2 commercial units, and 32 parking spaces. 
• An upgrade of an additional four stories (approximately 73,000 sf). 
• Thirteen percent of the total units (10 units) are proposed as affordable housing units. This 
exceeds the 10% affordable housing requirement established by the Mayor in 2000. 
Lovejoy Wharf Building 
131 Beverly Street 
$150,000,000 
• Under Article 80 and Chapter 121A, the BRA approved the Lovejoy Wharf 
Redevelopment, a two-building project, in 2006.  
• The Lovejoy Wharf Project sits on 2.1 acres on the waterfront that were formerly used for 
surface parking and is part of the North Station Economic Development Area. This project 
will revitalize an entire block of the Boston waterfront, preserve historic buildings, and 
create a vibrant 24-hour mixed-used community that will transform an underutilized wharf 
into a fully activated open space. 
• It was proposed that 160 North Washington Street be renovated to include 250 new 
residential units and a mix of ground-level retail and restaurant uses, while an entirely new 
10- to 14-story structure would be built at 131 Beverley Street; the existing building was 
described as unsafe and therefore demolished. 
• As a result of the economic recession and lawsuit, the plan proposed in 2006 never came to 
fruition.  
• In 2012, Beal Companies LLP and Related Companies LP acquired the project site. 
• 160 North Washington Street finished renovations in 2015 and became the new global 
headquarters for Converse, a subsidiary of Nike. 
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List of Downtown North/West End Development Projects Proposed and Begin Construction (2016–20) 
Nashua Street Residences, 
Avalon Bay Project 
$240,0000,000 
• The Nashua Street Residences project, located within the North Station Urban Renewal 
Area and in the New Boston Garden Development Area, opened in 2016 as a 38-story 
tower adjacent to TD Garden.  
• The 1989 MOU agreement between the City, the BRA, and the Boston Garden 
Development Corporation (BGCD) approved the construction of a new arena on city-
owned air rights behind the Old Boston Garden.  
• The Fleet Center opened in 1995 as the first commercial development project as part of the 
overall public and private development efforts outlined in the North Station Area Urban 
Renewal Plan. 
• The arena was built on top of the city-owned air rights, above the North Station rail lines, 
and MBTA’s underground parking garage. As part of the MOU, the second phase of the 
North Station Area project included developing 2 million square feet of property on the 
existing arena site and adjacent parcels.  
• In 2005, Nashua Street Residences, designated as a Chapter 121A project, was proposed as 
a 363 residential unit building that included 121 rental units (renter-occupied), 242 
condominium units (owner-occupied), and 244 parking spaces. 
• Due to the collapse of the financial markets, the 2005 Nashua Street Residences Plan was 
put on hold; the proposed plans were later altered to be compatible with 2012 market 
conditions.34 
Garden Garage 
35 Lomansey Way 
 
Permitted – 
Under 
Construction) 
• The BRA approved the original development plan for this site in 1972. The site is located 
within the Downtown Interim Planning Overlay District (IPOD), and the land development 
is governed by the 1957 West End Project Area. 
• Formerly serving  as the parking garage for TD Garden patrons, the Garden Garage will be 
converted into a 44-story apartment complex that will hold approximately 500 apartments 
units and 850 underground parking spaces 
• The project is expected to open in 2021. 
The Hub On Causeway 
 
(Permitted – 
Under 
Construction) 
• Proposed by the Boston Garden Development Corporation and the Boston Properties 
Limited Partnership, the project site, which will be constructed in three phases, is the final 
project of the public/private redevelopment efforts proposed by the BRA in the 1970s and 
1980s for the North Station and Boston Garden Area. 
                                                 
34 In 2012, AvalonBay Communities purchased the residential development from the Garden Corporation and changed the original inventory by increasing the 
residential unit count by 200 units, including both affordable and market-rate housing, and decreasing the number of parking spaces by 50. 
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• The Hub on Causeway, at 80 Causeway Street, is a 2.8 acre parcel and was vacant and 
formerly used for surface parking. 
• Envisioned as a mixed-use development project of approximately 1,870,000 square feet of 
residential, hotel, office, and retail use. 
• Will also include the city’s largest grocery store, a movie theater, 10,000 square feet of 
outdoor recreational public space, and 175,000 square feet of “creative office space.” 
• Phase I construction broke ground in 2016 and will include 500 residential units, 200 hotel 
rooms, 600,000 square feet of commercial office space, and 800 parking spaces (under 
construction). 
• Phase II includes a 440-unit residential tower, and 260-unit micro-hotel (under 
construction). 
• Phase III includes a 21-story office tower (under construction). 
• In conjunction with the Nashua Street Residences project, the Hub on Causeway will 
complete the vision for the North Station Garden Area and create connections from the 
heart of the district to the surrounding neighborhoods, created a vibrant place to live, work, 
and play. 
Source: Downtown North Association (2012) List of Downtown North/West End Development Projects 
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Since the BRA’s efforts to revitalize the overlooked North Station and Bulfinch Area in 
the 1980s and 1990s, major public and private projects have already completed, or will complete, 
the revitalization and redevelopment of the Downtown North and West End of Boston, creating a 
vibrant entertainment hub, with the TD Garden facility at its epicenter. Over the past ten years, 
more than 3,000 new residential units were constructed, 15% of which are affordable units. Four 
new hotels, ample office, retail, and restaurant space and the addition of a downtown grocery 
store have been critical in Boston’s redevelopment initiatives. 
 
4.3.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
The Boston Redevelopment Authority’s urban renewal plans of the 1980s–1990s for the 
North Station Area and the Bulfinch Triangle, in conjunction with its negotiation of the 
construction of TD Garden, attracted private investment in a once-overlooked section in Boston. 
Furthermore, the forgiving of property tax liability that resulted from the awarding of Chapter 
121A and 121B status to several projects motivated developers to pursue real estate investments. 
The BRA’s 1980 Urban Renewal Plan proposed the development of the North Station Area as a 
premier sport and entertainment district, inspiring residents to live, work, and play downtown.  
 
4.3.4.1 Land Use Composition 
The spread of land-use composition within the quarter-mile extent of influence 
surrounding TD Garden is consistent across the 25-year period. Across the five major land-use 
categories, there are no major outliers in which one land-use category overshadows the others. 
The concentration and percentage of land use by category in the arena’s micro-area was 
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determined by parcel-level data from the City of Boston Assessing Department between 1990 to 
2015. The total number of “active” parcels for each five-year time point determines percentage 
of land-use composition. 
Table 20 summarizes the raw count for each of the main land-use categories and 
subcategories for residential and commercial properties. The table also includes the percentage 
share of the overall land usage in TD Garden’s micro-area. The total land-use count is based on 
the relative count of land use per property and address and not the total land-use count by parcel. 
The total number of parcels will increase substantially when the subcategory land-use counts are 
added to the total number of parcels.  
For instance, in 1990, there were 62 residential parcels. This residential count includes 
both renter- and owner-occupied residential units. However, this count does not include the 
condominium parcel count. In 1990, the total condominium count was 1,004 units. As mentioned 
previously, condominiums on the same property parcel, while maintaining individual property 
identification numbers, are counted as one unit of residential land use; thus, the actual count of 
residential parcels in the micro-area is 1,068. Using the 1,068 residential parcel count would 
distort the percentage of residential properties relative to the six other land-use categories, 
thereby inflating the residential concentration within the arena’s micro-area. The total 
condominium count was eliminated from the percentage share. A similar tactic was administered 
with respect to the parking count, particularly those associated with condominium buildings. 
Coupled with resolving the appropriate count for land-use categories by parcel-level data, mixed-
use properties are a bit of an anomaly. The City of Boston’s Assessing Office provides a 
designation “residential/commercial” or “commercial/residential” for mixed-use properties. 
These labels are dependent on which land use is the primary use of the property. For example, 
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for the label “residential/commercial,” the first listed land use (residential) indicates the primary 
use of the parcel. To be clear, mixed-use land use is the designation for each individual parcel. 
This should not be confused with the larger infrastructure developments that are mixed-use in 
nature but contain multiple parcels of different land uses. The mixed-use parcels therefore have a 
smaller overall land-use count compared to residential and commercial parcel counts. 
Additionally, mixed-use parcels also have different assessment-rate designations compared to 
residential and commercial parcels, even though they may in theory be the same land use.  
Based on the raw count, the percentage of each land-use category provides a more realistic 
outlook on the diversity of land use within the TD Garden micro-area. Overall, residential 
parcels increased by 50% between 1990 and 2015, with an increase of 30 residential properties, 
including 130 new condominium units. The amount of properties designated as purely 
commercial decreased; meanwhile, the subcategories of the commercial properties (e.g., retail, 
restaurant, office, and hotel) increased. Office space accounted for over 60% of commercial 
properties. There was also a big boom in hotel construction, which increased four fold from 
1990. The reason for the decrease in commercial parcels in this area, which was once a booming 
commercial and industrial area of the City of Boston, is that they have been redefined as 
residential or exempt properties. Because of the expansion of two hospitals and the conversions 
of properties formerly listed as commercial properties into government offices, there is a 
dramatic increase in the number of exempt parcels. The number of exempt properties also 
increased as a result of the demolition of the Central Artery and its relocation underground, 
which increased the total number of parcels in the arena micro-area. The demolition of the 
Central Artery created 22 new parcels and the ability to build on the air rights owned by the City 
of Boston and the MBTA. Illustrated in Figure 9, relative to the number of parcels present in the 
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micro-area, the land-use concentration by type seem quite stagnant with only the increase in 
exempt properties being a major shift in property use.  
 
Figure 9. Percentage of land-use composition in Boston arena-district micro-area, 1990-
2015. 
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Table 20. City of Boston’s arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015. 
 
 
YEAR 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
  LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE % CHANGE 
  COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 1990-2015 
RESIDENTIAL 62 21.68 69 26.64 62 20.53 87 26.36 86 27.39 93 24.35 50.00 
RENTER-OCCUPIED 24 2.28 35 3.32 27 2.55 33 2.79 28 2.34 36 2.99 50.00 
OWNER-OCCUPIED 1,027 97.62 1,014 96.20 1,026 97.07 1,143 96.70 1,170 97.91 1,160 96.43 12.95 
TOTAL CONDOS 1,004 95.44 999 94.78 1,003 94.89 1,118 0.00 1,136 0.00 1,137 0.00 13.25 
COMMERCIAL 89 31.12 95 36.68 102 33.77 91 27.58 73 23.25 81 21.20 -8.99 
RETAIL - 0.00 1 0.74 1 0.72 12 10.34 9 7.83 11 9.02 - 
RESTAURANT - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 15 12.93 14 12.17 13 10.66 - 
OFFICE 42 33.07 47 34.81 44 31.65 73 62.93 80 69.57 78 63.93 85.71 
HOTEL - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 4 3.45 4 3.48 4 3.28 - 
INDUSTRIAL 17 5.94 11 4.25 12 3.97 5 1.52 7 0.39 7 1.83 -58.82 
PARKING - 0.00 - 0.00 1 0.33 32 9.70 32 10.19 34 8.90 - 
VACANT 33 11.54 33 11.34 33 10.93 26 7.88 25 7.96 30 7.85 -9.09 
EXEMPT 53 18.53 51 19.69 62 20.53 67 20.30 65 20.70 107 28.01 101.89 
MIXED-USE 32 11.19 32 12.36 30 9.93 22 6.67 26 8.28 30 7.85 -6.25 
TOTAL 286 100.00 259 100.00 302 100.00 330 100.00 314 100.00 382 100.00 33.57 
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4.3.4.2 Built Volume 
Changes in built volume measures the level of new construction, renovation, or 
improvements that have occurred over the last 25 years. Unfortunately, assessment records did 
not include building square footage prior to 2003. Table 21 provides a summary of the 
percentage change in built volume from 2000 to 2015. 
Since 2005, built volume in the TD Garden micro-area substantially changed, with a 50% 
increase between 2010 and 2015. While residential, commercial, mixed-use, and exempt 
properties made up the majority of built volume in the micro-area, at around 25%, industrial 
properties decreased by 60%. As expected, with the dwindling need of industrial warehouses and 
heavy manufacturing downtown, the built volume for industrial property use decreased and later 
transferred to the new conversions or renovations of residential, commercial, and exempt 
property use. The amount of new construction per residential properties increased by more than 
40%, with the total building square footage for owner-occupied parcels substantially outpacing 
that of renter-occupied parcels between 2005 and 2010. However, between 2010 and 2015, the 
built volume for renter-occupied housing units increased as the BRA pushed their agenda to 
include more apartment building options. The Avenir Project on Canal Street and the Victor 
Project on Beverly Street are two good examples of development projects completed in the mid-
2000s that increased the number of renter-occupied units. 
Between 2005 and 2010, commercial properties increased by 1 million square feet. While 
the total number of office parcels increased between 1990 and 2015, the amount of office 
building square footage actually decreased by 10%. This can be attributed to two factors: during 
the economic recession, many of the projects that had been approved and permitted for 
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constrution were put on hiatus or leases were transferred to different developers; and vacant 
buildings may have already been demolished, thus contributing to the fall in commercial stock. 
New construction is only noted during the next assessment cycle. Parcels with mixed-use 
property use increased close to 2.5 million square feet, a compounding growth rate of 30% 
between 2010 and 2015. The slight decrease in commercial built volume and the substantial 
increase in mixed-use infrastructure is related to the conversions of parcels that were once 
strictly commercial parcels and were dedicated to multi-story office spaces to mixed-use 
buildings with office or retail space on the ground floor and small apartment units on the second 
and third floor.  
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Table 21. City of Boston’s arena-district micro-area (TD Garden) built volume count, 2000-2015. 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2005-2015 
  BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
  COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - - - - - 1,421,679 24.48 1,434,721 18.91 2,345,539 20.87 64.98 
RENTER-OCCUPIED - - - - - - 216,851 15.25 221,528 15.44 1,275,057 54.36 487.99 
OWNER-OCCUPIED - - - - - - 1,206,868 84.89 1,269,319 88.47 1,070,482 45.64 -11.30 
COMMERCIAL - - - - - - 2,313,026 39.83 3,031,607 39.95 2,940,945 26.16 27.15 
RETAIL - - - - - - 75,922 3.28 68,947 2.27 81,083 2.76 6.80 
RESTAURANT - - - - - - 58,578 2.53 40,169 1.33 72,670 2.47 24.06 
OFFICE - - - - - - 2,013,052 87.03 1,979,181 65.28 1,845,183 62.74 -8.34 
HOTEL - - - - - - 153,412 6.63 165,160 5.45 165,160 5.62 7.66 
INDUSTRIAL - - - - - - 60,665 1.04 33,595 0.44 25,170 0.22 -58.51 
PARKING - - - - - - 451,858 7.78 445,682 5.87 594,615 5.29 31.59 
VACANT - - - - - - 59,948 1.03 59,948 0.79 59,948 0.53 0.00 
EXEMPT - - - - - - 1,397,403 24.06 2,002,889 26.39 2,288,346 20.36 63.76 
MIXED-USE - - - - - - 103,342 1.78 580,228 7.65 2,986,386 26.57 2,789.81 
TOTAL - - - - - - 5,754,776 100.00 7,588,670 100.00 11,240,949 100.00 95.33 
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4.3.4.3 Assessed Value35  
Boston’s assessment values are assessed at 100% of the market value. Figure 10 
demonstrates that the TD Garden’s micro-area compounding rate of change in assessment value 
is consistent with that of the City of Boston. Over 25 years, the arena’s micro-area had a 
compounding growth rate of 30% compared to Boston’s 49%. Yet in determining the 
compounded rate of change over five-year intervals, the growth in assessment values between 
the two areas trend similarly. The compounding rate of change in both the micro area and the 
city of Boston increased by 11% and 12%, respectively, between the five-year intervals 1990–
1995 and 1995–2000. In the following five-years interval (2000–05), both the micro-area and the 
city increased by 6%. During the economic recession, the city of Boston was impacted more 
substantially than the micro-area, decreasing by 8% compared to the micro-area’s 4%. Finally, 
between 2010 and 2015, the micro-area’s compounding rate of change in assessment values 
increased by 3%, outpacing those values from the city of Boston, which were flat. While there is 
a 20% difference in the compounding assessment value growth rate between the city of Boston 
and the micro-area over the 25 years, when analyzing the compounding assessment value rate of 
change over five-year intervals, the micro-area actually grew at the same rate as the city of 
Boston, suggesting that the arena did not have a significant impact on the assessment values 
                                                 
35 Prior to 2003, the City of Boston assessment records of land use was designated by the primary use of the parcel. 
For instance, a residential owner-occupied condominium development that contains underground parking may not 
have counted the parking spaces as separate parcels, as is the case with some of the newer residential condominiums 
units built after 2005. This means that in order to provide uniformity to the land-use count, parcels listed with a 
parking land use with the same address as a residential condominium were counted as a single unit of parking. The 
reason for this is that parking garages or surface parking lots were also counted as a single unit of parking. Mixed-
use parcels also have a different land-use designation than properties that have a combination of commercial and 
residential uses. 
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found in the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area and did not accrue higher valuations faster 
than the rest of the city.  
 
Figure 10. Compounding rate of change in assessed value in arena-district micro-area (TD 
Garden) vs. city of Boston, 1990-2015. 
 
4.3.4.4 Property Tax 
Table 22 provides a summary of assessment ratios by land-use category that are 
multiplied by the assessment value to determine a parcel’s property tax bill. Commercial and 
industrial properties generally pay higher property taxes than residential properties. Furthermore, 
the property tax generated for mixed-use properties is dependent on the percentage of the 
property that is commercial compared to residential. For these types of situations, the property’s 
deed will generally provide documentation as to what percentage of the building is allocated for 
commercial or residential use. Because of the unreliability of accessing property tax information 
prior to 2003 and the resultant difficulty in determining the percentage of commercial vs 
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residential use, the assessor’s office recommended designating the percentage of commercial or 
residential use based on the total assessed value of the property. Table 22 indicates the mixed-use 
property percentage allocations for 1990, 1995, and 2000. 
Property tax revenues increased exponentially over the last 25 years, both for the TD 
Garden arena-district micro-area and for Boston. Figure 11 illustrates the compounding rate of 
change in property tax for these two areas for every five years. Boston’s property tax revenue 
generation, while increasing within each time point, grew at a consistent pace, decreasing only 
slightly, by 1% every ten years. 
Property tax revenues as a whole also increased in the TD Garden micro-area, with the 
exception being between 1990 and 1995, when there was a slight decrease of 3%, or a loss of $2 
million in property tax revenue. The growth rates between 1995 and 2000, however, differed by 
8% between the first and second five-year intervals, increasing by 3% between 2000 and 2005, 
5% between 2005 and 2010, and 7% between 2010 and 2015. When comparing the rate of 
growth between the city of Boston and the TD micro-area, while there was a 9% difference 
between 1990 and 1995 across the two areas, in the following three five-year intervals, the 
growth rate difference was between only 1% and 2%. It was between 2010 and 2015 that the 
property tax rate of change in the TD Garden micro-area overtook that of the city of Boston. 
The assessment and property tax values for the TD Garden micro-area and the city of Boston 
both decreased in 1995 and 2005, which is consistent with the economic conditions impacting all 
cities during these two time points (see Table 23). The assessment and property tax values had a 
substantial rate of change in the TD Garden micro area between 1990 and 2000. This suggests 
that the BRA’s urban renewal plans for the North Station Urban Renewal Area and that of the 
Bulfinch Triangle had a positive impact on new construction and renovation in the area. The 
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tapering of the growth rates between 2000 and 2010 closed the gap between the TD Garden 
micro-area and the city of Boston but demonstrates that the recession partially impacted the 
values for both areas. TD Garden opened in 1995. Therefore, it is expected that if the arena has 
had a positive effect on the area’s development, the growth rate of change should have been 
higher than the 2% that was occurring in the rest of the city. It was only between 2010 and 2015 
that the micro-area grew at a faster rate than the rest of the city. This is attributable to the 
opening of the Converse Headquarters and residential condominiums located at Lovejoy Wharf 
as well as the beginning of the three-phase construction plans for the Hub on Causeway project. 
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Table 22. City of Boston assessment ratios used to determine property tax values, 1990-2015. 
 
  
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
COMMERCIAL: 23.9 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 8.45 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 23.9 
 
MIXED-USE:  
 
VALUE UNDER 2 
MILLION:  
80% COMMERCIAL 
& 20% RESIDENTIAL 
 
VALUE OVER 2 
MILLION:  
60% COMMERCIAL 
& 40% RESIDENTIAL  
COMMERCIAL: 42.66 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 13.86 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 42.66 
 
MIXED-USE:  
 
VALUE UNDER 2 
MILLION: 
80% COMMERCIAL & 
20% RESIDENTIAL 
 
VALUE OVER 2 
MILLION:  
60% COMMERCIAL & 
40% RESIDENTIAL  
COMMERCIAL: 34.21 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 13.15 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 34.21 
 
MIXED-USE:  
 
VALUE UNDER 2 
MILLION: 
80% COMMERCIAL & 
20% RESIDENTIAL 
 
VALUE OVER 2 
MILLION:  
60% COMMERCIAL & 
40% RESIDENTIAL  
COMMERCIAL: 32.68 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 10.73 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 32.68 
COMMERCIAL: 29.38 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 11.88 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 29.38 
COMMERCIAL: 29.52 
 
RESIDENTIAL: 12.11 
 
INDUSTRIAL: 29.52 
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Figure 11. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area (TD 
Garden) vs. City of Boston, 1990–2015. 
 
 
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
C
o
m
p
o
u
n
d
in
g
 R
at
e 
o
f 
C
h
an
g
e
Compounding rate of change of property taxes in arena-district micro-area vs. city of 
Boston, 1990-2015
Micro Area, Property Tax City of Boston, Property Tax
9%
1%
2% 0%
-2%
 150 
Table 23. City of Boston's arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015. 
Note: Since 1995, Boston’s assessed value was at 100% of the market value. 
 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
TD GARDEN MICROAREA 
LAND AREA (sf) - - - 5,311,006 4,771,648 6,540,834 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) - - - 8,419,883 9,351,316 11,181,001 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 480,575,563 560,397,390 731,613,261 1,313,828,147 1,845,036,129 2,918,069,060 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 888,236,254 907,028,095 1,022,845,237 1,558,771,757 1,994,760,315 2,918,069,060 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE - - - 300,112,265 431,510,851 928,536,914 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
- - - 854,293,822 1,412,786,134 1,989,532,146 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 757,978,503 560,397,390 731,613,261 1,313,828,147 1,845,036,129 2,918,069,060 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 1,400,953,436 907,028,095 1,022,845,237 1,558,771,757 1,994,760,315 2,918,069,060 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE - - - 300,112,265 431,510,851 928,536,914 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
- - - 854,293,822 1,412,786,134 1,989,532,146 
TOTAL TAX 4,416,006 7,691,389 11,448,083 15,697,197 22,279,831 33,718,662 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 8,161,998 12,448,855 16,005,201 18,623,704 24,087,834 33,718,662 
CITY OF BOSTON 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 33,673,223,044 26,279,577,775 37,497,445,000 69,253,529,000 87,256,532,000 110,736,862,000 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 62,237,409,995 30,533,043,068 52,423,977,936 82,164,810,679 94,337,399,572 110,736,862,000 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 33,673,223,044 26,279,577,775 37,497,445,000 69,253,529,000 87,256,532,000 110,736,862,000 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 62,237,409,995 30,533,043,068 52,423,977,936 82,164,810,679 94,337,399,572 110,736,862,000 
TOTAL TAX 477,296,000 654,830,000 869,295,000 1,138,254,000 1,467,605,000 1,867,259,000 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 882,174,742 760,817,117 1,215,333,522 1,350,464,384 1,586,701,146 1,867,259,000 
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4.3.5 KEY FINDINGS 
The arena-district micro-area is a success across the three measures: land-use 
composition, built volume, and assessed values. However, there was a lag in arena-led urban 
development outcomes since the opening of TD Garden. There is far more commercial activity 
within the arena-district micro-area, but it has not transformed into a successful sports and 
entertainment district.  
TD Garden opened in 1995 and was a part of the North Station and Bulfinch Triangle 
urban renewal plans. Had the BRA not initiated Chapter 121A exempt status to incentivize real 
estate developers to rehabilitate the old industrial warehouses and incite new residential 
development, the TD Garden arena-district micro-area’s assessment values and property tax 
revenues would not have grown at the rate they did in the early 1990s. Moreover, the TD 
Garden’s presence seems to have generated an impact and become the centerpiece of the 
development effort between 2010 and 2015, long after TD Garden’s opening. In 2010, the Hub 
on Causeway completed its first of three phases of construction. This large infrastructure project 
is the last remaining development project and will likely have the greatest transformative effect 
on the geographic area included in the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area into a sports and 
entertainment district, encouraging those to live, work, and play downtown.  
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4.4. CLEVELAND: PROGRESSIVE FIELD AND QUICKENS LOANS ARENA 
Table 24. Progressive Field and Quicken Loans Arena Rapid Notes 
The centerpieces of the Gateway Historical Redevelopment District, Progressive Field, 
formerly known as Jacobs Field, and Quicken Loans Arena (previously Gund Arena), played a 
large role in forging development plans throughout downtown Cleveland. However, the district 
created by Cleveland and Cuyahoga County had no authority for real estate development.  That 
responsibility fell to other development districts. 
Cleveland, similar to so many other Rust Belt cities during the 1950s, experienced 
population decline and job loss to the suburbs and other regions of the country. Its fate may have 
been charted in the early 20th century when it made the decision to sell water to suburban cities 
removing an incentive for suburban areas to be part of Cleveland. The post-World War II 
policies of the Federal government accelerated suburban development. The population of the 
entire region also shrank and declines have been constant since the 1950s across all of Northeast 
Ohio and the Cleveland-Elyria-Lorraine MSA. 
 
The effect of Cleveland’s decision regarding water and Federal incentives for suburban 
development (mortgage guarantees and the interstate system) contributed to the teetering of 
Arena Name Progressive Field (MLB, formerly Jacobs Field) 
Quicken Loans Arena (NBA) 
Owner Gateway Economic Development Corporation 
Year Opened 1994 
Key Players/Organization Cuyahoga County, Gateway Economic 
Development Corporation 
TIF District NULL 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $373,920,000 
Public Investment in Venue $325,310,400 
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 87% 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005 
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Cleveland’s finances in the 1970s. Mayor Kucinich advocated for the redistribution of resources 
throughout the neighborhood-level, but city resources were limited. The banks holding 
Cleveland’s bonds wanted the city to sell its utilities to the private sector. When the Kucinich 
Administration refused to sell the utility the city could not pay its bills (Perloff, 9/17/2017). 
George Voinovich, who supported public-private partnerships to foster development of 
the downtown area36, eventually replaced Kucinich. His strategy was anchored by substantial 
property tax abatements. Beginning in the 1980s Cleveland began to shift its reliance to an 
earnings tax paid by those who work in the city. Today, Cleveland collects more than $360 
million from the earnings tax and less than $28 million from its property taxes. Every mayor 
since Voinovich has implemented policies to increase the earnings taxes while abating the 
property taxes on residential development and new commercial properties.   
 
4.4.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
Despite the major renovations made to the Cleveland Brown’s stadium, Municipal 
Stadium, situated adjacent to Lake Erie, the Browns wanted to replace the 40-year old venue. 
Part of the city’s effort to bid for the Olympic Games, the original stadium was built in 1932 on a 
landfill that extended into the lake. The stadium was financed through a $2.5 million bond. Up 
                                                 
36 In 1982, Voinovich supported the creation of Cleveland Tomorrow, renamed the Greater Cleveland Partnership in 
2004, which encouraged corporations to revitalize the central business district and support projects that coincided 
with the city of Cleveland’s economic development agenda. Originally meant to be a temporary organization 
commissioned to repair damages from the 1970s under the Kucinich administration and stimulate new urban 
redevelopment initiatives, Cleveland Tomorrow provided approximately $2.8 million in funding towards projects 
listed in Cleveland’s Downtown Development Plan and the Citywide Plan for 2000. Cleveland Tomorrow played a 
substantial role in the redevelopment of Playhouse Square and advocating for a new professional sports facility. 
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until the early 1990s, multipurpose facilities were popular and cost effective; after WWII37, the 
Municipal Stadium permanently hosted both the Cleveland Browns (NFL) and the Cleveland 
Indians (MLB).  
In 1984, Cuyahoga County proposed a 0.9 mill property tax increase for 25 years, put up 
for referendum, for the construction of a new stadium for both teams. Voters rejected the 
proposition (2:1). Despite the public’s rejection, business leaders created the Greater Cleveland 
Domed Stadium Corporation (GCDSC). The GCDSC borrowed $22 million from the banks and 
the state of Ohio (Miller & Wheeler, 1997) in order to acquire land from the former Central 
Market site and raze a number of buildings for a new stadium and adjacent parking lots. The old 
Central Market site was selected to serve as a gateway to the downtown area.  
Over several years, the original domed stadium proposal shifted directions. With the 
change in ownership of the Cleveland Indians to the Jacobs family and the family’s intent to 
relocate if a new facility were not built, the former Central Market site seemed more likely to 
house a baseball-only facility. The GCDSC subsequently was renamed the Gateway Economic 
Development Corporation, and after the election of Mike White, the GCDSC’s agenda was to 
build a ballpark and an arena38, persuading the Cleveland Cavaliers to return downtown.39. The 
arena and ballpark’s total cost was expected to be $344 million ($715 million in 2018 dollars). 
Chapin (1999) provides a detailed summary of the financial estimates and lease agreements for 
                                                 
37 Sightline restrictions are one of the biggest flaws of multipurpose facilities in addition to other design limitations. 
In the 1990s, it became more common for teams to advocate for single-purpose facilities that were designed 
specifically to the sport’s needs. 
38 28 acres of land that had been previously acquired by the GCDSC was allocated for the baseball stadium, a 
basketball arena, parking facilities, and a possible hotel on an adjacent property parcel that the Indians and Cavaliers 
had purchased from the Gateway Economic Development Corporation. 
39 The Cleveland Cavaliers moved to a team-financed and owned arena in Richfield, a suburb of Cleveland in 1974, 
a period when many teams were relocating to the suburban areas across the United States. The arena was built in an 
underdeveloped location that failed to meet expected growth expectations.  
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the Gateway Project. The final cost of the Gateway Project was 35% more than the expected 
budget ($780 million in 2018 dollars)40. In 1990, Cuyahoga County attempted to secure the 
voters’ approval for a financing plan for venues, for a second time. The proposal narrowly 
passed, with the inclusion of a 15-year excise tax on alcohol and cigarettes. 
 
4.4.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
Since the opening of Jacobs Field and the Gund Arena in 1994, the adjacent area has 
emerged as an entertainment district. Two notable case studies have previously assessed the 
urban development outcomes. Chapin focused on the area contained at the southern boundary by 
the intersection of Interstate 70, 77, and 90; East 9th Street on the eastern boundary, excluding the 
Playhouse Square; Tower City on the western boundary because of its pedestrian tunnels and 
walkways; and parcels located south of Euclid Avenue. Rosentraub and Austrian (1997) focused 
on a broader section of downtown. To remain consistent with the quarter-mile impact area 
measurement used for the other arena-district case summaries, Cleveland’s quarter-mile impact 
area includes areas captured in Chapin’s case study, but little of the area studied by Rosentraub 
and Austrian. The quarter-mile area includes the following downtown districts: Tower City, 
Euclid/Prospect, The Flats/Oxbow South, and Ontario/9th St Gateway. These downtown districts 
provide some historical context that have subsequently influenced the development outcomes in 
the arena-district micro-area.  
 
                                                 
40 Since the project’s design had changed quite substantially, a public-private funding package was required to 
finance the overall project and ancillary development 
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4.4.2.1 Tower City 
The Tower City District is a 63-acre area located between Public Square and the 
Cuyahoga River. The area is bounded by Superior Avenue, Ontario Street, and the Cuyahoga 
River. While one of the smallest and most compact of the downtown districts located within the 
quarter-mile micro-area, the Tower City District is a vibrant mixed-use district and the centroid 
of public transportation due to the presence of the Cleveland Union Terminal. The Tower City 
District was a bustling retail area, but experienced disinvestment in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Tower City District is best known for being the first and one of the largest mixed-use projects in 
the United States created by the Terminal Group. The project incorporated the iconic Terminal 
Tower office building, Cleveland Union Terminal, Stouffer Tower City Plaza Hotel, and the 
Landmark Office Towers. All of these buildings were constructed in the 1920s when more than 
1,000 buildings were acquired and cleared to construct the iconic Terminal Tower, a business 
and transportation center (Petkovic, 07/9/2010; Western Reserves Public Media, 2003).  
 
Tower City Center is the most robust development in the district. The mixed-use complex 
was developed by both renovating and reusing the historic Terminal Tower and ancillary 
buildings. Forest City Enterprises acquired the majority of the Tower City property and produced 
planning designs that converted abandoned spaces within the old railroad terminal and the 
dilapidated retail arcade into a new shopping center. These renovations were accomplished while 
preserving Terminal Tower, renovating the old post office into the Post Office Plaza Office 
Tower encouraging more office space, and providing a foundation for an additional luxury hotel 
development. Tower City Center was specifically built on the railroad terminal’s air rights, while 
the entire complex sits on 34-acres. When the 2000 Civic Downtown Development Plan was 
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published in 1989, the area had 2.1 million square feet of office space within the district’s four 
existing office buildings. The development of the Tower City Center capitalized on existing 
infrastructure and was used as the first project to reinvigorate activity back in downtown.  
 
4.4.2.2 Euclid/Prospect District  
The boundaries of the Euclid/Prospect District consist of Superior and Euclid Avenue to 
the north, Huron Road to the south, Ontario Street to the west, and 8th Street to the east. Well-
known for its historic architecture, the Euclid/Prospect District is the core retail district. The 
Arcade, one of the most iconic buildings in Cleveland, consists of two nine-story office towers 
and a glass-skylight retail atrium. The Euclid and Colonial Arcades, adjacent to the main Arcade, 
combine office and retail space and housed a number of Cleveland’s notable department stores. 
East 4th Street is a popular pedestrian-only corridor lined with restaurants and bars that 
successfully creates a concentrated but vibrant atmosphere. Many of these buildings were 
developed with upper level office spaces that could be renovated or converted into mixed-use 
apartments. 
 
4.4.2.3 The Flats Oxbow South  
Flats Oxbow is a mixed-use area of industry, warehouses, and restaurant uses. The 
Cuyahoga River separates the north and south sections of the Flats, with only the southern 
section of the Flats included in the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area. The northern, more 
developed section of the Flats encompasses Whiskey Island, Columbus Road Peninsula on the 
east bank, and the Main Avenue Peninsula on the west bank. The area is undergoing immense 
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change, transitioning from an area formerly dominated by heavy manufacturing and industrial 
use, into a mixed-use district. The Northern Flats will still retain space for wholesale and 
distribution firms. There is limited residential development on Flats Oxbow North41, because of 
the uncertainty in the zoning and conversion process of industrial properties to non-industrial 
use. However, some notable projects include the Nautica project, a multi-phase development 
project, announced in the early 1990s that consisted of retail, entertainment, and recreational use 
facilities on a 25-acre site directly on the waterfront. In 2014, part of the Cleveland Downtown 
Vision Plan, the Flat East Bank project was proposed to further encourage the revitalization and 
development of the Flats Oxbow North. The first phase has completed including an office tower, 
hotel, and numerous restaurants and cafes. The second phase, currently under construction, will 
include apartment buildings, several parking structures, and a nightclub.  
 
The majority of the area of the Flats Oxbow South, a 246-acre site that includes the West 
3rd Street Peninsula on the east bank of the Cuyahoga River, falls within the boundaries of the 
quarter-mile arena-district micro-area. Compared to the Flats Oxbow North District, the Oxbow 
South42 has not experienced the same pressures to engage in redevelopment activities. Although 
residential development within the Flats Oxbow South District is limited, the Scranton Road 
Peninsula’s Grove Court Condominiums spearheaded plans for future residential development43. 
                                                 
41 When the 2000 Cleveland Civic Downtown Development Plan was published in the early 1990s, the few 
residential developments that existed in Flat Oxbow North included: the Old River Bend Condominiums near the 
Old River Road Area as well as the public housing project, Lakeview Terrace, on the Main Avenue Peninsula. 
42 The redevelopment efforts that targeted the Oxbow South in the early 1990s was on the western bank of the 
district known as Scranton Road Peninsula. In this area, the first residential development constructed, the Grove 
Court Condominiums, was used to encourage more residential use in an area that was underutilized and unlikely to 
continue with industrial uses.  
43 The West 3rd Street Peninsula is expected to retain most of its heavy industrial uses and was therefore not included 
in any residential redevelopment plans in the Civic 2000 Downtown Plan 
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There is a lot of potential for future development in Flats Oxbow South with the integration of 
public transit along the peninsulas and downtown Cleveland. This is in part due to the public 
access to the waterfront and the large presence of abandoned rail lines, bridges, and rights-of-
ways that provides room for new construction. 
 
4.4.2.4 Ontario/9th Street Gateway District  
The Gateway Historical Redevelopment District (managed by a separate redevelopment 
agency) is an area bounded by Euclid Avenue to the north, Carnegie Street and the Inner 
Beltway to the south, Ontario Street to the west, and East 14th Street to the east. The Gateway 
Historical Redevelopment District is located at the intersection of three different interstates – the 
71, 77, and 90. During the early 20th century, the area had been the site of two street markets, 
which contributed to the overall development of wholesale food and distribution firms and cold 
storage facilities throughout the district. Both public and private investors often overlooked the 
Gateway Historical Redevelopment District until the late 1980s when Cuyahoga County 
proposed the Central Market site for the future sport venues. Due to the close proximity to public 
rail transit, the intersection of three congested highways, and the future planned development for 
more parking structures, the Gateway District was determined as an ideal location to fulfill the 
downtown economic development promises and become a gateway for the rest of downtown’s 
development strategies. Extensive redevelopment of the area did not begin until Dan Gilbert 
purchased the Cleveland Cavaliers in 2005 and the Marin Company decided to redevelop East 
Fourth Street in the late 1990s. Yet, this work did not fully begin until the early 2000s when 
Cleveland created the 4th Street TIF District. 
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4.4.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Table 25. Notable completed and proposed development projects in Cleveland’s arena-district micro-area, 1990 to present. 
Development Name Project Cost Description 
List of Downtown North/West End Development Projects Completed in early 2000s 
Euclid Block Apartments $160,000,000 • Replaced surface parking lots. 
Residences at 668 $8,000,000 • Longtime standing vacant building transformed into a residential condominium complex. 
List of Downtown Development Projects Completed in late 2000s 
Park-Southworth Building $4,000,000 
• The Southworth Building, located at 2013 Ontario, across from Tower City Center and the 
Cleveland Horseshoe Casino, plans to be converted into a 4-story mixed-use retail-
residential development. Retail will be located on the ground floor, while the rest of the 
building will be dedicated to 18 luxury high-end apartments. 
• The building originally built in 1850, was largely vacant and unused since the 1970s.  
Renovation of Schofield 
Building (Euclid-Ninth Tower) 
$50,000,000 
• The Schofield Building is located at East Ninth Street and Euclid Ave, across from the 
vacant Ameritrust complex. Historic restoration of the 1902 building was projected for 
2009. Due to the use of historic material, the building qualified for federal and state tax 
credits, however, restoration plans were held up due to the recession. 
• The Schofield Building is a mixed-use commercial building, with restaurant and retail on 
the ground floor, and has had tenants on the upper floors deriving from manufacturing 
companies, advertising firms, layers, bankers, etc. 
• In 2013, Kimpton Hotels and Restaurants was interested in transforming the Schofield 
Building into a 122-room hotel on the top floors and 52 luxury apartments beneath the 
hotel. 
• The Kimpton Schofield Hotel opened in 2016; luxury boutique hotel-apartments are in 
high demand from developers based on the downtown plans for the new convention center 
and casino. Several of these developments were proposed in the Flats, the Warehouse 
District, and in the Theater District, but no proposals have entered into the next stage of 
construction. 
AmeriTrust Complex $170,000,000 
• Built in 1971, the Ameritrust complex, now referred to as the “Nine” is located on the 
corner of Euclid Ave and E. 9th St.  
• The complex included five buildings, including two parking garages, the Cleveland Trust 
Building, and a 29-story office tower. Much of the complex has been vacant since 1991. 
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Cuyahoga County acquired the property in 2005 with the intent of transforming the space 
into the county headquarters, which eventually fell through. 
• Geis Companies acquired the property in 2013 and used HUD 108 funding to complete 
the $170 million renovation, which encouraged developers to rehabilitate other vacant 
historical buildings throughout downtown Cleveland.  
• 50% of the complex’s residential units are affordable housing units. The price of the unit 
is based on the 80% of the area’s median income. 
East 4th Street Corridor $110,000,000 
• The East 4th Street corridor is the site of a $110 million 600,000 square-foot mixed-use 
historic development composed of 1/3 retail space and 2/3rd residential.  
• MRN Ltd built 322 apartments above the existing retail. 
• The corridor is home to restaurants, bars, a bowling alley, coffee shops, a nightclub, and a 
bowling alley. 
• It took over seven years for family-owned and operated development corporation, MRN 
Ltd, to acquire 12 buildings and negotiate deals with more than 250 landowners who held 
titles to the properties on East 4th Street to pursue the development strategy of creating a 
neighborhood downtown in close proximity to the sports and entertainment facilities 
(Schnieder, NY Times, 2009). 
List of Downtown Development Projects Planned, 2016-18 
May Company Building $12,000,000 
• The May Company Building on Public Square, originally a high-end department store 
until 1993, has sat vacant until 2017 when Bedrock Detroit, a Dan Gilbert-owned 
company, acquired the property for $12 million. 
• Plans for the building include converting the old department store into a residential 
property with 300 apartments and a parking garage. 
Cleveland Athletic Club 
Building 
$56,000,000 
• The former Cleveland Athletic Club building on Euclid Avenue is planned to be renovated 
into a primary residential but mixed-use property. 
• The building is proposed to have 160 apartments, 8,000 square feet of retail on the ground 
floor, and 8,000 square feet for commercial space. 
• The financing for the project derives from a $29 million bank loan, three million dollars 
from a county-level tax-increment financing plan, five million dollars in preservation tax 
credits from the state of Ohio, and $13 million in historic tax credits. 
925 Euclid Avenue $300,000,000 
• The former Huntington Bank Building located at East 9th and Euclid Ave, will transform 
into a mixed-use development with a 300-room hotel (Hotel Curio), 600 hotel-style 
apartments, 200,000 square feet of retail and 400,000 square feet of office space. 
• Originally built in 1924, this property was the second largest building in the world in 
terms of square footage, holding over 30 acres of floor space. Formerly the headquarters 
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for a major US bank, the building was purchased in 2015 with a 92% vacancy rate for $22 
million.  
• Developer from Hudson Holdings received $25 million in state tax credits in order to 
complete the mixed-use development project. $270 million was invested to revitalize the 
building. Construction began in 2017. 
nuCLEus $420,000,000 
• nuCLEus is a mixed-use development located on a site between Huron Road and Prospect 
Avenue.  
• In 2014, development corporation, Stark Enterprises, acquired four parcels and properties 
that were poorly maintained and vacant envisioning a new $420 million mixed-used 
development for the site.  
• The four acquired parcels included a surface parking lot at the intersection of East 4th 
Street and Prospect Avenue, a vacant and dilapidated retail structure, the Harold Building 
to the west of Prospect Avenue, and another parking garage. 
• It is expected that the 2 million square-foot development will include more 150,000 square 
feet in retail and restaurant space, 200,000-300,000 square feet of office space, 500 
housing units (600,000 square feet of residential space, a 140,000 square-foot hotel, and a 
parking garage to hold 1,500 cars).  
• The building financing plan will include public and private investments. Stark Enterprises 
invested $32 million to acquire the property, while the City of Cleveland has agreed to 
provide a TIF bond of $18 million and two Vacant Property Initiative (VPI) loans for the 
demolition of existing structures and brownfield concerns on the former parcels. The 
project is expected to be completed in 2018.  
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4.4.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
The Cleveland’s 2000 Downtown Civic Development Plan presented broad trends that 
affected the development of the downtown as a whole, but also addressed the city’s current needs 
and support for new capital improvement opportunities. Since the 1980s, there was a significant 
push for reinvestment in the city. The Development Guide to Cleveland’s Historic Gateway 
Neighborhood (2010) explains that reinvestment within the Gateway Historic Redevelopment 
District is due to the establishment of three national and local historic districts, which include the 
East 4th Street District (established in 1987), the Lower Prospect/Huron Road (established in 
1993), and the Lower Euclid Avenue Historic District (established in 2002). The purpose of this 
study is to highlight whether the Gateway Historic Redevelopment District44 and the 
development of Progressive Field and Quicken Loans Arena, influenced the urban development 
outcomes within the quarter-mile of the two venues. Since Progressive Field is located on the 
adjacent parcel to Quicken Loans Arena, assessment values were captured in two quarter-mile 
areas drawn around both venues. In addition to the Gateway Historic Redevelopment District, 
the two districts that were partially included in the arena-district micro-area include Tower City 
and the Flats Oxbow South. 
 
                                                 
44 The Historic Gateway Corporation determined the boundaries of the Gateway District.  
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4.4.4.1 Land Use Composition  
A substantial amount of reinvestment and redevelopment has occurred since the 
completion of the two professional sport facilities in 1994. As of 2010, 35 buildings were 
restored (Historic Gateway Neighborhood Corporation). Four new buildings were in the pre-
construction phase, 13 buildings were converted into five hotels, and another 18 buildings were 
converted into 16 residential properties. This corroborates with the parcel-level data from the last 
25 years. 
 
The land-use composition within the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area illustrates a 
shift parallel to the 2000 Civic Downtown Development Plan’s goals and initiatives. Table 26 
provides a summary of the land-use composition in the arena-district micro-area. Between 1990 
and 2015, there was a 25% increase in the number of parcels within the arena-district micro-area. 
Land-use counts are complicated by parcel splits and consolidations. A number of floors in a 
building can account for multiple individual parcels. In the case of Cleveland, there was higher 
concentration of building renovations and interior improvements compared to new construction. 
Examples of these changes include the renovations to the Euclid/Prospect District’s Tower City 
Center and Arcade. Commercial land-use count and built volume increased due to the expansion 
of Tower City’s retail stores, the adjacent JACK Casino, the Renaissance and Ritz-Carlton Hotel, 
and office space occupying the former luxury department store, Higbee Building. These 
additional parcels are built above the railway station’s air rights. In one case of many renovation 
projects, the conversions to Tower City Center resulted in changes in total parcel count within 
the quarter-mile radius. The Arcade, a National Register of Historic Places landmark located at 
East 4th Street, between Euclid and Superior Avenue, once offered shops, fine dining, and office 
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space in the two ten-story towers. Following the completion of the $60 million renovation in 
2001, the Arcade is now home to the Hyatt Regency Cleveland, which occupies three levels of 
the atrium, the two office towers, boutique retail, a food court, and fine dining found on the 
lower levels. Parcel splits and consolidations are good indicators for infrastructure changes and 
the renovation of buildings for mixed-use purposes. Although the Arcade was formerly a mixed-
use building, and is also the case after renovations, the land use count will illustrate shifts in the 
commercial subcategories. For instance, Table 26 shows that while there is a loss in retail, there 
is an addition of hotels and office space. 
 
The arena-district micro-area is largely dominated by commercial properties and parking. 
While the total percentage of commercial properties has actually decreased by 10% over the last 
25 years, commercial use still accounted for over 30% of parcel land-use. Surface parking lots 
and parking garages remained fairly consistent in its downtown presence as it composed an 
additional 30% of Cleveland’s land-use. 308 Euclid Avenue may be responsible for the 
fluctuation in the number of parking parcels between 2000 and 2015. Prior to 2000, 308 Euclid 
Avenue was listed as a single retail parcel. In 2005, the assessment records indicated that 15 
parcel identification numbers were associated with 308 Euclid Avenue, in which all the parcels’ 
land-uses were dedicated to parking. In 2010 and 2015, MRN Limited Partnership’s 308 Euclid 
Avenue became a mixed-use building consisting of 12 office parcels, two parking garages, and 
one restaurant. 308 Euclid Avenue is a good example of the complications that can occur when 
tracing parcel splits and consolidations back to their original or associated land uses. 
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The total percentage of industrial use in the arena-district micro-area remains consistent 
across the 25-years, although land area devoted solely to light and general industrial use, such as 
the Warehouse District, continued to decline as a percentage of the downtown’s total land-use. 
Industrial use increased by 29% as there was a slight increase in the number of parcels from 14 
to 18 over the 25 years. However, this statistic can be misconstrued, as the increase in industrial 
parcels was simply due to land-use categorization and the number of parcel changes that 
occurred within one building. Between 1990 and 2015, there was no new construction of heavy 
industrial buildings.  
 
Downtown Cleveland was the office, commercial, and government center of Northeast 
Ohio. There was, however, a focus on residential development in other parts of the greater 
downtown area, such as the Playhouse Square District (beyond the quarter-mile radius). Between 
1990 and 2000, only one housing development existed within the arena-district micro-area. In 
2005, the residential development count increased to four developments. It was not until 2010 
and 2015, that more residential developments were constructed and increased to 20 and 24 
residential buildings respectively45. From 1990 to 2015, there was a 14% compounding rate of 
change in residential property development in the arena-district micro-area. When considering 
the total arena-district micro-area’s land-use, residential properties only comprised 
approximately 10% of all the parcels listed in the arena-district in 2015. Institutional and exempt 
properties had a compounding rate of change of 8%. The increase in exempt properties is due to 
the split and consolidation of the Flats Oxbow South large railroad parcel into 18 smaller 
                                                 
45 These numbers include the number of residential building development, not the number of condominium units 
inside the building 
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municipally owned parcels as well as the assemblage of multiple parcels for the arena and 
ballpark. Land parcels were consolidated and multiple buildings were demolished in order to 
assemble the land needed for the construction of the sports complex and the adjacent parking 
garages.  
 
The 2000 Downtown Civic Plan’s objectives and goals specifically sought to increase 
hotel and residential development. Furthermore, financed through historic tax credits, office and 
retail was expected to increase through the renovations of old industrial warehouses. The 
Downtown Cleveland was successful in accomplishing these goals. Yet, how much of the change 
in land-use composition is attributable to the construction of Progressive Field and Quicken 
Loans Arena?  
Since the opening of the two major league venues and the establishment of the Gateway 
Historic Redevelopment District, construction began 10 years after the venues opened and 
accelerated in 2015. The Historic Gateway Neighborhood Corporation claimed that the two 
major league venues were the reason for the increase in historic building conversions. Figure 12 
highlights how property uses have changed over the last 25-years in response to Cleveland’s 
redevelopment initiatives. The Gateway Historical Redevelopment District is dominated by 
commercial properties and parking. Although the figure demonstrates a gradual decrease in 
commercial properties overall, office, hotels, and restaurants all increased in parcel count 
through parcel splits. As other districts throughout downtown Cleveland, particularly the 
Warehouse District, the area around Cleveland State University, and the Flats Oxbow North, 
were similarly undergoing change, it took almost 15 years for the Gateway Historic 
Redevelopment District to experience any substantial change in residential development. Table 
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26 provides a summary count of the land-use composition in the arena-district micro-area 
between 1990 and 2015. 
 
Figure 12. Percentage of land-use composition in arena-district micro-area (Gateway 
District), 1990-2015 
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Table 26. City of Cleveland arena-district micro-area (Gateway District) land-use count, 1990-2015. 
 
 
YEAR 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 1 0.57 1 0.45 1 0.49 4 1.78 20 8.73 25 11.31 13.74 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
1 100.00 1 100.00 6 100.00 9 13.85 33 34.74 32 33.33 14.92 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - 56 86.15 59 62.11 61 62.89 0.00 
TOTAL 
CONDOS 
- - - - - - 65  92  93  0.00 
COMMERCIAL 82 46.59 122 54.71 77 37.56 99 44.00 94 41.05 72 32.58 -0.52 
OFFICE 22 26.83 28 22.95 32 33.48 27 20.45 61 52.63 61 52.59 4.16 
RETAIL 33 40.24 28 22.95 34 35.57 50 37.88 20 17.54 20 17.39 -1.95 
RESTAURANT 3 3.66 6 4.92 14 14.65 14 10.53 18 15.79 19 16.52 7.70 
HOTEL 1 1.22 - 0.00 3 3.14 7 5.26 7 6.14 9 7.83 9.22 
INDUSTRIAL 14 7.95 14 6.28 16 7.80 14 6.22 15 6.55 18 8.14 1.01 
PARKING 56 31.82 48 21.52 54 26.34 74 32.89 64 27.95 69 31.22 0.84 
VACANT 9 5.11 19 8.52 26 12.68 9 4.00 11 4.80 17 7.69 2.58 
EXEMPT 3 1.70 12 5.38 25 12.20 20 8.89 22 9.61 19 8.60 7.66 
MIXED-USE 11 6.25 7 3.14 6 2.93 5 2.22 3 1.31 1 0.45 -9.15 
TOTAL 176 100.00 223 100.00 205 100.00 225 100.00 229 100.00 221 100.00 0.91 
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4.4.4.2 Built Volume 
Prior to 2000, building square footage was excluded from the Cleveland assessment 
records. This means the total built volume of existing buildings in the arena-district micro-area is 
unknown prior to the construction of the Gateway District. Since assessment values are 
determined by lot acreage and the building square footage, without the building square footage, 
verifying the accuracy of the assessment value for years 1990 and 1995, is challenging. 
Nevertheless, from the information that is available over the last 15 years, displayed in Table 27, 
the overall built volume in the arena-district micro-area increased from 4.5 million square feet to 
approximately 12 million square feet, a compounding rate of change of 4%. This again confirms 
that renovations and historical rehabilitation projects overshadowed new construction in both the 
arena-district micro-area and the City of Cleveland. 
The presence of residential development began to increase in the arena-district micro-
area between 2000 and 2015 in which the built volume increased by approximately 1.3 million 
square feet. Between 2005 and 2010, the built volume for residential parcels increased by one 
million square feet with an additional 200,000 square feet between 2010 and 2015. Cleveland’s 
goal is to have 20,000 residents living downtown by 2020 in order to support the existing retail 
and office infrastructure, and to attract future amenities. Despite the late onset of residential 
construction since the opening of the Gateway Complex, residential units had the largest 
compounding rate of growth in built volume of 7% along with hotel development at a 13% 
compounding growth rate. By 2020, seventeen residential projects are slated for completion, five 
of which are currently under construction. 
Between 2000 and 2015, commercial built volume increased by 4.3 million square feet 
with office and retail contributing 60% and 20% of the commercial built volume, respectively. 
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The Gateway Historic Neighborhood Corporation found that the area immediately around East 
4th Street, Tower City, and Progressive Field and Quicken Loans Arena, had less office space 
compared to the early 1980s. The Downtown Cleveland Alliance estimated that with the use of 
Ohio Historic Preservation Tax Credit, downtown Cleveland converted 5.8 million square feet of 
commercial space into residential space from 2008-2015. The assemblage of land for the sport 
venues and consequent demolition of office buildings explains the reduction in office space. 
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Table 27. City of Cleveland's arena-district micro-area (Gateway District) built volume count, 2000-2015. 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000-2015 
  BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
  COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 
    305,537 6.75 495,568 7.44 1,431,331 12.04 1,611,819 13.04 6.88 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
    377,156 123.44 495,568 100.00 1,077,770 75.30 1,296,264 80.42 5.06 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
    - - - - 64,658 4.52 65,346 4.05 - 
TOTAL CONDOS 
    - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 
    1,799,114 39.77 4,490,601 67.44 6,754,726 56.80 6,227,926 50.37 5.09 
OFFICE 
    971,192 53.98 1,168,106 26.01 3,580,548 53.01 3,545,647 56.93 5.32 
RETAIL 
    568,235 31.58 1,695,744 37.76 1,900,794 28.14 1,489,464 23.92 3.93 
RESTAURANT 
    149,786 8.33 185,057 4.12 193,005 2.86 175,010 2.81 0.62 
HOTEL 
    24,642 1.37 1,191,707 26.54 852,104 12.61 559,525 8.98 13.30 
INDUSTRIAL 
    493,933 10.92 467,505 7.02 942,005 7.92 1,402,792 11.35 4.26 
PARKING 
    900,443 19.91 803,403 12.07 1,459,806 12.28 2,179,328 17.63 3.60 
VACANT 
    256,129 5.66 - - - - - - -100.00 
EXEMPT 
    363,200 8.03 250,957 3.77 1,273,862 10.71 924,714 7.48 3.81 
MIXED-USE 
    404,984 8.95 150,719 2.26 30,546 0.26 18,100 0.15 -11.69 
TOTAL 
    4,523,340 100.00 6,658,753 100.00 11,892,276 100.00 12,364,679 100.00 4.10 
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4.3.4.2 Assessed Value 
New development and changes in land-use composition has a direct impact on the parcel 
assessment values. Figure 13 illustrates the compounding rate of change in assessment values 
within the arena-district’s micro-area compared to the city of Cleveland as a whole. The market 
value is multiplied by 35% to calculate the property assessed value. Over the last 25 years, the 
arena-district’s micro-area had a compounding growth rate in assessment values of 4% compared 
to the 2% loss for the city. Between 1990 and 1995, the micro-area’s assessment value 
compounding growth rate over the five years is 14%. The renovations of Tower City Center is 
largely responsible for the change in assessment values. In 2000, the assessment values within 
the micro-area reached its peak with a compounding growth rate of 16% between 1995 and 2000. 
Cleveland had a compounding growth rate of 1%. The arena-district micro-area had an 8% 
decrease, the largest decrease in the 25-year period in assessment valuations in 2005. Such 
properties were assessed prior to the economic recession, recovering back to the height of their 
assessment values in 2015. Cleveland also had its largest decrease in total assessed values 
between 2000 and 2005, a 4% decrease compared to the micro-area’s 8% point decrease. Despite 
the plans for new office, retail, and housing infrastructure, the city of Cleveland does not display 
dramatic shifts in property assessment or market valuations across the 25-year period. The city, 
overall, displays slight shifts in compounding growth rates in assessment values in comparison to 
the micro area, which had on average 10% point fluctuations. Cleveland’s assessment values 
decreased by 2% between 1990 and 1995, had a slight increase between 1995 and 2000 by 1%, 
and then continued to decrease in assessment values by 4% during 2005 and 2010 and 2010 and 
2015. Accounting for the inflation to 2015 dollars, assessment and market values were both at 
their height in 1990, for both the arena-district micro-area and the city of Cleveland. The 
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compounding growth rate of assessment values in the micro area surpasses those from the city of 
Cleveland. The overall growth rate of change for assessment values is expected to be greater than 
the current listed in Table 30. The 2015 arena-district micro-area assessment values only 
recovered to 2000 values and the city’s assessment values continued to decrease by 4%, despite 
an increase in completed and proposed residential projects in addition to the expansion of office 
and retail space in both locations. Cleveland’s implementation of a property tax abatement 
program in 1987 as well as the recent economic conditions explains the assessment and market 
value trends displayed in Table 28 for both areas. The majority of properties within the city of 
Cleveland and throughout Cuyahoga County experienced a reduction in property value. 
In 1987, Cleveland instituted a property tax abatement program for residential development in 
order to attract new investment downtown, reduce blight, and establish a stronger neighborhood 
atmosphere around the newly constructed downtown Gateway Complex and other entertainment 
amenities such as the JACK casino. Property tax abatements were used to lure developers 
downtown by offsetting high construction costs and lowering property prices for potential 
residents (Bier, 2001). New or renovated residential and office developments were constructed 
on vacant land or on lots where existing infrastructure was abandoned or underutilized. The 
majority of new residential developments or rehabilitation projects were subjected to tax 
abatements thus decreasing a larger percentage of the market value used to determine the 
parcel’s property taxes. Table 29 provides the total amount of assessment and exempt value 
foregone from tax-abated parcels located in the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area. In 2015, 
$38.6 million in assessment values and $353.5 million in exempt property values were either 
foregone or went uncounted in calculating the total amount of property tax generated within the 
arena-district micro-area. Foregone property taxes from the exempt properties mainly derive 
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from Progressive Field, Quicken Loans Arena, the Greater Cleveland Rail Transit Association in 
Tower City Center, and railway parcels located in Flats Oxbow South. In 2015, there were 16 
tax-abated properties, eight of which were residential developments. Of the total residential 
parcels, including condominiums, located in the arena-district micro-area, 70% of the parcels are 
tax-abated properties. The amount of revenue that is returned to the city and allocated towards 
public services is impeded due to the substantial amount of property tax foregone within the 
arena-district micro-area.  
 
Figure 13. Compounding rate of change in assessed value in the arena-district micro-area 
(Gateway District) vs. city of Cleveland, 1990-2015. 
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Table 28. Exempt and abatements values foregone in the arena-district micro-area 
(Gateway District), 2000-2015. 
 
4.4.4.3 Property Tax 
Property tax information for this study was calculated using the tax rates listed in Table 
29. The property tax formula listed below is a slightly different calculation compared to the 
standard calculation used for property taxes in the other city case summaries. Rather than simply 
multiplying the assessment value by the tax rate, Cleveland also includes a land-use credit rate. 
The taxable value is 35% of the market value. In Cuyahoga County, real property is reappraised 
every six years. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥
= (((𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)/1,000) ∗  𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) − (((𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)/1,000))
∗  𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)  
 
Tax reduction factors or specific tax credits are used to eliminate inflationary revenue 
growth that result from increases in property values during reappraisals. Tax reduction factors 
are applied to millage rates for real property. In 1990, voters approved a constitutional 
amendment that elected for separate reduction factors applied to two real property classes. Class 
One includes residential and agricultural property and Class Two includes all other real property. 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 
Exempt Total Property Value 271,224,500 380,077,900 384,668,700 353,422,700 
Exempt Land Value 31,514,500 31,836,400 32,334,000 21,474,100 
Exempt Building Value 237,430,500 348,241,500 352,334,700 331,948,600 
Abatement Total Property Value - 16,322,400 29,634,200 38,642,800 
Abatement Land Value - - - 1,323,200 
Abatement Building Value - 16,322,400 29,634,200 37,319,600 
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From 1990-00, assessment values were multiplied by tax credits based on whether the parcel was 
a commercial, industrial, or residential property. This type of computation was used to shift the 
tax burden to property classes that were experiencing the greatest levels of inflation. The tax 
reduction credit is most well known as the HB 920 reduction tax rate. From 2005 to present, the 
920 reduction rate is applied to each parcel which is then multiplied by the assessed value to 
calculate the amount of tax that is assigned to the property for that year. The tax credits are used 
to limit tax growth. Property taxes should not increase with the appreciation in property values 
simply due to inflation rates. To determine the appropriate tax rate used by each taxing 
jurisdiction, a public vote should be provided based on the area’s needs and availability of 
current public services. The tax credits are designed to maintain stable tax revenues when there 
are fluctuations in property values. This, however, freezes revenues for local governments when 
property values continue to inflate (Ohio County Commissioners, 2014). 
 
Table 29. City of Cleveland tax rates and tax credits, 1990-2015. 
Year    Tax Rate Residential Credit Commercial & 
Industrial Credit 
1990 80.2 0.267388 0.154158 
1995 80.4 0.361214 0.20804 
2000 93.5 0.373593 0.226175 
 
Effective Millage Rate 
2005 102.6 0.169755 
2010 102.7 0.209934 
2015 119.73 0.149309 
 
Property tax revenues within the arena-district’s micro-area grew at a compounding rate 
of 8% while the city of Cleveland had a depreciating compounding growth rate of 2%. 
Cleveland’s property values plummeted overall due to the economic recession, which 
subsequently impacted the collection of property tax revenue. Figure 14 illustrates the property 
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tax compounding rate of change between the arena-district micro-area and the city of Cleveland. 
Cleveland’s property tax revenue between 1990 and 2015 depreciated by 32%. Between 1990 
and 1995, the property tax decreased by 11%, had a slight increase of 3% from 1995-00. 
Between 2000 and 2005, the city of Cleveland’s overall property tax revenues decreased by 16% 
largely because of the depreciation in the city’s property values overall. Since the assessment 
values plummeted between 2000 and 2010, it is not surprising the same occurred with the 
property tax values. While the arena-district’s micro-area had a 33% compounding rate of 
change between 2010 and 2015, Cleveland’s overall property tax revenues had a 3% 
compounding rate of depreciation.  
In the arena-district’s micro-area, there was a percentage change of 56% in property tax 
revenue (1990-95), followed by 14% (1995-00) and 36% (2000-05). Following the economic 
recession, the property tax revenues in the micro-area decreased by 7%. While the assessment 
values and property tax revenues within the arena-district micro-area compose only 2% of the 
city of Cleveland’s assessment and tax revenues, the micro-area had a property tax compounding 
growth rate of 33% between 2010 and 2015 compared to the city of Cleveland, which had a 
depreciating growth rate of 36%. Figure 14 illustrates that the arena-district micro-area was 
impacted more substantially by a small number of new development projects than the city as a 
whole as it had a greater compounding rate of change in property taxes than the city of 
Cleveland. Some of the projects that have impacted the arena-district micro-area’s property 
values, and accounted for a $25 million difference in property values between 2010 and 2015 
include: 
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1) In 2015, the property value of the Jack Casino parking garage with an attached 
skywalk increased from $170,000 in 2010 to $1.5 million in 2015. 
2) Transformed into a new office building from originally a vacant commercial lot owned 
by the city of Cleveland’s Port Authority the lots’ property taxes increased to $100,000 in 
2015 from making no property tax payments in 2010. 
3) Compared to 2010, a number of abated retail parcels and the addition of the parking 
garage located in Tower City Center accounted for $3 million in property tax revenue in 
2015. 
4) The improvements and renovations to the Higbee Building at 100 Public Square 
increased the property’s assessment value from $11 million in 2010 to $93 million in 
2015. This generated an increase of $2.4 million paid property taxes. 
5) The parcels assembled for the 2-story office building for Sherwin William 
Development Corporation at 101 Prospect Ave accounted for the $600,000 difference in 
property taxes. 
6) The Amitel Colonial property at 530 Euclid Avenue had a $100,000 property tax 
revenue difference between 2010 and 2015.  
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Figure 14. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area 
(Gateway District) vs. city of Cleveland, 1990-2015. 
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Table 30. City of Cleveland's arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
GATEWAY DISTRICT (PROGRESSIVE FIELD/QUICKEN LOANS MICROAREA) 
LAND AREA (sf)        
BUILT AREA/VOLUME 
(sf) 
       
TOTAL ASSESSED 
VALUE 
45,101,518 92,552,075 174,183,660 142,551,115 148,262,310 228,924,220 6.71 
TOTAL ASSESSED 
VALUE (2015 $) 
77,083,739 128,014,726 228,591,170 167,265,033 159,790,199 228,924,220 4.45 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 17,035,809 23,468,088 75,460,963 77,070,210 74,274,340 110,764,675 7.78 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
30,898,595 70,572,313 102,692,923 65,481,115 73,987,970 118,159,545 5.51 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 128,861,480 264,434,500 497,667,600 407,288,900 423,606,600 654,069,200 6.71 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
220,239,253 365,756,360 653,117,630 477,900,093 456,543,426 654,069,200 4.45 
TOTAL MARKET LAND 
VALUE 
48,673,740 67,051,680 215,602,750 220,200,600 212,212,400 316,470,500 7.78 
TOTAL MARKET 
BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
88,281,700 201,672,980 293,408,350 187,088,900 211,394,200 337,598,700 5.51 
TOTAL TAX 3,059,530 5,893,122 7,078,941 10,742,544 10,826,859 21,563,255 8.12 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 5,229,093 8,151,156 9,290,099 12,604,966 11,668,684 36,854,110 8.12 
CITY OF CLEVELAND 
TOTAL ASSESSED 
VALUE 
4,472,873,000 5,001,303,000 5,497,881,000 6,007,614,000 5,513,219,000 4,948,114,000 0.40 
TOTAL ASSESSED 
VALUE (2015 $) 
7,644,658,810 6,917,622,263 7,215,182,616 7,049,148,032 5,941,888,317 4,948,114,000 -1.72 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 13,162,512,000 14,332,277,000 16,032,610,000 17,562,614,000 15,349,618,000 13,588,835,000 0.13 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
22,496,259,859 19,823,889,584 21,040,507,962 20,607,426,827 16,543,096,848 13,588,835,000 -2.00 
TOTAL TAX 55,402,174.00 61,161,211 66,686,339 73,187,031 66,729,327 64,338,822 0.60 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 94,688,742 84,595,985 87,516,284 85,875,393 71,917,732 64,338,822 -1.53 
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4.4.4 KEY FINDINGS 
The arena-district micro-area is a success across the three measures: land-use 
composition, built volume, and assessed values. However, there was a lag in arena led urban 
development outcomes. The arena-district micro-area has transformed into a successful sport and 
entertainment district, but the sports complex itself may not have affected the urban development 
outcomes and infrastructure changes. 
 
In the 1980s, the plans to build a sport and entertainment district in downtown Cleveland, 
unfolded. This was in response to Cleveland’s administration, which at the time was in strong 
opposition of private investment and championed urban populism. The 28 acre-site for 
Progressive Field and Quicken Loans Arena was assembled in anticipation of building a sports 
complex that would become a symbol and gateway to the rest of downtown Cleveland. Opened 
in 1994, the Gateway Complex cost approximately $375 million (2018 dollars). The public 
sector financed 87% of the two facilities. Downtown development in the Gateway Historic 
Redevelopment District would mostly likely not have occurred at the rate that it did without the 
construction of venues, tax exemptions, and the approval of tax abatements. In the 1980s and 
1990s, the height of property assessment values and property taxes was actually higher than after 
the construction of Historic Gateway. This is because there was a greater concentration of office 
buildings in the area prior to vacating the land for the pre-construction phase of the two sport 
venues. Following the opening of Gateway, proposals were signed for the rehabilitation of 
several buildings downtown. Yet, new residential development was essentially non-existent until 
after the economic recession. Moreover, as quite a few larger development projects were 
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designated as tax abated property parcels, a large portion of the assessment values and property 
tax revenues went uncollected. Although the arena district was an overall success in urban 
development outcomes calculated across the three measures, since the new development 
occurred much later compared to when the Gateway Complex opened, the success of the arena-
district micro-area may not be attributable to the professional sport facilities themselves.  
4.5 TAMPA BAY: AMALIE ARENA 
Table 31. Amalie Arena Rapid Notes 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005 
 
Downtown Tampa was an industrial dead zone and had been in decline for decades. The 
waterfront remained uninviting and inaccessible from office buildings located in the downtown 
core, offering little open space throughout the city. In the early 1990s, the Tampa mayor 
acknowledged that the city “blocked the views, blocked the access, and did everything in reverse 
of what you want to do when you have a river or any amenity” (Danielson, 06/15/2017). Prior to 
the 1990s, few resources had been invested in creating safe pedestrian walkways, bike lanes, and 
public art displays, nor established a vibrant “after-work hours” culture. Moreover, Tampa 
lacked residential units and was limited in its retail offerings. In an effort to reinvent downtown, 
Hillsborough County and Tampa invested more than a half billion dollars in development 
projects. Along the waterfront, Tampa and Hillsborough County initiated several large-scale 
Arena Name Amalie Arena 
Owner Strategic Property Partners 
Year Opened 1996 
Key Players/Organization Hillsborough County; Tampa Bay Sports and 
Entertainment LLC 
TIF District Yes 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $246,240,000  
Public Investment in Venue $169,905,600 
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 69% 
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development projects to begin the area’s redevelopment process. This began with the Tampa 
Performing Arts Center located north of the Curtis Hixon Waterfront Park in 1987, followed by 
the Tampa Convention Center in 1990, then the Florida Aquarium on the edge of Channel 
District in 1994, the Amalie Arena (formerly the St. Pete Forum) in 1996, and the Tampa Bay 
History Center in 2009. Channelside Plaza and the enhancements to the cruise ship terminal and 
supporting retail ensued. The 2.5-mile Riverwalk slowly interconnected these public projects 
along with seven parks and a number of hotels and restaurants. The Riverwalk project was first 
initiated in the 1970s but was not a priority until the election of Mayor Iorio (Manning, 2006). 
By 2006, five of the 21 segments were completed, beginning with the Cotanchobee Fort Brooke 
Park, located behind the Amalie Arena. In 2016, all 21 of the public access segments were 
connected as displayed in Figure 15. While large public infrastructure projects, such as the 
Amalie Arena and the Riverwalk, were utilized as anchors for surrounding development, 
Tampa’s comprehensive plans did not include the professional sport facility as part of the city’s 
economic development agenda nor established a sports and entertainment district along the 
waterfront. It was only through private investment and foundation of Strategic Property Partners 
20 years later, that an intentional urban development initiative and new urbanism movement 
occurred. 
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Figure 15. Tampa Downtown Riverwalk 
Source: Downtown Riverwalk Association (2012) 
 
4.5.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
In the late 1980s, the National Hockey League (NHL) announced that it would expand. It 
was originally proposed to build an arena near Tampa Stadium on land owned and operated by 
the Tampa Stadium Authority (TSA). The new franchise’s owners chose to build a new arena 
south of downtown Tampa, on the border of Channel District. Arena construction broke ground 
in 1994 and the facility officially opened in 1996. Hillsborough County owns the Amalie Arena, 
formerly known as the Ice Palace (1996-02), later referred to as the St. Pete Times Forum (2002-
12) and then the Tampa Bay Times Forum (2012-14). Although Hillsborough County owns the 
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arena, it leases the property to the TSA46, who then in turn leases the arena back to the Tampa 
Bay Lightning, who operate the facility.  
In 2010, former Fidelity Magellan hedge-fund manager, Jeff Vinik purchased the Tampa 
Bay Lightning for $170 million47. Vinik’s purchase of the Tampa Lightning not only turned 
around a struggling franchise into Stanley Cup contenders, but his desire to integrate the 
professional sports franchise within the fabric of the Tampa community led to a $3 billion 
redevelopment agenda for downtown Tampa. 
 
4.5.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
The Hillsborough County’s Imagine 2040 Comprehensive Plan for Tampa (2016), and 
Tampa’s Downtown Vision and Action Plan (2005) and Community Redevelopment Plan (1988) 
outline collaborative growth and economic development efforts to reinvent Tampa’s troubled 
identity. Over the past 30 years, Tampa and Hillsborough County have invested a substantial 
amount of public money to transform the central business district. Several projects were integral 
in the efforts of re-inventing downtown Tampa’s bleak city image. A residential condominium 
boom would bring new life to downtown and subsequently the influx of necessary amenities of 
retail options, restaurants, and grocery stores. 
                                                 
46 In 1965, the TSA was created as an independent special district, designated under Chapter 65-2307, to develop 
and maintain sports and recreational facilities throughout the Tampa Bay region (Raymond James Financial, 
2016)46. The TSA manages the Raymond James Stadium, home of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers (NFL), the former 
Tampa Stadium, three city golf courses, George Steinbrenner Field (formerly Legends Field, the spring training 
facility for the New York Yankees), and formerly the Amalie Arena. The TSA’s affiliation with and financing 
support from Tampa and Hillsborough County made it possible to complete these major capital construction 
projects. Subsequently, these sport and recreation-focused capital construction projects would further facilitate 
Tampa Bay’s future economic development agenda. 
47 Two years prior to Vinik’s purchasing the Tampa Bay Lightning, the team sold for $220 million. Vinik was able 
to take advantage of an undervalued asset (Danielson, 2017). 
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When Vinik purchased the team in 2010, he not only gained control over the publicly owned 
arena but also ownership over two parking lots (approximately 5.5-acres) on either side of the 
arena. As soon as the team’s competitiveness was secured, Vinik sought out key development 
opportunities to integrate the team with his community development efforts. Over the course of 
the next several years, Vinik continued to purchase multiple parcels surrounding the arena as 
they appeared on the market. Despite the residential development boom in the Channel District, 
little development took place near the Amalie Arena. Vinik recognized the ample development 
opportunities downtown along the Riverwalk, and continued his $60 million parcel assemblage 
that amassed more than 50 contiguous acres. Since the mid-2000s, there has been a gradual 
transformation of downtown Tampa with a chain of new developments, some that have been 
recently completed, and others that are planned or under construction. This has brought new 
energy and activity to the area, but nowhere near the scale of private real estate investment that 
Vinik has recently proposed. Tampa’s resurgence could potentially be realized through one of 
the most ambitious privately funded real estate projects to date. The formation of Strategic 
Property Partners, Vinik’s new partnership with Cascade Investment, a private capital fund 
created by Microsoft founder, Bill Gates is set to underwrite Water Street Tampa, a $3 billion 
multi-use development on 16-acres adjacent to Amalie Arena. The public sector would be 
responsible to redo the street grid. 
 
In the mid-1980s and early-1990s, vacant properties and an unoccupied waterfront 
defined Tampa’s downtown core, including the Channel District. The opening of the Tampa 
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Convention Center48 in 1990 spurred new private investment in condominium projects and retail 
space. Tampa’s city image as a place to live, work, and play was reinvented by the condominium 
boom in Channel District and the city’s decision to leverage its premium real estate with access 
to undeveloped lots along the waterfront. In combination with other public development projects 
along the 2.5-mile Riverwalk, the Amalie Arena inadvertently assisted in the city’s economic 
growth. That said, the Amalie Arena opened in 1996 and it was not until the Strategic Property 
Partners’ unveiling of Water Street Tampa that any sizeable amount of new urban development 
occurred in the area surrounding the arena. For the purpose of this study, the quarter-mile arena 
district area includes a portion of the southwestern edge of Channel District while the newly 
announced Water Street District extends into other parts of the downtown area (and towards the 
Ybor neighborhood).  
 
Prior to the Hillsborough County’s Imagine 2040 Comprehensive Plan for Tampa (2016), 
the last adopted master plan for Downtown Tampa was in 1995. In the 1990s, a limited vision or 
comprehensive plan was developed for the downtown Tampa. Since then, various plans have 
targeted certain areas similar to the Channel District. Large public infrastructure projects, such as 
cultural venues and professional sports facilities, were built without a strategy that would 
facilitate a comprehensive community vision.  
Over the past 25 years, Tampa has identified a number of opportunity areas where infill 
development is necessary. Redevelopment in such areas is dependent on market forces and 
public intervention. Since the mid-2000s, the city has been subject to a considerable amount of 
                                                 
48 According to the City of Tampa Comprehensive Annual Report (1990), the construction of the Tampa Convention 
Center cost approximately $275 million (in 2018 dollars), including land acquisition. 
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change and transition through two types of redevelopment strategies. In some areas, there is 
evidence of market-driven redevelopment that the city or county targeted as key sites (e.g, 
Channel District). In other areas, small revitalization efforts occurred parcel by parcel. Finally, in 
an unprecedented fashion, entire sections of downtown were proposed for residential 
development that were leveraged through ambitious private development efforts. Strategic 
Property Partners has been the strategic force behind the early planning stages of Water Street 
Tampa.  
 
4.5.2.1 Downtown Core Area 
Downtown Tampa began as an industrialized zone and in the 1980s experienced its first 
wave of office development. Although Water Street Tampa is yet to be constructed, the district 
will support the construction of the first new office buildings in the area since the early 1990s. 
The hospitality market was strengthened in the 1990s with the addition of the Tampa Convention 
Center and the need for new or renovated hotels. One important goal for the revitalization of 
downtown includes offering a greater variety of hotels at different price points to create greater 
linkages between the convention center and other public projects such as the Amalie Arena. 
Although the Tampa Performing Arts Center and the Amalie Arena contributed to the city’s 
cultural and sport and entertainment sector, supplemental retail development was relatively 
weak. Harbour Island created a small retail and entertainment center that catered to the needs of 
island residents and tourists staying in nearby hotels. Opened in 2001, the Channelside Bay Plaza 
was the only major retail center located in the Channel District and in the downtown area. The 
outdoor shopping and restaurant plaza was designed as a space for the few local residents already 
living downtown, the tourists and convention visitors staying in the downtown hotels, and the 
 190 
cruise ships docking at the Channel District terminal. The shopping plaza, however, was 
unsuccessful and many retail establishments were replaced by restaurants. In addition, the street 
grid and lack of safe pedestrian walkways created a sense of isolation. In 2014, Strategic 
Property Partners acquired the retail complex with a $10 million bond payment to the port and by 
2016, the Channelside Bay Plaza sat 70% vacant (Griffin, 09/20/2016). While redevelopment 
plans to raze the entire complex and replace it with new waterfront condos, restaurants, and a 
park on the current property parcel are further negotiated, Strategic Property Partners’ plan is to 
engage the area with pop-up restaurants and stores on a temporary basis (Griffin, 09/20/2016).  
 
4.5.2.2 Harbour Island 
Harbour Island, formerly Seddon Island, lies south of the Garrison Channel. While 
separated from the arena, Harbour Island is included in the analysis because it lies within the 
quarter-mile radius of the arena-district micro-area and despite the natural water boundary, the 
area is still well connected. The Tampa Downtown Partnership launched a new shuttle service 
that offers free rides49 anywhere within the downtown district, which spans from the northern 
end of Harbor Island to Interstate 275, and from the University of Tampa area to the Channel 
District (Dawson, 10/21/2016). 
 
Once a transport and docking station for rail and sea transport, Beneficial Corporation 
envisioned a major land-use shift on Seddon Island from heavy manufacturing and industrial to 
                                                 
49 The shuttle service operates similar to Uber or Lyft in which users request rides from certain locations and 
indicating the number people in their party. There are currently 12 electric shuttles that are in operation and will 
continue to operate based on funds from the Tampa Downtown Partnership, the City of Tampa, and the Florida 
Department of Transportation. (Dawson, 10/21/2016). 
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high-rises. Beneficial Corp’s real estate subsidiary company, Harbour Island Inc., invested 
millions into the island’s infrastructure. In 1985, a $160 million festival-marketplace complex 
with Harbour Island Hotel; the One Harbour Place, an office tower; The Shops, a retail and 
restaurant center; and residential condominiums were proposed for the northern tip of Harbour 
Island. This complex would be a part of a $1 billion joint venture between Harbour Island Inc. 
and Dallas-based company, Lincoln Property Co., to develop the 177-acre island. After enduring 
two economic recessions which tremendously impacted the real estate market at the time, 
Beneficial Corp. began subdividing the island into smaller parcels and selling them off to 
developers for houses, apartments, and condominium complexes. Trammel Crow built Island 
Walk Apartments, a 272-unit rental development, in 1991, and was one of the most successful 
real estate development projects on the island (Ossorio, 07/02/1991)50. In 1998, with a stronger 
residential market downtown, Atlanta-based developer, Post Properties Inc., planned to develop 
a $20 million apartment complex, Post Harbour Place, which includes, 210 apartments and 
townhomes, that caters to young professionals, business people, and empty-nesters who are able 
and willing to pay a premium for a more luxurious lifestyle51. Harbour Island began the 
residential development building boom, which preempted the infrastructure and land use changes 
in the Channel District.  
 
                                                 
50 The sale of the Island Walk Apartments set a new record for Tampa; each unit sold approximately for $100,000 
($187,000 in 2018 dollars). 
51 The strategy of Post Properties Inc. is to develop upscale apartment complexes in high-density areas where there 
is little competition. Harbour Island provides that type of environment and empty canvas to develop a number of 
new residential complexes (Gruss, 01/31/1997). 
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4.5.2.3 Channel District 
The Channel District, located along the eastern edge of the central business district, is 
bounded by the Nuccio Parkway and Selmon Expressway to the north, the Ybor Channel to the 
east, Channelside Drive and the Channelside Bay Plaza along the Garrison Channel to the south, 
and the North and South Meridian Avenue to the west. Located along the Ybor and Garrison 
Channels, the district development has been influenced by the port’s activity, and has become 
one of Tampa’s emerging downtown neighborhoods. In analyzing the urban development impact 
and outcomes surrounding a quarter-mile radius of the Amalie Arena, a portion of the Channel 
District is included in the analysis.  
Channel District was first developed in the 1920s for shipping and marine services. 
Similar to the rest of downtown Tampa, the area went into decline and remained inactive during 
the 1980s and 1990s. In 2002, Channelside was designated as a Community Redevelopment 
Area (CRA) in order to attract private investments including higher density residential and 
mixed-use projects. A TIF district was created to facilitate revitalization. The CRA will promote 
further construction of necessary public infrastructure and support public and private ventures 
within the emerging neighborhood. In 2005, Tampa created the Strategic Action Plan for the 
Channel District to target the needs of the area, provide the improvements needed for new 
infrastructure, maintain the momentum of development activity within the area, and recognize 
the development pattern of the area while ensuring that both private and public development 
design needs are met. Channel District has remained underutilized for over 20 years, but after its 
designation as CRA, the Strategic Action Plan forecasted that the residential developments 
would reshape the entire district and be supported by the public facilities such as the Port, the 
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Florida Aquarium, and the Amalie Arena. Since 2005, it was estimated that over the next 20 
years, 12 million square feet of new development would be built. 
 
In 2005, Channel District had the strongest real estate market of all the districts 
downtown. Residential development in the area was slow to penetrate the market in Channelside, 
however, the construction of the Florida Aquarium has helped anchor 12 residential 
developments that were under construction in the mid-2000s.  
 
4.5.2.4 Water Street District 
Tampa Bay Lightning owner, Jeff Vinik assembled more than 53 acres of land and 
envisioned a complete transformation of downtown Tampa. Water Street Tampa is expected to 
be a $3 billion multiuse district that extends across 16 blocks around the downtown waterfront. 
 
Water Street Tampa is located across from Harbour Island on Hillsborough Bay and the 
Garrison Channel. Since 2016, millions were invested in road, water, and sewage work in order 
to transform the street grid to incorporate more walkable and bikeable streets and create a more 
functional street network. Water Street Tampa is bounded by Channelside Drive, E. Cumberland 
Avenue, S. Meridian Ave, and S. Morgan Street. Old Water Street, which runs directly through 
the middle of the development area, will become the nucleus of the neighborhood brimmed with 
retail, restaurants, and open spaces. Seventeen buildings are proposed, ten are to be completed in 
the first development phase. Phase One of Water Street will begin in the summer of 2018 with 
3.5 million square feet of construction costing over $1.5 billion (Danielson, 2018). Some of the 
proposed projects include two new four-and-five-star hotels including the JW Marriott, more 
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than 2 million square feet of office space -- the first new office buildings that will be built in 
downtown Tampa in over 25 years, 3,500 new apartments and condominiums, and one million 
square feet of retail, restaurant, and entertainment space. Additionally, the $164.7 million 
University of South Florida Morsani College of Medicine and Heart Institute will be built 
adjacent to the Amalie Arena along with an office building that will specialize in health-related 
businesses. The development of Water Street Tampa is projected to be completed by 2027. 
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4.5.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Table 32. Notable completed and proposed development projects in Tampa’s Amalie Arena district micro-area, 1990 to 
present. 
Development 
Name 
Project Cost Description 
List of Downtown Development Projects Completed in early 2000s 
Island Walk $59,200,0000 
• Originally built as apartment buildings, Island Walk Apartments opened in 1991 with 272-units. 
• The condominium boom in downtown Tampa began in 2000 with the renovations of Island Walk and 
Island Place on Harbour Island from apartments into condominiums. 
• All 516 units within the two buildings were sold in less than two years. 
ParkCrest 
(Harbour 
Island) 
(not disclosed) 
• ParkCrest, opened in 2005, is located along the Garrison Channel on Harbour Island. 
• Structure was originally planned as an apartment complex, however, with the condominium boom in the 
early 2000s, the developer, CKT Development Co., decided to focus on condominiums instead. The 
reasoning behind this was that at the time, apartment developers were unable to compete with 
condominium and townhome developers for the land prices. 
• The building is nine stories with 335 residents with approximately 41-49 units per floor. 
• As the rest of the country experienced a downward slump in the real estate market during the economic 
recession in the late 2000s, many of the condominium owners of ParkCrest foreclosed on their properties 
as they could no longer afford the monthly maintenance fees. 
Post Harbour 
Place 
(not disclosed) 
• Post Harbour Place, located on Harbour Island, was built in 1998 as one of Tampa’s first residential 
properties. 
• In 2006, 206-apartments at Post Harbour Place were converted into condominiums through tax subsidies. 
The remaining 550 units will remain as apartments. 
Harbour Island 
Grandview 
Apartments 
$27,000,000 
• In 2001, Byrd Corp built Grandview, a 64-unit condominium complex on Harbour Island; 60% of the 
condominiums were pre-sold. 
• The apartments are located just along the Garrison Channel. The complex is walking distance to the 
Amalie Arena and the Florida Aquarium, and offers a special waterfront amenity of boat slips. 
List of Downtown Development Projects Completed in late 2000s 
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The Plaza at 
Channelside 
$200,000,000 
• Opened in 2001, Channelside at Garrison Seaport, later renamed as the Plaza at Channelside was built as 
an entertainment complex that houses various retail tenants, restaurants, and a move theater right along the 
waterfront. 
• In 2003, 3/4th of the complex was occupied, yet this did not last long. Over the last several years, the Plaza 
at Channelside was exposed to financial difficulties as the complex slowly lost restaurants and shops as 
tenants could no longer afford the rents and mortgages. 
• The complex fell into foreclosure until Jeff Vinik of Strategic Property Partners purchased the complex in 
2015 in order to convert the parcel into a mixed-use lifestyle center. The plan is to demolish the current 
complex and convert the area into luxury residential units while also offering an ample amount of office 
and work space. 
The Towers at 
Channelside 
$93,000,000 
• Built between 2005 and 2007, the Towers of Channelside is a $93 million, 260-unit project on North 12th 
Street just north of Channelside Drive. The complex is two 28-story towers and has four parking levels. 
List of Downtown Development Projects Planned, 2016-18 
Water Street 
Tampa 
$3,000,000,000 
• Water Street Tampa is a $3 billion “wellness district” proposed by Strategic Property Partners that will 
include new residential, office, and medical development in downtown Tampa. 
• The first proposed residences (815 Water Street) will be part of a larger mixed-use project. This will 
include twin towers and a ground floor grocery store and will sit at Channelside Drive and Water Street at 
the entrance of the Tampa Riverwalk. 
• One of the towers will be a 26-story condominium tower while the other will be a 21-story rental tower. 
Both of these towers will share a green roof that will promote green infrastructure and sustainability. 
• 815 Water Street is the first residential development that has been proposed in downtown Tampa in more 
than a decade. It will be the first building of many to occupy the 53-acre Water Street Tampa district. 
• Projected to begin construction in 2018, the first tower is proposed to be completed by 2020. 
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4.5.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
The southwesterly portion of the Channel District, the northern tip of Harbour Island, and 
the southern tip of Tampa’s central business district are captured in the Amalie Arena quarter-
mile arena-district micro-area. While it was proposed that the arena would play a role in the 
redevelopment of downtown Tampa, until the largely privately financed Water Street District 
proposal in 2016, there was little immediate development in the quarter-mile surrounding the 
arena. The analysis for this research study captures the changes in land-use composition and 
assessment values six years prior to the opening of the Amalie Arena through 2015.  
 
4.5.4.1 Land Use Composition  
The 1983 Community Redevelopment Plan for the Downtown Community Redevelopment 
Area by the Community Redevelopment Agency outlines the need to coordinate and facilitate 
public and private redevelopment of portions of Tampa’s central business district and provides a 
framework to guide development downtown generating a stronger commercial and residential 
base by 2000. While outdated, this plan verifies the type of redevelopment that was proposed for 
the two designated redevelopment areas in the CBD to be accomplished by the early 2000s, 
against the parcel-by-parcel land-use composition analysis conducted from assessment records 
between 1990 and 2015. Hillsborough County and Tampa have produced a few planning 
documents regarding redevelopment initiatives, however, none of these plans have been as 
comprehensive in detailing the development initiatives as outlined in the 1983 plan in the areas 
that are targeted in the arena-district micro-area over the past 20 years.  
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The Tampa City Council and the Community Redevelopment Agency declared that 
Areas I and II of the Tampa CBD, illustrated in Figure 16, are blighted cores areas; parcels are 
vacant and the properties are underutilized and thus, incapable of contributing to a vibrant city 
center and attracting an appropriate tax base. Downtown Tampa is therefore comprised of two 
CRAs. The initial non-core CRS was established in 1983, which is the area of downtown that is 
the focus of this study, along with the core-CRA established in 1988. If combined, the two CRAs 
encompass Tampa’s entire CBD. The primary role of the established TIF was meant to cover the 
debt of the Tampa Convention Center. Factors that have contributed to blighted areas throughout 
the CBD resulted from: 
1) the lack of early comprehensive planning which culminated into a random mixture of 
land uses that failed to create a coherent urban design and community downtown, 
2) infrastructure that was not only old and deteriorated but also functionally antiquated, 
3) irregularly drawn parcels and thus have an inaccurate boundaries and overall lot sizes 
which has prevented any new development, and  
4) the limited upgrading of infrastructure such as water and sewage lines, sidewalks, etc. 
(Community Redevelopment Agency, 1983; p. 12). 
 
 The Community Redevelopment Plan aims to accomplish the following, but is not limited to: 
1) eliminating blighted infrastructure and preventing furthering spread of blighted 
properties, 
2) attracting  public infrastructure to subsequently entice full-scale private development 
by 2000, 
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3) initiating redevelopment plans and actions that are consistent with the land use and 
development plans for Downtown Tampa (Community Redevelopment Agency, 1983; p. 
10). 
 
Figure 16. City of Tampa's Community Redevelopment Area (CRA) land-uses by subarea 
Source: Tampa’s Community Redevelopment Plan for the Downtown Community Redevelopment Area 
(1989) 
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Areas I and II are split into seven subareas. I focus on Subareas II and V since they are 
located directly within the boundaries of the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area. Subarea II 
lies between the Garrison Channel and the Crosstown Expressway and is the area that has been 
announced as the site for Water Street Tampa. The main area of focus for development in 
Subarea II was the harbor front. The Community Redevelopment Agency sought low to 
moderate intensity development for the areas’ hotel, office, entertainment, and residential land-
uses that would tie the area together. Prior to the announcement of Water Street Tampa in 2016, 
residential properties were nonexistent in Subarea II, but the area was successful in incorporating 
entertainment uses with the addition of the Tampa Convention Center, hotels, and a few office 
spaces. The second initiative for Subarea II was to ensure public access along the Garrison 
Channel and the Hillsborough River, which was accomplished with the implementation of the 
Riverwalk in the early 2000s. Harbour Island comprises Subarea V. Harbour Island is primarily 
residential, along with hotel, commercial office space, retail specialty shops, and boat slips 
which are also defined as commercial properties.  
 
With the population projections in the early 2000s, the City of Tampa expected that there 
was a need for higher residential density. The limited supply of commercial properties is better 
utilized and integrated into the downtown area. Contingent on private sector’s willingness to 
invest and participate in Tampa’s redevelopment plans, the city sought a mixture of medium and 
high density of residential development along the waterfront. 
 
Between 1990 and 2015, the greatest changes in land-use have been in the increased 
concentration of parking garages, surface parking lots, and residential units while industrial and 
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heavy manufacturing infrastructure and vacant lots have decreased in parcels located within the 
Amalie Arena micro-area. Figure 17 provides a summary of the percentage change by land-use 
category over the last 25 years.  
 
Figure 17. Percentage of land-use composition in the Amalie Arena district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
 
 
Prior to the 1970s, a number of shipping companies and warehouse owners privately 
owned the Channel District. In the 1970s and 1980s, the area was stagnant. The Port Authority 
bought up the majority of the parcels in Channel District in order to further develop and attract 
cruise lines to port in the area (Channel District History, 2012). Only a small southwesterly 
portion of the Channelside District is captured within the quarter-mile Amalie Arena district 
micro-area. In 1990, 18% of the 86 parcels located in the arena-district micro-area were listed 
with industrial land uses. By 2015, only 2% of 89 parcels were industrial property uses. This 
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demonstrates Tampa and the Port Authority’s encouragement of adaptive re-use of old 
warehouses. The decrease in industrial land-use encouraged a shift in the number of exempt 
properties. Although there was a 75% change in the exempt property count between 1990 and 
1995, on average, the number of exempt parcels from 1995 to 2015 composed 35% of the land-
use in Amalie Arena district micro-area. The 75% change between 1990 and 1995 illustrates the 
parcels’ transition in ownership from the various warehouse owners, to the Port Authority, 
Tampa, and Hillsborough County. From 1990 to 2015, highway construction is related to the 3% 
compounding rate of change in exempt properties (Amen, 2016).  
Similarly, vacant parcels composed approximately 45% of the total land-use in 199052. 
By 2015, vacant parcels decreased to 7% of the total land-use. This was a 13% compounding rate 
of change in parking over the last 25 years. The stark decrease in vacant properties between 2005 
and 2015 is due to the residential construction on Harbour Island. Between 1990 and 2015, there 
was a 7% compounding rate in residential land-use; the quarter-mile Amalie Arena district 
micro-area began with two residential parcels in 1990, which grew to four developments in 2000, 
and 11 in 2015. While the first condominiums for Island Place located on Harbour Island were 
completed in 1995, they were still designated as vacant residential properties since the 
assessment values for the condominiums were not recorded until the next assessment cycle. In 
2000, the 244-condominiums at Island Place were included in the residential development count. 
From 2000 to 2005, a 32% change in the condominium count was a result of the completion of 
the Garrison A and Grandview A condominiums on Harbour Island. Finally, between 2005 and 
                                                 
52 Parcels that were designated as vacant commercial or vacant residential by the assessor’s department are listed as 
vacant parcels in this study’s analysis. This is because the intended commercial or residential infrastructure were 
incomplete by the listed assessment cycle. Therefore, the assessment record did not assess appropriately capture the 
finished construction until the following assessment cycle. 
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2010, another shift in the residential count occurred with a 137% change in the total number of 
condominiums due to the completion of the Towers at Channelside, the Post Apartment Homes, 
Parkcrest Harbour Island, and the expansion of Island Place. In the arena-district micro-area, 
commercial properties accounted for approximately 20% of the total land-use composition from 
1990-15. Two hotels were built in the last 20 years, and the office infrastructure only increased 
by four office parcels by 2010. Despite the efforts outlined in development plans, the land-use 
composition changes in the Amalie Arena district micro-area are minor and do not necessarily 
reflect the expectation of new development or rehabilitation of infrastructure that is both 
consistent and reflects the adopted land-use and development plans for downtown Tampa.  
Consistent with the city and county’s agenda to redevelop Areas I and II, Table 33 shows 
that the percentage of industrial and vacant properties decreased substantially eliminating 
blighted and underutilized properties that are no longer compatible with the land-use mixture 
needed to create vibrant urban center. The percentage of residential and commercial properties 
relative to the total number of parcels in the arena district micro area, on the other hand, do not 
reflect the transformation that Tampa and Hillsborough County were hoping for in the last 25 
years. Although the percentage of residential properties increased, compared to the rest of the 
land-use categories, residential property use consisted of 12% of the land-use composition in 
2015. If all of the new residential properties in Channelside District were included, the 
residential concentration may be different. However, limited to the arena-district micro-area 
around the Amalie Arena, there is potential to increase the residential built volume since the 
waterfront can easily accommodate a number of new waterfront high-density condominiums. 
The proposed Water Street Tampa district development might finally be able to accomplish this 
goal. Public infrastructure such as the Amalie Arena, the Tampa Convention Center, and the 
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Florida Aquarium may have been catalysts for a resurgence in urban development downtown, 
but the assessment records do not necessarily reflect success. Due to access to the waterfront and 
affordable land values, private investors eventually developed Harbour Island. Furthermore, 
without Vinik and Strategic Property Partners’ consolidation of parcels around the Amalie 
Arena, and investing approximately $3 billion of private investment to develop Water Street 
Tampa, the land parcels excluding those along the waterfront that compose a portion of the 
Tampa Riverwalk could easily still be listed as vacant parcels. 
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Table 33. City of Tampa's Amalie Arena district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015. 
YEAR 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
  LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
  COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 2 2.33 4 4.88 4 4.76 10 11.49 11 11.22 11 12.36 7.06 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 4 0.51 3 0.38 - 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
2 100.00 3 75.00 247 100.00 326 99.39 772 99.23 773 98.98 26.91 
TOTAL CONDOS              
COMMERCIAL 14 16.28 17 20.73 15 17.86 18 20.69 20 20.41 15 16.87 0.28 
OFFICE 6 42.86 7 41.18 6 40.00 8 46.91 10 50.00 5 22.73 (0.47) 
RETAIL 2 14.29 3 17.65 1 6.67 1 5.86 2 10.50 1 4.55 (2.48) 
RESTAURANT 1 7.14 2 11.76 3 20.00 2 11.73 2 10.50 1 4.55 0.26 
HOTEL 1 7.14 1 5.88 1 6.67 2 11.73 3 15.75 3 13.64 4.76 
INDUSTRIAL 16 18.60 11 13.41 6 7.14 3 3.45 2 2.04 2 2.25 (7.58) 
EXEMPT 16 18.60 28 34.15 27 32.14 31 35.63 36 36.73 34 38.19 3.06 
PARKING 1 1.16 1 1.22 2 2.38 12 13.79 14 14.29 20 22.47 12.73 
VACANT 37 43.02 21 25.61 30 35.71 13 14.94 15 15.31 7 7.86 (6.44) 
MIXED-USE              
TOTAL 86 100.00 82 100.00 84 100.00 87 100.00 98 100.00 89 100.00 0.14 
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4.5.4.2 Built Volume 
Tampa Bay assessment records were inconsistent in documenting building square footage 
between 1990 and 2005. Heated living building square footage and total building square footage 
were recorded for residential properties. The difference between the two categories is that heated 
building square footage calculates the living areas of a structure while the total building square 
footage includes garages, basements, etc. in the total square footage count. Between 1990 and 
2005, building square footage for the majority of industrial warehouses and commercial office 
properties were not recorded and therefore creates some inconsistencies. Based on the downtown 
Tampa’s development context, it is clear that there were more industrial warehouses in the 1990s 
and therefore should have a relatively high building square footage. Downtown was also 
dominated by office buildings and no new office construction occurred in the last 25 years. It is 
reasonable to assume that on average, the building square footage for commercial properties is 
about 1.5 million square feet. At the height, in the arena-district micro-area industrial warehouses 
may have been 500,000 square feet or less. 
In 1990, there were two single-family properties located directly north of Amalie Arena 
on Nebraska Avenue that accounted for the small residential building square footage. The first 
wave of residential development in 1995 occurred on Harbour Island. Over the next three five-
year intervals, the construction and expansion of residential properties on Harbour Island and one 
development in Channelside District accounted for the increase in total built volume.  
Between 1990 and 2015, commercial properties had a 5% compounding rate of change in built 
volume53. The built volume for commercial office space is about 600,000 square feet as no new 
                                                 
53 Please note, the building square footage is incomplete. Industrial warehouses and the majority of commercial 
office space were not recorded for parcels between 1990 and 2005. On average, it can be assumed that commercial 
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office buildings were constructed. Furthermore, the raw count for office parcels between 2000 
and 2010 increased by four office parcels, which is not equally counted as if four new office 
buildings were construction. The increase in office parcels can be explained by the conversions 
of office space into retail, or simply office parcel expansions from subsequent changes in 
ownership. In 1990 and 1995, the retail building square footage is larger than in the most recent 
years because of the boutique retail center built on Harbor Island. The retail center on Harbour 
Island struggled financially and was later converted into a mixed-use development with offices 
and a hotel. The increase in hotel building square footage complements the raw hotel count. The 
Hilton Tampa Downtown Convention Center Hotel was the first hotel built in the arena-district 
micro-area located adjacent to the convention center. In 2005 and 2010, two other hotels 
followed, including the Tampa Marriott Waterside Hotel and Marina and the Westin Tampa on 
Harbor Island, respectively. The restaurant building square footage increased substantially in 
1995 and 2000 due to a warehouse conversion in the Channel District.  
As expected, between 1995 and 2015, the industrial warehouse building square footage 
had a 12% depreciation in the compounding rate of change with the city’s transition away from 
underutilized or inappropriate land-uses in the downtown area. A large portion of the split 
parcels in Channel District that were formerly designated as industrial properties, were 
reclassified as exempt properties when taken over by the Port Authority, Hillsborough County, 
and the City of Tampa,  
When the city, county, and the Port Authority bought up a large proportion of parcels in 
Channel District, the parcels supporting the cruise line terminals and industrial warehouses 
                                                 
properties overall had a total building square footage of 1.5 million as no new construction in office space occurred 
over the 25 years. 
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owned by the Port and parcels assembled for the Florida Aquarium are designated as exempt 
properties. The building square footage for vacant properties for years 1990, 1995, and 2000 
include residential and commercial buildings that were in the final construction phase but listed 
as either vacant commercial or vacant residential property uses. The reasoning for this is that the 
buildings were not fully finished with the construction and therefore property use for assessment 
values were postponed until the next assessment cycle. As a result, these properties are listed as 
vacant. Between 2005 and 2015, vacant properties were no longer listed with built volumes and 
were consequently vacant lots without building assessment values.  
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Table 34. City of Tampa's Amalie Arena district micro-area built volume count, 1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
1990-
2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
BLDG 
SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 3,534 0.42 466,140 22.30 656,617 18.56 859,252 19.33 1,468,342 30.75 1,779,318 36.51 28.26 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 364,227 74.99 659,611 37.07 - 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
3,534 100.00 466,140 100.00 656,617 100.00 854,150 99.41 1,101,083 130.28 1,107,761 62.26 25.85 
TOTAL CONDOS              
COMMERCIAL 543,097 64.68 1,023,393 0.49 959,527 27.12 1,649,432 37.11 1,913,013 40.06 1,748,458 35.88 4.79 
OFFICE 2,880 0.53 274,052 26.78 249,684 26.02 643,485 39.01 679,450 35.52 488,334 27.93 22.79 
RETAIL 169,230 31.16 307,389 30.04 112,388 11.71 10,278 0.62 14,684 0.77 6,640 0.38 (12.15) 
RESTAURANT 950 0.17 15,550 1.52 32,944 3.43 10,490 0.64 10,490 0.55 3,200 0.18 4.98 
HOTEL 370,037 68.13 371,530 36.30 371,530 38.72 933,760 56.61 1,208,389 63.17 1,208,389 69.11 4.85 
INDUSTRIAL - - 181,191 8.67 79,904 2.26 60,644 1.36 5,984 0.13 7,214 0.15 (12.10) 
EXEMPT - - 405,150 19.38 1,652,547 46.71 1,875,940 42.20 1,387,595 29.06 1,337,987 27.46 4.89 
PARKING - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
VACANT 293,013 34.90 14,600 0.70 189,297 5.35 - - - - - - (100.00) 
MIXED-USE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL 839,644 100.00 2,090,474 100.00 3,537,892 100.00 4,445,268 100.00 4,774,934 100.00 4,872,977 100.00 7.29 
 210 
4.5.4.3 Assessed Values 
Figure 18 illustrates the compounding rate of change in assessment values within the 
Amalie Arena district’s micro-area compared to the city. Florida requires market value be used 
for assessment procedures, assessing at 100% of the market value54. In some cases, however, 
adjustments can be made55. In Hillsborough County, property is adjusted by 15% for all uses56. 
Across the past 25 years, the arena district’s micro-area had an assessment compounding growth 
rate of 3% compared to the 1% growth for Tampa. Between 1990 and 2005, the arena-district 
micro-area’s assessment values doubled. Unlike other cities in which exempt properties are not 
assessed or subject to a tax abatement, Tampa’s exempt public infrastructure projects are still 
assessed based on their market value. The Tampa Convention Center and the Amalie Arena, 
contributed to a sizable increase in assessed valuation, but property taxes are not paid. In 1995, 
the vacant arena parcel that at the time was under construction was valued at $2.6 million. After 
the opening of the arena, the parcel was valued at $25 million and $45.8 million in 2000 and 
2005, respectively. The parking lot adjacent to the arena had an assessed value of approximately 
$590,000 in 1995 and increased to $22 million in 2000, and $42.5 million in 2005. The Tampa 
Convention Center was a vacant commercial lot in 1990 with an assessment value of $992,000. 
In 1995, the parcel transitioned to exempt land use with an assessment value of $71 million and 
                                                 
54 The market value of each parcel is influenced by the local real estate market and sales comparables in addition to 
the property use, and improvements on site. The State of Florida estimates market value through the three traditional 
approaches: the cost approach, market approach, and income approach.  
55 Historically, there have been cases in which property appraisers were charged with unfairly assessing properties at 
levels less than 100% of the market value. In order to ensure that appraisers are reflecting the full market value of 
the property per taxing jurisdiction, the Department of Revenue assumes a 15% adjustment for the sales ratios and 
the uses the adjusted value to evaluate the fairness of the county’s tax roll (Johnson, 03/11/2011). 
56 Under Florida law, all residences with homestead exemptions, usually single-family residences, are limited to a 
three percent per year cap on assessment increases. The Save Our Homes Amendment began in 1995, or in the year 
after a property receives the homestead exemption. 
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at its height in 2005 was valued at $81.6 million. Some other important development projects to 
note include the development of Harbour Island and the hotels and residential condominiums 
built on the island. In 1995, Harbour Island was assessed as one parcel at $16.5 million. The 
island was eventually subdivided into smaller parcels, and sold to a number of different owners. 
As a result, the assessment value changed as the size of the lots changed. In 1995, the Island 
Place Condominiums was a vacant residential lot with an assessment value of $12.2 million, in 
2000, the residential development was assessed at approximately $50 million. Its value fell to 
$35 million in 2015. Other notable projects that contributed to the peak of assessment valuations 
in 2005 for the micro-area include the Post Harbour Island Apartments at $30.8 million, the 
Wyndham Hotel at $22.7 million, and the Towers at Channelside Condominiums, $34 million 
dollars in 2010. 
Overall, the compounding rate of change in parcel assessment values are not significantly 
different between the Amalie Arena district micro-area and that of Tampa. The percentage 
change in assessment and market values over the 25-year period in the arena district demonstrate 
a much greater change than compared to Tampa. For instance, between 1990 and 2015 the 
compounding rate of change in assessed and market value for the arena district is 3% and 4% 
respectively compared to the 1% change in assessed and market values throughout the entire 
city. Yet, in analyzing the compounding rate of change every five years, the differences in 
assessment values between the two areas shrank. Between 1990 and 1995, the arena-district 
micro-area had less than a 0.5% compounding growth in assessment value while Tampa 
depreciated by approximately 2%. Between 1995 and 2000, Tampa rebounded with a 5% 
compounding assessment growth rate compared to the 4.5% compounding assessment growth 
rate. Assessment values in the arena-district micro-area peaked in 2005. The arena-district’s 
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compounding growth rate of change was 10% compared to 7% in Tampa. The Towers at 
Channelside might have also contributed to the growth rate and the transfer of ownership of two 
parcels to the Port Authority. In 2004, Channel District was established as a Community 
Redevelopment Area (CRA) and was the fastest growing in Hillsborough County. From 2004-
10, there was a 785% change in taxable assessment values in the Channel District CRA (Annual 
Report, 2010; p. 6).  
 
Figure 18. Compounding rate of change in assessed value in Amalie Arena district micro-
area vs. city of Tampa, 1990-2015. 
 
4.5.4.4 Property Taxes 
In Florida, parcels are assessed at a 100% of their market value. From 1990 and 2015, 
parcels located within the Amalie Arena district’s micro-area and Tampa did not have a dramatic 
shift in the compounding growth rates in property tax revenues. The Amalie Arena district’s 
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micro-area had a compounding growth property tax rate of less than 0.5%. Tampa had an overall 
compounding growth property tax rate of 0.9%. Figure 19 illustrates the property tax 
compounding rate of change and the difference in property tax revenues collections for every 
five years between the arena district micro-area and Tampa. Tampa’s property tax revenue 
between 1990 and 2015 reflects a 25% change, while the arena district micro-area had a 9% 
change. Between 1990 and 1995, the property tax for Tampa had a negative compounding rate of 
growth of 1%, increased by a compounding growth rate of 3% from 1995-00, and then 
experienced an upsurge with a compounding growth rate of 9% or a 55% change from 2000-05, 
during which was the city’s peak for property tax revenue intake. Tampa implemented a number 
of CRAs throughout the city boundaries to incentivize private developers to spur new 
development. Hillsborough County has eight active CRAs that benefit from the growth in 
assessed property values or TIF funds in order to reinvest within the different CRA boundaries. 
These CRAs include Central Park, Channel District, Downtown, Drew Park, East Tampa, West 
Tampa, Tampa Heights Riverfront, and Ybor City I and Ybor City II. Table 35 presents the eight 
CRAs, the base year when the CRA was established, the total amount of taxable assessment 
values recorded during the base year, and the total taxable assessment values in 2015. 
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Table 35. The change in total taxable assessed value in 2010 and 2015 in Hillsborough 
County’s Community Redevelopment Areas (CRAs). 
CRA 
Establishment 
Year 
Taxable Assessment 
Value in Establishment 
Year 
Taxable Assessment Value 
in 2010 
Taxable 
Assessment in 
2015 
Downtown Non-Core 
& Core Area 
1983/1988 454,090,045 1,765,334,086 2,008,173,477 
Ybor City I & II 1987/2002 59,123,090 181,268,97;| 77,503,293 215,133,489 
East Tampa 2003 492,472,827 853,954,177 548,194,743 
Channel District 2003 39,869,871 352,848,596 413,855,683 
Drew Park 2003 168,033,380 260,948,073 222,383,153 
Central Park 2006 6,701,795 9,472,264 12,765,050 
Tampa Heights 
Riverfront 
2005 8,464,415 24,029,000 15,965,183 
West Tampa  2015 274,629,731 xxx 274,629,731 
Source: Annual Activity Report from the City of Tampa Community Redevelopment Agency to the 
Tampa City Council, 2005, 2010, 2015. 
 
Between 1990 and 1995, the Amalie Arena district micro-area had a negative property 
tax compounding growth rate of 8%. From 1995 to 2000, the micro-area had another 2% 
decrease in the compounding growth rate. The rise in exempt properties, relative to the total 
concentration of property uses in the arena district, is the reason for the declining property taxes. 
In 1990, assessment records show that 16 exempt properties in the micro-area, which are all 
large public infrastructure projects, increased to 28 exempt properties by 1995. One example of 
this is the expansion of the Port Authority’s parking garage used to accommodate the cruise line 
industry and nearby entertainment venues such as the Amalie Arena. Since 2005, two parcels 
owned by the Port Authority had an immense increase in assessment value. Furthermore, since 
the Port Authority owns the parking garage, the two parcels are listed as exempt properties, and 
therefore do not contribute to the city’s property tax revenue. Between 2000 and 2005, the 
micro-area had a 15% compounding growth rate - or a 55% change - and reached its peak 
because of the number of new residential developments completed on Harbour Island and along 
the peripheries of the Channel District. Similar to Tampa, the micro-area also experienced a 
depreciation in property values and subsequently a decrease in the compounding growth of 2% 
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and 1% in 2005-2010 and 2010-2015, respectively. Table 36 provides lists the amount of the 
micro-area’s forgone taxes that are a result of the number of exempt properties found in the 
quarter-mile radius. The total amount of exemptions far surpass the amount of property tax 
collected within the arena district. In sum, between 1990 and 2005, the city had a greater 
compounding growth in property tax revenues relative to the micro-area. 
 
Table 36. Total amount of exemptions from parcel sample size in the Amalie Arena district 
micro-area, 1990-2015. 
 
Figure 19. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in Amalie Arena district micro-
area vs. city of Tampa, 1990-2015. 
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Table 37. Assessment, market, and property tax values in the Amalie Arena district micro-area vs. city of Tampa, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
AMALIE ARENA DISTRICT MICRO AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 11,103,018 14,555,097 23,450,499 4,439,358 3,932,313 3,738,730 (4.26) 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) 839,644 3,161,738 2,788,308 4,481,759 4,774,934 4,872,977 7.29 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 179,157,412 211,223,450 296,535,994 553,492,609 580,461,062 706,930,917 5.64 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
339,319,647 344,531,992 430,571,484 694,927,216 634,615,310 706,930,917 2.98 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 99,669,599 118,891,109 113,280,612 179,688,888 93,215,655 219,355,881 3.21 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
79,308,238 92,107,484 169,787,407 
390,547,162 
472,791,802 587,980,114 8.34 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 179,157,412 211,223,450 300,927,659 561,052,981 593,931,187 810,077,234 6.22 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
339,319,647 344,531,992 407,903,011 704,419,499 649,342,133 810,077,234 3.54 
TOTAL MARKET LAND 
VALUE 
99,669,599 118,891,109 113,280,612 179,688,888 93,215,655 219,355,881 3.21 
TOTAL MARKET 
BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
79,308,238 92,107,484 169,787,407 390,547,162 472,791,802 587,980,114 8.34 
TOTAL TAX 4,491,852 3,425,689 2,832,251 8,515,351 9,057,806 9,268,216 2.94 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 8,507,454 5,587,729 5,258,127 10,691,288 9,902,856 9,268,216 0.34 
CITY OF TAMPA BAY 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 8,924,006,000 9,544,867,000 13,841,329,000 22,302,375,000 25,431,727,000 23,984,839,000 4.03 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
16,901,843,665 15,568,877,625 20,097,666,707 28,001,326,694 27,804,385,795 23,984,839,000 1.41 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 13,243,659,000 14,252,304,000 20,655,274,000 35,581,500,000 38,012,176,000 33,241,723,000 3.75 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
25,083,158,165 23,247,298,977 29,991,542,907 44,673,681,872 41,558,530,666 33,241,723,000 1.13 
TOTAL TAX 56,093,000 60,407,000 78,691,000 141,022,000 139,391,000 133,027,000 3.51 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 106,238,736 98,531,409 114,259,656 177,057,515 152,395,515 133,027,000 0.90 
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4.5.5 KEY FINDINGS 
The arena-district micro-area is a success across the four measures: land-use composition, built 
volume, assessed values, and property taxes. The land-use diversity shifted to include more 
residential, hotel, and retail development. The arena-district micro-area had a significant increase 
in built volume, particularly in residential development on Harbour Island and parts of the 
growing Channel District. With the increase in residential and retail development, the assessment 
values and property tax values subsequently grew over 25 years. However, since the opening of 
the Amalie Arena, there has been a lag in arena-led urban development outcomes. The increase 
in development in the Channel District and the downtown core is more likely a result of the 
implementation of the CRA rather than the opening of the Amalie Arena in 1996. Furthermore, 
the immediate proposed development in the arena-district micro-area that will encompass the 
development plans for Water Street Tampa were only publicly released in 2016, just outside of 
the scope of this study’s time frame. The Water Street development plan is bound to provide a 
sizable amount of change to the arena-district micro-area in the following years. It can be 
concluded that the arena was not part of a larger development plan for the revitalization of 
downtown Tampa. The arena presence did not cause a shift in urban development within the 
quarter-mile arena-district because of the inherent lag as verified by the assessment records. 
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4.6. DALLAS: AMERICAN AIRLINES CENTER 
Table 38. American Airlines Center Rapid Notes  
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005 
Victory Park was envisioned as a mixed-use entertainment district. Plans for the 
development included retail boutiques and outlets, restaurants, and luxury residential and office 
buildings. Two hotels were in the plans, the W Dallas Residences and the Mandarin Oriental 
Hotel, only one of which was eventually built.  
The site selected for the arena and Victory Park is located near Oak Lawn and Uptown, 
two evolving upscale neighborhoods that at the time highlighted a strong market for new luxury 
high-rise hotels, residences, and office development. Oak Lawn and Uptown’s promising success 
in addition to the transformation of the Design District, gave developers of Victory Park 
confidence that a high-end development that catered to empty-nesters and tourists would 
succeed. Victory Park was an ambitious large-scale high-density project. In the beginning, it was 
difficult to believe that the vision for Victory Park would falter. Across the northern section of 
the Dallas city boundaries, renovations and new construction of residential high-rises, office 
buildings, and hotels was rampant. New transit-oriented development was encouraged along the 
Trinity River Corridor, and the warehouses found throughout the Design District were 
rehabilitated and transformed into art galleries, showrooms, and office space. The city was 
Arena Name American Airlines Center 
Owner City of Dallas 
Year Opened 2001 
Key Players/Organization 
Hillwood-Hicks Holdings; Hillwood 
Development Company; Center Operating 
Company LP  
TIF District Sports Arena TIF District 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) 640,680,000  
Public Investment in Venue 237,051,600  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 37% 
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growing and prospering, providing little indication that Victory Park’s potential success would 
wane. Given the large number of cities in the region such as Fort Worth and Arlington, Victory 
Park’s staggering success could be in part due to the number of competing areas offering a 
similar amenity package. Moreover, areas such as Uptown and Oak Lawn were exponentially 
growing with luxury real estate, which could have saturated the Victory Park and part of the 
Design District’s targeted market. There was also the complicating factor of the extensive 
freeway system and the barriers it created. Based on what was initially envisioned for the master-
planned development, Victory Park would require more construction to reach its full potential. In 
hindsight, Victory Park’s retail development model and urban design both hindered the project’s 
outcomes, coupled with the possibility that too many areas were built with similar products.  
 
4.6.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
4.6.1.1 Reunion Arena 
The Dallas Stars and the Mavericks played in Reunion Arena located on the southwestern 
side of Dallas’ central business district, at the intersection of the Stemmons, Tom Landry, and RI 
Thornton freeways, prior to the construction of the American Airlines Center and the 
development of Victory Park. The renovated Union Station, the Reunion Tower, the Hyatt 
Regency Hotel, and the Reunion Arena define the Reunion District. These four landmarks were 
intended as urban development catalysts to reinvigorate development in an area that was largely 
dominated by railroad yards and industrial uses.  
The city of Dallas acquired property and redefined major land uses in the area, most of 
which was underutilized land from the city’s purchase of Union Station.  In the 1970s, Robert 
Hunt’s, son of oilman, HL Hunt, and John Scovell, later named president of real estate company, 
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Woodbine Development Corporation, each purchased cheap parcels of unimproved land in the 
Reunion District near Union Station. A Master Agreement had been proposed between the Hunt-
Woodbine Development Corporation and the city of Dallas to engage in a land swap and sharing 
of costs to combine each party’s parcels for a large-scale public-private development investment 
on top of 50-contiguous acres. This exchange and consolidation of the various land tracts 
supported the development of the city’s 1974 Union Terminal and Reunion projects. The 
agreement between the city of Dallas and Hunt-Woodbine Corporation to redevelop what was 
essentially deemed an industrial wasteland, was one of the first public-private partnerships that 
served as blueprint for future urban development projects throughout the city. Although the 
partnership was promising for the revitalization of the Reunion District, the proposed projects 
were never completed on the remaining parcels under agreement. The Dallas Convention Center 
was renovated and a number of hotels were built in close proximity to the arena, while the Hunt-
Woodbine Corporation parcels were left vacant. The city’s vision to revitalize the Reunion 
District into an entertainment district was left lackluster. 
Opened in 1980 and costing an estimated $27 million ($87.2 million in 2018 dollars), the 
Reunion Arena was home to the Dallas Mavericks (NBA) from 1980-01 and the Dallas Stars 
(NHL) from 1993-01. The two sports franchises relocated to the newly constructed American 
Airlines Center, located east of the Design District, bounded by the Stemmons Freeway. As the 
two teams moved to the American Airlines Center, the city of Dallas was still left financially 
responsible for the Reunion Arena. Vulnerable to the prospect of losing the city’s two 
professional sports teams, the Dallas City Council determined that renovations to the arena were 
not feasible and a new arena was necessary (Dallas Observer, 1995). Despite the significant 
amount of debt still owed on the Reunion Arena and the city’s other needs, funding for the 
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facility became a priority on the city’s agenda (Dallas Observer, 1995). With the opening of the 
new arena, Reunion Arena had lost its major tenants and the right to host premier entertainment 
events. Within five years, the arena lost more than $6 million in revenue (Williamson, 2003). In 
2008, the Dallas City Council voted unanimously to demolish the facility and redevelop the 
property for higher-and-better usage; the facility was demolished in 2009.  
The former arena site has significant redevelopment potential in residential, office, and 
retail development as it positioned in close proximity to a number of hotels and the newly 
expanded Dallas Convention Center. Since the Reunion District had the largest contiguous 
portion of vacant land within the Dallas CBD, in 2013 the Downtown Dallas 360 Plan focused 
on the Reunion/Union Station Area. The Downtown Dallas 360 Plan envisioned that the arena 
site and adjacent parcels would develop into a regional office hub with residential uses5758. City 
block development is contingent on development rights and potential tax increment financing 
schemes that will maximize the value of the land.  
 
4.6.1.2 American Airlines Center and Victory Park 
The City of Dallas feared that without building a new facility nor renovating the outdated 
Reunion Arena, the city’s two professional sports teams, the Stars and the Mavericks, would 
relocate to the suburbs. In 1994, the Dallas City Council approved a $55,000 feasibility study to 
determine a site and financing mechanisms for a potential new arena59. In 1996, Ross Perot Jr., 
                                                 
57 As there was a lack of historical development within the district, to support increases in development intensity, the 
site will need basic infrastructure improvements such as storm water detention structures, connections to wastewater 
systems, electrical and gas lines, etc.  
58 The future development of the district will also encourage smaller urban blocks compared to the super block 
patterns that exist across much of the rest of the city.  
59 The establishment of a public-private partnership was recommended which would involve lease purchases and 
some form of tax financing rather than over extending the city’s bond capacity In 1994, the City of Dallas was 
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principal of Hillwood Development, purchased a 67% stake of $125 million in the Mavericks 
franchise – a decision that was largely used to leverage his own real estate ventures. Contrary to 
popular belief that the Mavericks and Stars would be an anchor tenant for the arena, Perot 
“viewed the arena as the anchor tenant for a much larger [investment in real estate]” (Myerson, 
1999; p. 4). In that same year, Tom Hicks purchased the Stars and both Perot and Hicks 
negotiated to purchase a one-third of each team in order to align the economic interests for both 
the teams, the new arena, and the ancillary real estate development of what would become 
Victory Park60. In 1997, in a 12-2 vote the Dallas City Council approved to place the $230 
million arena deal up for referendum on the 1998 ballot and passed the Brimer Bill that 
authorized city funding for professional sports facilities and other large public infrastructure 
projects61. The arena proposal established that Dallas would commit $125 million to build the 
arena, create a TIF district, increase the rental car (5%) and hotel tax (2%) and the city would 
contributed another $12 million to cover the public’s share (Gillman, 1998). The Stars and the 
Mavericks would together contribute $105 million for the arena construction, cover any cost 
overruns, agreed to a 30-year lease, and would pay $3.4 million in annual rent (Gillman, 1997). 
The teams would retain all revenues. Arena opponents questioned whether the arena would spur 
downtown development, particularly because nearly no development occurred surrounding the 
Reunion Area despite city promises. Even with these concerns, voters narrowly approved the bill 
(50.65% to 49.35%). 
                                                 
already stretched to sell 100 million dollars in general obligation bonds for streets, sewers, etc., approved by voters 
in 1985 (Friend, 1994). 
60 This decision was before Mark Cuban bought a majority stake in the Dallas Mavericks from Ross Perot in 2000 
for $285 million. 
61 The Brimer Bill, passed in 1997, allows the city to own, construction, and operate public facilities or in the case of 
professional sports facilities, negotiate terms with the teams directly. The bill also permits six different taxing 
mechanisms and property tax exemptions for a 30-year term on the lease. 
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The American Airlines Center opened in 2001 and was financed under the Arena Master 
Plan Agreement between Dallas and the Center Operating Company, a joint-venture between 
owners’ Hicks (Dallas Stars) and Perot (Dallas Mavericks). Perot’s ownership was simply used 
as leverage to launch his own development agenda and vision for a luxury mixed-use real estate 
development that would be joined by the American Airlines Center as its anchor. After securing 
the city’s approval to move forward with the adjacent real estate development, in 2000, Perot 
sold a majority stake of the team to Mark Cuban for $285 million.  
In 1998, formerly host to a rail yard and toxic power plant, a 70% contaminated vacant 
site located just north of downtown’s West End along Interstate-35, was selected for the new 
arena62 (Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2018) and ancillary real estate development. 
By 1999, Perot and other minority partners purchased land tracts from TU Electric and 
independent land owners to eventually consolidate land parcels into a 75-acre site that would 
become an ambitious $3 billion mixed-use development project (e.g., luxury residential 
condominiums, office space, retail, including renovations of existing projects located within the 
West End.) known as Victory Park. Victory Park’s initial construction phase began in 2004 and 
officially opened in 2006. It was designed to be a mixed-use urban development hub that would 
connect downtown Dallas with Uptown. Ultimately, Victory Park turned out to be an urban 
development failure. In 2012, the Sports Arena TIF District was amended and two additional 
sub-districts, West Dallas and the Riverfront Gateway, were added to the agreement. 
 
                                                 
62 Perot purchased 13 acres from TU Electric for the new arena and a parking garage and another 15 acres from two 
other landowners for more surface parking 
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4.6.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
The quarter-mile arena district area incorporates Victory Park’s Sports Arena TIF District 
and a portion of the Design District.  
 
4.6.2.1 Stemmons Corridor-Design District 
Victory Park is a small component of the Stemmons Corridor-Design District. 
Warehouses and industrial land-uses, similar to the site prior to the development of Victory Park, 
dominated the Design District. Issued in 2005, the forwardDallas! Comprehensive Plan targeted 
the Stemmons Corridor as an area for growth since it was undergoing a number of 
redevelopment projects and land-use changes, as a result of the development pressures from the 
new American Airlines Center. The Design District is home to more than 300 design businesses 
(e.g. furniture retailers, showroom hubs, art galleries, photography studios, etc.). Positioned 
between the Trinity River Corridor and Victory Park, the city of Dallas was interested in 
redeveloping the district to support its existing uses as an art and design hub while contributing 
to new residential construction. The Design District TIF District, established in 2006, was 
intended to transform the old Stemmons Industrial area into a mixed-use neighborhood. The area 
was filled with large tracts of vacant land, dilapidated structures, inadequate sidewalks, etc. The 
Planned Development District (PD 621) assisted with the redevelopment of a number of older 
industrial warehouses and office structures. Without new zoning regulations, new retail, housing, 
and residential development would not have been possible. 
The revenues from the TIF district would finance public infrastructure improvements 
such as the DART light-rail system expansion, improvements in the accessibility to the Trinity 
River, and the increase in adjacent development along the Trinity Corridor. The first residential 
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project built in the Design District was the Trinity Lofts built in 2007, which included 90-units in 
addition to 28,000 square feet of galleries and showrooms. The Alexan Design District apartment 
and the Alta Design Complex, both completed in 2009 involved $62 million of private 
investment (NCTCG, 2017). Since 2012, more than $168 million in new investments have either 
been completed, underway, or planned. Furthermore, since 2006, there has been a 116% increase 
in overall tax revenues (Design District TIF District, 2006). The Design District has also been a 
part of an initiative to attract new mixed-use developments in the Trinity River corridor with 
recreational opportunities. Over the last 22 years, the Design District TIF development program 
advanced mixed-use development and promoted construction along the DART light-rail system 
and the Trinity River City of Dallas Department of Planning and Development, 2001). 
 
4.6.2.1 Victory Park and Related TIF Increment Financing 
In 1998, Dallas City Council authorized the establishment of TIF Reinvestment Zone 
Seven, the Sports Arena TIF District, to promote development or redevelopment within the 
reinvestment zone boundaries. A TIF district is commonly established in an area that is heavily 
concentrated with blighted parcels and properties that require an investment to ensure private 
development (Texas Tax Code, 2017). 
In order to establish a reinvestment zone, city council must: 
1) outline the geographic boundaries of the reinvestment zone or TIF district,  
2) provide clear termination dates of when the financing mechanism will end (e.g. State 
of Texas statute does not have a time horizon, but the City of Dallas has an extension of 
20-years), and  
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3) verify the “but for” clause which determines that “development or redevelopment 
would not occur solely through private investment in the reasonably foreseeable future” 
(Texas Tax Code, 2017).  
Perot’s interest in acquiring the Mavericks in 1996 included a master-planned arena district, 
which was essentially, “a real estate play with a government subsidy” (Helman, 2013). His 
selection of the 75-acre heavily contaminated and blighted site north of the West End, along the 
Trinity Corridor, was sufficiently large enough for the planned district. TIF funds were not 
utilized for arena construction. Instead, the American Airlines Center was funded through the 
city’s increase in rental car and hotel taxes, and the remaining costs were split between the two 
teams. The Sports Arena TIF District was originally intended to reimburse the public 
improvements (e.g. road infrastructure, open plaza space, etc.) completed within the 75-acres. 
Sroka (2017) provides a powerful analysis of the Dallas Sports Arena TIF District, critically 
analyzing both the Texas TIF policies, those specific to the city of Dallas, and the legitimacy and 
need of the TIF for the development of Victory Park. Since there is a possibility that the TIF 
could be a factor for the increase in development in Victory Park and the surrounding areas as 
opposed to the American Airlines Center, it is relevant to determine whether the TIF may have 
increased the likelihood of new construction. The Sports Arena TIF District played an active role 
in the secondary phases of the development of Victory Park when the City of Dallas decided to 
amend the Sports Arena TIF District in 2012 by expanding the TIF’s boundaries, which had a 
subsequent impact to the neighboring blighted areas in the Design District. 
Before the city would reimburse Victory Park third-party developer, Palladium Inc., for 
the street and public infrastructure improvement investments, subject to the Sport Arena TIF 
District stipulations, it was required that $385 million worth of construction was completed. The 
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developers would be repaid for their investments in addition to 6% in interest (compounded 
semi-annually) in city property taxes generated from increases in land value (Brick, 2002). This 
pay-as-you-go financing scheme uses TIF funds to reimburse the developer for his investments; 
channels future investments back into the reinvestment zone, and shifts the risk to the developer. 
Perot’s Hillwood Development Company was able to make upfront payments within the pay-as-
you-go financing system to reinvest back into Victory Park. Since there were no contractual 
obligations and no development timeline instituted by the city, Hillwood Development Co. 
controlled all of the land and the pace of development in Victory Park (City of Dallas, 2017). 
Limited city intervention in pushing a development timeline became apparent during the Great 
Recession. The initial phases of development broke ground in 2003 despite the delays due to the 
political disputes over amendments to the original subsidy packages63. 
By 2008, $1 billion of the total $3 billion project development of Victory Park’s initial 
construction phase had been completed. The completed projects involved in the initial phase of 
Victory Park included, the American Airlines Center (2001); 600,000 square feet of retail space; 
900,000 square feet of office space; the W Dallas Victory Hotel and Residences (2006); four 
other residential projects such as the Terrace (2006), the Vista (2007), the Victory Plaza 
Buildings (2007), Cirque (2007); two parking garages owned and operated by the COC (Center 
Operating Company – the joint venture between the Stars and Mavericks); and a movie theater. 
The projects were estimated to cost a total of $550 million (Dallas Office of Economic 
Development, 2017; Johnson, 2009; Brown, 1999). This first phase of construction generated a 
                                                 
63 Post-arena construction, Perot and Hicks sought a more lucrative subsidy package from the city. They asked the 
city to sell new bonds worth $83 million, which would create a debt service payment of $175 million over 30 years 
(Brick, 2002). This plan was later revised for $30 million in bond financing and paying for all street infrastructure 
upfront. These two propositions went unsupported by City Council. 
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3,500% increase in assessed value between 1998 and 2008. Prior to the Great Recession in 2008, 
the few ancillary projects that were successfully completed, generated millions of dollars in 
assessed value in a formerly blighted and particularly underdeveloped side of downtown Dallas. 
As the project turned insolvent in the late 2000s, future phases of Victory Park that included 
more office, retail, and residential components were put on hold. Victory Park was often left 
empty on non-event days as it predominantly offered luxury retail options that were unsuitable 
per market demands and the high-end residential did not achieve expected sales volumes. The 
ambitious real estate development was too large for the existing demand (Heid, 2012).  
 
4.6.2.2 Victory Park and Related TIF Increment Financing 
In 2012 the Sports Arena TIF District Agreement was amended under the guidance of 
property owners and Dallas City Council to extend its boundaries and include an additional two 
sub-districts: the Riverfront Gateway and the West Dallas Sub-Districts, illustrated in Figure 20. 
In areas that have little potential for private investment without public subsidies, sub-districts can 
be created from larger TIF districts. A percentage of the incremental values generated by the 
original TIF district are filtered into the sub-district until the area is either able to generate higher 
property values from an increase in construction or matches the expected valued capture prior to 
the termination of the TIF (Sroka, 2017, p. 210).  
The Riverfront Gateway Sub-district is 33-acres and was incorporated as part of the TIF 
amendment to serve as a connector between West Dallas and Victory Park. Under Texas TIF 
laws, TIFs must be geographically contiguous. The Riverfront Gateway was established purely 
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as a corridor to funnel increment values from Victory Park into West Dallas64. The West Dallas 
Sub-district extends across 89 acres and is a historically blighted and low-income neighborhood 
compromised of residential properties. West Dallas was included in the TIF amendment plan to 
facilitate the redevelopment in a neighborhood that was both heavily contaminated and where 
future investments would otherwise not occur without public funding. From the 10% of the total 
City and County increment revenue generated from the Victory Sub-district, revenues will be 
allocated to the West Dallas Sub-district. The anticipated increment value generated from the 
TIF would increase from approximately $1,500 in 2012 to potentially $4 million dollars by 2030 
(a compounding annual growth rate of 55%). In addition to the TIF incremental value, the total 
property values amassed $12 million in 2012 and is expected to increase to $570 million by 
2030, a 23% compounding growth rate. Under the new amendment, Victory Park’s boundaries 
will also be extended to include an additional five acres of undeveloped land. TIF districts can 
either be extended for one addition cycle of ten years, or can be continually amended dependent 
on market conditions. The Victory Park Sub-district TIF term was extended by ten-years, ending 
in 2028, while 30-year terms were established for both the Riverfront Gateway and West Dallas 
Sub-districts.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 A new TIF district could be established for West Dallas, however, with limited interest from private developers in 
investing in the area, funneling a portion of incremental values from the Victory sub-district would increase assessed 
values at a faster rate. 
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Figure 20. Sports Arena TIF boundary amendment, 2012 
 
Source: City of Dallas, Office of Economic Development, 2012  
 
Perot’s initial plan for the 75-acres was to create a high-density, high-income 
development – this would include a mixture of 31 high and mid-rise buildings for office and 
residential (Schnurman, 2010). Dallas region was simply unable to support this type of density 
based on the other growing areas in the region. Between 2006 and 2008, six projects were 
completed, four residential developments and two that were a mixture of office and retail. 
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Compared to the residential rate in neighboring areas, the majority of condominium units in 
Victory Park had a listed price that was double the price per square footage (Schnurman, 2010). 
The scale of the development and the prices far surpassed the market comparables and left 
Victory Park empty and half-finished. Perot tried to create a high-rise and luxury lifestyle that 
was not well suited for the Dallas clientele who work in the nearby office towers nor those who 
would most likely attend games. There were also no plans nor obligations from the city of Dallas 
to provide affordable housing units in the future.  
The TIF plan was specifically amended to attract 250,000 square feet of additional retail 
space, 3,000 additional residential units (a mixture of townhomes, multifamily, and 
condominium units), and improve recreational connections throughout the city with the increase 
in trails and open space systems such as the Katy Trail (City of Dallas, Office of Economic 
Development, 2017). Surface parking lots comprise one-third of the original land area within the 
Sport Arena TIF District. The parking rights agreements established in 1998 restricted future 
development. The agreements set up a minimum parking requirement of 3,000 spaces, 841 of 
which must be within 400 feet from the Arena (Office of Economic Development, 2012). Under 
the condition that there was an equal replacement ratio of comparable surface and structured 
parking available, existing surface parking could be replaced with alternative land uses. An 
amendment to the original TIF District was needed to resolve the parking issues and their 
restrictions on new development. In 2010, property values were still on the decline in Victory 
Park. Without the new TIF extension, the property values would continue to fall along with 
increasing residential vacancies.  
While the American Airlines Center was intended to anchor development in Victory Park 
and vice-versa, development occurred before and immediately after the arena was constructed. It 
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cannot be denied that Victory Park’s development occurred in relation to the arena construction, 
however, the complexities of including the TIF and other similar stimuluses that are associated 
with the arena development need to be separately analyzed in future research to determine 
whether or not foregone property taxes were offset by other property tax growth.  
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4.6.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Table 39. Notable completed and proposed development projects in Dallas’ Victory Park arena-district micro-area, 1990 to 
present. 
Development Name Project Cost Description 
List of Victory Park Projects Completed in early 2000s 
Center Operating Company 
Parking Garage 
$3,816,450 
• Under the Parking Rights Agreement created in 1998, the COC owned all of the parking 
garages and surface parking lots in Victory Park. 
• The COC constructs all the lots and operates all of the parking. 
W Dallas Victory Hotel and 
Residences 
$157,870,540 
• The W Dallas Victory Hotel and Residences did not utilize TIF funding at the time of its 
construction. 
• The building was completed in 2006 and has 145 condominiums, 42,500 square feet of 
retail. 
List of Downtown Development Projects Completed in late 2000s (No TIF Investment) 
The Terrace $31,364,260 
• Completed in 2006, the Terrace has 97 condominiums along with 24,000 square feet of 
retail. 
The Vista $28,930,000 
• Completed in 2006, the Vista is occupied by 127 apartments and 28,000 square feet of 
retail. 
Victory Plaza Buildings $41,872,520 
• Completed in 2007, the Victory Plaza Buildings contains 65,000 square feet of retail and 
155,000 square feet of office space. 
Cirque $74,000,000 • Completed in 2008, the development has 252 apartments and 11,000 square feet of retail. 
One Victory Park $138,666,840 
• Completed in 2008, the building holds 9,000 sf retail and is occupied by 430,000 square 
feet in office space. 
The House by Starck & Yoo $86,233,950 
• Completed in 2009, the development holds 150 condominiums with an additional 30,000 
square feet in retail space. 
List of Downtown Development Projects Planned, 2013-28 
Arpeggio Victory Park 
Apartments 
Hines Office Building 
Residential Blocks M & K 
$35,488,631 
• Completed in 2014, the Arpeggio Victory Park Apartments is located on proposed 
residential Block N and houses 377 apartments. It is designed to be a luxury multifamily 
complex. 
• Recently announced, the Hines Office Building is proposed for residential Block M with 
an anticipated opening date of 2020. 
Moda $50,101,650 
• Completed in 2014, Moda was built on proposed residential Block O. The building is 
occupied by 263 apartments and 3,500 square feet of retail space. 
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SkyHouse Dallas $76,913,000 
• Officially completed in 2015, the SkyHouse Dallas was built on proposed residential 
Block C; it houses 336 apartments and 5,000 square feet of retail. 
KATY Station 
Hillwood Projects, Blocks E-H 
$185,000,000 
• The KATY Station opened in 2018 and was built on the Hillwood-owned Block H 
parcels; it is a 461-residential building with 2,000 square feet of retail space. 
• Camden Victory Park, opened in 2016, is a 425-unit residential building built on the 
Hillwood-owned Block F. 
• Hillwood-owned Block E is still occupied by surface parking lots. 
The Ascent 
Victory Place 
Retail Blocks D, G 
$55,397,540 
$50,237,940 
• The Ascent was built on proposed Retail Block D and is a residential building with 302 
units and 3,000 square feet of retail space. 
• Victory Place was built on proposed Retail Block G; it is also a residential building with 
352 apartments and 8,250 square feet of retail space. 
• Construction on both of these properties began in 2014 and the towers were completed in 
2017. 
The 23 Dallas 
South Parking Garage 
Office Blocks D & G 
$80,000,000 
• The 23 Dallas began construction in 2014 and will be completed at the end of 2018. The 
residential building sits on the proposed Office Block; it is a 285-unit apartment building 
with 20,000 sf of retail and a movie theater. 
• On Office Block D, sits the South Parking Garage. The South Parking Garage is valued at 
$8 million and utilized close to $13 million in TIF funding.  
West Dallas Projects 
(Cypress at Trinity Groves) 
$361,070,000 
($44,906,920) 
• The West Dallas sub-district is primarily comprised of vacant heavy industrial land and 
warehousing, with a bit of retail. Interest in further developing this area has been slow. 
New development in West Dallas would not be likely without City intervention.  
• 10% of revenue generated in the Victory Sub-district will be dedicated to the development 
of West-Dallas 
• Trinity Groves was completed in 2015 at an estimated cost of $16,500,000. Trinity Groves 
was intended to be the initial project that would spur future development along Singleton 
Boulevard. 
• In 2012, the Cypress at Trinity Groves Mixed Use Project was the only residential project 
in the District to receive TIF funding. 70% of the units were set aside for affordable 
housing. 
• The first phase of the project, projected to open in 2018, will include 34,200 square feet of 
retail, 349-multifamily units, and parking. 
Notes: In the Victory Sub-district, seven of the 14 projects aimed to be completed by 2018, five-years after the extension of the TIF-term. In the 
West Dallas Sub-district, the goal is to have two of the 11 projects completed by 2018. 
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Figure 21. Blocks of anticipated development in the Victory Subdistrict 
Note: Figure illustrates the blocks of anticipated new development owned by the Hillwood Development 
Company in Victory Park’s Subdistrict. 
Source: City of Dallas, Office of Economic Development  
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4.6.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
Uptown and Oaklawn were growing quickly with top market potential. Perot strategically 
consolidated 75 acres, north of the Dallas CBD for the impending master-planned arena district 
development. In the 1980s, 70% of the land was contaminated and required environmental 
remediation prior to new construction. In the first phase of building out Victory Park, only a few 
projects were completed in conjunction with the construction of the American Airlines Center. In 
1998, the Dallas City Council enacted a special financing district, the Sports TIF Arena District. 
Limited to Hillwood-owned parcels, property taxes that are collected in Victory Park are 
redirected back into the district to continue financing new construction and to provide more 
financial assistance for public improvement projects such as new streets, sidewalks, lighting, etc. 
The Dallas City Council also approved another $25 million to assist with environmental 
remediation. Between 1990 and 2000, little new development occurred in the area prior to the 
opening of the American Airlines Center in 2001. During this time, Perot’s development 
company, Hillwood Development, was still in the process of consolidating contaminated and 
fallow land tracts and undergoing negotiations with the city of Dallas for more financial support. 
While new construction occurred from 2005-15, Victory Park’s success and impact on the city of 
Dallas was limited. Victory Park and the arena spurred more than $1 billion in new development 
within the arena-district micro-area. This added a substantial amount of taxable value that will 
continue to increase as tax dollars are redirected within the TIF boundaries. However, Victory 
Park was underperforming compared to Uptown and Oaklawn.  
Although the economic recession hindered the construction process and negatively 
impacted Victory Park’s tenants, the area was already in financial decline prior to 2008. The 
limited number of retail tenants created a challenging environment for many businesses to thrive 
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in Victory Park. As a result, retail and restaurants closed and future planned construction such as 
the highly anticipated Mandarin Hotel halted. 
The American Airlines Center was a natural anchor to generate foot traffic along Victory 
Park Lane, the project’s main street. In the original layout, Victory Park was designed to be a 
destination district that includes professional sports events and concerts, but also high-end 
shopping and dining. However, the district required a more diverse land-use and amenity 
package that would be attractive to clientele of multiple income levels. The analysis of Victory 
Park’s land-use composition illustrates how each property use has transformed over the 25 years 
of relative to new construction. That said, although there is an overall increase in residential, 
commercial, and parking properties throughout the district, new construction does not mean that 
the buildings are financially solvent or that all residential condominiums are 80-100% occupied. 
 
4.6.4.1. Land Use Composition  
Over the last 25 years, Victory Park experienced its largest growth in residential 
development, with over a 750% change. Parking garages and surface parking cover 20 acres or 
92% of the developable land (Office of Economic Development, 2012). There are approximately 
12 land tracts dedicated to parking garages, which does not include the surface parking lots that 
were listed as commercial business personal properties (BPPs). Of these 12 parking garages, 
some are located on the same parcels as residential complexes as underground parking, or are 
located on their own parcel. In accordance with Victory Park’s Parking Rights Agreement, 
surface parking may be displaced if it replaces existing parking with reasonably comparable 
surface or structured parking. More than 25 land tracts are committed to parking surface lots. 
Commercial properties had a percentage change of more than 250% between 1990 and 2015. 
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The majority of the commercial properties are surfacing parking lots listed as commercial BPPs 
and commercial improvements for public infrastructure improvements.  
In 1990, 77% of all of the parcels in the area were vacant and 22% were listed as 
commercial improvements. Vacant parcels are a combination of vacant industrial and 
commercial properties. In the Dallas case study, commercial improvements are any 
improvements made to the parcel such as the surfacing of vacant tracts to convert into surface 
parking lots. Early property records were ambiguous as to whether the commercial improvement 
parcels served for parking purposes or other improvements. These could include public 
infrastructure improvements such as the implementation of new streetscapes, siting land for new 
residential development, and so on. For this reason, commercial improvement parcels are 
designated as commercial properties. In 1990, the land-use composition was similar to that of 
1995. Commercial improvements and vacant parcels composed 26% and 70% of the quarter-mile 
district, respectively.  
Although located within the TIF district boundaries, the two residential developments, 
Magnolia Hill and Magnolia Station, are not designated as TIF properties. In 2000, an additional 
two residential properties, the Monterey Plaza adjacent to Magnolia Hill and the North End 
Apartments complex parcel south of the American Airlines Center, both were located in the TIF 
boundaries, but not officially counted as part of the TIF district. The first phase of real estate 
development for Victory Park was under construction after the construction of the American 
Airlines Center. Between 2000 and 2005, the number of commercial parcels increased by 60%. 
Five office buildings were completed, two of which are located in the southern end of the 
Victory Park TIF District. Victory Dallas Residences was the first residential building completed 
in Victory Park and has mixed-use retail and office space on the ground floor. The office and 
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retail parcels are listed as business personal property (BPP) parcels. BPP parcels are listed as 
commercial properties; more granular property-use characterization, such as commercial sub-
categories, are not provided. The W Dallas Hotel, also located within the Victory Dallas 
Residences, opened in 2006. The W Dallas Hotel was still under construction in 2005 and not 
included in the 2005 assessment roll.  
Between 2005 and 2010, a 200% change occurred in residential property-use. Prior to the 
economic crash, ten residential buildings were constructed in a two-year period. Although a 
number of new residential buildings were completed between 2006 and 2008, the success of 
these buildings was minimal. The condominium prices were higher than market rate comparables 
and there were no options for affordable housing units. Since the high density and luxury retail 
and residential type of community that was envisioned for Victory Park, was not conducive to 
the Dallas market, condominium vacancy rates were high. Since 2008, the construction for the 
remaining planned residential properties was halted. In 2014 and 2015, two more residential 
properties, the Arpeggio Victory Park Apartments and Moda, were built bringing the residential 
property count to 17. Although from 1990 to 2015, residential properties increased by 750%, by 
2015, residential properties only composed 9% of the total land-use composition in Victory Park. 
Between 2005 and 2015, commercial properties comprised, on average 30% of Victory Park’s 
property use. The city of Dallas uses both account numbers and GIS identification numbers to 
classify property parcels. Several account numbers can be allocated to one GIS identifier, based 
on the property use and land tract. The count for commercial subcategories is determined by the 
property use assigned to the GIS identification number. This means there could be a number of 
account numbers attached to the GIS parcel that are uncounted. For example, the office building 
at 2501 Harwood Street, is counted as one commercial and one office property, even though 
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there are 38 commercial parcels located on the same land tract. In 2015, there were ten office 
parcels in which office space was the primary property use determined by the GIS identification 
number, not the account number. The sum of account numbers located on the ten parcels are not 
individually counted in the land-use composition percentages. The same holds for the retail and 
restaurant count, unless the primary parcel property use is one of the subcategories.  
Relative to the other land-uses in Victory Park, the overall percentage of vacant parcels 
decreased from 75% in 1990 to 45% in 2015. Although the number of parcels increased 
substantially due to the splitting of large land tracts, the percentage decrease in vacant properties 
is evidence of new development prospects. Between 2005 and 2010, particularly in the two-year 
period between 2006 and 2008, residential properties increased the most. Yet, subsequent to the 
economic recession, residential development halted and has only picked up recently with the 
introduction of new investors and the TIF amendment extension in 2012. The first phase of 
construction for Victory Park was successful in increasing a high-density mixed-use 
development surrounding the arena. Although the first phase of construction occurred, a large 
percentage of new construction sat empty, and the rest of the Victory Park left undeveloped. In 
the late 2000s, Victory Park was concentrated by surface parking lots and vacant land tracts. Due 
to the poor performance in residential leases and office vacancies, the resale of entire buildings 
in the planned community future development was questionable. This was because there was 
little interest from external financiers to continue to develop Victory Park. Although Victory 
Park succeeded in spurring new development in its initial years, the master-planned development 
eventually flopped as it was ill-designed for the Dallas market. Table 40 provides a summary of 
Victory Park’s land-use composition from 1990-2015. 
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Figure 22. Percentage of land-use composition in the arena-district micro-area (Victory 
Park), 1990-2015. 
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Table 40. City of Dallas's arena-district micro-area (Victory Park) land-use count, 1990-2015. 
 
 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
  LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
  COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - 2 2.38 4 5.33 5 4.42 15 8.29 17 8.99 8.94 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - 2 100.00 3 13.64 3 3.66 10 2.12 7 1.79 5.14 
OWNER-OCCUPIED - - - - 19 86.36 79 96.34 395 93.16 383 98.21 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 17 21.79 22 26.19 22 29.33 33 29.20 55 30.39 63 33.33 5.38 
OFFICE - - - - - - 5 5.81 8 3.33 10 2.54 7.18 
RETAIL - - - - - - 1 0.01 6 2.50 8 2.03 23.11 
RESTAURANT - - - - - - 2 2.33 3 1.25 2 0.01 - 
HOTEL - - - - - - - - 1 0.42 1 0.25 - 
INDUSTRIAL - - - - - - - - 5 2.76 4 0.02 - 
EXEMPT 
1 1.28 1 1.19 1 1.33 6 5.31 5 2.76 7 0.04 8.09 
PARKING - - - - - 0.00 2 0.02 11 6.08 12 6.35 - 
VACANT 60 76.92 59 70.24 48 64.00 67 59.29 90 49.72 86 45.50 1.45 
MIXED-USE - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL 78 100.00 84 100.00 75 100.00 113 100.00 181 100.00 189 100.00 3.30 
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4.6.4.2 Built Volume 
Prior to 2005, the city of Dallas assessment records did not include building square 
footage. The land area encompassed by Victory Park was either undeveloped or vacant. The 
level of new construction and changes in built volume in Victory Park is only realized after the 
construction of the American Airlines Center. Based on Victory Park’s land-use composition, 
residential properties had the greatest change in built volume. The residential built volume had a 
compounding growth of 11% over the ten-year period; the Victory Park began with one building 
and grew to 17 new residential complexes by 2015. Victory Park residential development was 
largely a renters market compared to an owners market. Table 41 illustrates that there were 
approximately 400 owner-occupied units compared to roughly ten renter-occupied units, yet, the 
renter-occupied built volume is twice as large. Rental units are not assessed on an individual 
basis. This is the reason why there is a greater number of owner-occupied units, but the built 
volume is higher for renter-occupied buildings. The height of construction occurred in Victory 
Park between 2006 and 2008 when a number of new residential and office buildings opened. In 
2010, close to 3 million square feet of new residential and 2 million square feet of commercial 
properties were built after the first phase of Victory Park completed. As more buildings that are 
residential were constructed, this in turn, increased the built volume of mixed-use properties (e.g. 
restaurant and retail). Of course, the built volume count for commercial subcategories are not 
completely accurate as some retail and restaurant property-uses were designated as non-specified 
commercial BPPs. Instead, the built volume is included in the main commercial built volume 
count.  
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Table 41. City of Dallas's arena-district micro-area (Victory Park) built volume count, 2005-2015 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2005-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % Change 
RESIDENTIAL       2,527,282 20.92 3,164,233 21.34 7,147,065 38.83 10.96 
RENTER-OCCUPIED       2,309,276 91.37 2,447,262 77.34 6,385,427 89.34 10.71 
OWNER-OCCUPIED       218,006 8.63 675,886 21.36 693,181 9.70 12.26 
TOTAL CONDOS       - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL       6,617,921 54.78 6,448,716 43.50 6,049,439 32.86 (0.89) 
OFFICE       415,830 6.28 3,066,830 47.56 1,303,965 21.56 12.11 
RETAIL       4,312 0.07 23,799 0.37 170,236 2.81 44.42 
RESTAURANT       26,909 0.41 10,251 0.16 16,658 0.28 (4.68) 
HOTEL       - - 294,261 4.56 294,261 4.86 - 
INDUSTRIAL       - - - - - - - 
EXEMPT       180,000 1.49 180,000 1.21 180,000 0.98 - 
PARKING       2,755,878 22.81 5,031,560 33.94 5,031,560 27.33 6.20 
VACANT       - - - - - - - 
MIXED-USE       - - - - - - - 
TOTAL       12,081,081 100.00 14,824,509 100.00 18,408,064 100.00 4.30 
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4.6.4.3 Assessed Value 
In Texas, properties are appraised at 100% of the market value. Figure 23 illustrates the 
compounding rate of change in assessment values between these two areas. Over the 25-year 
period, Victory Park had a 10% compounding rate of change in assessment value compared to 
0.5% in Dallas. Dallas’ compounding rate of change in assessment values remained constant 
across the five, five-year intervals, with an overall percentage change of 8% across the 25 years. 
In 2005, the construction activity was approximately $2.6 billion and by 2015, the annual value 
of construction permits increased to $4.1 billion (CAFR, 2015). After the recession construction 
activity was amounted to $3.2 billion, a 30% increase from 2010 to 2015. The increase in 
construction activity is a clear indicator of a resurgence of the city’s economy. The total taxable 
value of property, including commercial BPPs, increased from $67.6 billion in 2005 to $87.3 in 
2010, a 30% change in total taxable value of property. In 2015, the property tax value was $93.1 
billion, another increase of 6.6%. The increase in property values was in part due to the City of 
Dallas’ primary economic development strategy, expanding the downtown through multi-modal 
transit (e.g. DART light rail) and the since there are 17 TIF districts throughout Dallas.  
Victory Park’s assessment values had a compounding rate of change in assessment values 
over a 25-year period of 10%. Between 1990 and 2000, the assessment values within Victory 
Park were low since 80% of the parcels were vacant industrial parcels undergoing environmental 
remediation. A dip in assessment values occurred in 1995 for both Victory Park and Dallas. 
Moreover, vacant parcels transitioned into commercial parcels, which explains a negative 
compounding growth rate of approximately 20%. After the opening of the American Airlines 
Center (the parcel was appraised even though exempt from property taxes), and the first phase of 
Victory Park (e.g. W Dallas Residences and the construction of two parking garages, along with 
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a number of surface parking lots) assessment values. In these five years, the majority of 
residential and office construction was completed. Refer to Table 39, which provides a list of 
notable construction projects in Victory Park. The reasons that Victory Park’s overall assessment 
compounding growth rate is higher than that of the City of Dallas, is two-fold. Hillwood 
Development and other investment groups predominantly privately financed Victory Park. It was 
a planned development with a clear buildout trajectory. In just 15 years, excluding commercial 
and office properties, 12 new residential buildings were constructed in the quarter-mile area. 
Secondly, Perot envisioned that Victory Park would be comprised of high-end retail and luxury 
residential living. Affordable housing was absent without plans to modify the residential 
diversity. Compared to the rest of the City of Dallas, Victory Park is a high-density development 
of expensive retail and luxury condominiums, which far surpass the market value of other 
neighborhoods. .What is interesting to note, however, is the constant rate of assessment value 
growth in the city compared to the variability in Victory Park. The largest compounding rate of 
change in the arena-district micro-area in assessment values occurred between 1995 and 2000. 
Between 2000 and 2005, the compounding rate was 16% due to the construction of the arena, 
and the next five-year interval, was another increase of 20%. Victory Park experienced the 
greatest amount of construction between 2006 and 2008, which explains the 15 and 20% 
compounding growth rates in 2005 and 2010 assessment years. The Great Recession and the 
declining property values of the major development projects built between 2006 and 2008, 
explains the decrease in assessment values between 2010 and 2015. The property values have 
decreased because of half-leased residential buildings and a high percentage office vacancies. 
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Figure 23. Compounding rate of change in assessed value in arena-district micro-area 
(Victory Park) vs. city of Dallas, 1990-2015. 
 
4.6.4.4 Property Taxes 
A parcel’s taxable value determines the amount of property tax paid. Over 25 years, the 
compounding rate of change in property tax for Victory Park is 11%, compared to Dallas’ 1%. 
Victory Park’s property values had the greatest growth of 38% over the five-year period between 
2005 and 2010 due to the 12 new residential developments, income-generating parking garages, 
and commercial business personal property parcels. As property values decreased during and 
after the Recession, the property tax values decreased as well. Since 2015, six big projects with 
long-term construction buildout timelines have been proposed. The resurgence in construction 
will subsequently increase the property tax values generated within Victory Park.  
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There is a wide gap in comparing the percentage differences in compounding between 
five-year interval property tax growth rates of the city of Dallas and Victory Park. Between 1995 
and 2000, the 29% difference in property tax values is a reflection of an area’s transition from 
vacant industrial lots to the micro-area’s first two residential complexes. Although the American 
Airlines Center and the first phase of construction were completed between 2000-2005, the next 
largest gap in the compounding rate of change for property taxes occurred from 2005 and 2010. 
In this five-year interval, the rate of construction of properties valued above the market rate 
contributed to the 37% difference between Victory Park and the rest of the city.  
 
Figure 24. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area 
(Victory Park) vs. city of Dallas 1990-2015. 
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Table 42. Assessment, market, and property tax values in arena-district micro-area (Victory Park) vs. city of Dallas, 1990-
2015. 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
VICTORY PARK/AMERICAN AIRLINES ARENA DISTRICT MICRO AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 2,192,544 1,627,451 5,092,083 6,090,670 7,058,273 7,643,742 5.12 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) - - - 10,063,094 13,541,266 15,647,636 - 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 50,739,920 20,397,210 161,326,740 379,043,860 1,005,699,010 1,395,991,210 14.18 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
91,706,220 30,599,334 212,922,891 446,356,468 1,084,888,380 1,033,596,150 10.17 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 42,057,580 12,696,290 49,251,850 94,986,860 267,659,100 323,481,980 8.50 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
8,682,340 7,740,040 112,074,890 284,057,000 745,001,880 1,072,509,230 21.25 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 50,739,920 20,397,210 147,919,121 379,043,860 1,005,699,010 1,395,991,210 14.18 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
91,706,220 30,599,334 212,922,891 446,356,468 1,084,888,380 1,033,596,150 10.17 
TOTAL MARKET LAND 
VALUE 
42,057,580 12,696,290 49,251,850 94,986,860 267,659,100 323,481,980 8.50 
TOTAL MARKET 
BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
8,682,340 7,740,040 112,074,890 284,057,000 745,001,880 1,072,509,230 21.25 
TOTAL TAX 791,841 536,565 2,229,961 3,654,489 19,653,113 30,068,079 15.66 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 1,431,155 804,940 2,943,156 4,303,473 21,200,611 20,131,805 11.15 
CITY OF DALLAS 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 47,621,728,000 44,382,238,000 60,178,612,000 67,579,878,000 87,264,095,000 93,138,210,000 2.72 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
86,070,468,153 66,581,014,391 79,425,171,727 79,581,069,112 94,135,324,478 93,138,210,000 0.32 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 47,621,728,000 44,382,238,000 60,178,612,000 67,579,878,000 87,264,095,000 93,138,210,000 2.72 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
86,070,468,153 66,581,014,391 79,425,171,727 79,581,069,112 94,135,324,478 93,138,210,000 0.32 
TOTAL TAX 286,181,000 285,041,000 375,377,000 479,723,000 637,304,000 735,913,000 3.85 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 517,237,271 427,610,679 495,431,544 564,914,740 687,485,716 735,913,000 1.42 
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4.6.5 KEY FINDINGS 
Victory Park is an example of a catalytic project that utilized the American Airlines 
Center, as an entertainment anchor, to spur residential and office growth in an area that was 
largely concentrated by vacant industrial lots and warehousing. Victory Park emerged from a 
public-private partnership between the City and County of Dallas and the private development 
company, Hillwood Development. The City and County of Dallas contributed the majority of 
public funds to build the stadium, contingent that the Hillwood Development Corporation and 
other financiers would privately invest in the buildout of the mixed-use development. While 
questionable whether the TIF district was necessary given the private investment already 
funneled into the development, the city established the Sports Arena TIF District to fund the 
various public infrastructure improvements. The first phase of construction was successful; 
however, when the supply of the product overtook the demand, Victory Park flopped. Several 
new buildings went up for sale by the end of the 2000s, vacancy rates were high, and the overall 
design of the district failed due to limited pedestrian walkways fronting the retail shops. 
Overall, it is questionable whether Victory Park is a successful arena district. Indeed, the arena 
was built as part of a master-planned development. Ancillary development was planned in 
conjunction with the arena, not because of the arena. As land-use changes transformed from 
vacant industrial parcels to residential, office, retail, and parking, parcel assessment values and 
subsequently property taxes increased. Victory Park even had greater rates of change in these 
two aspects compared to the city at large. Although the area experienced peaks in construction, 
the product could not sell and the property values decreased. The financial burden also affected 
developers who were unable to cover the construction costs. The outcomes from the master-
planned development failed to meet City expectations after predominantly funding the arena 
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construction and creating the Sports Arena TIF to assist with public infrastructure improvements. 
To rectify the financial failure of Victory Park and the Sports Arena TIF, the City of Dallas 
approved the expansion of the current TIF boundaries that would reinvest 10 percent of the TIF 
revenues generated in Victory Park into low-income and blighted areas of West Dallas and the 
Riverfront Corridor. Built in 2001, the American Airlines Center contributed to the master-
planned development outcomes of Victory Park. However, inadvertently the biggest contribution 
the arena has had on urban development outcomes has been with the expansion of the TIF 
District, diverting funds into an area that otherwise would not have received similar investment 
opportunities. 
Time will be a factor in determining whether Victory Park is a successful arena district 
overall in leading arena-led development strategies for urban redevelopment. While there were 
plenty of new construction and residential developments on the horizon, the economic climate 
and failure to achieve occupancy rates to feasibly pay off the upfront developer and construction 
fees, has left Victory Park reeling compared to neighboring areas of Uptown and Oak Lawn. 
Furthermore, the saturation of Dallas and the regional competition with Forth Worth and 
Arlington could have over-stressed Victory Park’s the luxury development strategy. While the 
arena was successful in acting as an anchor for future development, the development itself never 
quite took off as planned, resulting in a questionable assessment of Victory Park’s success as an 
arena district for this particular study. 
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4.7 HOUSTON: TOYOTA CENTER 
Table 43. Toyota Center Rapid Notes 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005 
4.7.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
Opened in 1975, the Summit (known as the Compaq Center65 from 1998-2003) was a 
major center for sport and entertainment events in Houston. From 1975 to 2003, the Summit was 
the home court for the Houston Rockets, Aeros (AHL), Comets (WNBA, now dissolved), and 
several arena football teams. In 1995, the Houston Rockets claimed that the venue economically 
obsolete as a result of the absence of luxury seating. The demand for a new arena took place at 
the same time Houston’s other major professional teams were also seeking new venues. The 
Houston Astros (MLB) moved to Minute Maid Park built just due north of the Toyota Center, 
while the Houston Oilers (NFL), now the Tennessee Titans, moved to Nashville after failing to 
receive public funding for a new stadium. When the Houston Texans joined the NFL in 2002 as 
an expansion team, the reception of the franchise was predicated on a new stadium (NRG 
Stadium, formerly Reliant).  
                                                 
65 In 1998, Houston’s Summit Arena became the first sports venue to sell its naming rights (Hlavaty, 2017) when the 
venue’s name changed to the Compaq Center.  
Arena Name Toyota Center 
Owner City of Houston 
Year Opened 2001 
Key Players/Organization 
City of Houston; Harris County’ Downtown 
Redevelopment Authority/TIRZ; Houston First 
Corporation; Harris County-Houston Sports 
Authority 
TIF District Greater Houston No. 24 TIRZ 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $283,860,000 
Public Investment in Venue $283,860,000 
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 100% 
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The Houston Rockets sought legislation for the creation of an enterprise zone to generate 
enough incremental tax revenues to pay for a new arena; their initial effort failed. In 1995, the 
Texas Legislature voted to provide $1 billion in subsidies for the state’s major professional 
football, basketball, and ice hockey franchises over 30 years. Under this bill, cities could create 
enterprise zones, in which 80% of taxes collected within the maximum radius of 1.25-miles, are 
allocated to improving and building new venues. The bill also limited the total state subsidy to 
$33 million annually for all major league sport venues. The subsidy would cover the construction 
of all the major sports facilities through sales, hotel occupancy, beverage, and use taxes. It was 
anticipated that $20 million would derive from incremental tax revenues while the remaining $13 
million would come from existing tax revenues (Williams, 1995). While there was some 
criticism regarding the necessity of the new legislation, since the venues would create their own 
additional tax revenues, the bill was passed on a voice vote. In 1997, Governor George W. Bush 
signed the stadium bill into law, giving the city of Houston authority to build a new baseball 
stadium, a new arena for the Houston Rockets, and renovate the Astrodome. The Letter of Intent 
to build a baseball stadium downtown, stated that the venue would need to be constructed 
through a “county-wide sports authority or other non-profit organization.” (HCHSA, 2018). The 
Harris County Houston Sports Authority (HCHSA) was created shortly after the new bill passed. 
The conditions under which the HCHSA can operate is two-fold.  
First, to establish and operate a proposed professional sport venue, approval of county 
voters was necessary. Second, the Harris-County-Houston Sports Authority (HCHSA) would 
maintain the venues and be responsible for serving the debt66. HCHSA was allowed to impose a 
                                                 
66 The first project the HCHSA oversaw was the construction of Minute Maid Park in 2000. This was followed by 
the construction of NRG Stadium (formerly Reliant Stadium) in 2000, the Toyota Center and its adjacent parking 
garage in 2003, and finally the BBVA Compass Stadium for Houston’s professional soccer team in 2012.  
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countywide 2% hotel occupancy tax and a 5% rental car tax in addition to generating tax 
revenues from surface parking lots and parking garages near the arena, and all sales taxes 
collected from on-site purchases.  
 
Toyota Center’s current site, adjacent to the George R. Brown Convention Center 
(GRBCC) was proposed by the city of Houston. The arena would be linked to the convention 
center and the proposed convention hotel so that the public funds generated from those two 
properties could be used to pay for the venue (Williams, 1995). As negotiations continued, 
complications with the Summit Arena lease terms arose.  
 
In 1999, under the new stadium-financing bill, the HCHSA held a countywide 
referendum to impose new taxes for the new arena. Voters would be required to approve the split 
costs between the Houston Rockets ownership and the HCHSA, while the city would purchase 
the necessary land parcels67 (Williams, 1999). The Houston City Council supported the bill, 
while voters rejected it, 54% to 46%. Without a new arena deal, the Rockets began to evaluate 
relocation advantages and disadvantages. Opponents of the arena deal were concerned with the 
10% ticket tax and the idea that the revenues captured from within the arena would not be 
returned to the city. Furthermore, there was concern regarding the tax abatements offered for a 
proposed parking garage. A new financing plan was developed because of the relocation threat. 
The team would pay $8.5 million annually in rent and the HCHSA with the hotel and car rental 
tax revenues would sell bonds to cover the arena’s costs and would contribute $1.5 million a year 
                                                 
67 Reportedly, the Department of Convention and Entertainment Facilities Department has $22 million in excess 
revenues generated from rents and hotel occupancy fees to spend on acquiring the downtown land. (Schwartz, 
1999). 
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to offset operating costs (Berger, 2000). The Houston Rockets would control all of the arena’s 
revenues and 95% of the naming rights. The city’s investment would amass to $60 million by 
purchasing land for the arena and building a parking garage. After intense negotiations, the 
Houston City Council agreed to cap its arena investment to $20 million in an 11-4 vote. There 
were some stipulations within outlined in the agreement. First, the city would no longer pay for a 
parking garage. The city would receive $200,000 a year for naming rights and a suite in the arena 
in order to host 20 fundraising events per year (Berger, 09/14/2000). In 2000, after months of 
negotiations and lobbying with the HCHSA, 66% of voters approved the arena deal. The 
decision was a landslide based on the controversial defeat the previous year. In 2001, arena 
construction began and in 2003, the Toyota Center officially opened. The Toyota Center was 
built below street level integrating the arena smoothly into the streetscape and maintaining an 
appropriate scale with the surrounding buildings. The total cost of the arena construction was 
$235 million ($327 million in 2018 dollars). Houston paid $182 million ($253 million in 2018 
dollars) and the Houston Rockets contributed $43 million ($60 million in 2018 dollars) for arena 
enhancements (Lopez, 09/02/2003).  
The Houston Rockets began playing in the new venue in 2003 and Houston leased the old 
Compaq Arena to a church. In 2001, the church signed a 30-year lease and invested $95 million 
in renovating the venue. In 2010, the church offered to purchase the site for $7.5 million; the city 
accepted the offer (Olson & Mendoza, 2010).  
 
4.7.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
Houston does not have a zoning code. The city adopted a laissez-faire economic and 
urban development policy and the private sector dominated the city’s planning, development, 
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and policy-making decisions. Houston’s local government participation was limited and 
constrained in initiating policy at the grassroots level (Vojnovic, 2003; Fisher, 1989; Feagin, 
1998). Some academics characterize Houston as an “unplanned city” due to the city’s lack of a 
formal planning and development department. It is a misconception, however, to characterize 
Houston as an “unplanned city” simply due to these factors. While the local government did not 
regulate land-use, it still provided basic public services and encouraged business growth. Indeed, 
Houston is described as anti-government, anti-regulation, anti-public planning; however, the idea 
that the city embraces “free enterprise” or “laissez-faire capitalism” does not suggest that there is 
a complete absence of government intervention in the city’s economic growth (Fisher, 1989). 
That is not to say that Houston and its residents did not attempt to have their input heard in the 
city’s urban policy. Given the laissez-faire capitalistic approach and the lack of civic input on 
urban policy and planning of the city, neighborhood-based civic clubs were created. In Houston, 
there are over 600 neighborhood civic clubs. Due to the lack of a zoning code, these city clubs 
were predominantly created to protect smaller neighborhoods from decreases in property values 
(Fisher, 1989). Houston’s urban policy was designed for community civic groups to protect their 
own individual property interests. “Planning has always been done, until very recently, by the 
private, not the public, sector, or done by the public sector at the request and under the guidance 
of the private sector leadership” (Jones, 1977).  
 
Business and private sector coalitions largely influenced the city’s economic 
development growth. The Chamber of Commerce (CC) and the Houston Economic Development 
Council (HEDC) were two of Houston’s core organizations that were part of the city’s growth 
coalition. These two organizations played a role in bringing businesses together to carry out 
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development efforts and influenced the growth of the local economy. Over the last 15 years, 
however, Houston experienced a big shift in the city’s planning and development. Notable large-
scale downtown development projects and the rehabilitation of historic buildings were made 
possible through public investments and the increase in local government participation. To 
encourage urban revitalization in Houston’s downtown core, the city supported public-private 
partnerships, encouraged public investment, and subsidized several projects (Qian, 2011; 
Vojnovic, 2003). Supporters of government regulation argue that the city’s land-use policies led 
to Houston’s sprawl (Lewyn, 2005). The city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction policy allowed the city 
to annex neighboring subdivisions, which explains the city’s growth expanding to 556 square 
miles (Fisher, 1989).  
 
The city created 22 tax increment reinvestment zones (TIRZ) to target and redevelop 
certain neglected urban areas (Qian, 2011). Whereas the private sector and pro-growth 
development coalitions would undertake the redevelopment of certain blighted areas in the past, 
the public sector was now more involved in the land acquisition process, investments in public 
infrastructure, and the implementation of affordable housing, to name a few. Although Houston 
eschews zoning, the city has land development regulations that guide where new construction or 
renovations should occur. For example, the city reviews subdivision plats and variances for 
certain land development regulations such as limitations by block and lot size (Lewyn, 2005) 
while high and low density development is restricted to urban or suburban zones throughout the 
city. When a subdivision is first created, land-use and density is controlled by subdivision 
restrictions established by the developer (Peiser, 1981). Houston does not have any restrictions to 
mixing residential and commercial land-uses with the exception that residential units cannot be 
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located near major interstate highways or thoroughfares (Lewyn, 2005; Houston Texas Code, 
1999). Restrictive covenants are created to separate residential from commercial uses.  
 
There was little incentive for the growth coalition to improve policies and its larger 
development portfolio since the energy business dominated Houston’s local economy. The 
Chamber of Commerce (CC) served as a quasi-governmental unit to oversee infrastructure 
improvements and better serve future planning. CC board members were political elites who 
facilitated growth for the “good business climate” (Schaffer, 1989; Feagin, 1985; Murray, 1980; 
Kaplan, 1983) which focused on low taxes and little government intervention on private sector 
development projects. Houston was strewn with mega-projects as developers leveraged the city’s 
weak planning (and absent) zoning regulations. As land prices doubled or tripled over the course 
of just a few years, office and retail projects were built on a speculative basis (Schaffer, 1989). 
Since 1995, developers have undertaken revitalization efforts throughout the city’s downtown 
and surrounding areas. In the first three years of the city’s full-fledged revitalization efforts, 
construction was valued at more than $3 billion per year (City of Houston, 2000); 60% of these 
renovations or new construction projects were concentrated on the southeastern side of 
Houston’s downtown.  
 
Houston’s Toyota Center is located on the east side of downtown. The quarter-mile 
arena-district micro-area captures a portion of the east side’s development trajectory for the last 
25 years. The development of the east side of Downtown Houston is a result of the combination 
of both civic and business interests and public subsidies. Compared to the west side of Main 
 259 
 
Street, lined with high-rise office buildings, the majority of land parcels were abandoned on the 
east.  
Texas Eastern Corporation, a publicly traded natural gas company, was part of the rapidly 
growing sector of the energy industry that was successful in focusing on the expansion of the 
natural gas system and converting pipelines in order to transport natural gas (Castaneda & Pratt, 
2018). However, as the energy business began to decline in the 1980s, the company eventually 
decided to diversify and spread the company’s assets into liquefied natural gas, North Sea oil, 
and Houston real estate (Castaneda & Pratt, 2018). Texas Eastern Corporation purchased 32 
contiguous blocks on the east side of downtown (Van Ness, 2012). Land acquisition required 
over 127 transactions in order to acquire 74 acres; the Texas Eastern Corporation owns 95% of 
the acquired parcels. In 1970, the Houston Center, a $1.5 billion development, was 
conceptualized as a catalyst to redevelop the east side. The Houston Center was projected to 
become one of the largest private development projects, however, only a small portion of the 
envisioned project was eventually completed. After the first phase of construction was completed 
in 1989, the Houston Center encompassed 4.2 million square feet of office and retail space and 
one hotel with a 90% occupancy rate. The complex, however, never yielded the financial success 
that had been predicted. In conjunction with the development of the Houston Center, a new 
convention center was proposed and put up for referendum to be located on the underutilized 
land bordering the freeway and replace the outdated convention center. The referendum passed 
and five blocks of land were donated to the city of Houston for the George R. Brown Convention 
Center (GRBCC). The GRBCC opened in 1987.  
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Houston’s downtown revitalization began with both the mixed-use Houston Center 
development and the GRBCC. However, the city’s biggest wave of downtown revitalization 
occurred between 1995 and 2011. More than $5.3 billion in public-private partnership 
development was completed on the east side of downtown (Van Ness, 2012). Major 
developments such as Minute Maid Park, the Houston Center, the GRBCC, the Toyota Center, 
Discovery Green, and many others transformed the east side of downtown Houston. In 2004, 
Houston produced the Houston Downtown Development Framework, which discussed the city’s 
development progress from 1985 to 2004 and outlined the vision for Houston’s development by 
2025. The Downtown Living Initiative stimulated new residential construction throughout the 
downtown area. Houston’s downtown core was a commercial success and served as a business 
hub with few entertainment venues; residential development was still limited. The first notable 
residential development in downtown was the renovation and conversion of the Rice Hotel68 in 
1997. The Downtown Living Initiative proposed 18 new residential projects. In 2015, Plan 
Houston was the city’s very first general plan adopted by the Houston City Council that outlined 
12 core strategies for achieving the city’s overall vision and its economic development potential 
by 2036. The GRBCC 2025 Master Plan (2015) specifically outlined potential future public and 
private development opportunities surrounding the immediate areas around the convention center 
and Toyota Center, recently named as the Avenida Houston District, encompassed within the 
quarter-mile arena-district micro-area.  
 
                                                 
68 The city of Houston contributed a $5 million historic tax credit and $7 million in incremental taxes for its 
subsequent conversion into a residential development. The total project was a $32 million renovation into loft 
apartments (Williams, 1997; Schaffer, 1989).  
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Beginning in 1995, Downtown Houston experienced a substantial amount of 
development changes. The Main Street Market Square Redevelopment Authority (MSRA) and 
its tax increment reinvestment zone (TIRZ) had been established69. The MSRA encompasses the 
development on both sides of the Main Street corridor and the Buffalo Bayou Redevelopment 
Project. Significant amounts of public investments were allocated to improving downtown 
infrastructure and the aesthetics by adding a number of new public parks and public art 
installations. Between 1995 and 2004, approximately $873 million was allocated for public 
infrastructure improvements and $1.3 million was for public facilities such as new theaters and 
professional sport facilities (Houston Downtown Development Framework, 2004). Over $2.2 
billion was invested in private commercial, residential, and non-profit projects. The primary goal 
of the Downtown Development Framework was to recreate Houston from a place of business, to 
a vibrant place of business, entertainment, residential, and civic life. Since the mid-1990s, the 
priority was to substantially increase the residential housing stock to maintain pace with the 
expanding population. The residential growth areas for high-rise residential were identified along 
the southwestern side of Main Street, the Theater District, the historic Market Square area, and 
the superblocks surrounding the GRBCC. The 2004 Development Framework sought to 
encourage coordinated development of the superblock on the western side of the GRBCC. The 
announcement of Discovery Green, an open green space, adjacent to the GRBCC spurred new 
high-rise residential which has created a more communal and vibrant atmosphere within the 
Avenida de las Americas corridor.  
                                                 
69 The Main Street/Market Square TIRZ was created in 1995 to stimulate residential development across nine blocks 
surrounding the Rice Hotel, the first residential development in downtown. In 1998, the TIRZ boundaries expanded 
to include the northern blocks of the CBD along the Buffalo Bayou to enhance connections between the eastern and 
western portions of the downtown. In 2005, new mixed-use retail and entertainment was included. Overall, the TIRZ 
was used to encourage new residential, retail, hotel, and commercial development (City of Houston, 2018). 
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Between 2004 and 2011, more than $6 billion had been invested in the downtown area 
(Plan Downtown, 2011). In 2012, there was special focus in considering a potential public-
private redevelopment program for the “Convention District” which partially falls within the 
quarter-mile arena-district micro-area boundaries for this study. The City of Houston has not 
formally designated boundaries for the “Convention District,” and there is no TIRZ designated 
specifically for the area immediately around the convention center. Rather the Greater Houston 
Reinvestment Zone 24 covers 193 acres. The 2025 GRBCC Master Plan outlines the future 
development and success of the GRBCC that will only be realized by committing to long-term 
development strategies that extend beyond the convention center, including the new 
infrastructure along the Avenida de las Americas corridor.  
Currently, Houston has 27 active TIRZs including designations for the GRBCC and the 
three professional sports venues: NRG Stadium (Reliant Stadium), Minute Maid Park, and the 
Toyota Center all fall within the boundaries of Houston’s 24th “Greater Houston” TIRZ7071. 
However, this TIRZ was not a function of the establishment of these major entertainment venues 
Without formal government boundaries, the designation of the “Convention District” outlined in 
the GRBCC 2025 Master Plan is merely symbolic. Figure 25 provides a visual of the GRBCC 
district boundaries. Avenida Houston District is the newest “unofficially” demarcated district or 
                                                 
70 The Houston City Council established the Greater Houston Reinvestment Zone No. 24, issued per Chapter 311 of 
the Texas Tax Code for the purposes of developing and redeveloping the areas surrounding the eastern end of 
Houston’s CBD and the area around NRG Stadium. The intent of the Greater Houston TIRZ is to establish a project 
and financing plan to facilitate the development and redevelopment of a 462-acre area (with approximately 1,280 
parcels) that will attract new private investment. Of the 462 acres, 27% of parcels are vacant underdeveloped, 
former oil field properties that hinder the development for future housing or commercial uses. (City of Houston, 
2012).  
71 The Greater Houston No. 24 TIRZ is a contiguous irregular shaped geographic area but is bounded by the Old 
Spanish Trail, Alameda Genoa Road, Highway 288, Main Street, and the eastern section of the Houston CBD (City 
of Houston, 2012).   
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neighborhood surrounding the GRBCC. Avenida Houston grew out of the initial phase of 
Houston First Corp’s 2025 GRBCC Master Plan, in which the City of Houston spent more than 
$1.5 billion to redevelop the area immediately surrounding the convention center, which 
encompasses the geographic area for the arena district. 
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Figure 25. The 2025 GRBCC Master Plan geographic boundaries 
  
Source: (Houston First Corporation, 2012) 
 
4.7.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
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Table 44. Notable completed and proposed development projects in Houston’s arena-district micro-area, 1990 to present. 
Development Name Project Cost Description 
List of City of Houston projects completed in early 2000s 
Minute Maid Park $286,000,000 
• After the Houston Astros threatened to leave if a new venue was not provided by the 
city, a downtown was determined as a potential site for a new ballpark. With the passing 
of legislation at the state level, land was purchased on an old railway station site on the 
east side of downtown.  
• Compared to other sections of downtown, the east side was a suitable site as land prices 
were more economical. The price of land was $11 per square foot compared to $200 per 
square foot on the western side of Main Street. 
• The railroad station was converted into the Astros corporate offices. 
• The ballpark funding proposal was up for referendum in 1996 and was approved by 
voters 51% to 49%. This would lead to the creation of the Harris County-Houston 
Sports Authority in financing the new ballpark, which opened in 2000. 
5 Houston Center $166,000,000 
• GRBCC’s presence impacted the expansion of the downtown office market on the east-
side of Main Street. 
• Completed in 2000, 5 Houston Center is a 28-story 577,000-square foot office building. 
GRBCC Expansion and Hilton 
Americas-Houston 
$285,000,000 
• GRBCC opened in 1987, however, the center had to be expanded with the demand for 
more space. 
• In 2003, 400,000 square feet of additional exhibition space and meeting rooms were 
added, which brought the total size of the GRBCC to 1.2 million square feet with 
approximately 850,000 square feet of exhibition space. 
• A 1,200-room conference center hotel, Hilton Americas-Houston, was also built using 
public subsidies. The public subsidies derived from bonds paid off by the hotel and sales 
taxes, and parking revenues. Construction also included a 1,600-space parking garage. 
List of City of Houston projects completed in mid-2000s 
Discovery Green $112,000,000 
• Discovery Green is an 11.8-acre park located adjacent to the GRBCC. 
• The site was originally intended to be part of the Houston Center expansion, however, 
city philanthropists encouraged mayor, Bill White, for the city to acquire the block and 
add it to property already owned by the city to create a permanent green space 
downtown.  
• The city purchased land for $56 million, another small portion of land was a partial sale 
and partial donation, and then another portion of land was added with the closure of a 
street that ran straight through the land parcel. 
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• Land acquisition was completed in 2004 and Discovery Green opened in 2008. 
• Park operational costs amount to approximately $3.2 million a year. 
• Discovery Green was also a catalyst for the two larger developments that fall just short 
of the quarter-mile radius, One Park Place72 completed in 2008 and Hess Tower73 
completed in 2011. 
Houston Pavilions $170,000,000 
• Previously the site of three surface parking lots, Houston Pavilions opened in 2008, as a 
mixed-use retail, office development, and entertainment center that extends over three 
blocks. 
• The building is occupied by 305,000 square feet of retail and 200,000 square feet of 
office space 
• This project was financed through public subsidies and incentives. 
• Two retail spaces were built with $600,000 and $400,0000 worth of public infrastructure 
improvements (e.g., pedestrian walkways, sidewalks, streetscapes etc.) derived from the 
Houston Downtown Management District. 
• $14.3 million was also provided through the Downtown Redevelopment Authority’s 
Tax Incrementing Reinvestment Zone. 
Embassy Suites $55,000,000 
• The Embassy Suites is located adjacent to Discovery Green and the Hilton Americas 
Houston Hotel and next door to the GRBCC. There was a big need for more hotel 
development surrounding the GRBCC. 
• It is the first privately developed hotel built in Houston since 1986. 
• Property tax abatements and hotel occupancy tax rebates were negotiated in the area to 
encourage more downtown hotel development. 
• It was negotiated that for the first seven years, the developer will take home equal 
payments to the generated hotel occupancy tax in exchange that the Embassy Suites 
would reserve 70 percent of the total rooms for events at the convention center. 
• The 19-story 262-room hotel was completed in 2011. 
List of City of Houston projects completed in late-2000s 
                                                 
72 Land acquired between the Shops at Houston and Discovery Green was acquired for the future development of One Park Place shortly after plans for 
Discovery Park, the city’s largest urban greenspace was announced. One Park Place is a 37-story 346-unit, apartment building and one of the first apartment 
buildings built in the downtown area in the last 40 years. Formerly a vacant plot of land, the property values increase dramatically with the apartment occupancy 
and the presence of the Discovery Green nearby (Van Ness, 2012). 
73 Similar to One Park Place, Hess Tower was also constructed after plans for Discovery Green were announced. Construction began in 2007 and the 29-story, 
850,000 square foot building opened in 2010. The building sold in 2011 at $442 million, the biggest sale of an office building in Houston history (Van Ness, 
2012). 
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Marriott Marquis Houston 
Convention Center Hotel 
$370,000,000 
• RIDA Development Corporation developed 29-story, 1,000-room convention center 
hotel opened in 2016. 
• The building has over 100,000 square feet of meeting space and plenty of luxury 
amenities including a lazy river. 
Camden Downtown Phase I and 
II 
N/A 
Two phase construction project of two 21-story, 500-unit total residential development. 
The two buildings are estimated to be completed by 2020. 
Note: In 2016, 48 new projects either were completed, under construction, or planned. A full list of public and private sector construction projects 
in Downtown Houston, built from 1995 to projects that are currently under construction is located on Houston Downtown Management District’s 
website at https://www.downtownhouston.org/site_media/uploads/attachments/2018-03-28/Downtown_Development_Project_List_032218_1.pdf. 
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4.7.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
In 1995, Houston’s first revitalization efforts began. However, it is only over the last few 
years that the surge of development in Houston’s downtown core is noticeable. More than $1.5 
billion has been invested in new downtown construction projects that are already underway or on 
the verge of completion. Furthermore, $3 billion has been invested in projects that are in the pre-
development stage. One-third of these projects are strictly dedicated to residential development 
(Houston Downtown Management District, 2018). To support a vibrant 24-hour convention 
center district, the rise in residential, office, and retail development and the integration of urban 
parks such as Discovery Green have been anchors for Houston’s downtown growth.  
 
The Avenida Houston District and the Convention Center District do not contain official 
public declarations district boundaries. The Greater Houston No. 24 TIRZ, which does have an 
official district boundary and captures the majority of the eastern side of Houston’s downtown. 
The Greater Houston TIRZ was also only enacted at the end of 2012, and therefore the surge of 
development that may have occurred because of the Toyota Center construction does not pertain 
to the TIRZ. The Toyota Center’s quarter-mile arena-district micro-area partially encompasses 
most of the Convention Center District and the Avenida Houston District. 
 
4.7.4.1 Land-Use Composition 
Since 1995, the City of Houston has invested in the redevelopment efforts on the eastern 
side of downtown. Despite development elsewhere, the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area, 
surrounding the Toyota Center, only began to experience a spur in development between 2010 
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and 2015. Development initiatives in the Convention Center District included the Convention 
Center, three major league sports venues, and Discovery Green. Additionally, Houston is 
focusing its future development strategies on a smaller street-level scale to enhance these larger 
developments (ULI, 2012). There is significant market potential for residential development and 
hotels adjacent to the convention center to create a more vibrant downtown and 24-hour district. 
There is a lack of pedestrian interconnections between the major development projects that 
negatively affect street activity and retail consumption. Overall, downtown Houston would 
benefit from more hotel development complemented with residential development. An increase 
in parking garages would also support both the nearby convention center and future hotels and 
residences (ULI, 2012).  
Over the last 25-years, the overall compounding rate of change among the different land-
uses was quite insubstantial. Table 45 provides a summary of total land-use composition by 
category in Houston’s Toyota Center’s micro-area. The greatest changes occurred in the rise of 
residential and parking properties and the decrease in industrial properties. Each of these three 
categories had a positive and negative compounding rate of change of approximate of 5%. The 
lack of residential properties in the downtown area has posed a problem in spurring the rest of 
Houston’s development. Without a strong residential base, it is more difficult to establish a 
vibrant and active “24/7” downtown and a convention center district as outlined in the GBRCC 
2025 Master Plan. There are now three residential properties in the arena-district micro-area. 
These three properties include two apartment complexes at One Park Place and at 1416 Austin 
Street and the condominiums at 1111 Caroline Street. Two new residential buildings have been 
proposed within the arena-district micro-area; construction will only be completed by 2020. 
Between 1990 and 2010, vacant properties composed the largest percentage of property-use at an 
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average 32%, in the arena-district micro-area. Some exempt parcels are listed as vacant exempt 
properties, but categorized as exempt properties and not vacant parcels. Exempt properties 
composed 16% of the land-use composition, a majority of which were vacant exempt parcels. 
The other exempt properties include two public parks, Discovery Green and Root Square, the St. 
Joseph Medical Center, and the South Texas College of Law Houston. Three to four separate 
parcel identifiers composed each of these exempt properties. The number of vacant properties 
decreased with the rise in surface parking lots and parking structures.  
Between 2005 and 2015, the overall number of commercial parcels decreased by 20%. 
This decrease in total percentage of commercial properties does not necessarily mean that there 
was a decrease in commercial properties, particularly because the commercial built volume has 
had a compounding rate of change of 4% between 2000 and 2015. Instead, commercial property 
parcels could have been consolidated through land assembly and created a larger commercial 
parcel. For example, four commercial parcels compose the Houston Center. However, the 
Houston Center also contains multiple commercial business property parcels that constitute as 
the Shops in Houston Center that are not captured in the land use count. The decrease in 
commercial land parcels is also because of the decrease in retail parcels. For assessment 
purposes, the Houston Center and the GRBCC possess up to four parcel identification numbers 
that are based on historic lot configurations rather than individual commercial business property 
parcel identifications as some other cities use. Indeed, retail is integrated on the first floors of 
buildings like the Houston Center or in the GRBCC, these retail parcels have not been accounted 
for because they are listed under the assessment value of the larger development itself. Individual 
retail parcels, such as individual shops that were strewn throughout the city decreased, the lots 
were replaced with larger development projects such as the five hotels that were built between 
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2005 and 2015. Prior to 2005, commercial properties also consisted of a majority of full-service 
auto-garages and privately operated electrical companies. Since then, the number of individual 
commercial parcels has decreased and been replaced with a consolidation of commercial parcels 
and office and hotel development in which the commercial built volume increased by 4%. 
 Based on the ULI Houston Technical Panel’s recommendations and the goals outlined in 
the GRBCC 2025 Master Plan, private development is slowly shaping the arena-district micro-
area into an entertainment district anchored by the GBRCC and Toyota Center. Based on how 
the downtown street grid is laid out and a low compounding rate of change of 4%, three new 
residential developments with two recently proposed developments, is a start. Surface parking 
lots and parking garages are also necessary in supporting further residential development and the 
five new hotels constructed since 2005. 
 
Figure 26. Percentage of land-use composition in the Houston arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
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4.7.4.2 Built Volume 
The total built volume in Houston’s arena-district micro-area grew at a compounding rate 
of change of approximately 3% over the last 15 years. Table 45 provides a summary of the built 
volume by land-use category for four year intervals and the compounding rate of change between 
2000 and 2015. Building square footage was not recorded prior to 2000 on the assessment 
records. Although there are only three residential developments located in the arena-district 
micro-area, residential had a 22% compounding rate of change in the last 15 years. Commercial 
parcel built volume had a compounding rate of change of about 4%, with the largest increases in 
office and hotel development. Office development had its surge in development starting in 2005, 
while the hotel development seems to have begun after 2010 when the GRBCC 2025 Master 
Plan was published. Similarly, hotel built volume grew in 2015, as did the built volume for 
parking structures. This indicates that one or two parking garages were constructed in tandem 
with hotel construction.
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Table 45. City of Houston's arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015. 
YEAR 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 1 0.57 1 0.63 1 0.63 1 0.64 3 1.86 3 1.84 4.49 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
1 0.57 1 0.63 1 100.00 - - 2 4.00 2 4.00 2.81 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - 47 100.00 47 94.00 47 94.00 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - 47 100.00 47 95.92 47 95.92 - 
COMMERCIAL 44 25.29 43 27.04 43 26.88 43 27.56 45 27.95 36 22.09 (0.80) 
OFFICE 9 5.17 9 5.66 9 20.93 9 20.93 8 17.78 8 4.91 (0.47) 
RETAIL 11 6.32 11 6.92 11 25.58 10 23.26 8 17.78 6 3.68 (2.40) 
RESTAURANT 1 0.57 1 0.63 1 2.33 1 2.33 2 4.44 2 1.23 2.81 
HOTEL - - - - - - 2 4.65 3 6.67 5 3.07 - 
INDUSTRIAL 9 5.75 10 6.29 10 6.25 9 5.77 1 0.62 2 1.23 (5.84) 
EXEMPT 22 16.67 25 15.72 27 16.88 26 16.67 34 21.12 36 22.09 1.99 
PARKING 19 10.92 19 11.95 19 11.88 24 15.38 31 19.25 64 39.26 4.98 
VACANT 59 40.80 61 38.36 60 37.50 53 33.97 47 29.19 22 13.50 (3.87) 
MIXED-USE - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL 154 100.00 159 100.00 160 100.00 156 100.00 161 100.00 163 100.00 0.23 
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Table 46. Houston's arena-district micro-area built volume, 2000-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL     4,292 0.13 70,660 1.80 701,132 14.03 701,132 9.22 22.61 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
    4,292 100.00 - - 630,472 89.92 630,472 89.92 22.09 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
    - - 70,660 100.00 70,660 10.08 70,660 10.08 - 
TOTAL CONDOS     - - 70,660 100.00 70,660 10.08 70,660 10.08 - 
COMMERCIAL     1,936,117 58.30 2,997,577 76.53 3,588,543 71.82 4,863,072 63.92 3.75 
OFFICE     101,417 5.24 132,425 4.42 1,136,442 31.67 1,174,951 24.16 10.30 
RETAIL     148,140 7.65 145,332 4.85 104,715 2.92 185,974 3.82 0.91 
RESTAURANT     5,170 0.27 5,170 0.17 18,470 0.51 18,470 0.38 5.23 
HOTEL     - - 581,475 19.40 847,285 23.61 2,053,488 42.23 - 
INDUSTRIAL     146,068 4.40 134,212 3.43 19,500 0.39 47,876 0.63 (4.36) 
EXEMPT     27,057 0.81 27,057 0.69 - - - - (100.00) 
PARKING     629,970 18.97 687,240 17.55 687,240 13.75 1,996,320 26.24 4.72 
VACANT     577,647 17.39 - - - - - - (100.00) 
MIXED-USE     - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL     3,321,151 100.00 3,916,746 100.00 4,996,415 100.00 7,608,400 100.00 3.37 
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4.7.4.3 Assessed Value 
Houston’s properties are appraised at 100% of the market value. Figure 27 illustrates the 
compounding rate of change in assessment values between the arena-district micro-area and that 
of the City of Houston. The line markers in the graph indicate the difference in compounding 
rate of change between the micro area and Houston. The compounding rate of change of 12.6% 
in assessment values within the arena-district micro-area corroborates with the city’s economic 
development initiatives by investing more on the eastern side of downtown. The rollout 
continues with an 11% compounding rate of change between 2000 and 2005 with the opening of 
the Toyota Center. 
Over the course of the 25-year period, the arena-district micro-area’s assessed values 
compounded annually at 5% compared to 2% in the city overall. Table 47 provides a summary of 
the assessment, market, and property tax values for the arena-district micro-area and the city of 
Houston. Houston maintained a constant rate of change in property assessment values. 
Interestingly, between 2005 and 2015, the Great Recession did not seem to affect the assessment 
values in Houston in the same way that other cities experienced. As seen in other case 
summaries, a national recession in 1995 caused real estate values to decrease. In addition to the 
property values decreasing, one parcel located in the micro-area in particular, AT&T 
Communication had built an operating site in the early 1990s. The property has an assessed value 
of over $20 million, largely due to the improvements made to the property. In 1995, the total 
assessed value for the parcel was less than $5 million. Assessed values in the micro-area had a 
percentage change of 99% compared to 1990. Houston assesses exempt properties, although they 
are not valued for tax purposes. The valuations are maintained in order value the adjacent 
properties correctly. Although land adjacent to a residential development is owned by Houston 
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and is exempt, that does not mean that the land is less valuable, and therefore it is still accounted 
for in the assessment records. Values of exempt properties in 1990 and 1995 were not distributed 
to the public due to accuracy issues. The predominant reason for the substantial shift in assessed 
value is between 1995 and 2000 is due to the inclusion of exempt values. Parcels dedicated to the 
Houston Southwest College of Law and the GRBCC are tax exempt, however, in order to assess 
the property value purposes, the parcels were assessed from 2000 onward. Additionally, the 
Houston Downtown Park Corporation and the City of Houston assembled land parcels to create 
Discovery Green. In 1995, the assessed value of the parcels assembled for the park amassed to 
$2.8 million. In 2000, with the same number of parcels, the value of land increased to $11.2 
million. As the city core continued to redevelop, the demand for downtown properties increased, 
which subsequently caused an increase in property values as well. In 1999, the average property 
values increased by 7%, while the property values within the downtown inner-core increased by 
close to 11% (Bivin, 2000; Smith, 2000).  
 
From 2005 to 2015, the assessment values within the arena-district micro-area steadily 
increased with the construction of the Shops at Houston Center, the number of new residential 
developments and hotels, and parking garages. The transition from vacant parcels or parcels used 
for surface parking lots to parking garages increased the assessment value quite profoundly, as 
each new parking structure was valued at over $25 million. In 2012, the Greater Houston TIRZ 
was instituted. It is difficult to determine whether the TIF had an effect on assessment values by 
the 2015 assessment record. In general, based on the different urban planning documents created 
for the eastern side of Houston’s downtown, the GRBCC was the anchor for development rather 
than the Toyota Center. Yet, the GRBCC was opened in 1987 and the Toyota Center opened in 
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2003. Office buildings were already downtown with no new construction within the micro-area, 
while residential and hotel developments only ascended with the release of the GRBCC 2025 
Master Plan, with the purpose of spurring new private investment downtown to create a vibrant 
entertainment district. Although new development has taken place in the micro-area, this comes 
ten years after the opening of the arena. If the arena and the convention center had been a 
catalyst for new development, assessment and property values would have increased when the 
construction of the arena was announced and developers would have already occupied land to 
build the residential developments in conjunction with the arena development. The Toyota 
Center and the GRBCC are now amenities for the creation of an entertainment district, but it 
would be hard pressed to state that the arena was the catalyst for the development of the east side 
of Houston. Table 47 provides a summary of the assessed values and property taxes captured in 
the arena-district micro-area in relation to the City of Houston 
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Figure 27. Compounding rate of change in assessed value in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Houston 1990-2015. 
 
 
4.7.4.4 Property Taxes 
Over 25 years, the compounding rate of change in property tax for the arena-district 
micro-area is 3%, compared to Houston’s 2%. Figure 28 illustrates the compounding rate of 
change in the arena-district micro-area and the Houston for every five-year interval between 
1990 and 2015. The graph also indicates the differences between the two observed areas. 
Houston’s property tax revenues are constant with an average compounding growth rate of 2%, 
and the greatest compounding growth rate occurring between 2005 and 2010. The arena-district 
micro-area’s highest compounding growth rate of 10% in property taxes between 2005 and 2010 
and with another increase in compounding growth rate of 8% between 2010 and 2015 due to the 
new residential and hotel developments and income generating parking garages. Developments 
such as the GRBCC, the South Texas College of Law, Discovery Green, and various other 
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government owned parcels were exempt parcels and therefore not generating property taxes for 
the City of Houston. Property exemptions for these institutional properties amassed to $341 
million in 2005, $390 million in 2010 and $545 million in 2015. The city of Houston has a tax 
abatement program that was created to encourage new growth, development, and taxes. While 
the city of Cleveland’s downtown relied heavily on tax abatements to incentivize private 
development downtown, the City of Houston has executed 15 tax abatement projects between 
2004 and 201674. None of these projects are located within the arena-district micro-area nor the 
Greater Houston No. 24 TIRZ. The Houston City Council approved the expansion of the 
Downtown Living Initiative that doubled in the amount of new residential units that could 
receive tax breaks, amassing over $75 million (Pulsinelli, 04/17/2014). Launched in 2012, the 
Downtown Living Initiative, offers developers $15,000 for each unit built in a complex of 10 or 
more units. SkyHouse Houston was the first high rise apartment project to be awarded the 
subsidy, breaking ground in 2013. While the proposed Camden Downtown Apartments would be 
able to take advantage of this tax subsidy, the existing buildings captured in the arena-district 
micro-area were built prior to the announced change. 
 In all, as the parcel property values in the arena-district micro-area increased with the 
changes in land-use composition, the property tax values simultaneously increased overall. Table 
47 provides a summary of the property taxes compared in the five-year intervals between 1990 
and 2015 for both the arena district and the City of Houston.  
 
 
                                                 
74 A list and description of the tax abatement projects in the City of Houston can be accessed here: 
http://www.houstontx.gov/ecodev/tax_abatements.html 
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Figure 28. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Houston 1990-2015. 
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Table 47. Assessment, market, and property tax values in arena-district micro-area vs. city of Houston, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
TOYOTA CENTER ARENA DISTRICT MICRO AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 304,970 329,205 2,978,340 3,122,847 3,494,626 3,563,557 10.33 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) - - 3,315,295 3,916,746 4,996,415 7,608,400 3.38 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 231,811,380 138,118,730 275,261,100 519,305,856 810,016,533 1,217,103,232 6.86 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
409,493,073 210,476,939 380,294,095 630,025,058 888,722,948 1,217,103,232 4.45 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 104,121,760 65,656,220 100,183,890 146,884,323 360,024,119 597,407,804 7.24 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
128,316,810 70,073,470 175,077,210 382,888,003 449,992,414 622,283,968 6.52 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 231,811,380 138,118,730 275,261,100 529,772,326 810,016,533 1,219,691,772 6.87 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
409,493,073 210,476,939 380,294,095 642,723,044 888,722,948 1,219,691,772 4.46 
TOTAL MARKET LAND 
VALUE 
104,121,760 65,656,220 100,183,890 146,884,323 360,024,119 597,407,804 7.24 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING 
VALUE + IMPROVEMENTS 
128,316,810 70,073,470 175,077,210 382,888,003 449,992,414 622,283,968 6.52 
TOTAL TAX 5,053,354 3,758,183 5,447,159 6,072,430 10,835,349 17,710,752 5.14 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 8,926,711 5,727,036 7,525,664 7,367,109 11,888,181 17,710,752 2.78 
CITY OF HOUSTON 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 58,909,377,000 63,913,106,000 80,691,551,000 105,881,226,000 149,011,563,000 187,823,028,000 4.75 
 TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $)  
104,062,974,848 97,396,167,304 111,481,500,217 128,455,754,589 163,490,484,570 187,823,028,000 2.39 
 TOTAL MARKET VALUE  58,909,377,000 63,913,106,000 80,691,551,000 105,881,226,000 149,011,563,000 187,823,028,000 4.75 
 TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $)  
104,062,974,848 97,396,167,304 111,481,500,217 128,455,754,589 163,490,484,570 187,823,028,000 2.39 
 TOTAL TAX  379,137,000 433,863,000 542,777,000 664,831,000 895,779,000 1,074,070,000 4.25 
 TOTAL TAX (2015 $)  669,742,681 661,156,936 749,887,609 806,577,058 982,818,647 1,074,070,000 1.91 
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4.7.5 KEY FINDINGS 
Downtown Houston is emerging into more of an entertainment center where residents are 
willing to live, work, and play. Since 2003, there is a lag in the development initiatives when the 
Toyota Center first opened. Although it is beneficial that Houston launched different plans 
(Downtown Living Initiative, the GRBCC 2025 Master Plan, Plan Houston, etc.) for downtown 
development; Toyota Center, Minute Maid Park, and the GRBCC were operational for ten years 
without any new construction and developments taking place when the Toyota Center was first 
announced, during the arena’s construction phase, and immediately following the opening of the 
venue. It is not possible to conclude that the Toyota Center was a catalyst. Without the 
convention center as the anchor tenant, the vision of creating an entertainment district may not 
have been feasible. The property values, assessment values, and total property tax all increased 
over the last 25-years in the arena-district micro-area, however, the compounding growth rates 
are not drastically different from those of Houston. Houston is undergoing a green-space 
renaissance, embarking on a $220 million parks project, Bayou Greenways 2020, which will 
connect city parks through a 150-mile network of trails, bike paths, and greenspace throughout 
the city (Mock, 2016). This project along with the Discovery Green project in the downtown 
core have been catalysts for more residential development and the overall increase in property 
values.  
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4.8. MEMPHIS: THE FEDEX FORUM  
Table 48. FedEx Forum Rapid Notes 
Source: Judith Grant Long (2005) 
 
Over the last 20 years, Memphis has made substantial investments in its downtown 
revitalization efforts with the overall vision of transforming the central business district into a 
vibrant 24-hour entertainment, sports, and cultural hub that is recognizable as a tourist 
destination. The city has prioritized new residential and commercial development as well as the 
restoration of historical buildings. Long fragmented by race relations and the defined as a 
derelict and dangerous place, the completion of the FedEx Forum in 2000, the construction of 
new hotels, a performing art center, the National Civil Rights Museum, Peabody Place, a luxury 
retail center, have played a substantial role in redefining downtown Memphis. The city continues 
to fund projects and initiatives to improve downtown, such as the revitalization of the historic 
riverfront, Beale Street Landing, a $27 million docking facility and open space area along the 
Mississippi River which is currently still under construction. 
 
Since 1991, the Memphis physical environment has transformed with more than $3.3 
billion invested in development projects that either have been completed, planned, or currently 
Arena Name FedEx Forum 
Owner City of Memphis 
Year Opened 2004 
Key Players/Organization 
City of Memphis; Memphis and Shelby 
County Sports Authority Board 
TIF District 
South Central Business Improvement District 
Renewal Community 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $351,120,000 
Public Investment in Venue $351,120,000  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 100% 
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under construction (Downtown Memphis Commission, 2018). Furthermore, a substantial amount 
of investment has focused on sport and entertainment infrastructure, which led to a clearly 
delineated “sports and entertainment district” anchored by the former Peabody Place75, the 
FedEx Forum, Beale Street, and the AutoZone Park (home to the AAA-baseball team, the 
Memphis Redbirds), and the Orpheum Theatre.  
 
4.8.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
4.8.1.1 The Memphis Pyramid  
Prior to the opening of the FedEx Forum in 2004, the Memphis Grizzlies temporarily 
played in the Pyramid, built in 1990 that had replaced the old Mid-South Coliseum, built in 
1963. The $68 million Pyramid of Memphis is located along the Mississippi River adjacent to 
Mud Island76, underneath the Interstate-40 bypass, and near the Hernando do Soto Bridge. 
Inspired by Egypt’s Pyramid of Giza, the 32-story Pyramid of Memphis opened 1991. The 
structure included an arena for sports and concerts, a Hard Rock Café, a hall of fame for music, 
and an observation deck at the tip of the pyramid. Despite its sleek yet quirky design and prime 
                                                 
75 Peabody Place covers eight city blocks and is composed of restored historic buildings, a 15-story office tower, an 
enclosed mall, luxury apartments, offices, restaurants, etc. Two million square feet are connected by skywalks and 
corridors (Silk & Amis, 2005). The Peabody Place development took years to plan and the first building was 
constructed in 1993. Although the mall was originally successful, the mall was unable to compete financially with 
the suburban areas, and officially closed by 2012. In 2016, ServiceMaster relocated its headquarters to Memphis, 
overtaking the former mall space that had been vacant for years. 
76 Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Downtown Memphis Airport had used a portion of Mud Island, prior to the 
island’s split due to the new highway and bridge infrastructure. Suburbanization and the lack of public infrastructure 
compelled residents to relocate from the downtown core to the suburbs. In the late 1960s, Mud Island Park had 
developed in order to attract more residents back downtown. In addition to the Mud Island Park, the peninsula was 
occupied by the Mississippi River Museum, an amphitheater, boat slips, etc. Future projects on the island include a 
new aquarium and an indoor and outdoor Eco Hub campus providing educational opportunities and research about 
eco-conversation (Memphis River Parks, 2018).  
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location77 along the riverfront, the Pyramid underperformed to city expectations and became 
financially insolvent. Furthermore, the Pyramid’s developer, Sidney Shlenker, failed to 
contribute his share of the project’s cost and over 150,000 square feet of the interior space went 
unused (Barry, 2008). In the early 2000s, contingent on a new arena, the Vancouver Grizzlies 
agreed to move to Memphis. 
Since the Pyramid did not comply with NBA regulations and it would have been too 
expensive to retrofit the building, the team played in the Pyramid for their first three years before 
moving to the FedEx Forum that in the meanwhile had been under construction. The $250 
million FedEx Forum eventually opened in 2004 in South Main area, a “transitional” section of 
downtown Memphis along the Beale Street Corridor (South Main Plan, 1987). Based on the 
contract between the city of Memphis and the Grizzlies, the Pyramid could not be used without 
the team’s approval. As the teams, concerts, and other big events were booked at the Forum, the 
Pyramid was abandoned and a re-use committee was organized to determine the Pyramid’s 
future. Since 2004, the Pyramid sat largely unused for 11 years. Several potential uses for the 
building were proposed, such as an aquarium, a mega-church, and an indoor theme park. In 
2010, after five years of negotiations, the city and Bass Pro Shops, a retail outfitter focused on 
hunting and fishing, signed a 55-year lease term and in 2015, the Pyramid reopened as a mixed-
use retail and hotel complex for Bass Pro Shop. Optimistic that the complex would anchor more 
development and redevelopment projects in the Pinch District, the north end of downtown, the 
city of Memphis invested $30 million while the sales tax revenue in the surrounding area funded 
                                                 
77 The Pyramid has played a key role in the development of the north end of Memphis and is located in close 
proximity to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, the Cook Convention Center for Performing Arts, and is 
concentrated in a higher-incoming neighborhood relative to the rest of the city (Silk & Amis, 2005). 
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the rest of the Pyramid’s renovations (Mercury News, 04/29/2015). On average, the Bass Pro 
Shop draws as many as three to four million visitors to Memphis every year.  
4.8.1.2 The FedEx Forum 
Host to the Memphis Grizzlies (NBA) and the University of Memphis (NCAA D. 1) 
basketball program, the FedEx Forum is a multi-purpose arena, built in the South Main area of 
downtown Memphis along the Beale Street corridor. Owned by the city of Memphis and 
operated by the team, the FedEx Forum opened in 2004, financed through $250 million worth of 
public bonds issued by the New Memphis Arena Public Building Authority78. The arena was the 
largest public works project in Memphis history79 (Williams, 01/14/2004). In 1995, the 
Vancouver Grizzlies were part of the NBA’s expansion into Canada. Following the 2000 season, 
the Vancouver Grizzlies moved to Memphis. In 2001, there were two proposed sites for the new 
arena, the first option was located on Union Avenue near the AutoZone Park and the second 
option was located south of Beale Street, near the Gibson Guitar Plant and Interstate-61. The 
second option, one block south of Beale Street, was eventually selected and it was anticipated 
that the FedEx Forum would be tied directly into the surrounding areas to create a vibrant sport 
and entertainment district and tourist destination. FedEx Forum was 100% publicly funded. The 
city raised funds for the arena through a 2% car rental tax and hotel tax, and the FedEx Forum 
negotiated a $90 million 20-year naming rights agreement with the Memphis Grizzlies (Crouch, 
2005).    
                                                 
78 In addition to issuing bonds to construct the FedEx Forum, the Sports Authority’s responsibility is to bring more 
sporting events to the city of Memphis that can potentially have an economic impact on the city and its local 
businesses (Williams, 01/14/2004). 
79 The FedEx Forum is considered one of the more successful projects in the history of the city as it involved 
minority-led and owned companies (Perl, 2006).in the construction and authorization process. 
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4.8.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
Due to previous urban renewal projects, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, many of the 
parcels in the central business district were occupied by vacant land (Downtown Memphis, 
1974). While the infrastructure along Main Street and Fourth Street was preserved, buildings 
throughout historic Beale Street were destroyed as part of the Beale Street Urban Renewal 
Project. Only 65 of 625 buildings were saved within the designated urban renewal area (Vance 
Neighborhood Community Forum, 2009). Following the aftermath of the Urban Renewal 
Program, the city published a number of comprehensive improvement and redevelopment plans 
to encourage new development in the downtown area. Prominent projects that grew out of the 
redevelopment plans include the Mid-America Mall, which connects the $30 million Convention 
Center ($160 million in 2018 dollars) with the main shopping district in the southern end of the 
downtown area. In addition to the mall, the other notable large-scale development initiative for 
the area includes the restoration of Beale Street. A result of a substantial amount of large-scale 
public and private investment, Beale Street was not only registered as a historic district on the 
National Register to preserve and restore the remaining historic buildings, but renovated the 
corridor for new restaurants, night clubs, and so on. Within the downtown’s central business 
district, the area that are relevant to this research and are included in the arena-district micro-area 
analysis, include the South Main Area, which includes a smaller subsection known as the South 
Central Business Improvement District.  
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4.8.2.1 South Main Area 
The South Main Area is located in the southwestern section of downtown Memphis. The 
area is comprised of over 320 acres and is bounded by the bluffs on the west, Fourth and Second 
Street on the east, Beale Street from the north, and Fourth and Second Street on the east, and 
Calhoun Avenue on the south. The South Main Area is divided into Sub-area I, the western 
section, and Sub-area II, the eastern section by Second Street. Sub-area I, formerly occupied by 
railroad yards, is largely concentrated by the South Bluffs Warehouse District. Figure 29 
illustrates the divide of sub-areas I and II in the South Main Area. In the last 20 years, a portion 
of the Bluffs has transitioned into high-end residential complexes overlooking the Mississippi 
River and the Tom Lee Park. Sub-area II, which includes the arena-district micro-area, is 
downtown’s “transitional” area with mixed commercial uses, large parcels of vacant land, and 
substandard housing, such as the Foote Homes public housing complex (South Main Area Plan, 
1987). In 1982 and 1986, two historic districts, the South Main Historic District and the South 
Bluffs Warehouse District respectively, were listed in the National Register for Historic Places to 
ensure that through the redevelopment process of the South Main Area, this area’s historic 
structures are preserved. The renovation and rehabilitation of buildings along South Main Street 
began with the conversion of industrial buildings into restaurants and offices first along the 
bluffs and then extended to Beale Street. The arena-district micro-area, located within the east 
sector of Sub-area II Zone C, was defined as a transition area for residential with mixed-use. In 
the early 1990s, 50% of Zone C was vacant land; this provided many opportunities for infill 
development (South Main Area Plan, 1987).  
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Figure 29. South Main Area Plan study boundaries by sub-areas I and II, 1987. 
Source: South Main Area Plan (1987). 
 
4.8.2.2 South Central Business Improvement District 
The South Central Business Improvement District (SCBID) is bounded by the 
Mississippi River to the west, Madison Street to the north, E.H. Crump on the south, Danny 
Thomas to the east. Figure 30 provides a snapshot of the boundaries of the SCBID, borrowed 
from the 2003 comprehensive plan. The improvement district’s boundaries are a slight extension 
from that of the South Main Area. As the city of Memphis continues to undergo downtown 
revitalization, developers have had an increased interest in the future of the South CBID. The 
goals of the SCBID Comprehensive Plan are to revitalize the area by both addressing and 
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mitigating incompatible and obsolete land uses and buildings to drive development forward, 
create a vibrant sports and entertainment district downtown, preserve historical and cultural 
assets, and encourage a strategy for future growth and redevelopment (SCBID, 2008). Notable 
landmarks and developments within the SCBID include Beale Street, Peabody Place, AutoZone 
Park, and the FedEx Forum. Beale Street serves as the connector between the sports and 
entertainment district and Peabody Place and the Mississippi riverfront. Peabody Place provides 
a renewed sense of downtown urban living and commerce serving as a mixed-residential and 
office complex, and the AutoZone Park and the FedEx Forum downtown have elevated the city 
to become a sport and tourist destination.  
 
While new residential construction and the increase in public open and recreational space 
such as Tom Lee Park have spurred more development and an increase in residents moving to 
downtown along the riverfront and in the South Bluffs area, older industrial and commercial 
facilities, abandoned buildings, and vacant lots define much of the SCBID. The large percentage 
of vacant lots and buildings in the SCBID is a function of obsolescence (SBCID, 2008). The 
platting and zoning regulations of the area are incompatible with the need for new development. 
In addition to the obsolete industrial warehouses, the Foot Homes complex is another example of 
building infrastructure deemed insufficient, thus detracting from the highest and best property 
use for future development in the area. In 2015, the city of Memphis received $30 million from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through the Choice Neighborhoods 
Grant to finally demolish the crime-ridden Foote Homes complex, the first and largest public 
housing complex in the city of Memphis that was one of the last remnants of segregation-era 
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housing policies80. The federal grant will provide a new beginning to the South City 
neighborhood, located just south of the FedEx Forum. Overall, the transformation of the Foote 
Homes into a 712 mixed-income apartment complex with retail and commercial space, which 
stretches across 880 acres, is estimated to cost $210 million (Faber, 05/10/2017). Demolition was 
set to begin in 2016, but has been delayed to 2018. 
As property market values depreciated due to poor infrastructure conditions, a substantial 
amount of public and private investment, such as the establishment of the Renewal Community 
and PILOT programs, is needed to stimulate reinvestment in the area. In 2002, 48 census tracts 
within the SCBID qualify for federal tax incentive and could potentially have a total impact of 
more than $300 million dollars (SCBID, 2008) while PILOT (payments in lieu of taxes) are used 
to increase reinvestment in the renewal community designated tracts.  
During the 1990s, 12 studies were published analyzing downtown residential 
development, retail potential and other business opportunities, streetscape and public 
infrastructure conditions, among other initiatives (SCBID, 2008). In 2008, Memphis allocated 
$125 million over a five-year period to make public infrastructure improvements (SBCID, 2008).  
 
 
  
                                                 
80 The Foote Homes, first opened in 1940, was one of several public housing complexes built in Memphis through 
the funding from one of the New Deal’s agency, Public Works Administration. Following renovations to the 
complex in the 1990s, the future of Foote Homes was debated whether the public housing project should be 
demolished and residents dispersed throughout the community, or whether the complex should undergo immense 
improvements and renovations along with the South City community at large. In 2015, it was determined that the 
Foote Homes project would be demolished. The Memphis Housing Authority relocated the former residents of the 
Foote Homes project throughout the city who are connected with social workers from the HOPE Urban Strategies 
(Faber, 09/07/2017). 
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Figure 30. Boundaries of the South Central Business Improvement District. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: South Central Business Improvement District Comprehensive Plan (2003) 
 
4.8.2.3. Beale Street 
Located in the southern section of the CBID, Beale Street originated as a Freedman’s 
camp established during the Civil War; the area became the leading African American 
community in Memphis. Beale Street gained notoriety as an entertainment district and the home 
of blues music as musicians migrated from the Delta cotton plantations to Memphis, creating a 
space to preserve the historical legacy of African Americans who were confined to the lowest 
social class (Rushing, 2004). During the first half of the 20th century, Beale Street was 
concentrated with black-owned businesses, churches, and political and social organizations and 
identified as the “Harlem of the Lower South”, was characterized as a separate city from 
Memphis (Rushing, 2004). At that time, Memphis was a segregated city. In the last half of the 
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20th century, as Beale Street and other downtown areas suffered from suburbanization, many of 
the buildings along Beale Street and the riverfront were abandoned. Beale Street and 
communities south of where the FedEx Forum is now located, such as the Vance neighborhood 
were subjected to urban renewal, particularly neighborhoods concentrated with a predominantly 
African-American demographic. In conjunction with the growth of the interstate system and the 
housing demand, which pulled residents to the suburbs, city officials closed many of the 
pawnshops, bars, and nightclubs along Beale Street to reinvent the area’s image. In doing so, 
much of the vibrancy and uniqueness of the area was lost (SCBID, 2008). It was not until the late 
1970s when the Center City Commission and the Beale Street Development Corporation were 
founded that a greater amount of private investment was directed into the area. The City Center 
Commission provides payments-in-lieu-of-taxes and other financing options to redirect 
development downtown in underserved markets (SCBID, 2008). The Beale Street Development 
Corporation (BSDC) led the resurgence of Beale Street by focusing on the area’s rich African 
American history, music, and culture. The city of Memphis acquired properties along three 
blocks of Beale Street. In the 1980s, a number of structures in the downtown were rehabilitated, 
including the reopening of some of the first clubs along Beale Street. The Peabody Hotel 
(renovated in 1981) and the Orpheum Theater (renovated in 1983) were also acquired, inspiring 
the construction of Peabody Place, the mixed-use retail, office, hotel development downtown. 
The BSDC was then commissioned to create an entertainment district. Its members defined the 
BSDC as the “cultural guardian of the district between Fourth and Second Street” (Dries, 
01/16/2015) to protect the narrative, the historical context of Beale Street, and its black culture. 
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The BSDC received $23 million ($200 million in 2018 dollars) from the federal government to 
promote an inclusive and diverse vision for Beale Street’s revitalization81.  
4.8.2.4. Vance Neighborhood, South of the Forum District 
In 2009, graduate students from the University of Memphis Urban Planning Graduate 
program held focus groups with local residents, business owners, church and other institutional 
leaders to create and implement a comprehensive revitalization plan for the future of the Vance 
neighborhood, an area located south of the FedEx Forum. The boundaries of the South of the 
Forum planning district include Beale Street to the north, East Street on the east, Crump 
Boulevard to the south, and Third Street to the west. Notable landmarks within the district 
include the FedEx Forum, the Clayborn Temple, Robert Church Park, and the First Baptist 
Church Beale. The Universal Life Insurance Building is also located within the Vance 
neighborhood, but falls slightly outside of the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area. The total 
area encompassed by the South of the Forum District is 615 acres and includes 1,153 parcels in 
2010. According to the Vance Neighborhood Community Forum Preliminary Data Book created 
by the University of Memphis City and Regional Planning program, 431 of the 1,153 parcels, 
approximately 37% of the parcels, are vacant properties. Vacant properties make up the greatest 
percentage of the area’s land-use composition, which demonstrates that the area is largely 
concentrated by underutilized parcels that do not adhere to their highest and best use. As a result, 
the property value potential is lower than expected in the area. Vacant properties had a high 
                                                 
81 Over the last two decades, the BSDC has been consumed in legal issues concerning the leasehold interest between 
the city, which owns the property on Beale Street and Performa Entertainment, a company that subleases the district 
from the BSDC. The Memphis mayor, Wharton Jr., has proposed to have a tourism authority oversee the Beale 
Street on behalf of the city while a separate management company is hired to manage the operations (Dries, 
01/16/2015). 
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percentage of number of parcels, but based on the total acreage of the neighborhood, vacant 
parcels composed 14% of the total land area. Religious and government institutions composed 
7% of the area’s parcels that covered 21% of the neighborhood’s total land area. Residential and 
commercial property-uses followed, composing 21% and 18% of the land area. Furthermore, the 
number of renter-occupied units were substantially disproportionate to owner-occupied units, 
even though between 1990 and 2000, the Vance neighborhood experienced a 29% decrease in 
total residential units. Overall, the high percentage of vacant parcels within the Vance 
neighborhood provides many opportunities for redevelopment and converting properties into 
higher and best uses, thus increasing property values to leverage further private investment.  
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4.8.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Table 49. Notable completed and proposed development projects in arena-district micro-area, 1990 to present 
Development Name Project Cost Description 
List of Development Projects Completed in early 2000s 
Renovations to the Memphis’ 
Central Station 
$23,200,000 
• While the Memphis Central Station is not located directly in the arena-district micro-area, 
it is a major anchor to the redevelopment of South Main Street. 
• Built in 1914, the Memphis Central Station was eventually abandoned in the late 1960s 
and experienced a steady decline in infrastructure. 
• Following the Memphis Area Transportation Authority’s (MATA) acquisition of Central 
Station, the property underwent a $23.2 million renovation to convert the transportation 
hub into a commercial and residential center. The federal government provided $17 
million, while the private sector provided the remaining contributions. 
• In 2016, Central Station and 17 adjacent acres are part of a new $53 million development 
that will include a new hotel, movie theater, more commercial space, and 200 new 
apartments built at the south end of the property (Great American Stations, 2018).  
AutoZone Park $114,000,000 
• AutoZone Park is a minor league baseball stadium, home to the Memphis Redbirds, and 
an affiliate of the St. Louis Cardinals 
• The stadium construction broke ground in 1998, and the stadium opened in 2000. 
• The Memphis Redbirds are owned by a non-profit community foundation while the city of 
Memphis owns the stadium. 
List Development Projects Completed in mid 2000s 
Westin Hotel $40,000,000 
• In 2007, the 10-story, 203-room Westin Hotel opened up along Beale Street integrating 
with the rest of the streetscape. 
List of Projects Planned, 2016–18 
Hilton Garden Inn Memphis 
Downtown 
$20,000,000 
• Projected to open in fall of 2018, the 140-room Hilton Garden Inn is located on 1.7 acres.  
• The site is located on Union Avenue situated between the FedEx Forum and AutoZone 
Park 
One Service Master Center $39,542,920 
• Recently completed, the One Service Master Center occupies the former Peabody Place 
Mall, a four-story, 328,000 square-foot building. 
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• ServiceMaster Global Holdings, a provider in residential and commercial services, moved 
its headquarters to Memphis  
• The project received $1 million in commercial and development grants.  
Holiday Inn Express $15,000,000 
• Currently a 1.3-acre commercial parking lot, the site is planned for a new 150-room hotel, 
Holiday Inn Express. 
The Inn at Beale Street $16,087,750 
• Still in the planning phase with the approval of a PILOT grant, the Inn at Beale Street is 
projected to be a five-story 120-room hotel. 
• The Inn would replace a vacant building that was formerly a nightclub. 
Vib Hotel $6,000,000 • Projected 101-room boutique hotel on Beale Street that is still in the planning process. 
Forum Flats $16,000,000 
• Forum Flats is currently under construction and is an affordable 205-unit apartment 
development that is located just south of the FedEx Forum. 
• The apartment complex contains four buildings and is located on a 4.25-acre parcel. 
• The project is financed using low-income tax credits. 
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4.8.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
In 1994, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) unveiled its 
Enterprise Zones and Empowerment Community initiatives in which public-private partnerships 
are formed to revitalize downtown city centers. These initiatives provide substantial federal tax 
incentives such as tax credits, tax deductions for business relocations, tax exempt private facility 
bonds, and so on (US Department of Health and Human Services cited in Silk & Andrews, 
2008). The city of Memphis was designated as an enterprise community due to its high 
concentration of crime, poverty, urban blight, and low educational attainment (Silk & Andrews, 
2008). In 2002, Memphis was subjected to more urban regeneration initiatives through public-
private partnerships such as Memphis 2005, MPact Memphis, the City Center Commission, 
Memphis Tomorrow, and so on. The city of Memphis was also designated as a Renewal 
Community in order to reduce crime and facilitate more private investment downtown. One of 
the largest public investments included the $2.3 billion downtown redevelopment of the “Sports 
and Entertainment District” anchored by the Peabody Place Mall, the FedEx Forum, the 
AutoZone Park, and Beale Street. The Orpheum Theatre and the Civil Rights Museum are also in 
some ways part of the Sports and Entertainment District, however, these two landmarks fall 
outside of the arena-district micro-area and are more suited as anchors for the redevelopment of 
South Main Street rather than tied to the sports district and the Vance neighborhood. The city of 
Memphis adopted the tagline “Come Downtown and Play” to further facilitate downtown 
redevelopment and reinvigorate the city’s image as a major league city.  
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4.8.4.1 Land-Use Composition 
The Framework Plan for Downtown Memphis (1974) and the South Central Business 
Improvement District Comprehensive Plan (2003) analyze the market potential of downtown 
Memphis, consider the past and current social and economic conditions of the city, and 
acknowledge the need to make public and private development decisions in order to move the 
downtown development process forward. The Framework Plan guides development of the 
downtown area by recognizing the need for a stronger retail and office core to anchor the rest of 
the sport and entertainment district. Moreover, residential developments, which have been 
largely absent within the micro-area, are important in establishing a stronger sense of community 
in the downtown area by increasing the number of permanent residents living downtown to 
encourage more opportunities in entertainment, retail, and business development. While it is 
encouraged to expand different types of land-uses throughout the downtown, the Framework 
Plan promotes the consolidation of development to create more defined levels of activity 
throughout the downtown area. For example, Beale Street is defined as the entertainment 
corridor, concentrated with restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and so on; while limited in office and 
residential development. 
Table 50 presents the raw count and percentage of land-use composition by parcel for the 
quarter-mile arena-district micro-area surrounding the FedEx Forum while Figure 31 illustrates 
the change in overall land-use composition in every 5-year interval between 1990 and 2015. Due 
to inconsistencies in the information displayed on the Shelby County assessment records, the 
land-use composition is limited to the major land-use categories. For instance, the sub-categories 
for commercial properties (e.g., office, retail, restaurant, and hotel) are not available. Since 
parking structures and parking surface lots are commercial properties, the percentage of parking 
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parcels is also not included in 1990. Moreover, the raw count for vacant properties is also zero in 
1990. Indeed, the majority of the downtown area was plagued with abandoned and under-utilized 
land parcels. Since the assessment records were limited to major categories in 1990, the vacant 
parcels are listed as either commercial or industrial parcels based on the use of the property, even 
if the parcel is vacant. This explains why the 80-parcel raw count is high for the industrial-use 
category. The 80 parcel raw count suggests that the vacant properties were previously zoned for 
industrial use.  
Between 1990 and 2015, the arena-district micro-area is heavily concentrated with 
commercial, industrial, and exempt parcels. A number of parcels are listed as exempt parcels 
even though based on their property-use, identify more with a commercial land-use. The reason 
for this is that the parcel is eligible for a tax incentive or tax credit of some kind. For example, 
from 2005 to 2015, a hotel (Peabody Place), an office building (African Methodist Episcopal 
Church) and three retail parcels (Peabody Place and two properties owned by the Memphis 
Municipal Corporation directly along the Beale Corridor) were listed under the exempt land-use 
category. Table 51 illustrates that although a number of parcels are exempt and therefore do not 
generate property tax revenue. The table also shows that seven vacant parcels, three parking 
structures, one restaurant, and an industrial parcel compose the remaining exempt property 
parcels that belong to commercial property-uses. Parcels located in the Vance neighborhood 
predominantly belong to religious institutions. Besides the physical places of worship, these 
religious institutions such as the Church of God in Christ had control over a large portion of 
general commercial properties, parking structures, and vacant lots within the area. Finally, the 
Memphis Housing Authority owned tracts of land along the Danny Thomas Boulevard including 
the Foote Homes Public Housing complex, also an exempt property, recently demolished in 
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2016. A block of vacant parcels that sits directly in front of the former site of the Foote Homes 
Public Housing complex on Dr. Martin Luther King Jr were originally listed as residential 
properties in 1990 and 1995, but were demolished in 2000. This explains the reduction in 
residential parcels between the two 10-year periods for 1990-2000 and 2005-2015. The FedEx 
Forum arena-district micro-area is defined as an area in transition, however, based on the land-
use composition found in Table 50, the area is struggling to develop the large tracts of vacant 
land. A slight possibility for this is that because religious institutions and similar organizations 
control a large percentage of land parcels in the area, development could be inhibited based on 
who controls the land.  
Overall, the raw count and compounding rate of change for each land-use categories 
decreased between 1990 and 2015. Over the 25 years, commercial parcels had a compounding 
rate of change of -2%, industrial parcels -7%, and residential parcels -3%. Exempt parcels 
remained constant over the same period. From 1990 to 2015, the compounding rate of change 
across the major land-use categories do not display substantial differences which suggest that 
even though the city intended the Beale Street corridor to be a promoter and anchor for the 
downtown area’s major comeback, the area did not deliver to the expected results. The decrease 
in total number of parcels from the early 1990s to the late 2000s is due to land assembly, the 
consolidation of smaller property parcels into larger parcels. As the smaller parcel lots, which 
typically include multiple land-use categories were consolidated, the percentage in land-use 
composition was negatively impacted based on a smaller number of parcels in the raw count and 
therefore fewer consolidated parcels that were once composed of multiple land-uses. 
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Figure 31. Percentage of land-use composition in the Memphis arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 -
 10.0
 20.0
 30.0
 40.0
 50.0
 60.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
L
an
d
 U
se
 C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 (
%
)
Percentage of land-use composition in Memphis arena-district micro-area, 1990-2015
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Exempt
Parking
Vacant
Mixed-Use
 303 
 
Table 50. City of Memphis arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 15 6.41 24 7.84 16 9.36 8 3.09 6 2.88 7 3.61 (3.00) 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - 13 54.17 - - 3 37.50 2 33.33 3 42.86 (7.07) 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - 10 41.67 - - 4 50.00 3 50.00 4 57.14 (4.48) 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 81 34.62 78 25.49 88 51.46 56 21.62 45 21.63 45 23.20 (2.32) 
OFFICE - - 4 5.13 - - 1 1.79 3 6.67 3 6.67 (1.43) 
RETAIL - - 25 32.05 - - 6 10.71 6 13.33 6 13.33 (6.89) 
RESTAURANT - - 1 1.28 - - 5 8.93 4 8.89 4 8.89 7.18 
HOTEL - - 5 6.41 - - 3 5.36 3 6.67 3 6.67 (2.52) 
INDUSTRIAL 80 34.19 22 7.19 44 25.73 25 9.65 14 6.73 12 6.19 (7.31) 
EXEMPT 56 23.93 99 32.35 86 50.29 84 32.43 68 32.69 55 28.35 (0.07) 
PARKING - - 2 0.65 - - 3 1.16 2 0.96 2 1.03 - 
VACANT - - 78 25.49 47 27.49 82 31.66 72 34.62 72 37.11 (0.40) 
MIXED-USE 2 0.85 3 0.98 1 0.58 1 0.39 1 0.48 1 0.52 (2.73) 
TOTAL 234 100.00 306 100.00 171 100.00 259 100.00 208 100.00 194 100.00 (0.75) 
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Table 51. Exempt sub-category property parcel land-use composition and built volume, 1995-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995-2015 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
EXEMPT PARCEL LAND USE COMPOSITION 
EXEMPT   99 32.46   84 32.43 68 32.69 55 28.72 (2.25) 
RENTER-OCCUPIED  - -   1 1.19 1 1.47 1 1.79 - 
OFFICE   1 1.01   1 1.19 1 1.47 1 1.79 - 
RETAIL   7 7.07   3 3.57 3 4.41 3 5.36 (3.33) 
RESTAURANT  2 2.02   2 2.38 4 5.88 4 7.14 2.81 
HOTEL   - -   1 1.19 1 1.47 1 1.79 - 
VACANT   63 63.64   20 23.81 15 22.06 9 16.07 (7.49) 
PARKING   - -   3 15.00 3 4.41 3 5.36 - 
INDUSTRIAL  1 1.01   3 3.53 3 4.41 3 5.36 - 
MIXED-USE  1 1.01   - - - - - - - 
EXEMPT PARCEL BUILT VOLUME 
EXEMPT   103,968 9.38   1,225,016 50.47 1,349,588 53.25 1,225,016 48.66 10.80 
RENTER-OCCUPIED  - -   - - - - - - - 
OFFICE   8,324 8.01   7,358 0.60 7,358 0.55 7,358 0.60 (0.49) 
RETAIL   15,372 14.79   18,856 1.54 18,856 1.40 18,856 1.54 0.82 
RESTAURANT  24,087 23.17   43,163 3.52 43,163 3.20 43,163 3.52 2.36 
HOTEL   - -   526,043 42.94 526,043 38.98 526,043 42.94 - 
VACANT   - -   - - - - - - - 
PARKING   - -   572,406 46.73 572,406 42.41 572,406 46.73 - 
INDUSTRIAL  - -   177,682 13.17 177,682 13.17 177,682 13.17 - 
MIXED-USE  - -   - - - - - - - 
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4.8.4.2 Built volume 
Since 1995, the arena-district micro-area had a compounding rate of change of 4% in 
built volume, with the total built volume increasing by 1.4 million square feet. Table 52 
highlights the changes in built volume by land-use type. Between 1995 and 2015, residential 
parcels had a compounding rate of change of 8% in built volume. In 1995, the total recorded 
built square footage for the 15 residential parcels is approximately 24,000 square feet. This is 
square footage count is based on two standing structures, while the rest of the parcels that were 
designated as residential parcels are in fact vacant properties but zoned for residential use. The 
1995 records indicate the zoning and property-use as for these parcels is residential, while 
between 2005-15, the assessment records are more specific, detailing that the land is zoned for 
residential, but the lot is in fact vacant. This could explain why the residential count is higher in 
1995, but a disconnect in the built volume count. These land-use inconsistencies were verified 
using historical LANDSTAT aerial images from the early 1990s. In 2015, the residential built 
volume increased by approximately 180,000 square feet due to the inclusion of an apartment 
complex that had actually been built in 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, the building square 
footage for the apartment complex was not available. In addition, the apartment complex was 
composed of 12 individual residential and vacant parcel lots that were then consolidated into one 
large land tract by 2015. 
The compounding rate of change in commercial parcels was 3% with decreases in office 
and retail built volume. However, with the transformation of Beale Street, and the conversion of 
old buildings into nightclubs, bars, and restaurants, restaurants had a 16% compounding rate of 
change in built volume. There was a decrease in the hotel count, by one hotel unit, between 1995 
and 2005-15, which was due to the demolition of a motel, which then transferred the parcel to 
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the vacant land-use count. One of the biggest issues with the diversity of land-use in the arena-
district micro-area and for the city as a whole is the limited number of hotels. Although Memphis 
has a large number of hotels either being planned or under construction since 2016, over the last 
25-years, Memphis failed to become a more reputable tourist and convention destination, despite 
building a convention center near the sports and entertainment district. Memphis was incapable 
of becoming a bigger convention destination because of the limited number of hotels. According 
to the Memphis Convention and Visitors Bureau, even though there has been a recent growth in 
number of hotels and the occupancy rates have increased as new developments are finishing 
construction or newly planned, the majority of the new hotels proposed will not be capable of 
supporting the convention center business; this is because most of the hotels proposed are 
“boutique and suburban-style hotels with limited services” (Commercial Appeal, 08/27/2018). 
Exempt properties had the largest increase of 13% in the built volume compounding rate 
of change. The increase in built volume between 1995 and 2005-2015 was due to the resurgence 
of Beale Street and the concentration of its restaurant row, the transfer of the Peabody Hotel 
from a commercial hotel property to an exempt hotel parcel, the increase in parking structures 
adjacent to the FedEx Forum, and of course the construction of the FedEx Forum. 
Despite some of these recent changes, based on the proposed development plans from 
various city comprehensive plans from the mid-2000s, and the evidence of the changes in built 
volume in the arena-district micro-area, overall, there has not been much new construction or 
growth within the city. While Beale Street was subject to urban renewal strategies, the buildings 
captured in the arena-district micro-area were saved and are listed under the National Register. 
Though the buildings along Beale Street were rehabilitated, the overall built volume in the area 
did not change substantially as existing buildings were more likely to be rehabilitated rather than 
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demolished for new construction. Furthermore, new development in the 2000s was largely 
concentrated in the South Bluffs, the southern section of the central business district, rather than 
in the transitional area, where the FedEx Forum is located. As determined in the South Main 
Area Plan (1987) and the study undertaken by the University of Memphis Planning Department, 
while the city foresees the creation of a strong sport and entertainment district anchored by Beale 
Street, the FedEx Forum, the AutoZone Park, and Peabody Place, the surrounding areas are still 
largely vacant or under control of several influential religious institutions which may possibly 
inhibit new development projects. 
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Table 52. City of Memphis arena-district micro-area built volume count, 1995-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL   24,106 2.16 - - 16,896 0.72 16,896 0.69 106,410 4.13 7.71 
RENTER-OCCUPIED   - -   7,728 45.74 7,728 45.74 97,242 91.38 - 
OWNER-OCCUPIED   24,106 100.00   9,168 54.26 9,168 54.26 9,168 8.62 (4.72) 
TOTAL CONDOS   - -   - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 
COMMERCIAL   1,189,362 72.76 - - 629,705 26.69 696,106 28.23 696,106 27.05 (2.64) 
OFFICE   56,890 4.78   1,725 0.27 15,149 2.18 15,149 2.18 (6.40) 
RETAIL   316,134 26.58   98,282 15.61 98,282 14.12 98,282 14.12 (5.67) 
RESTAURANT   2,503 0.79   26,772 4.25 51,284 7.37 51,284 7.37 16.30 
HOTEL   750,072 63.07   439,983 69.87 439,983 63.21 439,983 63.21 (2.63) 
INDUSTRIAL   108,448 9.73 - - 105,953 4.49 146,428 5.94 164,547 6.39 2.11 
EXEMPT   110,048 9.87 - - 1,349,588 57.21 1,349,588 54.73 1,349,588 52.44 13.35 
PARKING   187,110 16.79 - - 254,204 10.78 254,204 10.31 254,204 9.88 1.54 
VACANT   6,549 0.59 - - - - - - - - (100.00) 
MIXED-USE   15,024 1.35 - - 2,830 0.12 2,830 0.11 2,830 0.11 (8.01) 
TOTAL   1,114,604 100.00 - - 2,359,176 100.00 2,466,052 100.00 2,573,685 100.00 4.27 
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4.8.4.3 Assessment Values 
The city of Memphis applies assessment percentages to the appraised value of a property 
based on the parcel’s property classification. Residential properties are assessed at 25% of the 
appraised value and commercial and industrial are assessed at 40% of the appraised value. The 
appraised or market values for exempt properties are included in the arena-district market value 
total as shown in Table 53, but exempt parcels are not assessed. Since the majority of the parcels 
in the arena-district micro-area are exempt parcels, there is large gap in the parcels’ market 
values and the overall property tax generated within the arena-district. Over 25 years, the arena-
district micro-area had a compounding growth rate of change in assessed value of 4.4%, while 
the city of Memphis had a compounding growth rate of change of 1.4% in assessed value. The 
market value compounding rate of change for the arena-district micro-area is 9%. While the 
compounding growth rate for the market value and the assessed value for the city of Memphis 
are relatively similar, the compounding growth rate for the market value is 5% higher than the 
assessed compounding growth rate. Figure 32 provides a five-year breakdown of assessment 
values from 1990 to 2015 including the differences in compounding growth rates of change 
between the micro-area and the city of Memphis. Figure 33 compares the differences in 
compounding growth rates of change in market value to the assessed value; the city 
compounding growth rate in market value is a proxy since the growth rates between the market 
and assessed value are similar. The overall growth rate of change in assessed values in the micro-
area are not substantially different compared to the city of Memphis, however, as illustrated in 
Figure 32, the outlier in the assessment growth rate occurs between 1990 and 1995 in which 
there is a 23% difference in compounding growth rate in assessed values. This is a similar 
occurrence in the compounding rate of change in the micro-area’s market value. To begin, 
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between 1990 and 1995 a number of land consolidations occurred that explains the large increase 
in assessed values. Land assemblage, particularly of vacant parcels, can immediately increase the 
value of the land parcel, especially in a transitional area where new development was 
encouraged. Furthermore, in the case of the land assemblies, a number of the parent parcels’ 
assessment values were missing, which could also explain the lower assessment values in 1990. 
However, of the parcels that were on average consistent across the five-year intervals, the 
assessment values in 1995 were assessed almost 50% more than in 1990. Finally, the Memphis 
City Center Revenue Corporation, the Memphis Housing Authority, the Memphis Engraving 
Company, and several religious organizations, including the Church of God in Christ, the 
Pentecostal Temple of Church of God, the Thirteenth Episcopal District Church, the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Progressive Baptist Church, own the majority of parcels 
located in the arena-district micro-area. The majority of the parcels controlled by the 
organizations listed above are largely vacant and exempt. As long as these parcels are retained by 
religious organizations, and do not include the infrastructure pertaining to the actual place of 
worship, there is not a great likelihood that these parcels will be converted to their highest and 
best use, and instead will remain fallow.  
From 2000 to 2015, the differences in the compounding rate of change in assessment 
values between the micro-area and the city were constant at 1%, which demonstrates that the rate 
of growth in the assessment values did not differentiate much between the two observed areas. In 
the micro-area, the compounding rate of change between 1995 and 2005 was minimal, increasing 
4% from 1995-00 and 2% from 2000-05. In 2005, the arena-district micro-area’s total 
assessment value was at its peak at approximately $20 million. In the same year, the total market 
value for the arena-district micro-area was $180 million. The market value is $160 million more 
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than the assessed value due to the high percentage of exempt properties. Projects such as the 
FedEx Forum, the Peabody Hotel, the Double Tree Hotel, a large restaurant and nightclub on 
Beale Street contributed to the increase in market value as all of these establishments were built 
between 2000 and 2005. Following the recession in 2008, the micro-area’s assessed and market 
values fell within the two five-year intervals in 2005-10 and 2010-15. These values still have yet 
to recover to the 2005 values. The assessed and market values in the city overall also decreased 
by a compounding growth rate of change of 1% and 3% in 2005-10 and 2010-15, respectively. 
In sum, while the assessed and market values had compounding growth rates in the arena-district 
micro-area of 4% and 9% respectively from 1990 to 2015, since the opening of the FedEx 
Forum, the level of new development has not increased faster than the city overall. Between 
2005 and 2015, there was an increase in the number of vacant parcels, no large-scale residential 
developments were constructed (the residential parcels were primarily single-family residences 
that had existed prior to the 1990), the public housing complex near the FedEx Forum was 
demolished, and exempt parcels largely dominated the land-use composition within the arena-
district micro-area. Although a number of hotel developments within the arena-district micro-
area are under construction or have been proposed as detailed in Table 49, the low assessment 
values comparative to the other arena-district micro-areas in this research study, are relatively 
low due to the minimal development in arena’s transitional areas. 
 
 
 
  
 312 
 
Figure 32. Compounding rate of change in assessed value in arena-district micro-area 
(FedEx Forum) vs. city of Memphis, 1990-2015. 
 
Figure 33. Compounding rate of change in market value in arena-district micro-area 
(FedEx Forum) vs. city of Memphis, 1990-2015. 
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4.8.4.4 Property Tax 
Figure 34 illustrates the compounding rate of change in property tax between the arena-
district micro-area and Memphis from 1990 to 2015. The arena-district micro-area has a 
compounding rate of change in property tax values of 5% compared to Memphis’ 2%. The rate 
of change in property tax is a reflection of the changes in the assessment values. For example, 
between 1990 and 1995, the rate of change in assessment values was 23% in the micro-area, 
which relates to the 36% rate of change in property tax values for the same period. Compared to 
the assessment values within the city, however, the city’s overall property tax revenue fluctuates 
and appears not to complement with the assessed values. Between 2005 and 2010, the city had a 
compounding rate of change of 19%. In 2006, the city experienced an overall increase in 
property tax revenues because of a tax rate increase. In 2011, the total property tax revenues 
decreased as a percentage of the total city and county revenues. The decrease in the property 
revenues was a result of the increase in the collection of sales and state tax as well as the transfer 
of property tax revenues into the city and county’s debt service fund (City of Memphis CAFR, 
2016). The increase in sales tax and transfer of general revenues into different funds explains the 
city’s decrease in the property tax compounding rate of change between 2010 and 2015. 
Despite the dramatic increase in property tax values between 1990 and 1995, which is a 
reflection of the assessment values in the micro-area, the property tax revenues generated after 
the opening of the arena in 2004, decreased. The compounding growth rate in the property taxes 
decreased by 2% and 1.5% between 2005-10 and 2010-15, respectively. The large concentration 
of exempt properties and the lack of large-scale residential and office development inhibited the 
generation of property taxes within the arena-district. The quarter-mile radius focuses on a small 
area of the Beale Street corridor. However, even if the entire corridor was included in the arena-
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district micro-area to capture the changes in the assessed values and property tax revenues, Beale 
Street is concentrated with small-scale restaurants and nightclubs that could be considered a form 
of “cheap tourism.” Such establishments will not substantially increase the property values 
without adjacent up-scale residential or office development. A few parking structures are located 
adjacent to the FedEx Forum and considered part of the Beale Street corridor, yet do not generate 
property tax revenue for the city. The sport and entertainment district is located in an area of the 
city that lies within the boundaries of the community redevelopment designated area. This 
program provides tax credits and tax incentives for developers to invest within the South Main 
Area. The priority for the development of the sport and entertainment district is to include larger 
scale development projects that will generate higher property tax revenues. Since 2016, the 
development plans within the micro-area include an increase in hotel development and an 
affordable housing complex.  
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Figure 34. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area 
(FedEx Forum) vs. City of Memphis, 1990-2015. 
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Table 53. City of Memphis's arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
FEDEX FORUM ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 6,070,797 12,110,802 6,717,784 6,042,414 6,138,210 6,149,725 0.05 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) - 1,049,540 1,015,782 2,432,470 2,552,365 2,641,879 - 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 2,412,865 9,676,217 12,886,305 16,190,745 16,304,460 15,218,735 7.64 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 5,206,456 14,726,226 17,943,079 19,782,503 17,794,355 15,218,735 4.38 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 1,195,678 1,563,448 - 5,415,555 5,744,410 5,770,425 6.50 
ASSESSED BUILDING + IMPROVEMENTS 1,189,354 8,017,533 - 10,576,750 10,524,170 9,448,310 8.64 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 7,554,300 27,426,500 31,560,320 147,119,400 190,273,400 148,656,300 12.66 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 16,300,594 41,740,367 43,945,051 179,756,392 207,660,501 148,656,300 9.24 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE 3,735,800 5,442,208 - 30,852,500 35,223,900 36,717,200 9.57 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
3,812,100 22,293,700 - 116,266,900 155,049,500 111,939,100 14.48 
TOTAL TAX 91,206 615,336 461,616 663,094 657,776 665,059 8.27 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 196,804 936,479 642,761 810,195 717,883 665,059 4.99 
CITY OF MEMPHIS 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 3,667,945,311 6,035,036,113 8,456,107,673 11,108,643,960 12,053,353,530 11,142,251,428 4.54 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 7,914,656,292 9,184,716,322 11,774,407,948 13,572,987,405 13,154,783,786 11,142,251,428 1.38 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 11,654,255,747 18,902,371,943 26,565,060,901 35,550,324,536 38,788,129,245 35,448,457,555 4.55 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 25,147,438,348 28,767,503,768 36,989,579,167 43,436,814,512 42,332,571,795 35,448,457,555 1.38 
TOTAL TAX 114,509,866 175,222,550 109,555,000 164,527,000 442,960,000 387,565,000 5.00 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 247,088,262 266,671,050 152,545,984 201,025,697 483,437,494 387,565,000 1.82 
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4.8.5 KEY FINDINGS 
Memphis’ FedEx Forum’s arena-district micro-area is unsuccessful in terms of arena-led 
urban development outcomes studied across the three measures: land-use composition, built 
volume, and assessed and market values. A number of arena-district micro-areas explored in this 
research study had a lag in arena-led urban development outcomes since the opening of the 
various professional sport facilities. Yet, these micro-areas eventually experienced changes in the 
diversity of land-use composition, the transition of underutilized parcels to their highest and best 
uses based on zoning modifications, and increases in property values and assessed values. 
In the case of the FedEx Forum arena-district-micro-area, a large percentage of the parcels 
remains under-utilized and fails to exist at their highest and best use. Without the increase in 
large-scale residential and office development to complement the “low-end” tourism of Beale 
Street, the arena-district micro-area cannot develop further, yield higher assessment values, and 
generate more property tax for the city. While Beale Street underwent a series of transformations 
since the effects of urban renewal, prior to the opening of the FedEx Forum, the corridor had 
undergone some form of revitalization. The FedEx Forum was located in the southern end of the 
city of Memphis intended to be an anchor for the sport and entertainment district, which includes 
the Beale Street corridor and the AutoZone Park. Yet, since the opening of the arena, the 
property values and degree of development within the arena-district did not occur at a faster rate 
compared to the city as a whole. Since 2016, developers have begun to invest more within the 
transitional area as outlined in the South Main Area Plan, however, development over the last 25 
years, and particularly since the arena’s opening in 2004, the FedEx Forum failed in its arena-led 
development strategies within the quarter-mile radius.  
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4.9 PORTLAND: THE ROSE QUARTER 
Table 54. Rose Garden Rapid Notes 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005. 
4.9.1 NEW ARENA NEGOTIATIONS 
The Moda Center, formerly known as the Rose Garden, is the primary indoor sports arena 
for the Portland Trailblazers. The arena is currently owned by Vulcan Inc., a holding company 
owned by Paul Allen and managed by Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG). In hopes of 
creating a more distinct entertainment district, positioned adjacent to the Oregon Convention 
Center, the Moda Center served as a potential anchor for the revitalization of the 538 acres 
encompassed in the Oregon Convention Center Urban Renewal Area which is bounded by the 
Willamette River on the west, the Interstate-84 on the south, 21st and 17th Avenues on the east 
and Schulyer and Multnomah Avenues to the north. In 1988, Portland City Council adopted the 
Oregon Convention Center Area Policies and Procedures Guide (Resolution 34497) which 
focused on bringing new industry and job creation in the area near the Convention Center to 
support more residential development in the area, create a transportation system that is regionally 
accessible, and to become an eastern anchor and gateway to Portland’s central city. 
Construction on the arena  
Arena Name Moda Center 
Owner Vulcan Inc. 
Year Opened 1995 
Key Players/Organization Albina Vision Group, Portland Development 
Commission, City of Portland; Paul Allen; 
Vulcan Inc. 
TIF District N/A 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) 459,420,000  
Public Investment in Venue 59,724,600  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 13% 
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Although the Moda Center was eventually built and a quasi-entertainment district was 
created incorporating the arena with the Memorial Coliseum, the Lloyd Center, and the Oregon 
Convention Center, through the assemblage of multiple blocks of land, creating superblocks, the 
anticipated development never materialized to the city’s promises or expectations. A few 
different district plans have been proposed since the early 1990s to redevelop and transform the 
area into a gateway district for the rest of the central city, however, none of the proposed plans 
received enough political support or private capital to spur redevelopment in the area. 
The Moda Center was opened in 1995 and cost approximately $262 million to build. The 
arena construction was financed with the help from the City of Portland, private investment from 
Paul Allen, and $155 million in bonds issues by local insurance companies.  
 
4.9.2 SUBDISTRICT ANALYSIS 
Predominately stimulated by private developers and their private for-profit initiatives, 
over the last decade several plans were proposed to redevelop the Rose Quarter and the 
Northeast end of Portland. In 2009, for example, Imagine Jumptown was proposed by the Trail 
Blazers to develop a mixed-use sports and entertainment district, similar to L.A. Live. The plans 
for Jumptown included a 7,000-seat arena, a sport museum, and facilities for amateur recreation. 
Moreover, Jumptown envisioned new buildings along the Willamette River waterfront, new 
residential neighborhoods north of Broadway on the Blanchard site, the location of the aging 
Portland Public Schools headquarters, and a mix of hotel and entertainment space (Libby, 2010). 
It even divided the district into sub-districts, the location of the two arenas called “the Yard” and 
the “Jump Street” which would consist of bars, restaurants, small shops, and so on leading up to 
Broadway. Figure 35 provides an aerial rendering of the proposed Jumptown site (Libby 2010). 
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In 2012, the Rose Quarter District Plan, created by Michael McCulloch, a Portland-based 
architect, was produced for the Portland Development Commission (renamed to Prosper 
Portland) and supported by an advisory group composed of employees from Nike, Trail Blazers, 
and the like. The Rose Quarter District Plan’s overall goals were to describe a vision for the 
whole district “the District of Sport” that would combine existing sports and entertainment 
facilities with mixed-use community amenities such as innovative retail space, indoor and 
outdoor venues, housing, etc. Furthermore, the Rose Quarter District Plan sought to leverage the 
success of the sports franchises, renovate the Veteran’s Memorial Coliseum as a central focal 
point in the city, develop new connections with the Willamette River and the Lloyd District. The 
Rose Quarter District Plan eventually fell apart as Nike was unable to begin the development 
process. Figure 36 illustrates the proposed plan in the Rose Quarter District Plan. Most of these 
plans never came into fruition. McCulloch explains, “there’s been plan after plan after plan for 
the [Rose Quarter], but the problem is architects can dream up all kinds of cool stuff, and they 
can draw all kinds of cool stuff. That’s not a problem. Getting the political and economic forces 
to align, that the problem.” (McCurdy, 2017). This proved to be particularly the problem with the 
Rose Quarter District Plan, causing it to fall apart. As a result, residents have grown skeptical of 
promises for change that are often unmet. 
A fifty year vision and proposed in 2015, the Albina Community Plan, proposed in 2015, 
relies on community input and citizen participation to “acknowledge the city’s history, 
acknowledge an entire community, generations of people who have been severed from the land 
that they made their home, and an initiative that aims to thrust the city forward in a more 
equitable way” (Anderson, 04/27/2018). Albina Community Plan is unique from more tradition 
development master plans since it is developed and funded through stakeholder support. The 
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Albina Vision Trust is not an official governmental entity, but rather a non-profit organization 
formed by a group of Portland stakeholders “who act as ‘curators’ for the district by raising 
money and awareness, providing programming, and determining how land will be allocated” 
(Lynes, 2018). Albina Community Plan also underscores the grassroots strategies rather than a 
top-to-bottom development strategy in recreating the Rose Quarter.  
Portland’s arena-district micro-area is found at juncture of the Eliot/Albina 
neighborhood, the Lloyd District, and the Rose Quarter, which includes a number of 
undeveloped land tracts owned by the Trail Blazer’s owner Paul Allen, under his business 
development venture company, Vulcan. Formerly an African-American neighborhood, in the 
1950s and 1960s and the onset of the urban renewal efforts, the Rose Quarter, including the 
Albina neighborhood, was transformed. The Rose Quarter was a thriving neighborhood where 
people lived, filled with homes, churches, and small family-owned retail stores. By the 1960s, 
due to the implementation of a number of urban renewal plans, a large percentage of the private 
residences were razed. The development of the Memorial Coliseum, the I-5 corridor, the Legacy 
Emanuel Hospital, and eventually the Moda Center took precedent over the preservation of 
housing and small businesses. The intent of the Albina Community Plan is create a multi-model 
transportation corridor and to reinvigorate an area that was ridden with lower property values and 
fewer amenities due to the past practices of red-lining. The redevelopment of the Rose Quarter 
encompasses an areas bounded by the Broadway Bridge and the Blanchard school site on the 
north, the Steel Bridge on the south, and the Lloyd District to the east.  
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Figure 35. Jumptown development proposal rendering, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brian Libbey, 2010 
 
Figure 36. Rose Quarter District Plan, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Friends of the Memorial Coliseum, 2012. 
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4.9.2.1 Rose Quarter 
In 2010, the Portland Development Commission (PDC) began the process of creating a 
District Plan for the Rose Quarter to be integrated into the Central City’s 2035 planning process. 
Given the presence of the Rose Quarter and its anchored developments, the Veteran’s Memorial 
Coliseum (VMC) and the Moda Center (formerly the Rose Garden Arena), the future area 
development of the Rose Quarter is determined as a sports-focused district that combines 
existing sports and entertainment facilities with mixed-use development of office, retail, and 
housing. I-5 and the Willamette River on the west, the Oregon Convention Center on the east, 
the Blanchard development site to the north, and Sullivan’s Gulch to the south are the Rose 
Quarter District Plan’s borders. Although the Rose Quarter is located at a transportation corridor 
that has direct connections to the I-5, I-84, light rail transit, and major bus lines, the Rose Quarter 
itself is seemingly isolated. There are “boom and bust” levels of traffic in the area directly 
related to the game day and special events, yet, on non-game days, the area is uninhabited. There 
is a lack of development surrounding the Rose Quarter with little to no office or residential 
developments. Even surface parking lots and multi-story parking garages located north of the 
arena lie vacant on non-game days. 
  
There are a number of blocks surrounding the Rose Quarter that are sites for future 
development and well-connected along the transportation corridor. Development Blocks No. 1, 
as labeled in Figure 3, are large mixed-use land tracts that currently serve as surface parking lots 
or are vacant. The vacant and under-utilized lots have the potential to be converted into mixed-
use ground retail and residential developments. An example of one of the under-utilized land 
tracts for the area includes the Blanchard opportunity site located north of the Rose Garden, 
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which is currently occupied by the Portland School District headquarters. The school district 
headquarters will be relocated to an alternative site in order to upgrade the site to a more 
profitable, highest and best use. With the reconfiguration plans for the I-5, the Blanchard land 
tract will have increased transportation access and heightened redevelopment potential. The 
school site has the potential for mixed-use development and become an anchor for the 
revitalization of the Lower Albina neighborhood. Development Blocks No. 2 are the located 
along Broadway Street and are positioned to be the gateway to the Broadway Bridge. The Rose 
Quarter District Plan indicated these development blocks would be suitable for residential and 
office structures. The riverfront area just north of Sullivan’s Gulch, where the heavy 
manufacturing plant is located, are several blocks of underdeveloped land tracts. Development 
Block No. 7 offers opportunities to engage with the Willamette River such as a combination of 
recreational facilities with a combination of institutional facilities, office, hotel, and so on. 
Finally, other notable development blocks for the Rose Quarter would include Development 
Block No. 8, located adjacent to the VMC. The Rose Quarter District Plan indicated that these 
blocks would serve well as athletic, entertainment, and parking facilities that aid a broader vision 
for the Rose Quarter.  
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Figure 37. Rose Quarter district plan development blocks, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rose Quarter district plan development blocks, 2012 
 
4.9.2.2 Albina Community Plan 
The Albina Vision Trust is a new community effort to transform 94 acres within the Rose 
Quarter into a high density, mixed-use neighborhood. After several failed attempts in 
redeveloping the Rose Quarter, Albina’s Vision Trust imagines a socially diverse neighborhood 
that is affordable for all. The Albina Vision Trust is one of the latest (2017-2018) of the many 
proposed plans for the Albina neighborhood that dates back to the Portland Model Cities 
program from 1967 to 1975 (Albina Community Plan Process, 1990). Conceived by artists, 
community leaders, academics, businessmen, developers, and designers in 2015, the Albina 
Vision (2018) is a long-term plan that addresses how to redevelop the Rose Quarter. The plan 
specifically focuses on the Lower Albina area in Northeast Portland, formerly a thriving Black 
community that has transformed over the last 20 years due to gentrification, displacement, and 
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lack of affordability. Large scale projects such as the Memorial Coliseum (voter-supported) the 
I-5 freeway, and the Emanuel Hospital instigated involuntary displacement of residents and 
businesses. Lower Albina contains the last large vacant land tracts in Portland’s downtown area 
with the potential for mixed-use development. Since the City of Portland, Portland Schools, and 
the Portland TrailBlazers own the majority of the land tracts in Lower Albina, the Albina Vision 
Trust group is hopeful that these groups and organizations are encouraged to adopt some of the 
plan’s outlined policies and pushing development in the area forward. The Albina Vision Trust’s 
objective is to redevelop the available 94-acres of the city with the implementation plan of 50 
new streets, reconnecting the community with the Willamette River, in addition to promoting 
inclusionary housing and zoning.  
 
In 1990, the Portland City Planning Commission developed the Albina Community Plan 
that proposed for the redevelopment of the inner North and inner Northeast portions of Portland. 
The 1990 plan was the first plan since the Model Cities program to provide a more 
comprehensive plan for the district and address a number of different planning issues. The plan’s 
land-use objectives included the need to reconsider the zoning patterns for the Albina 
Community to create a better mixture of commercial, industrial, institutional, and residential uses 
in order to promote more job creation and provide opportunities for existing businesses to grow 
along transportation corridors near light-rail stations. Furthermore, there is a great need to 
increase home ownership, while also providing more opportunities for higher density housing 
developments (Albina Community Plan Process, 1990). Primarily designed to target land-use 
changes in high impact areas, the Albina Community Plan had a focus area of 13 
 327 
 
neighborhoods82 with boundaries, positioned from the south of Columbia Boulevard to Northeast 
Broadway, west along Chautauqua, Delaware, and Greeley, and east from 33rd Street to Prescott 
Street. Figure 38 illustrates the boundaries of the 1990 Albina Community Plan. The Moda 
Center and the Rose Quarter are located in the southern section of the Albina Community Plan 
boundaries. For the purpose of this study, I am interested in the land-use changes and 
redevelopment strategies found within the quarter-mile arena-district micro-area boundaries. The 
micro-area encompasses the Eliot neighborhood, the Convention Center Urban Renewal District, 
and portion of Sullivan’s Gulch, which falls just outside of the Albina Community boundaries.  
 
Although millions of dollars of public and private investment have been funneled into the 
Albina Community which had drastic negative impacts from urban renewal in the 1960s and 
1970s, the area continues to be impacted by disinvestment and declining property values. The 
neighborhood’s recovery has been slow due to former red-lining practices and the lack of issued 
mortgages to potential home-owners. These two instances caused a decrease in homeowners and 
instead increased rent prices, higher renter turnaround, and building vacancy. In the 1950s, it was 
determined that 60% of the housing units in the Albina neighborhood were sub-standard (Lynes, 
2018). A coalition of African-American residents requested funds to rehabilitate the 
neighborhood, however were denied and the Portland Development Commission instead 
declared the area in a stage of “advanced blight” that required urban renewal. The city of 
Portland’s urban renewal efforts subsequently impacted the integrity of well-established African-
American communities. 
                                                 
82 The 13 neighborhoods located within the Albina Community Plan are Kenton, Arbor Lodge, Overlook, Piedmont, 
Humboldt, Boise, Eliot, Woodlawn, Concordia, King, Vernon, Sabin, and Irvington. 
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The Portland Development Commission used enterprise zones in order to boost economic 
development initiatives, provide property tax incentives to encourage businesses to make capital 
investments in the area. The majority of the Albina Community Plan study area is encompassed 
by the North/Northeast Portland Enterprise Zone, which is one of 30 sites found within the state 
of Oregon’s enterprise program (Albina Community Plan Process, 1990).  
Figure 38. Albina Community Plan Area and Neighborhood Plan Boundaries, 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Albina Community Plan Process, City of Portland Bureau of Planning, May 1990 
 
4.9.3 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Table 55. Notable completed and proposed development projects in arena-district micro-
area, 1990 to present. 
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Development Name Project Cost Description 
List of Projects Planned, 2016–18 
Blanchard Site Redevelopment 
(Portland Public School District) 
N/A 
• The Portland Public Schools’ Blanchard site and three adjacent parcels are located near 
the Rose Quarter in North Portland. 
• Given the potential of land assembly with the adjacent parcels and the location of the 
Blanchard site near the city’s core, makes the redevelopment of the parcel highly 
desirable to change the parcel’s zoning to its highest and best use.  
• Due to the location of the site, the Blanchard site will yield high-assessed values with 
zoning alterations. 
• Currently, the site’s land values are lower than that of the city’s downtown core and the 
office and residential developments located across the river, however, with similar 
locational advantages, the site’s assessed values will increase after the site’s 
redevelopment. 
• The site houses the Blanchard Education Service Center (BESC), which occupies over 8 
acres of administrative offices, kitchen, food services, warehouses, distribution services, 
and maintenance functions. 
Veterans Memorial Coliseum $30,000,000 
• In 2016, Capstone Partners announced new vision for the renovation of Veteran’s 
Memorial Coliseum that would require $100 million in public money. 
• The plan would transform the coliseum into a music venue along with adjacent mixed-
use development and surface parking lots. 
• Multiple plans have been proposed over the years to redevelop the Rose Quarter, yet 
Portland mayors were unsuccessful on delivering on redevelopment promises. 
• Some plans proposed the demolition of the Coliseum to build a new baseball stadium, 
while others sought the renovation of the Coliseum partially paid by the city and that of 
the junior hockey team. 
• The Veterans Coliseum was built in 1960 and is a 12,000-seat arena that hosts the WHL 
Winterhawks (Junior Ice Hockey) and was the former home of the Portland Trailblazers 
(NBA). 
• The arena is listed on the National Register of Historic Places and the oldest structure 
located in the Rose Quarter.  
Oregon Convention Center 
Renovation Project 
$27,000,000 
• The OCC  is owned by the Metro and managed by the Metro Exposition and Recreation 
Commission. 
• The renovation of the Oregon Convention Center (OCC) began in 2018 and is projected 
to open in 2020 along with the Hyatt Regency Portland. The renovations include the 
reconstruction of the front plaza, the TriMET light rail, and hotel.  
 330 
 
4.9.4 DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
In conjunction with the support from the Portland Development Commission, the purpose 
of the 1988 Convention Center Urban Renewal Plan was to implement different types of 
activities that would eliminate existing blight, stimulate redevelopment of underutilized land, and 
engage in developing the designated area into a tourist living, shopping, and working type of 
environment (Portland City Council, 1989). 
Section 100 of the Convention Center Urban Renewal Report found that of the 538 acres 
located within the convention center’s urban renewal boundaries, 45% of the total area was 
devoted to arterial streets and interstates. An additional 4% of the land area was dedicated 
railroad property. Only 3% of the entire urban renewal area was vacant property that would serve 
as potential lots for new development initiatives. Furthermore, of the 427 existing buildings in 
the urban renewal area, which extends further than the quarter-mile radius for the arena-district 
micro-area, 71% of the buildings were designated as requiring “substantial rehabilitation and 
improved maintenance” (Portland City Council, 1989, p. 7) while 3% of the buildings were 
designated as extending beyond the possibilities of being economically viable for rehabilitation. 
With the use of tax abatements, the Convention Center Urban Renewal Plan encourages 
residential development in the Convention Center area through $3 million made available to fund 
low interest loans and other financial incentives to spur new housing development. The area is 
already zoned for medium and high-density apartment complexes adjacent to zoned commercial 
centers which would allow for continued multi-family uses and provide more opportunities for 
those interested in living and working in mixed-use development areas.  
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4.9.4.1 Land-Use Composition 
 Overall, the land-use composition in the Moda Center’s arena-district micro-area stayed 
stagnant over the last 25-years with limited new construction and increases across the different 
land-uses. This was simply because the different proposed arena district development plans 
lacked the financial support and political backing to spur any new types of larger residential 
projects. Furthermore, the Albina Community, located north of the Moda Center disintegrated as 
the predominantly minority area was severed through drastic urban renewal practices. Religious 
institutions are the remains of a once prominent and thriving neighborhood. As demonstrated in 
Figure 39 and Table 57, vacant parcels made up most of the land-use composition within the 
arena-district micro-area with a concentration of 30%. Commercial parcels made up 
approximately 20% of the land-uses between 1990 and 2015, with slight increases in office 
development. Exempt properties and industrial properties each composed approximately 9 to 
12% of the land-uses in the arena-district micro-area, particularly because of the large land tracts 
found along the waterfront that were part of grainer refineries and other railroad uses. 
The Rose Quarter is limited in its residential development availability and lacks any 
larger condominium complex as most of the buildings in the downtown area are built to low-
scale. The overall rate of change was less than one percentage point. Of the available residential 
properties, most of the locations are small-scale residential townhomes that were converted from 
industrial lofts, or were single-family dwellings strewn throughout the city. Commercial 
properties stayed relatively the same, with a slight increase in the office presence by a 
compounding rate of 4% as office space was integrated in the Rose Quarter’s development, 
which also included adding a hotel adjacent to the restaurants and team stores that encompass the 
area adjacent to the entrance to the arena. Parking structures and parking surface lots also 
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remained stagnant, as most of the parking is owned by the Portland School District. The school 
district’s plot of land has remained in question for the last several years as it is positioned in a 
prime location in which the property values will increase exponentially once the land is 
redetermined for its highest and best uses. 
Despite the number of different comprehensive plans that have been proposed for the 
redevelopment of the area surrounding the Moda Center and the Rose Quarter, beginning with 
the Oregon Convention Center Urban Renewal Plan in 1989 to the Rose Quarter Urban Design 
Plan in the mid-2000s, and the recently proposed Albina Community Plan in 2016, the arena-
district micro-area continues to be surrounded by vacant parcels and surface parking lots. The 
assemblage of the land parcels owned by the Portland School District north of the Moda Center 
provides some insight as a new potential development site, however, the remaining land parcels 
have remained untouched without any indication of land assemblage or progress for new 
development. 
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Figure 39. Percentage of land-use composition in the Portland arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
 
 
 
4.9.4.2 Built Volume 
 
Table 57 illustrated limited change in the land-use composition within the Rose Quarter 
arena-district micro-area from 1990 to 2015. The percentage concentration across the different 
land-use types remained largely the same over the 25-year period. Similarly, there were limited 
changes in the arena-district micro-area’s built volume from 1990-2015 which indicates that there 
was limited new construction or renovation to the existing buildings in the area. The Oregon 
Convention Center Urban Renewal Plan indicated that in the early 1990s, there were 
approximately 429 existing buildings found within the   plan’s boundaries. While the arena-district 
micro-area contains a smaller land concentration within the urban renewal area boundaries, it is 
clear that the buildings that had been designated as blighted and deemed as being not economically 
viable for rehabilitation has neither been rehabilitated nor demolished. Over the 25-year period, 
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little changes have been made to the arena-district micro-area regarding the changes in built 
volume, which indicates that there was little incentive to invest in the area surrounding the Moda 
Center. Table 58 provides the raw numbers for the recorded built volume in the arena-district 
micro-area from 1990-2015. Industrial warehousing and heavy industry, including the grain silo 
along the waterfront composed approximately 20% of the arena-district micro-area’s built volume.  
There are several parking garages that serve the Convention Center, the Moda Center, and 
Memorial Coliseum with 350,000 square feet of decked parking, which does not include the 
availability of surface parking lots. Although commercial parcels had a compounding rate of 
change of 3% from 1990 to 2015, office development increased by  8,000 square feet from between 
2000 and 2005, contributing to the 16% compounding rate of change from 1990-2015.
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Table 56. City of Portland arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
LAND 
USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 12 16.44 11 12.94 10 11.63 10 11.63 8 9.52 10 11.90 (0.73) 
RENTER-OCCUPIED 5 41.67 7 63.64 6 60.00 6 60.00 3 37.50 5 50.00 - 
OWNER-OCCUPIED 7 58.33 4 36.36 4 40.00 4 66.67 5 62.50 5 50.00 (1.34) 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 18 24.66 21 24.71 19 22.09 19 22.09 18 21.43 19 22.62 0.22 
OFFICE 2 11.11 2 9.52 4 21.05 4 21.05 4 22.22 5 26.32 3.73 
RETAIL 6 33.33 3 14.29 3 15.79 3 15.79 3 16.67 3 15.79 (2.73) 
RESTAURANT 1 5.56 1 4.76 - - - - - - - - (100.00) 
HOTEL 5 27.78 3 14.29 3 15.79 3 15.79 3 16.67 3 15.79 (2.02) 
INDUSTRIAL 9 12.33 8 9.41 8 9.30 8 9.30 8 9.52 7 8.33 (1.00) 
EXEMPT 8 10.96 10 11.76 10 11.63 10 11.63 10 11.90 10 11.90 0.90 
PARKING - - 8 9.41 8 9.30 8 9.30 9 10.71 8 9.52 - 
VACANT 25 34.25 26 30.59 30 34.88 30 34.88 30 35.71 29 34.52 0.60 
MIXED-USE 1 1.37 1 1.18 1 1.16 1 1.16 1 1.19 1 1.19 - 
TOTAL 73 100.00 85 100.00 86 100.00 86 100.00 84 100.00 84 90.48 0.56 
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Table 57. City of Portland arena-district micro-area built volume count, 1990-2015.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % Change 
RESIDENTIAL 352,772 43.33 416,451 27.77 415,027 36.29 415,027 27.94 325,941 23.34 374,292 23.03 0.24 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
340,018 96 410,624 98.60 406,552 97.96 406,552 97.96 317,466 97.40 365,817 97.74 0.29 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
12,754 4 5,827 1.40 8,475 2.04 8,475 2.04 8,475 2.60 8,475 2.26 (1.62) 
TOTAL 
CONDOS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 243,452 29.90 280,572 18.71 272,956 23.87 272,956 18.37 272,956 19.55 458,606 28.21 2.57 
OFFICE 5,486 2.25 5,220 1.86 13,206 4.84 13,206 4.84 13,206 4.84 256,976 56.03 16.63 
RETAIL 46,250 19.00 16,250 5.79 16,250 5.95 16,250 5.95 16,250 5.95 16,250 3.54 (4.10) 
RESTAURANT 4,720 1.94 4,720 1.68 - - - - - - - - (100.00) 
HOTEL 161,522 66.35 168,312 59.99 168,312 61.66 168,312 61.66 168,312 61.66 168,312 36.70 0.16 
INDUSTRIAL 159,837 19.63 453,738 30.25 453,738 39.68 453,738 30.54 453,738 32.49 448,738 27.61 4.22 
EXEMPT 58,120 7.14 - - - - - - - - - - (100.00) 
PARKING - - 347,263 23.15 - - 342,000 23.02 342,000 24.49 342,000 21.04 - 
VACANT - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MIXED-USE - - 1,808 0.12 1,808 0.16 1,808 0.12 1,808 0.13 1,808 0.11 - 
TOTAL 814,181 100.00 1,499,832 100.00 1,143,529 100.00 1,485,529 100.00 1,396,443 100.00 1,625,444 100.00 2.80 
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4.9.4.3 Assessed Value 
The arena-district micro-area had an overall decrease in the compounding rate of change 
of 1% in assessed value between 1990 and 2015 as demonstrated in Figure 40. The total assessed 
value in the micro-area decreased by approximately $40 million between 1990 and 1995, 
although there was an increase of 500,000 square feet of built volume during those 5-years. The 
market value between 1990-1995 illustrated a gain of approximately $40 million dollars. The 
decreased in assessed value is an indication that there was a shift in land-use type in which the 
assessment ratio decreased the property’s value for tax purposes while the market value 
experienced increases. Since 1995, the assessment values slowly increased illustrating changes 
of approximately 2% in assessed values from 1995-2000, 2000-2005, and 2005-2010, 
respectively. Between 2010-2015, the compounding rate of change in assessed value surpassed 
the compounding rate of change of the city. Since there were no large changes in built volume 
between 2010 and 2015 and shifts in land-use type, it is possible that the market value of the 
vacant properties increased exponentially with the potential for large area development due to 
the ongoing discussions focused in the Albina Community Plan. 
 Between 2005 and 2010, the assessed values in the micro-area increased by $2 million 
and then from 2010-2015, the total assessed value in the area increased by $20 million, 
demonstrating compounding rate of change of 4% compared to the city’s slight decrease in 
compounding rate of change in assessed value. The City of Portland’s assessed values were 
stagnant with 2% gains every five years between 1995 and 2010.  
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Figure 40. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area 
(Rose Garden) vs. city of Portland, 1990-2015. 
 
4.9.4.4 Property Tax 
 Between 1990 and 2015, the compounding rate of change in property tax values for the 
arena-district micro-area was a decrease less than 1%, while the city had a compounding rate of 
change in property tax value of 2% demonstrated in Table 59. Both the micro-area and the city 
has decreases in total property tax values between 1990 and 1995 because of the tax law changes 
in the City of Portland. In 1995, it was amended that property tax was too high, and the 
percentage that each parcel is tax would be reduced to relieve owners of residential properties. 
The micro-area experienced more substantial increases in the compounding rate of change in 
property tax values between 2000 and 2015 as the market land value for the vacant properties 
increased substantially. The city’s accumulated property taxes remained constant after the 
changes in the property tax law.  
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Figure 41. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area 
(Rose Garden) vs. city of Portland, 1990-2015. 
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Table 58. City of Portland’s (Rose Garden) arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 
1990-2015. 
  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
ROSE GARDEN ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 1,831,528 2,449,265 2,436,938 2,433,438 2,192,413 2,646,891 1.48 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) 814,181 1,499,832 1,485,542 1,396,443 1,396,443 1,625,444 2.80 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 62,806,730 52,922,843 58,113,750 56,599,000 64,342,860 91,496,570 1.52 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 120,382,852 84,355,281 79,723,576 70,514,846 71,959,307 91,496,570 (1.09) 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 12,672,000 35,854,723 - - - - (100.00) 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
50,134,730 68,893,270 - - - - (100.00) 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 62,806,730 104,747,993 171,560,140 231,417,850 233,054,090 288,127,350 6.28 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 120,382,852 166,960,917 235,355,453 288,315,943 260,641,365 288,127,350 3.55 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE 12,672,700 35,854,723 63,560,540 88,583,270 113,636,230 147,753,730 10.32 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING 
VALUE + IMPROVEMENTS 
50,134,730 68,893,270 107,999,600 142,834,580 119,417,860 140,373,620 4.20 
TOTAL TAX 1,192,394 1,640,608 1,217,483 1,123,009 1,206,416 1,920,206 1.92 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 2,285,484 2,615,014 1,670,209 1,399,120 1,349,222 1,920,206 (0.69) 
CITY OF PORTLAND 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 14,730,487,995 25,038,801,518 30,195,948,585 36,126,155,540 43,786,711,136 51,321,383,398 5.12 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 28,234,206,150 39,910,084,482 41,424,430,814 45,008,397,558 48,969,868,612 51,321,383,398 2.42 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 14,730,487,995 25,038,801,518 42,945,730,222 58,806,347,394 89,022,110,363 92,618,335,901 7.63 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 28,234,206,150 39,910,084,482 58,915,268,893 73,264,908,011 99,559,910,643 92,618,335,901 4.87 
TOTAL TAX 145,100,435 161,657,188 300,432,168 321,585,788 423,295,282 479,007,449 4.89 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 278,116,760 257,670,161 412,149,051 400,653,233 473,401,948 479,007,449 2.20 
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4.9.5 KEY FINDINGS 
 The Portland arena-district micro-area illustrated relative weakness across the three 
measurements of success in land-use composition, built volume, and assessed value. Although 
the market value of the parcels increased as the area’s potential for new development increased 
with the different  development plans that had been proposed over the last 10-years, the assessed 
values remained low as the parcels were largely vacant parcels and not performing at their 
highest and best uses. While the area is certainly positioned as the next area for major 
redevelopment, which is illustrated in the increases in market value of the properties in the last 
five years, since the arena was built in 1995, little new development has materialized. The city 
has made reasonable efforts to redevelop the area with the different urban design proposals, 
however, with little private investment to support the city’s vision, no new development has 
occurred despite the immense potential for the area. It can be therefore concluded that the Moda 
Center and the adjacent entertainment properties such as Memorial Coliseum, the Convention 
Center, and the Lloyd Center did not contribute to the redevelopment of the lower-end of the 
Albina Community that still experiences the negative impacts of urban renewal. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Cities continue to use sports-anchored development strategies as a means to further the 
city’s economic development agenda to increase the city’s competitiveness, quality of life 
measures, city image, and other economic and intangible benefits. Despite the numerous 
academic studies that have refuted the claims of significant economic impacts created by sport 
facilities, public funding for major league facilities continues, new facilities continue to be built, 
and subsidy levels are increasing (Zimbalist and Long, 2006). A few examples of the newly 
proposed arena-led sport development projects include San Francisco’s Mission Rock (NBA)83, 
Long Island’s Belmont Arena (NHL)84, the Milwaukee Bucs Fiserv Arena (NBA)85, and the 
                                                 
83 San Francisco’s Mission Rock Development Project, the proposed new home for the Golden State Warrior’s in 
the new Chase Arena, is envisioned to be a 3.6 million square feet mixed-use development that will consist of both 
residential and commercial buildings in addition to 8 acres of parks and open space. The development project will 
also incentivize the rehabilitation for the Pier 48. The 28-acres of current parking and storage will be transformed 
into a new neighborhood that includes 1,500 rental apartments as well as 1.6 million square feet of commercial 
space. The infrastructure is privately funded during the development stage and will be publicly-funded through 
various financing tools (City of San Francisco, 2017).  
84 In 2015, the Governor Cuomo supported a plan to relocate the New York Islanders from the Barclays Center in 
Brooklyn back to Long Island in order to spur the local economy while  build a new arena for the New York 
Islanders on state-owned land while making improvements to Belmont Park, the historic horse-racing track. The 
New York arena partners, which includes the Scott Malkin Group, Sterling Equities, Oak View Group, and the 
Madison Square Garden Company have pledge to spend $1 billion in private funds on the new arena in addition to 
agreeing to a 49-year lease on 36-acres for $49 million (Hughes, 2018). The plan includes redeveloping 43-acres of 
land that previously served as underutilized parking spaces, 60,000 square foot arena, 435,000 square feet of retail 
space and restaurants, and a 193,000 square foot hotel. Construction is scheduled to begin in 2018 with an estimated 
timeline to completion in 2021.  
85 The Milwaukee Bucks broke ground on a new arena, the Fiserv Forum, in June 2016, and has just recently 
completed in the summer of 2018. The Bucks secured $250 million in public funding for the project and the total 
cost of the arena development accrued to $524 million (Davis, 2017). The arena is located in the center of 
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Sacramento Kings’ Golden1 Center (NBA).86 Professional sport facilities are among the most 
expensive infrastructure investments and expensive decisions city leaders can make (Mason, 
2012). Despite the economic evidence, city leaders continue to bolster sport-led development 
projects as a strategy to revitalize downtown. Indeed, given the development footprint of these 
professional sport facilities, particularly arenas predominantly located downtown, can take up a 
large development footprint and as a result, can change the land-use composition of the 
downtown area. The location of a major league venue can impact future zoning and land-use 
decisions, traffic patterns, retail presence, and so on. Furthermore, Siegfried and Zimbalist 
suggest that only a “sports arena accompanied by a year-round business district or residential 
neighborhood will attract substantial investment.” (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). 
The current academic literature suggests that the “number of unsuccessful or questionable 
stadium and arena projects outnumber the success stories where such developments are held out 
as solutions to urban issues” (Mason, 2012; p. 166). Cities are actively integrating professional 
sport venues into broader urban development agendas to support ancillary development. 
However, there are some cases in which a major league venue is intended to be part of a larger 
sport-anchored development project or grander revitalization effort, but the promised, hoped for, 
or even assumed ancillary development may fail to materialize (Mason, 2012). This research 
                                                 
downtown, and promises to generate economic development throughout the downtown by beginning with providing 
residential and retail options adjacent to the arena.  
86 Sacramento Kings owner, Vivek Ranadive played an integral part in relocating the Sacramento Kings to 
downtown and convincing the Sacramento City Council to approve public financing to build a new arena. The 
facility opened with a final cost of $558.2 million with $223 contributed by the City of Sacramento. In addition to 
the construction of a new arena, there has been significant investment in the Downtown Commons. In 2017, the 
Downtown Sacramento Partnership and the Greater Sacramento Economic Council found that with the $1 billion 
investment in the Golden1 Center and in the Downtown Commons, an addition $1 billion in urban investment has 
occurred since 2015. Downtown property sales have accrued to $885 million since the construction of the arena and 
26 new ground floor retail businesses were created in the last year (Rishe, 2018). 
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study explores an alternative way in which cities should evaluate the success of arena projects 
and their impact on urban development.  
 Mason (2012) questions whether academics are asking the right questions when it comes 
to examining professional facilities and urban development. Indeed, cities invest in professional 
sport facilities for a variety reasons – economic development, community development, city 
branding, tourism, and so on. However, in comparing the success of one city’s arena-led urban 
development strategy to another, it is important to recognize that each city has its own unique 
elements. Historical trajectory, political and economic climate, city’s demographics, and 
combination of different amenities and land-uses all play a factor in ultimately influencing the 
success and failure of a sport-led development project. The determinants of the success and 
failure of a sport-led urban development strategy and its impact on real estate prices, property 
values, intangible benefits, and so on can truly only be determined by considering the context of 
a city. Mason (2012) continues to discuss that future research should explore ways in which 
sports-related infrastructure is integrated into other development projects and plans throughout 
the city and how major league venues complement other civic amenities and ultimately fits into 
the city’s overall development strategy. In respect to Mason’s call for action in moving towards a 
broader outlook on sport-related development strategies based on city context, this research 
study has made a contribution to the research field by creating an exhaustive data record of  
parcel-level property characteristic and assessment valuations in a quarter-mile radius around 15 
major league arenas over a 25-year period. Furthermore, this study uses locational effects of a 
quarter-mile radius to determine the impact of sport-led urban development strategies on the 
changes in built area, land-use patterns, and assessed values around 15 major league arenas.  
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This research advances the sport-led development strategy discourse by analyzing the urban 
development outcomes over a 25-year period. First, as cities increasingly look to sports and 
entertainment districts as key element of their urban strategy, this research provides a better 
understanding of this trend and its impacts. Second, there is a gap in the existing literature that 
explains the rationale for public investment in major league sports facilities, and this research 
makes an important contribution by bringing the urban development perspective to bear on this 
discourse. Third, our understanding of what constitutes a “success” in sports-led development is 
largely based on informal observations. In response, this research presents an exhaustive 25-year 
data record of assessment valuations and property characteristics to measure and interpret these 
outcomes. 
 
5.1 RECAP OF DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
Data collected in constructing the city case studies presented in Chapter 4, was used to 
generate an aggregate urban development record for all parcels located within a quarter-mile of 
each city’s arena district (the “micro-area”). These standardized records were then used to 
compare the success measures across each of the five-year intervals between 1990 and 2015. 
 
In order to measure changes in land-use, assessment, market, and property tax values in 
each micro-area, identification numbers were collected for all parcels located in the quarter-mile 
radius. These parcel identifiers were then used to trace property information back to 1990. In 
many cases, parcel identifiers that were active in 2015, were not active in earlier years due to 
parcel splits and consolidations. Small parcels were consolidated into larger parcels as a result of 
land acquisition. Larger parcels were split into smaller parcels due to changes in ownership, 
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demolition of buildings, or renovations and conversions, thereby increasing the number of 
parcels listed for one property.  
 
When a recent parcel identification number could not be matched with earlier assessment 
records, legal descriptions, surveyor maps and historical deeds were examined to trace the earlier 
parcel identification numbers. The property values of the parent parcels were summed together to 
generate, for prior years, values comparable to the active parcel value in 2015. After parent 
parcels were identified and summed together to compose a total number of active parcels for 
each five-year interval, all active parcels were then summed in order to determine the total 
assessment and property tax values within the micro area. Similarly, the land use composition for 
each parcel split was documented and included in the total percentage of land use categories and 
sub-categories.  
 
5.2 RECAP OF CASE SUMMARY FINDINGS 
Based on the 15-city case summaries, eight of 15 arena-district micro-areas87 had 
successful urban development outcomes in the arena-district micro-areas based on the four 
success measures: the change in land-use diversity, the increase in built volume, the increase in 
assessed value, and the increase in property tax values. Seven of the 15 arena-district micro-
areas88 were unsuccessful in at least one of the success measures. These arena-district micro-
areas were typically unsuccessful because the land-use composition was largely concentrated 
                                                 
87 The eight cities that were reported as successful arena-district micro-areas include Boston, Cleveland, Tampa, 
Dallas, Nashville, Miami, Phoenix, and Denver. 
88 The seven cities reports to be unsuccessful in at least one of the four success measurements include Houston, 
Memphis, Oklahoma City, Buffalo, Portland, St. Paul, Glendale.  
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with parcels that were operating at less than their highest and best uses. Those micro-areas with 
more than 30% vacant parcels and  
The success of these cities was attributed to increases in residential and commercial 
development (e.g. office, retail, restaurant, and hotel) along with decreases in industrial and 
vacant parcels. Examples of arena-district micro-areas that produced a compounding rate of 
change that was higher than the average in residential development included Cleveland, Dallas, 
Denver, Nashville, and Tampay. Increases in the parking category was deemed as a successful 
shift in land-use if the parcel transitioned from a vacant parcel or surface parking lot to a parking 
garage. Unless listed as an exempt property, parking garages will typically yield higher assessed 
values and property taxes compared to surfacing parking lots. Parking parcels are accounted as a 
successful measure if it has a built volume count, as these structures are more likely to be an 
income-generating structure. St. Paul, Dallas, Denver, and Houston had above average 
compounding rates of change in parking structures. Furthermore, arena-district micro-areas yield 
a successful measure in land-use composition when the industrial count decreases. The arena-
district micro-areas in Tampa, Phoenix, Nashville, Oklahoma City, Memphis, Houston, Boston, 
and Denver produced higher compounding rates of change in the decrease in industrial use 
parcels, which suggests that the land-use composition shifted from a heavily industrial 
concentrated downtown area to one that is more integrated with land-uses that are more relevant 
for today. Professional sport facilities tend to be located in low-income areas with a high 
percentage of the resident population living below the poverty line (Huang & Humphreys, 2014) 
or in old heavily industrialized warehousing districts. The shift in land-use composition from 
high industrial uses in the early 1990s to more mixed-use, residential, and commercial properties 
indicates that the arena-district micro-area was successful in transitioning its land-use 
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composition to its highest and best use, and yields higher property values. Arena-districts that are 
located in low-income communities were typically impacted by long-term urban renewal efforts 
during the 1960s and 1970s, which still have profound effects on urban development today. 
Boston, Portland, and Memphis are examples of some cases in which urban renewal efforts had a 
profound impact on the development trajectory of the arena-district micro-area. Entire 
communities with predominantly minority populations were razed in order to implement large-
scale infrastructure projects. In the process, the integrity of the communities were severed and 
large land tracts were left vacant. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, a high percentage of parcels 
were allocated as vacant parcels or surface parking lots that yield low property values. With the 
onset of new development, beginning in 2005, the increase in mixed-use, residential, and 
commercial development caused the compounding rates of change in assessed values to be 
higher than the rest of the city because of the substantial change in development, yet begins to 
equalize by 2015 with the compounding rate of change in city-assessed values. 
 
In sum, 50% of the case summaries in this 15-city sample study appeared to have 
successful urban development outcomes based on the three measures: land-use composition, 
built volume, and assessed value. Of these successful cases, development in the arena-district 
micro-area tended to lag. Based on the data record created at the parcel-level, uptake in 
development within the quarter-mile radius is visible approximately ten years after the opening 
of the major league arena. Since the study sample includes arenas built between 1992 and 2004, 
arenas built in the mid-1990s demonstrated more noticeable land-use changes beginning in 2005, 
while arenas built in the 2000s illustrated changes between 2010 and 2015. Within this 
development lag, residential development, particularly condominium construction, was the most 
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pronounced change that typically resulted in the increase in overall assessment values and 
property tax generation.  
5.3 LESSONS LEARNED 
All of the cities included in this studies have created an extensive planning process, influenced 
by state and federal policies, to guide the development process. City and county comprehensive 
plans are the guiding forces of urban development (Talen, 1996). Yet, there is wide variability in 
determining whether the implementation of a plan achieves definitive “successful” urban 
development outcomes. Plans contain a “set of instructions that detail both goals and the means 
for achieving those goals” (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980, p. 31), and vary by city and project 
based on scope, range, and specificity. Plans both broadly describe city and regional vision and 
policy changes, while also providing detailed action plans for CBDs and surrounding 
neighborhoods.  
 
The case summaries explored how city plans and policy decisions have influenced urban 
development outcomes in the micro-areas. In the case of major league facilities and their 
integration into the urban fabric, very few comprehensive plans in the 1980s and 1990s 
incorporated these venues as part of their overall development plans. Generally, city 
comprehensive plans address land use, physical development, and infrastructure improvement 
goals for the next five, ten, fifteen years. As the popularity of public-private partnerships 
increased in the 1990s, cities assumed greater responsibility in financially supporting the 
attraction and retention of professional sports teams; this was achieved either through the 
construction or renovation of new and existing sports facilities. As a result, major league venues 
have been included in city comprehensive plans and redevelopment strategies.  
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As public sector, private developers, and team owners partnerships have strengthened, request 
for proposals (RFPs) have come to include not only development and financing strategies for the 
facility itself, but also development strategies that will help reinvigorate future development of 
the surrounding infrastructure located in surrounding neighborhoods. 
 
From this research study, it is clear that the three metrics (land-use composition, built volume, 
and assessed value) are interrelated and build upon one another to provide one key measurement of arena-
led development outcomes. Across all 15 cases, there were significant development lags since the opening 
of the major league venues, which demonstrates that the arena may not have had a direct impact on the 
development outcomes. As there is a ten to 15 year development lag since the opening of the arena, it can 
be concluded that professional sports facilities may not have the direct impact on urban redevelopment as 
city officials and proponents of arena-led developments have promised. In summary, there might be an 
inflation of the sports facility’s capability and presence in downtown urban redevelopment strategies. 
Finally, in cities where there was a presence of a single large landholder or private investor, (e.g. Perot’s 
investment in Dallas’ Victory Park and Vinik’s investment in Water Street Tampa) development 
surrounding profession sport facilities was intentional and therefore illustrates greater changes in land-use 
composition, particularly in residential development. In this case, the success of arena-district micro-areas 
and the use of arena-led development strategies may be contingent on intentional private investment 
rather relying solely on the use of the public sector and the development of comprehensive plans. This 
analysis may provide a different perspective on the future of planning in which there a direct conflict in 
how our future cities are further developed. Is the success of downtown redevelopment surrounding 
professional sport facilities contingent on private investment and if so, how will private investors impact 
the future of city planning? 
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I believe the next steps in this research agenda is too compare all 25 cities and their arenas built 
between 1990 and 2004 to provide a larger sampling size. For the purpose of the dissertation, I 
focused on 9 case summaries while collecting data for 15 cities and their arena-district micro-
areas. The remaining 10 arena-district micro-area case summaries will provide further insight on 
arena-led development strategies and their relative success in downtown revitalization. 
Furthermore, by including more case summaries, I envision that the next step in this research 
would be to run a cross-sectional time-series analysis. This study would add to the research by 
exploring the spatial effects of venues on development and on whether the presence of a 
professional sport facility enables these local areas to develop or redevelop faster in comparison 
with the city overall, and fulfill city redevelopment agendas. The regression analysis would be 
used to determine  
(a) whether the presence of the arena had an impact on the growth rates for the micro area 
compared to the city as a whole.  
(b) whether the micro areas had a different growth rate in market, assessment, and property 
tax values compared to the city. 
The cross-sectional regression model would determine if it is possible to produce a quantitative 
estimate of the impact of opening of an arena on assessment, market, and property tax values and 
provide another element in analyzing whether arena-led development strategies are good 
development tools for downtown revitalization. Another extension to the present study would be 
to collect data on a control group of cities that did not have a new arena. One difficulty in such a 
study would be to decide what the reference micro-area would be, since here it is defined by the 
presence of an arena. One approach would be to identify characteristics of the micro-areas in this 
study before the arena was built, and then match them in the control group of cities to generate 
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comparable micro-areas. The benefit of such a study is that it would facilitate a difference-in-
difference analysis, so not just to measure the change in value of cities that built an arena, but 
also the difference between this change and the change in value of cities that did not build an 
arena. 
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL CASE SUMMARIES 
A.1 MIAMI: AMERICAN AIRLINES ARENA 
Table 59. American Airlines Arena Rapid Notes  
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005. 
A.1.1 Land-Use Composition 
Figure 42. Percentage of land-use composition in the Miami arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
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Percentage of land-use composition in Miami arena-district micro-area, 1990-2015
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Exempt
Parking
Vacant
Mixed-Use
Arena Name American Airlines Arena 
Owner City of Miami 
Year Opened 1995 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $ 403,560,000 
Public Investment in Venue $ 64,569,600 
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 16% 
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Table 60. City of Miami arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-20
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - - - - - - - 6 9.52 3 4.69 - 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 1,225 100.00 1,225 100.00 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - 1,225 - 1,225 - - 
COMMERCIAL 12 23.08 9 17.65 8 14.29 6 10.91 8 12.70 8 12.50 (1.61) 
OFFICE 2 16.67 1 11.11 1 12.50 2 33.33 35 49.30 35 49.30 12.13 
RETAIL 3 25.00 4 44.44 3 37.50 2 33.33 33 46.48 33 46.48 10.07 
RESTAURANT 1 8.33 - 0.00 - - - - 1 1.41 1 1.41 - 
HOTEL 2 16.67 1 11.11 1 12.50 1 16.67 1 1.41 1 1.41 (2.73) 
INDUSTRIAL 4 7.69 4 7.84 4 7.14 4 7.27 1 1.59 - 0.00 (100.00) 
EXEMPT 11 21.15 11 21.57 16 28.57 26 47.27 29 46.03 33 51.56 4.49 
PARKING 19 36.54 18 35.29 19 33.93 12 21.82 11 17.46 10 15.63 - 
VACANT 6 11.54 9 17.65 9 16.07 7 12.73 7 11.11 9 14.06 1.64 
MIXED-USE 1 1.92 - - - - - - 1 1.59 1 1.56 - 
TOTAL 52 100.00 51 100.00 56 100.00 55 100.00 63 100.00 64 100.00 0.83 
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Table 61. City of Miami arena-district micro-area built volume count, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % Change 
RESIDENTIAL - - - - - - - - 1,550,760 44.21 1,587,774 29.20 - 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 1,550,760 100.00 1,587,774 100.00 - 
TOTAL 
CONDOS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 66,125 18.49 625,816 54.95 598,829 53.03 569,673 31.37 617,730 17.61 925,432 17.02 11.13 
OFFICE - - - - 82,948 13.85 91,781 16.11 71,885 11.64 73,409 7.93 - 
RETAIL - - - - 349,805 58.41 343,153 60.24 356,966 57.79 399,265 43.14 - 
RESTAURANT - - - - - - - - 54,140 8.76 54,140 5.85 - 
HOTEL - - - - 127,739 21.33 127,739 22.42 127,739 20.68 127,739 13.80 - 
INDUSTRIAL - - 52,941 4.65 52,941 4.69 55,538 3.06 4,819 0.14 - - - 
EXEMPT 10,983 3.07 190,539 16.73 207,938 18.41 907,741 49.98 1,026,246 29.26 3,016,000 55.46 25.18 
PARKING 280,562 78.44 269,580 23.67 269,580 23.87 269,579 14.84 269,579 7.69 - - - 
VACANT - - - - - - 13,500 0.74 - - - - - 
MIXED-USE - - - - - - - - 38,700 1.10 38,700 0.71 - 
TOTAL 357,670 100.00 1,138,876 100.00 1,129,288 100.00 1,816,031 100.00 3,507,834 100.00 5,438,459 102.38 11.50 
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A.1.2 Assessed Value 
Figure 43. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Miami, 1990-2015 
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A.1.3 Property Tax  
Figure 44. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Miami, 1990-2015. 
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Table 62. City of Miami arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
AMERICAN AIRLINES ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 4,992,753 5,093,481 5,016,379 5,009,857 6,047,884 7,206,201 1.48 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) 357,670 1,138,876 1,129,288 1,816,031 3,507,834 5,541,844 11.59 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 405,374,895 629,009,994 759,868,047 870,525,349 1,324,753,556 1,547,566,286 5.50 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 777,239,854 1,036,742,805 1,111,359,096 1,099,554,610 1,457,530,610 1,547,566,286 2.79 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 240,684,770 203,706,360 211,484,130 294,657,331 268,633,815 561,940,113 3.45 
ASSESSED BUILDING + IMPROVEMENTS 22,720,300 36,150,089 149,836,764 185,852,849 187,606,820 202,777,309 9.15 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 405,374,895 629,009,994 151,414,985 870,525,349 1,325,449,560 1,850,618,345 6.26 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 777,239,854 1,036,742,805 221,454,793 1,099,554,610 1,458,296,373 1,850,618,345 3.53 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE 240,684,770 203,706,360 211,484,130 294,657,331 268,633,815 561,940,113 3.45 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
22,720,300 36,150,089 149,836,764 185,852,849 187,606,820 202,777,309 9.15 
TOTAL TAX 3,656,978 2,796,860 4,222,055 5,667,446 16,192,455 19,664,168 6.96 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 7,011,655 4,609,823 6,175,045 7,158,512 17,815,388 19,664,168 4.21 
CITY OF MIAMI 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 11,515,111,000 11,497,352,000 14,135,578,666 21,929,702,057 36,949,521,366 39,903,058,628 5.10 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 22,078,336,145 18,950,091,541 20,674,252,566 27,699,256,558 40,652,888,363 39,903,058,628 2.40 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 11,515,111,000 15,339,834,878 18,857,553,034 32,133,104,422 52,146,883,603 54,280,943,197 6.40 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 22,078,336,145 25,283,323,948 27,580,463,695 40,587,104,242 57,373,447,862 54,280,943,197 3.66 
TOTAL TAX 98,366,000 99,178,000 120,426,167 208,091,814 264,548,387 269,303,313 4.11 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 188,600,667 163,466,525 176,131,523 262,839,346 291,063,474 269,303,313 1.44 
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A.2 OKLAHOMA CITY: CHESAPEAKE ARENA  
Table 63. Chesapeake Energy Arena Rapid Notes  
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005. 
 
A.2.1 Land-Use Composition 
Figure 45. Percentage of land-use composition in the Oklahoma City arena-district micro-
area, 1990-2015. 
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Percentage of land-use composition in Oklahoma City arena-district micro-area, 1990-2015
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Exempt
Parking
Vacant
Mixed-Use
Arena Name Chesapeake Energy Arena 
Owner Oklahoma City 
Year Opened 1995 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $ 271,320,000  
Public Investment in Venue $ 271,320,000  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 100% 
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Table 64. Oklahoma City arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RENTER-OCCUPIED - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OWNER-OCCUPIED - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 7 11.86 9 14.75 9 15.52 21 33.33 22 33.33 26 40.00 5.39 
OFFICE 4 57.14 5 55.56 4 44.44 4 19.05 5 22.73 6 23.08 1.64 
RETAIL 1 14.29 1 11.11 1 11.11 4 19.05 4 18.18 4 15.38 5.70 
RESTAURANT - - - - 2 22.22 7 33.33 6 27.27 8 30.77 - 
HOTEL 2 28.57 2 22.22 2 22.22 3 14.29 3 13.64 2 7.69 - 
INDUSTRIAL 23 38.98 23 37.70 23 39.66 13 20.63 12 18.18 8 12.31 (4.14) 
EXEMPT 12 20.34 12 19.67 12 20.69 11 17.46 12 18.18 15 23.08 0.90 
PARKING 10 16.95 8 13.11 6 10.34 8 12.70 10 15.15 8 12.31 (0.89) 
VACANT 7 11.86 7 11.48 7 12.07 8 12.70 6 9.09 4 6.15 (2.21) 
MIXED-USE 3 5.08 2 3.28 1 1.72 2 3.17 4 6.06 4 6.15 1.16 
TOTAL 59 100.00 61 100.00 58 100.00 63 100.00 66 100.00 65 100.00 0.39 
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A.2.2. Built Volume  
Table 65. Oklahoma City arena-district micro-area built volume, 1990-2015.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 754,296 15.30 949,998 19.06 1,221,176 55.01 1,583,997 65.63 1,816,123 72.52 4,423,833 78.46 7.33 
OFFICE 380,920 50.50 576,622 60.70 567,822 46.50 593,822 37.49 601,582 33.12 648,753 14.66 2.15 
RETAIL - - - - 84,035 6.88 130,812 8.26 374,341 20.61 56,487 1.28 - 
RESTAURANT - - - - 15,486 1.27 101,637 6.42 84,674 4.66 159,780 3.61 - 
HOTEL 373,376 49.50 373,376 39.30 553,833 45.35 657,695 41.52 657,695 36.21 547,155 12.37 1.54 
INDUSTRIAL 625,531 12.69 611,681 12.28 979,179 44.11 555,097 23.00 339,903 13.57 247,473 4.39 (3.64) 
EXEMPT 2,790,096 56.60 2,790,096 55.99 - - - - 59,666 2.38 68,892 1.22 (13.76) 
PARKING 279,967 5.68 - - - - 207,158 8.58 170,658 6.81 255,500 4.53 (0.37) 
VACANT 480,021 9.74 564,286 11.32 - - 2,550 0.11 - - - - (100.00) 
MIXED-USE 90,480 1.84 67,080 1.35 19,422 0.87 64,680 2.68 117,865 4.71 642,481 11.40 8.16 
TOTAL 4,929,911 100.00 4,983,141 100.00 2,219,777 100.00 2,413,482 100.00 2,504,215 100.00 5,638,179 100.00 0.54 
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A.2.3. Assessed Value 
Figure 46. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
Oklahoma City, 1990-2015. 
 
Figure 47. Compounding rate of change in market values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
Oklahoma City, 1990-2015 
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A.2.4 Property Tax 
Figure 48. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
Oklahoma City, 1990-2015.  
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Table 66. Oklahoma City’s arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY ARENA ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 5,403,075 6,104,641 5,203,612 6,761,557 6,241,612 6,576,907 0.79 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) 4,972,791 4,983,141 2,330,503 2,413,482 2,504,215 5,638,179 0.50 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 499,611 5,449,428 10,855,781 10,968,611 18,787,816 75,280,561 22.21 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 926,334 8,701,486 15,330,898 13,781,940 20,612,637 75,280,561 19.23 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE - - - - - - - 
ASSESSED BUILDING + IMPROVEMENTS - - - - - - - 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 4,501,005 35,031,205 94,788,443 146,387,810 180,260,648 669,260,401 22.15 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 8,345,366 55,936,794 133,863,418 183,934,684 197,768,985 669,260,401 19.17 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE 876,686 7,621,500 14,047,140 21,449,916 26,340,456 59,283,891 18.36 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
3,659,268 41,910,155 80,741,303 112,517,894 153,920,192 669,260,401 23.17 
TOTAL TAX 46,788 539,548 1,103,599 1,194,482 2,148,011 8,619,624 23.20 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 86,750 861,534 1,558,539 1,500,853 2,356,643 8,619,624 20.20 
OKLAHOMA CITY 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 1,852,037,000 1,800,145,000 2,332,299,000 3,148,044,000 4,516,446,000 5,134,971,000 4.16 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 3,433,883,351 2,874,418,397 3,293,750,857 3,955,482,904 4,955,118,876 5,134,971,000 1.62 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 15,515,601,000 15,133,753,000 19,708,011,000 25,936,521,000 38,143,742,000 43,956,071,000 4.25 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 28,767,656,342 24,165,130,053 27,832,314,002 32,588,955,366 41,848,563,222 43,956,071,000 1.71 
TOTAL TAX 24,923,000 27,717,000 34,805,000 45,780,000 64,343,000 79,371,000 4.74 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 46,210,024 44,257,687 49,152,788 57,522,070 70,592,500 79,371,000 2.19 
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A.3 BUFFALO: KEY BANK ARENA 
Table 67. Key Bank Arena Rapid Notes. 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005. 
 
A.3.1 Land-Use Composition 
Figure 49. Percentage of land-use composition in the Buffalo arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
 
 
Arena Name Key Bank Arena 
Owner City of Buffalo 
Year Opened 1996 
Key Players/Organization  
TIF District  
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $ 217,740,000  
Public Investment in Venue $ 95,805,600  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 44% 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
la
n
d
 u
se
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 (
%
)
Percentage of land-use composition in the Buffalo arena-district micro-area, 1990-2015
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Exempt
Parking
Vacant
 391 
Table 68. Buffalo arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - 1 3.45 1 3.70 1 3.70 3 7.32 4 8.51 - 
RENTER-OCCUPIED - - 1.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 1.00 33.33 1.00 25.00 - 
OWNER-OCCUPIED - - - - - - - - 2.00 66.67 3.00 75.00 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 3 10.34 4 13.79 4 14.81 4 14.81 6 14.63 7 14.89 3.45 
OFFICE 1 33.33 1 25.00 1 25.00 1 25.00 3 50.00 4 57.14 5.70 
RETAIL - - - 0.00 - - - - - - - - - 
RESTAURANT 1 33.33 1 25.00 1 25.00 1 25.00 1 16.67 1 14.29 - 
HOTEL - - - - - - - - - - 1 14.29 - 
INDUSTRIAL 16 55.17 16 55.17 14 51.85 14 51.85 12 29.27 12 25.53 (1.14) 
EXEMPT 1 3.45 - - - - - - 8 19.51 10 21.28 9.65 
PARKING 2 6.90 2 6.90 2 7.41 2 7.41 3 7.32 4 8.51 2.81 
VACANT 7 24.14 6 20.69 6 22.22 6 22.22 9 21.95 10 21.28 1.44 
MIXED-USE              
TOTAL 29 100.00 29 100.00 27 100.00 27 100.00 41 100.00 47 100.00 1.95 
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A.3.2 Built Volume 
Table 69. Buffalo arena-district micro-area built volume, 1990-2015.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - 2,550 0.08 2,550 0.08 2,550 0.08 85,579 0.57 246,879 1.61 - 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - 2,550 100.00 2,550 100.00 2,550 100.00 2,550 2.98 2,550 1.03 - 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 83,029 97.02 244,329 98.97 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 315,546 9.96 315,546 9.96 315,546 10.08 315,546 10.08 350,106 2.34 735,107 4.80 3.44 
OFFICE 306,746 97.21 306,746 97.21 306,746 97.21 306,746 97.21 341,306 97.49 570,319 77.58 2.51 
RETAIL - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RESTAURANT 8,200 2.60 8,200 2.60 8,200 2.60 8,200 2.60 8,200 2.34 8,200 1.12 - 
HOTEL - - - - - - - - - - 155,988 21.22 - 
INDUSTRIAL 2,757,809 87.03 2,757,809 87.03 2,718,269 86.87 2,718,269 86.87 2,657,500 17.74 2,657,500 17.37 (0.15) 
EXEMPT - - - - - - - - 11,670,297 77.91 11,571,228 75.61 - 
PARKING 92,778 2.93 92,778 2.93 92,778 2.96 92,778 2.96 - - - - (100.00) 
VACANT 2,550 0.08 - - - - - - 215,329.00 1.44 92,778.00 0.61 15.46 
MIXED-USE             - 
TOTAL 3,168,683 100.00 3,168,683 100.00 3,129,143 100.00 3,129,143 100.00 14,978,811 100.00 15,303,492 100.00 6.50 
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A.3.3 Assessed Value 
Figure 50. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Buffalo, 1990-2015.  
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A.3.4 Property Taxes 
Figure 51. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Buffalo, 1990-2015. 
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Table 70. City of Buffalo’s arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
KEYBANK ARENA (CANALSIDE) ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 5,173,646 5,173,646 5,173,646 5,173,646 5,173,646 5,173,646 - 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) 15,303,492 15,303,492 15,303,492 15,303,492 15,303,492 15,303,492 - 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 25,803,080 24,270,290 14,072,540 180,742,200 211,313,440 349,248,640 10.98 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
48,105,391 38,897,419 20,030,938 221,472,285 228,743,437 349,248,640 8.25 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 2,575,270 5,087,410 4,930,510 7,373,570 24,502,170 30,055,770 10.33 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
- - - - - - - 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 35,837,611 33,708,736 19,545,194 181,932,100 211,313,440 402,639,795 10.16 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
66,813,043 54,024,193 27,820,748 222,930,328 228,743,437 402,639,795 7.45 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE       
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING VALUE + IMPROVEMENTS      
TOTAL TAX 10,896,641 8,766,429 5,301,251 67,610,734 67,751,421 94,263,064 9.01 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 20,314,907 14,049,748 7,545,833 82,846,749 73,339,835 94,263,064 6.33 
CITY OF BUFFALO 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 4,188,128,166 6,521,698,223 5,966,121,565 5,415,155,000 6,302,729,000 6,516,347,000 1.78 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 
(2015 $) 
7,808,042,452 10,452,171,324 8,492,213,473 6,635,455,095 6,822,603,883 6,516,347,000 (0.72) 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 5,141,330,918 7,459,336,867 5,243,098,308 5,604,591,000 6,722,274,000 6,905,105,000 1.19 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 
(2015 $) 
9,585,124,542 11,954,902,578 7,463,057,801 6,867,580,320 7,276,754,672 6,905,105,000 (1.30) 
TOTAL TAX 99,102,000 148,781,000 140,617,000 128,382,000 125,431,000 124,242,000 0.91 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 184,758,582 238,447,786 200,155,087 157,312,763 135,777,062 124,242,000 (1.57) 
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A.4 ST. PAUL: XCEL ENERGY ARENA  
Table 71. Xcel Energy Arena Rapid Notes. 
Arena Name Xcel Energy Arena 
Owner City of St. Paul 
Year Opened 1996 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $ 200,640,000  
Public Investment in Venue $ 146,467,200  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 73% 
Source: Judith Grant Long (2005) 
 
A.4.1 Land-Use Composition 
Figure 52.Percentage of land-use composition in the St. Paul arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
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Table 72. City of St. Paul arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015.
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
LAND 
USE 
LAND 
USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 16 12.70 10 10.64 10 8.47 11 9.91 8 7.08 9 7.76 (2.28) 
RENTER-OCCUPIED - - - - 2 20.00 2 18.18 1 12.50 2 22.22 - 
OWNER-OCCUPIED - - - - 7 70.00 8 72.73 7 87.50 6 66.67 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 62 49.21 48 51.06 35 29.66 25 22.52 30 26.55 29 25.00 (2.99) 
OFFICE - - - - 9 25.71 8 32.00 7 23.33 7 24.14 - 
RETAIL - - - - 8 22.86 8 32.00 12 40.00 9 31.03 - 
RESTAURANT - - - - 3 8.57 7 28.00 7 23.33 8 27.59 - 
HOTEL - - - - 2 5.71 2 8.00 2 6.67 2 6.90 - 
INDUSTRIAL 4 3.17 5 5.32 14 11.86 14 12.61 12 10.62 9 7.76 3.30 
EXEMPT 44 34.92 31 32.98 35 29.66 36 32.43 36 31.86 38 32.76 (0.58) 
PARKING - - - - 3 2.54 4 3.60 5 4.42 5 4.31 - 
VACANT - - - - 21 17.80 21 18.92 22 19.47 26 22.41 - 
MIXED-USE - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL 126 100.00 94 100.00 118 100.00 111 100.00 113 100.00 116 100.00 (0.33) 
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A.4.2 Built Volume 
Table 73. City of St. Paul arena-district micro-area built volume count, 2000-2015. 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL     49,560 0.97 100,993 1.18 27,348 0.30 152,671 1.72 7.79 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
    38,368 77.42 83,988 83.16 12,906 47.19 136,425 89.36 8.82 
OWNER-OCCUPIED     13,076 26.38 15,244 15.09 14,442 52.81 15,206 9.96 1.01 
TOTAL CONDOS     - - - - - - - -  
COMMERCIAL     3,828,201 74.55 3,617,232 42.11 3,877,321 42.71 3,736,679 42.04 (0.16) 
OFFICE     2,908,913 75.99 2,925,847 80.89 2,888,789 74.50 2,893,584 77.44 (0.04) 
RETAIL     73,924 1.93 103,778 2.87 258,055 6.66 69,346 1.86 (0.43) 
RESTAURANT     20,478 0.53 66,998 1.85 41,528 1.07 121,627 3.25 12.61 
HOTEL     187,622 4.90 290,305 8.03 290,305 7.49 290,305 7.77 2.95 
INDUSTRIAL     157,863 3.07 285,296 3.32 241,212 2.66 196,510 2.21 1.47 
EXEMPT     1,069,313 20.82 3,523,299 41.02 3,603,894 39.70 3,354,814 37.75 7.92 
PARKING     30,314 0.59 1,062,436 12.37 1,327,442 14.62 1,335,056 15.02 28.70 
VACANT     - - - - - - 111,988 1.26 - 
MIXED-USE     - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL     5,135,251 100.00 8,589,256 100.00 9,077,217 100.00 8,887,718 100.00 3.72 
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A.4.3 Assessed Value 
Figure 53. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of St. Paul, 1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015C
o
m
p
o
u
n
d
in
g
 r
at
e 
o
f 
ch
an
g
e
Compounding rate of change in assessed value in micro-area vs. city of St. Paul, 1990-2015
Micro Area, Assessed Value City of St. Paul, Assessed Value
0%
-11% 
2% 
-19% 
2% 
 400 
A.4.4 Property Tax 
Figure 54. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of St. Paul, 1990-2015. 
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Table 74. City of St. Paul arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015. 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
XCEL ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) - - 2,002,736 2,067,070 2,354,871 2,535,893 - 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) - - 5,348,143 8,789,551 9,114,977 8,887,718 - 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 175,931,800 159,427,000 378,093,800 758,646,320 886,549,900 783,450,700 6.16 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 319,402,105 250,058,538 512,498,255 905,432,776 814,112,328 783,450,700 3.65 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE       - 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
      - 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 175,931,800 159,427,000 378,093,800 758,646,320 886,549,900 783,450,700 6.16 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 319,402,105 250,058,538 512,498,255 905,845,707 814,112,328 783,450,700 3.65 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE       - 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
      - 
TOTAL TAX 2,091,580 1,920,521 9,981,156 5,716,780 8,274,732 9,022,384 6.02 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 3,797,239 3,486,683 13,529,249 6,826,001 7,598,626 9,022,384 3.52 
CITY OF ST. PAUL 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 210,167,927 179,934,654 172,563,457 202,575,538 266,352,654 234,362,892 0.44 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 381,557,389 282,224,445 233,906,165 241,881,067 290,052,012 234,362,892 (1.93) 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 7,848,000,214 7,864,569,652 9,169,403,301 19,629,226,000 21,509,656,800 18,530,456,300 3.50 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 14,247,951,696 12,335,443,748 12,428,934,808 23,437,865,102 23,423,529,431 18,530,456,300 1.06 
TOTAL TAX 71,308,686 83,489,564 82,769,002 61,138,759 86,060,440 99,614,529 1.35 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 129,460,077 130,951,961 112,191,655 73,001,451 93,717,871 99,614,529 (1.04) 
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A.5 DENVER “LODO” DISTRICT: PEPSI CENTER & COORS FIELD  
Table 75. “LODO” Pepsi Center and Coors Field Rapid Notes 
Arena Name 
Pepsi Center (NBA) 
Coors Field (MLB) 
Owner City of Denver 
Year Opened 1996 
Key Players/Organization City and County of Denver 
TIF District Downtown BID 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $ 285,000,000  
Public Investment in Venue $ 8,550,000  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 3% 
Source: Judith Grant Long (2005) 
 
A.5.1 Land-Use Composition 
Figure 55. Percentage of land-use composition in the Denver “LODO” arena-district 
micro-area, 1990-2015.  
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Table 76. City of Denver arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
1990-
2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
LAND 
USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 8 2.58 28 7.35 29 8.06 50 13.40 52 13.27 47 11.60 7.34 
RENTER-OCCUPIED 7 87.50 19 67.86 14 48.28 7 0.88 8 0.77 10 0.97 1.44 
OWNER-OCCUPIED - - 161 5.75 329 11.34 793 99.13 1,026 99.23 1,016 99.03 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL 76 24.52 102 26.77 109 30.28 119 31.90 141 35.97 132 32.59 2.23 
OFFICE 12 15.79 33 32.35 40 36.70 62 39.49 76 43.68 94 57.67 8.58 
RETAIL 24 31.58 22 21.57 18 16.51 27 17.20 26 14.94 18 11.04 (1.14) 
RESTAURANT 13 17.11 20 19.61 36 33.03 33 21.02 35 20.11 32 19.63 3.67 
HOTEL 2 2.63 2 1.96 - - - - - - 1 0.61 (2.73) 
INDUSTRIAL 102 32.90 78 20.47 62 17.22 27 7.24 26 6.63 41 10.12 (3.58) 
EXEMPT 53 17.10 96 25.20 100 27.78 83 22.25 86 21.94 98 24.20 2.49 
PARKING 1 0.32 2 0.52 4 1.11 23 6.17 28 7.14 10 2.47 9.65 
VACANT 62 20.00 64 16.80 47 13.06 61 16.35 51 13.01 65 16.05 0.19 
MIXED-USE 8 2.58 11 2.89 9 2.50 10 2.68 8 2.04 12 2.96 1.64 
TOTAL 310 100.00 381 100.00 360 100.00 373 100.00 392 100.00 405 100.00 1.07 
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A.5.2 Built Volume 
Table 77. City of Denver arena-district micro-area built volume count, 1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % Change 
RESIDENTIAL 49,504 0.01 503,051 12.23 552,122 8.79 2,066,594 35.83 2,393,850 32.51 2,117,745 33.24 16.21 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
49,504 100.00 157,842 31.38 65,437 11.85 681,939 33.00 921,137 38.48 625,894 29.55 10.68 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - 331,601 65.92 486,685 88.15 1,383,660 66.95 1,472,713 61.52 1,501,070 70.88 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - - -   - 
COMMERCIAL 1,902,142 28.48 1,276,079 31.01 2,737,548 43.57 2,091,610 36.26 2,849,890 38.70 2,312,942 36.30 0.79 
OFFICE 266,776 14.03 500,000 39.18 1,178,177 43.04 1,062,198 50.78 1,523,151 53.45 1,125,090 48.64 5.93 
RETAIL 750,662 39.46 456,725 35.79 430,391 15.72 859,390 41.09 904,656 31.74 246,340 10.65 (4.36) 
RESTAURANT 61,169 3.22 221,421 17.35 432,294 15.79 208,165 9.95 204,725 7.18 309,961 13.40 6.71 
HOTEL 60,571 3.18 51,770 4.06 - - - 0.00 - 0.00 98,469 4.26 1.96 
INDUSTRIAL 1,989,977 29.80 1,646,703 40.02 1,151,429 18.33 400,868 6.95 365,630 4.97 508,421 7.98 (5.31) 
EXEMPT 531,849 7.96 531,849 12.92 1,673,498 26.63 822,930 14.27 1,084,449 14.73 1,112,557 17.46 3.00 
PARKING 40,140 0.60 40,140 0.98 33,857 0.54 15,590 0.27 - - 71,253 1.12 2.32 
VACANT 392 0.01 38,220 0.93 90,180 1.44 - - - - - - (100.00) 
MIXED-USE 26,061 0.39 57,298 1.39 44,475 0.71 370,021 6.42 670,297 9.10 248,239 3.90 9.43 
TOTAL 6,678,683 100.00 4,114,911 100.00 6,283,109 100.00 5,767,613 1.00 7,364,116 100.00 6,371,157 100.00 (0.19) 
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A.5.3 Assessed Value 
Figure 56. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Denver, 1990-2015. 
 
Figure 57. Compounding rate of change in market values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Denver, 1990-2015. 
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A.5.4 Property Taxes 
Figure 58. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Denver, 1990-2015.  
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Table 78. City of Denver arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015. 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
LODO ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 12,225,365 100,550,744 15,473,026 15,910,071 15,560,807 16,688,142 1.25 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) 3,858,916 4,166,098 5,200,108 5,788,758 7,149,076 19,757,143 6.75 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 106,943,751 162,830,264 184,354,256 290,880,904 392,741,083 561,436,119 6.86 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 212,286,442 264,216,599 255,445,600 365,681,028 443,658,571 561,436,119 3.97 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE       - 
ASSESSED BUILDING + IMPROVEMENTS      - 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 192,487,558 250,445,230 730,602,108 1,225,539,404 1,889,443,573 2,810,510,400 11.32 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 382,093,375 406,385,062 1,012,339,491 1,540,687,279 2,134,403,230 2,810,510,400 8.31 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE 126,047,484 88,922,265 255,171,500 655,029,600 763,845,269 1,108,327,200 9.09 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING 
VALUE + IMPROVEMENTS 
79,587,015 161,706,364 478,498,392 - - 1,702,183,200 13.03 
TOTAL TAX 1,852,675 2,760,323 6,330,665 155,705,520 243,109,227 43,863,320 13.49 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 3,677,614 4,479,040 8,771,919 195,745,248 274,627,476 43,863,320 10.42 
CITY OF DENVER 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 4,661,000,000 4,321,000,000 6,492,000,000 8,943,168,000 11,960,084,000 14,384,910,000 4.61 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 9,252,219,934 7,011,472,549 8,995,468,129 10,623,578,240 13,510,666,468 14,384,910,000 1.78 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 22,140,000,000 25,797,000,000 40,422,000,000 65,842,159,000 83,581,295,000 100,203,607,000 6.23 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 43,948,540,943 41,859,513,387 56,009,675,404 78,213,819,493 94,417,313,434 100,203,607,000 3.35 
TOTAL TAX 61,398,000 53,643,000 61,087,000 212,778,000 295,381,000 349,176,000 7.20 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 121,876,807 87,043,838 84,643,586 252,758,724 333,676,099 349,176,000 4.30 
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A.6 PHOENIX: TALKING STICK ARENA  
Table 79. Talking Stick Arena Rapid Notes 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005. 
4.6.1 Land-Use Composition 
Figure 59. Percentage of land-use composition in the Phoenix arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
 
 
Arena Name Talking Stick Arena 
Owner City of Phoenix 
Year Opened 1992 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $ 176,700,000  
Public Investment in Venue $ 68,913,000  
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Table 80. City of Phoenix arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015. 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL 1 0.64 1 0.53 1 0.55 2 1.00 2 0.99 2 0.90 2.81 
RENTER-OCCUPIED - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OWNER-OCCUPIED - - 1 100.00 1 100.00 32 16.00 196 100.00 196 100.00 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - 31 - 196 - 196 - - 
COMMERCIAL 44 28.03 47 24.74 57 31.15 75 37.50 78 38.61 89 39.37 2.86 
OFFICE 4 9.09 3 6.38 3 5.26 3 4.00 7 8.97 9 1.03 3.30 
RETAIL 7 15.91 5 10.64 7 12.28 2 2.67 4 5.13 7 8.05 - 
RESTAURANT 2 4.55 3 6.38 6 10.53 10 13.33 10 12.82 6 6.90 4.49 
HOTEL 1 2.27 1 2.13 1 1.75 1 1.13 2 2.56 1 1.15 - 
INDUSTRIAL 43 27.39 41 21.58 27 14.75 21 10.50 19 9.41 15 6.79 (4.13) 
EXEMPT 34 21.66 46 24.21 53 28.96 72 3.60 77 38.12 86 38.91 3.78 
PARKING 7 4.46 26 13.68 25 13.66 24 12.00 19 9.41 22 9.95 4.69 
VACANT 28 17.83 29 15.26 18 9.84 4 2.00 5 2.48 7 3.17 (5.39) 
AGRICULTURAL - - - - 2 1.09 2.00 1.00 2 0.99 2 0.90 - 
TOTAL 157 100.00 190 100.00 183 100.00 200 100.00 202 100.00 221 100.00 1.38 
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A.6.2 Built Volume 
Table 81. City of Phoenix arena-district micro-area built volume count, 2000-2015. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000-2015 
 BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF BLDG SF 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % % Change 
RESIDENTIAL     - - - - 247,868 3.08 246,541 2.54 - 
RENTER-OCCUPIED     - - - - - - - - - 
OWNER-OCCUPIED     - - - - 247,868 100.00 246,541 100.00 - 
TOTAL CONDOS     - - - - - - - - - 
COMMERCIAL     301,040 8.77 314,008 7.17 342,211 4.25 521,032 5.36 3.72 
OFFICE     168,314 55.91 189,158 60.24 171,768 50.19 368,076 70.64 5.35 
RETAIL     65,553 21.78 4,138 1.32 5,498 1.61 5,498 1.06 (15.23) 
RESTAURANT     47,072 15.64 100,611 32.04 128,717 37.61 128,717 24.70 6.94 
HOTEL     10,180 3.38 10,180 3.24 10,180 2.97 10,180 1.95 - 
INDUSTRIAL     342,376 9.97 345,424 7.88 387,497 4.81 317,472 3.27 (0.50) 
EXEMPT     2,789,655 81.26 3,680,949 84.00 7,069,929 87.78 7,950,314 81.67 7.23 
PARKING     - - - - 6,298 0.08 678,095 6.98 - 
VACANT     - - 41,833 0.95 - - - - - 
AGRICULTURAL     - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL     3,433,071 100.00 4,382,214 100.00 8,053,803 100.00 9,713,454 100.00 7.18 
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A.6.3 Assessed Value 
Figure 60. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Phoenix, 1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
C
o
m
p
o
u
n
d
in
g
 r
at
e 
o
f 
ch
an
g
e
Compounding rate of change in assessed value in micro-area vs. city of Phoenix, 1990-
2015
Micro Area, Assessed Value City of Phoenix, Assessed Value
-15% -11% 
2% 
-6% 
-14% 
 412 
A.6.4 Property Tax 
Figure 61. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area vs. 
city of Phoenix, 1990-2015.  
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Table 82. City of Phoenix arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
TALKING STICK RESORT ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) - - 4,514,238 4,555,500 4,978,791 6,262,567 - 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) - - 3,433,071 4,382,214 8,053,803 9,713,454 - 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 69,136,553 33,094,284 85,169,236 120,678,454 346,636,205 302,740,362 6.09 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 88,507,923 42,366,971 107,739,925 142,651,293 375,345,905 302,740,362 5.04 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 26,674,786 14,406,972 11,896,796 10,096,999 127,517,864 33,387,774 0.90 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
42,067,292 18,754,789 73,272,440 110,581,455 219,118,341 269,352,588 7.71 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 214,564,757 180,082,854 498,625,696 731,042,150 1,817,657,725 1,897,624,944 9.11 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 274,683,656 230,540,269 630,766,433 864,117,754 1,968,202,900 1,897,624,944 8.04 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE 95,965,056 81,786,337 60,406,886 55,749,918 438,253,899 207,930,976 3.14 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING 
VALUE + IMPROVEMENTS 
118,641,671 98,296,517 438,113,915 675,292,232 1,379,403,826 1,689,693,968 11.21 
TOTAL TAX 980,615 994,742 575,205 739,761 2,292,264 1,233,596 0.92 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 1,255,373 1,273,459 736,372 874,455 2,482,118 1,233,596 (0.07) 
CITY OF PHOENIX 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 5,066,598,000 5,149,844,000 6,915,960,000 10,637,361,000 18,861,238,000 10,818,634,000 3.08 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 6,486,208,094 6,592,778,790 8,748,757,740 12,574,185,760 20,423,395,904 11,714,673,518 2.39 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 38,423,459,000 37,083,765,000 51,170,109,000 83,439,807,000 169,320,058,000 106,487,248,000 4.16 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 49,189,327,977 47,474,265,115 64,730,693,518 98,632,323,660 183,343,775,154 115,306,918,062 3.47 
TOTAL TAX 99,827,000 91,005,000 121,231,000 183,308,000 318,039,000 187,809,000 2.56 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 127,797,527 116,503,691 153,358,413 216,684,274 344,380,173 203,364,040 1.88 
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A.7 GLENDALE (AZ): GILA RIVER ARENA 
Table 83. Gila River Arena Rapid Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Judith Grant Long, 2005. 
 
A.7.1 Land-Use Composition 
Figure 62. Percentage of land-use composition in the Glendale (AZ) arena-district micro-area, 
1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
Arena Name Gila River Arena 
Owner City of Glendale (AZ) 
Year Opened 2001 
Total Cost of Venue (in 2018 $) $ 320,340,000  
Public Investment in Venue $ 262,678,800  
Public Share of Total Venue Cost 82% 
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Table 84. City of Glendale (AZ) arena-district micro-area land-use count, 1990-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
 LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE LAND USE 
LAND 
USE 
 COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % 
% 
CHANGE 
RESIDENTIAL - - - - - - - - 2 3.23 2 22.22 - 
RENTER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 1 0.94 1 0.94 - 
OWNER-
OCCUPIED 
- - - - - - - - 105 99.06 105 100.00 - 
TOTAL CONDOS - - - - - - - - 105 100.00 105 100.00 - 
COMMERCIAL 1 11.11 1 33.33 1 20.00 1 1.82 7 11.29 11 20.00 10.07 
OFFICE - - - - - - - - 38 88.37 38 88.37 - 
RETAIL - - - - - - - - - 0.00 1 2.33 - 
RESTAURANT - - - - - - - - 1 2.33 2 4.65 - 
HOTEL - - - - - - - - 2 4.65 2 4.65 - 
INDUSTRIAL - - - - 1 20.00 - - - - - - - 
EXEMPT - - - - - - 14 25.45 16 25.81 16 29.09 - 
PARKING - - - - - - 5 9.09 7 11.29 12 21.82 - 
VACANT - - - - - - 35 63.64 27 43.55 11 20.00 - 
AGRICULTURAL 8 88.89 2 66.67 3 60.00 4 7.27 3 4.84 3 5.45 (3.85) 
TOTAL 9 100.00 3 100.00 5 100.00 55 100.00 62 100.00 55 100.00 7.51 
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A.7.2 Assessed Value 
Figure 63. Compounding rate of change in assessed values in arena-district micro-area 
(Gila River Arena) vs. city of Glendale (AZ), 1990-2015.  
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A.7.3 Property Tax 
Figure 64. Compounding rate of change in property taxes in arena-district micro-area 
(Gila River Arena) vs. city of Glendale (AZ), 1990-2015.  
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Table 85. City of Glendale’s (Gila River Arena) arena-district micro-area assessment, market, and property tax values, 1990-
2015. 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990-2015 
GILA RIVER ARENA-DISTRICT MICRO-AREA 
LAND AREA (sf) 15,324,452 15,324,452 1,282,985 5,890,673 15,482,550 17,259,387 0.48 
BUILT AREA/VOLUME (sf) - - - - 258,082 173,185 - 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 72,940 88,033 375,493 25,144,535 175,569,700 167,801,397 36.29 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 93,377 112,699 475,002 29,722,791 190,111,036 167,801,397 34.95 
ASSESSED LAND VALUE 61,830 69,185 332,484 2,891,532 20,960,100 9,674,440 22.40 
ASSESSED BUILDING + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
11,110 18,848 43,009 22,253,003 154,046,186 158,126,957 46.60 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 470,608 563,631 1,018,357 155,569,417 1,060,239,767 1,030,508,795 36.02 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 602,468 721,555 1,288,232 183,895,117 1,148,052,769 1,030,508,795 34.69 
TOTAL MARKET LAND VALUE 393,758 444,024 645,183 16,338,204 112,659,818 57,234,021 22.04 
TOTAL MARKET BUILDING VALUE + 
IMPROVEMENTS 
76,850 119,607 373,174 139,231,213 947,579,949 973,274,774 45.92 
TOTAL TAX 8,320 9,732 19,682 181,456 5,987,559 5,556,507 29.71 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 10,652 12,459 24,897 6,483,471 6,483,471 5,556,507 28.44 
CITY OF GLENDALE, AZ 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE 570,654,000 525,267,000 787,692,000 1,269,568,000 2,130,907,000 1,408,099,000 3.68 
TOTAL ASSESSED VALUE (2015 $) 730,545,544 672,441,561 996,438,164 1,500,727,847 2,307,396,646 1,408,099,000 2.66 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE 3,937,166,000 4,321,468,000 6,526,885,000 11,296,734,000 20,635,557,000 12,452,875,000 4.71 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE (2015 $) 5,040,320,542 5,532,300,119 8,256,574,020 13,353,615,789 22,344,670,605 12,452,875,000 3.68 
TOTAL TAX 9,806,030 9,650,095 12,794,779 21,386,000 33,749,000 23,881,000 3.62 
TOTAL TAX (2015 $) 12,553,582 12,353,955 16,185,522 25,279,911 36,544,218 23,881,000 2.61 
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APPENDIX B. EXAMPLES OF LAND-USE COMPOSITION MAPS, 1990-2015 
 This appendix provides a sample of map examples of different arena-district micro-areas 
and the changes in their land-use composition. Examples are provided for Nashville, Cleveland, 
Dallas, Memphis, Miami, Oklahoma City, Denver, and Glendale (AZ). For each of the eight city 
examples, a context map with subsidiary land-use maps for 1990 and 2015 are provided. 
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B.1 NASHVILLE CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 65. Context map of Nashville and Davidson County including an inlay of Nashville’s 
arena-district micro-area. 
 
 
 421 
Figure 66. Nashville’s arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 and 
2015. 
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B.2 CLEVELAND CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 67. Context map of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County including an inlay of 
Cleveland’s arena-district micro-area. 
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Figure 68. Cleveland’s arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 and 
2015. 
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B.3 DALLAS CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 69. Context map of Dallas and Dallas County including an inlay of Dallas’ arena-
district micro-area. 
 
 425 
Figure 70. Dallas’ arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 and 2015. 
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B.4 MEMPHIS CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 71. Context map of Memphis and Shelby County including an inlay of Memphis’ 
arena-district micro-area. 
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Figure 72. Memphis’ arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 and 
2015. 
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B.5 MIAMI CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 73. Context map of Miami and Miami-Dade County including an inlay of Miami’s 
arena-district micro-area. 
 
 429 
Figure 74. Miami’s arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 and 2015. 
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B.6 OKLAHOMA CITY  CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 75. Context map of Oklahoma City and Oklahoma County including an inlay of 
Oklahoma City’s arena-district micro-area.
 
 431 
Figure 76. Oklahoma City’s arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 
and 2015. 
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B.7 DENVER CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 77. Context map of Denver and Denver County including an inlay of Denver’s 
arena-district micro-area. 
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Figure 78. Denver’s arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 and 2015. 
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B.8 GLENDALE (AZ) CONTEXT AND LAND-USE MAP 
Figure 79. Context map of Glendale (AZ) including an inlay of Glendale’s arena-district 
micro-area. 
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Figure 80. Glendale’s arena-district micro-area land-use composition map in 1990 and 
2015. 
 
